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ABSTRACT
In the 1980s Patrick McAuslan identified the three grundnorm ideologies of land use planning
namely: the ideology of Private Property; of the Public Interest and of Public Participation.
From at least ancient Roman times until very recently the ideology of private property governed
land use transactions. Whilst building regulation has a long historical tradition, formal land use
planning laws were not enacted until the early twentieth century. With the advent of such laws
the ideology of public interest dominated land use policy until the 1980s when it was challenged
by the neo-liberal movement. Since that time there has been an ideological power struggle
between the protagonists.

The guardians of the ideology of public interest have railed against the neo-liberal agenda to
‘devalue’ the institution of planning in seeking to reduce it to being a mere siphon for
development. The guardians of the ideology of private property, in turn, have disparaged calls
for greater state intervention questioning whether there is any case for government intervention
given that cities are such complex social systems. It seems that as society moves beyond the
neo-liberal paradigm in land use planning in search of a new explanatory theory to guide its way
the very notion of planning is being questioned. Yet, in this debate the function of public
participation has been largely ignored; it has been an island in the flux of power. The ideology
of public participation remains the untried path in land use planning.

In March 2011, the New South Wales opposition political party went to an election and won
government with a policy to reform the land use planning system pledging to empower the
people by returning ‘planning controls to local residents’ through their councils. Empowerment
is emblematic of democratic principles. But to implement democratic processes in land use
planning decision-making would require the government to depart from McAuslan’s ideology
of public interest and to embrace the ideology of public participation. It is argued in this
research that to change the status quo the government must overturn one hundred years of
planning law history. It requires the enactment of legislative mechanisms that elevate the voice
of the people to the status of power.

The purpose of this research is to consider the nature and role of public participation in the land
use planning system of NSW. The research undertakes a synoptic traverse of the historical
narrative relying on an array of secondary sources to understand the dynamic of participation in
the context of Patrick McAuslan’s land use planning ideologies. Presently, s5(c) of the
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) elevates participation to the status of
an objective of the Act; but the mechanism by which the objective is to be attained is absent in
the Act. By framing the thesis as a call to repeal the provision places the government’s dilemma
into sharp relief.

The conclusion of the research is that despite the call to reform the NSW land use planning
system creating an opportunity for planning to become more participatory and democratic, it is
unlikely that any reform will actually achieve that end. If that conclusion is correct, then s5(c)
should be repealed. If participation remains and objective of any new planning legislation
without an effective legislative mechanism it will only lead to a perpetuation of the confusion
and disarray that presently exists in the land use planning system.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

‘…it is the Government’s intention that town and country planning shall be democratic and that, under
skilled guidance, the people themselves shall join in the planning to the greatest extent possible. We will
not have planning imposed from above.’

Joe Cahill NSW Minister for Local Government
November 19451

Figure 1: Participation in Action?

1.1

Introduction

The election of a new government in New South Wales in 2011 heralds an era of change in the
NSW land use planning system. In his election victory speech on 26 March, 2011,2 the new
Premier of New South Wales, Barry O’Farrell, announced that his government would overhaul
the New South Wales planning system. The policy of the new government is to empower the
people by returning ‘planning controls to local residents’ through their councils.3 The policy
document proclaims a belief ‘that local decision-making delivers better outcomes for
communities.’4

1

The Minister was addressing the first meeting of the County of Cumberland Council – see Australian
Labor Party, Five Critical Years: Story of the McKell Labor Governmet in New South Wales, May 1941May 1946 (1946), 52.
2
http://media.smh.com.au/ofarrell-claims-vows-to-govern-2254399.html accessed on 27 March 2011.
3
NSW Liberals and Nationals, 'Putting the Community Back into Planning' (2009), 1. The policy
documents specifically says:
‘We believe that local residents – through councils – are best placed to make local planning
decisions affecting their suburbs. After all, it is local residents – not Macquarie Street planners –
who have to live with the results of these planning decisions.’
4
Ibid, 2.

1

When a government says that it will empower the people in the land use planning system what
does that mean? To empower people is suggestive of democratic processes. But in order to
implement democratic processes in land use planning it would require a government to depart
from McAuslan’s ideology of the public interest and to embrace the ideology of public
participation.5 This remains the untried path in land use planning even though ther have been
calls for it to be explored.6 Empowerment suggests real participation in decision-making
structures as opposed to tokenistic gestures. As American academic Sherry Arnstein famously
suggested ‘participation is a categorical term for citizen power.’7 To change the status quo
requires legislative mechanisms that elevate the voice of the people to the status of power.8
Referencing participatory mechanisms signals a move by government towards exploring the
‘third way’ approach to planning ideology.9 It is a significant change in strategy for the state.

The Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (NSW) 1979 (EP&A Act) is the principal
mechanism in the State of New South Wales by which land use planning is regulated. It
contains an express objective in section 5(c) namely ‘to provide increased opportunity for
public involvement and participation.’ The New South Wales Court of Appeal has recently
confirmed that it is ‘one of the principal objects of the Act.’10 It is argued here that unless there
is a meaningful role for public involvement and participation in the decision-making and
decision-review mechanisms in the EP&A Act, the object is otiose. The purpose of framing the
thesis question as a call to repeal the object is to bring into relief the on-going debate in
planning as to whether or not planning laws should be inclusive.11 Planning laws can be made

5

P McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980), 2.
Ibid, 269.
7
Sherry R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation' (1969) 35(4) Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 216, 216.
8
McAuslan, above n 5, 269. McAuslan saw the ideology of participation as the ‘ideology of opposition to
the status quo.’ He noted that ‘[o]nly by ending ideological conflict about the aims and ends of society
and government, will the law and administration of planning cease to present a picture of confusion and
disarray.’
9
Harry Smith, 'Place Identity and Participation' in Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity,
Participation and Planning (2005) 39, 49. As Smith notes:
‘The third way is different [to strong state welfarism and neo-liberal ideology]. Just as customers
do have power in markets and producers seek to manipulate their preferences, so in the public
arena participants also have power that politicians seek to mould and capitalize upon.
Participation can be a new channel for political action, bypassing clogged arteries of traditional
representative democracy. Participation can reconnect politicians and the public.’
10
Homeworld Ballina Pty Ltd v Ballina Shire Council [2010] NSWCA 65 [11].
11
It is recognised that social inclusion is a value laden concept. In Mike Geddes, 'International
Perspectives and Policy Issues' in Paul Smyth, T Reddel and Andrew Jones (eds), Community and Local
Governance in Australia (2005) , 22-4, Geddes suggests that the phrase ‘is, notoriously, a slippery
concept’ and that it is located within a ‘structuring and limiting neo-liberal context’ aligned with
‘corporate capital and power.’ McAuslan’s work was published in 1980 when the neo-liberal ideology
was emerging in planning. In that context, it is suggested that McAuslan’s ideology of public
participation presaged an emerging course for planning law to explore. In this research social inclusion is
6

2

to advance the public interest (as interpreted by the government of the day) or to advance the
cause of public participation; but they cannot do both at the same time. Which ideology is to
prevail is therefore of significance at a time when there are calls to overhaul the NSW planning
system.

This paper undertakes a synoptic traverse of the historical narrative to understand the dynamic
of participation in the context of Patrick McAuslan’s land use planning ideologies.12 If as a
matter of public policy, the extent of participation in the ‘new’ planning system is to change,
then it is suggested that the government should clearly signal the ideology which it believes
should underpin the future planning policy. If the new strategy is to accord with McAuslan’s
ideology of public participation, then the government will have to overturn one hundred years of
planning law history. Could that really be the government’s intent?

1.2

Aim of the Research

Since McAuslan formulated the ideology of public participation in 1980 there has been a dearth
of research into whether or not it could be adopted as public policy. For decades the NSW
government has created the illusion of participation by retaining an express reference to
participation in the objects clause of the EP&A Act. Yet, successive reforms to the Act since its
enactment in 1979 have diluted the original legislative intention such that the objective is now
meaningless. In December 2009 the standing committee of the NSW Legislative Council on
State Development (the Standing Committee), published a report on the New South Wales
Planning Framework (the Standing Committee report).13 The report included the following
recommendation:

used in the context of citizenship as theorised by A Bora and H Hausendorf, 'Participatory science
governance revisited: normative expectations versus empirical evidence' (2006) 33(7) Science and Public
Policy 478. They view citizenship as being relational concept, as ‘a mode of social inclusion.’
Semantically, legislation can tend to be either socially inclusive or it can be socially exclusive. As Bora
and Hausendorf note (at 482):
‘If citizenship is to acquire real social relevance, rather than remaining an inanimate husk
depending solely on formal rights of participation, it has to prove itself in terms of social
positions emerging in the course of the participation process.
12
McAuslan, above n 5, 2.
13
Standing Committee on State Development, 'Report 34: New South Wales Planning Framework' (NSW
Legislative Council December 2009) (Standing Committee Report), 34. The report, commissioned by the
then Minister for Planning Mr Sartor MP shortly prior to his leaving the planning portfolio in June 2008,
included terms of reference to examine ‘the need, if any, for further development of the New South Wales
planning legislation over the next five years, and the principles that should guide such development.’ The

3

‘If the EP&A Act is subjected to fundamental review then it should be the case that the
objects honestly reflect the purpose of the legislative outcome of that review. Just as the
legislation needs to support the intent of the planning system; so do the objects need to
reflect how the legislation will provide that support.’14

The new state government seeks to return planning power to the people through local councils;
but a review of history suggests that local government structures evince a non-participatory
tradition. To introduce a policy of inclusion in land use planning decision-making will therefore
necessitate the creation of specific legislative mechanisms in the reform Act. By telegraphing in
this research the repeal of section 5(c) the essence of the government’s dilemma is placed into
sharp focus.15 Objects provisions are meant to have legal force.16 If the new planning system is
to incorporate participatory mechanisms, then the government will need to do more than just
pay lip service to the ideal of participation. Empowerment suggests a legislative right to do
more than just make a submission. As Arnstein postulated in the 1960s, the people in the
neighbourhood do not want to be ‘planned for.’17 If the government is offering to empower the
people, then it must be prepared to cede control over planning processes to the citizens.

Committee recognised that in its examination of the planning system, the issues raised ‘included whether
the current objects, some of which date back to the inception of the EP&A Act, are still valid; the need to
prioritise the objects; and the inclusion of objects more relevant to today’s needs and goals.’ The new
government has commenced the review process – see The Hon Brad Hazzard MP, Minister for Planning
& Infrastructure, 'Overhaul of the Planning System Heralds a new era in NSW' (Media Release, 12 July
2011).
14
Ibid, 36.
15
Adopting a utilitarian approach, the thesis of this research calls for the champion of participation to
come forth. As Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (1776), xv, observed:
‘For if the institution is in truth a beneficial one to the community in general, it cannot but have
given an interest in its preservation to a number of individuals. By their industry, then, the
reasons on which it is grounded are brought to light:’
16
As a matter of law, objects clauses are interpreted to have effect. See Woollahra MC v Minister for the
Environment (1991) 23 NSWLR 710. And see also J. Rohde, 'The objects clause in environmental
legislation; the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (QLD) exemplified' (1995) 12 Environmental and
Planning Law Journal , 80. Rhode argues (at 80-81) that because objects clauses are contained in
legislation, they have ‘the status of a clause of paramount force. … As a result, all other powers conferred
under the Act are subject to the primacy of the objects clause …’ The observation can be made however
that in order for the object to have ‘some work to do’ there must be other machinery provisions in the Act
to call in aid.
17
Arnstein, above n 7, 221.

4

1.2.1

Planning Ideologies

Patrick McAuslan’s ideologies of planning will frame the analytical reference. These ideologies
are the ideology of private property; the ideology of the public interest; and the ideology of
public participation.18 What McAuslan did not do was locate these ideologies within their
historical context. Over the course of history, state control over decisions affecting urban
planning has ‘waxed and waned.’19 It will be seen from the historical analysis in chapters 3 and
4 that the ideology of private property held sway for centuries due to the fact that ownership of
land was tightly held in the hands of the ruling elite. The ideology of public interest has only
been dominant during the later stages of the era of nation-states. This coincides with a period
when land has been more generally held in private hands.

Since the 1980s there has been a reaction to the dominance of the ideology of the public interest
by those professing a preference for market mechanisms, particularly sourced to the ideas of
Friedrich Hayek (of the Austrian School of Economics).20 The Austrian school advocates a
return to the ideology of private property as the dominant mechanism for determining land use
planning decisions. Gleeson and Low view this development as ‘the subjugation of politics to
economics.’21 Whilst the neo-liberal renaissance in land use planning is in the ascendancy, it is
argued here that the tide of history is against a return fully to the ideology of private property.22

Competing within this ideological space have been the advocates of a ‘third way’ raised by
Smith.23 Such scholars espouse ideas associated with Jurgen Habermas and Charles Lindblom.24

18

McAuslan above n 5, 2.
Christopher Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai, Property Rights, planning and markets: managing
spontaneous cities (2003), 2: ‘Historically, the degree of state control has waxed and waned, influenced
by economic prosperity, internal and external political conditions and by beliefs and values’
20
Mark Pennington, ‘Citizen Participation, the ‘Knowledge Problem’ and Urban Land Use Planning’
(2004) Review of Austrian Economics, 217.
21
B. Gleeson and N. Low, 'Revaluing planning: Rolling back Neo-liberalism in Australia' (2000) 53
Progress in Planning 83, 97.
22
This is not to say that it could not happen. As Mark Pennington, 'Hayekian Political Economy and the
Limits of Deliberative Democracy' (2003) 51(4) Political Studies 722, 729, notes, its allure lies in the
efficiency of the market:
‘Under conditions of complexity, where millions of individual decisions must be coordinated
with one another, it would be impossible for deliberative committees to comprehend the nature
of the interrelationships between all relevant actors.’ … In markets, … [t]he price system, albeit
imperfectly, transmits knowledge in a compact form which represents the complex interrelated
decisions of many dispersed actors.’
Accordingly, it is not impossible for the people to elect to return to a completely market driven paradigm.
However, to do so it would be first necessary for that policy position to be put forward by a government
or political party as a choice so that a mandate for that policy could be sought.
23
Smith, above n 9, 49:
19

5

In its urban context land use planning is about the space called the neighbourhood, but viewed
as part of a wider region territorially defined by rules of governance.25 Adopting a place based
theory of planning, Hague and Jenkins argue that urban planning is ‘a set of institutions, ideas
and practices that sits within a social context and is embedded in power relations.’26 The
ideology of public participation, as framed by McAuslan, is within this ideological stream in
that it stands for greater participatory mechanisms as an alternative to private property (price)
mechanisms.
As society moves into what Bobbitt styles ‘Market-States’,27 a new planning paradigm may be
necessary. Whether that will result in a move away from the prevailing ideology of the public
interest and towards the ideology of public participation is the moot point. McAuslan
recognised in 1980 that the ideology of public participation lacked a ‘constituency.’28 The
ideology remains the untried path awaiting exploration by government.

‘The third way is different. Just as customers do have power in markets and producers seek to
manipulate their preferences, so in the public arena participants also have power that politicians
will seek to mould and capitalise on. Participation can be a new channel for political action,
bypassing the clogged arteries of traditional representative democracy. Participation can
reconnect politicians and the public…’
24
See in this regard the works of Gray: Beyond the New Right (1993) and Giddens: The Third Way
(1998).
25
Admittedly, it is an imprecise term for an artificial construct. It is here applied in the sense of the
locality in which the people live. It is a place in transition, it has always been. As Sugerman J observed in
Mitchell v Sydney City Council (1956) 2 LGRA 152, 157, neighbourhood and the ‘amenity of the
neighbourhood’ are ‘relative, and flexible concepts giving rise, in the widely varying contexts and
circumstances in which they have to be applied, to many difficulties of application.’ Sophie BodyGendrot, The Social Control of Cities? A comparative perspective (2000), xxviii, suggests that
neighbourhood ‘is a social construct that plays a role in its own formulation, articulation and
disarticulation.’ Fran Tonkiss, Space, the City and Social Theory (2005), 73, discusses the modern
problem of the privatisation of public spaces such as neighbourhood. He describes the tendency by which
the ‘meaning and the contours of space are redrawn’ … ‘what passes as public space increasingly is an
addendum to private development – the atrium, piazza or porte cochére of international corporate style
which stands as vacant temples to an urban cult of privacy.’ To market theorists, the neighbourhood could
be said to be the ‘geography of economic location’ see - Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier:
Gentrification and the revanchist city (1996), 58.
26
Hague and Jenkins, above n 6, 8. Hague and Jenkins see planning as being ‘about place-making.’
27
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), 228. Bobbitt
suggests that a new constitutional arrangement is emerging which he describes as the Market-State.
Bobbitt sees the period of the twentieth century as involving a struggle ‘over a single set of constitutional
issues which were unresolved until the end of the Cold War.’ He describes this period as the ‘Long War,’
which begins with the First World War and ends with the Treaty of Paris of 1990. In the aftermath of that
struggle, the constitutional arrangements we know as Nation-States began to undergo structural change
and ‘market-states’ emerged. Bobbitt defines a market-state as follows:
‘The market-state is a constitutional adaptation to the end of the Long War and to the revolutions
in computation, communications, and weapons of mass destruction that brought about that end.
… Its political institutions are less representative (though in some ways more democratic) than
those of the nation-states. … Where as the nation-state justified itself as an instrument to serve
the welfare of the people (the nation), the market-state exists to maximise the opportunities
enjoyed by all members of society.’
28
McAuslan, above n 5, 5.

6

Yet, for participation to be effective it needs to be dynamic.29 As Saul reminds us: ‘if democracy
fails, then it is ultimately the citizen who has failed, not the politician.’30 The people of New
South Wales do not have a long tradition of active participation in governance. From the outset,
the people refused to take responsibility for local government.31 Halligan and Paris theorise that
a ratepayer ideology emerged in the people of New South Wales in the early years of
settlement.32 It negated civic involvement in local governance. This ideology, rooted in
McAuslan’s ideology of private property, remains a pervasive force working against
participation in local governance in New South Wales.33

The aim of this research is to show how closely land use planning law is related to politics and
power.34 Gleeson and Low suggest that it is arguable that planning is ‘a servant of power.’35 The

29

Erhard Berner, 'The metropolitan dilemma: global society, localities and the struggle for urban land in
Manila' in Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland (eds), Space, Culture and Power: New identities in globalizing
cities (1997) , 108. Berner suggests that: ‘The necessary basis for the “sense of belonging to the city” is a
sense of belonging to a place, namely the locality.’
30
John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (1997), 82. Saul goes on to say: ‘The politician can
always find a new place in a new configuration of power – witness the growing attachment of the elected
to private sector interests.’
31
Andrew Kelly, The role of local government in the conservation of biodiversity (Ph. D. Thesis,
University of Wollongong, 2004), 73-75. Kelly describes the ‘antagonism’ of the people to submit to
property taxation (and therefore municipalisation) as being ‘a direct result of the community’s historical
reliance on the central government for all services.’ People of property resisted paying tax because they
had already benefited from facilities provided without cost by the government. As the early forms of
voluntary incorporation excluded from the franchise those who did not have property, there was no
incentive for the people generally to participate in local governance.
32
John Halligan and Chris Paris, 'The Politics of Local Government' in John Halligan and Chris Paris
(eds), Australian Urban Politics (1984) 58, 61; ‘[t]his ideology derived from the legacy of property
franchises and the centrality of property to municipal affairs. … The effect of this ideology was to limit
the number of people who could formally participate and also the content of local politics.’ Kelly above n
31, 72-74 concurs, suggesting that what began as antagonism to property taxation in the 1830s,
crystallised into a social ethos. The ‘community’s historical reliance on the central government for all
services’ and the government’s provision of infrastructure and services fuelled an antipathy to
participation in local government structures. See also FA Larcombe, The Origin of Local Government in
New South Wales 1831-58 (1973), 54. Larcombe attributes the ‘trenchant’ opposition to land taxation,
first manifested in the resistance of the community to system set up under the Public Roads Act of 1840,
as the origin of public hostility to civic participation in the funding of infrastructure for the colony. The
historical study in chapter 5 identifies that the ratepayer ideology continues to be manifested today.
33
James Gray Pope, 'Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order' (1990) 139(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 289, 304. Whilst written in
the context of the United States, the sentiment expressed demonstrates the point:
‘Most of the citizenry most of the time is simply too apathetic, ignorant of public issues, and
selfish to engage in political activity. A serious attempt to eliminate these obstacles would
require a system of “coercive democracy,” which would force citizens to pay attention, for
example, by compelling them to send an hour or two each day discussing public issues. Since the
coercive cure is worse than the liberal pluralist disease, the normal operation of politics must be
conceded to interest group representation – albeit bounded by civic-minded judicial review.’
34
McAuslan, above n 5, 268:
‘It is quite simply a question of political power, against which the theories of planners, however
noble in intent, are quite irrelevant. The law and administration of planning is operated,
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NSW land use planning system draws heavily on its UK heritage, both in the context of its
legislative framework and in the context of the model for public participation. If the EP&A Act
excludes civic participation from the decision-making processes, the antecedents for this can be
traced to the historical roots of planning law. If planning law is to become participatory, then it
will need to become democratic.

1.2.2

Participation and Democratic Theory

Bates describes the advent of planning laws as a ‘great social revolution.’36 Planning laws were
spawned out of the industrial revolution in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The social changes of this period have their genesis in the political revolution of the seventeenth
century in England when the people rose up to take sovereign power over their governance after
a long history of struggle. It was a struggle against tyranny. Tyranny results when a government
exercises power without consent.

It was Hobbes who postulated a theory of civil society under the dominion of a forceful
sovereign. As Uhr reformulated the concept, this civil society would function through ‘the
accommodation of competing self-interests, regulated into peace and security by the forceful
sovereign’.37 Locke softened the impact of Hobbes’ position by postulating the concept of
popular sovereignty in which ‘legitimate government rests on the consent and not simply fear of
the governed’.38 Stein argues that under Locke’s conceptualisation of civil society, its purpose
was to protect property rights which ‘precede government and are inviolable’.39 Yet, in the
history of the development of land use planning law, these property rights were interfered with
regularly by a forceful sovereign, exercising coercive legislative power for the common good.40

explained, interpreted, manipulated and occasionally reformed by judges, senior legal
practitioners, public servants both central and local, well established professions such as
chartered surveyors, land agents and valuers, Ministers and leading local councillors, and
planners.’
35
Gleeson and Low, above n 21, 102.
36
Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (7th ed, 2010), 8: ‘The environmental movement [hardly
four decades old] must therefore rank as one of the great social revolutions of history.’
37
J. Uhr, Deliberative democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (1998), 23, 44.
38
Ibid.
39
L. Stein, Principles of Planning Law (2008), 6.
40
Ibid. Stein cites Ambler v Village of Euclid (1926) 272 U.S. 365 where the US Supreme Court
determined that planning law was ‘a proper regulatory subject for the good of the community, whereby
the state can modify rights associated with the free and unfettered use of one’s land.’
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John Keane’s theory of monitory democracy has recently located the historical development of
public participation in democratic governance.41 There is a direct correlation between the use of
law as an instrument of power and the struggle of the people to participate: to wrest power from
the governing elite. Understanding the history of this struggle for democratic participation
explains why, as land became more generally owned in Britain, there was interest by
government in using the law to retain control over the development of land. This interest was
fostered by the new ‘town planning professionals.’42 It culminated in the enactment of the
Housing Town Planning etc Act 1909 (UK). As is discussed in chapter 4, by legislation the
state, and not the people, defined ‘the public interest’ in land use planning decision-making. In
this system, participation was at the discretion of another powerful institution, the
administrator/bureaucrat.

When introducing the first solid planning regime into NSW sixty years ago, the State of New
South Wales suggested that planning would be democratic.43 Yet this did not occur. Thirty years

41

J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (2009), xxvii. ‘[T]he emerging historical form of
“monitory” democracy is a “post-Westminster” form of democracy in which power-monitoring and
power controlling devices have begun to extend sideways and downwards through the whole political
order.’ Monitory democracy is differentiated from other forms of democracy (at 737) as follows:
‘assembly based democracy belonged to an era dominated by the spoken word, backed up by
laws written on papyrus and stone, and by messages despatched by foot, or by donkey and horse.
Representative democracy sprang up in the era of print culture – the book, pamphlet and
newspaper, and telegraphed and mailed messages – and fell into crisis during the advent of early
mass communication media, especially radio and cinema and (in its infancy) television. By
contrast, monitory democracy is tied closely to the growth of multi-media-saturated societies –
societies whose structures of power are continuously “bitten” by monitory institutions operating
within a galaxy of media defined by the ethos of communicative abundance.’
Keane’s conclusion is supported by John Wiseman, 'Designing Public Policy after Neo-liberalism?' in
Paul Smyth, T Reddel and Andrew Jones (eds), Community and Local Governance in Australia (2005) ,
59. Wiseman notes that:
‘[t]hese expectations [that the government must play a significant role] have been reinforced by
the increasing transparency and rapid circulation of information about the actions of government.
This has provided individuals and organisations with more detailed understandings of the
consequences of policy choices and increased expectations that the government can and should
be accountable for their actions. At the same time there has been a widely documented fall in the
levels of trust that citizens express in governments of all political persuasions (Pharr and Putnam
2000).’
42
Andrew Kelly and Christopher Smith, 'The Capriciousness of Australian Planning Law: Zoning
Objectives in NSW as a Case Study' (2008) 26(1) Urban Policy and Research 83, 84. As Kelly and Smith
note, the ‘garden city movement’ which coalesced around the ideas of Ebenezer Howard in the last
decade of the nineteenth century was instrumental in ‘fostering a new profession that lobbied,
successfully, for legislative institutionalisation of town planning’, and for the creation of the first town
planning legislation which ‘empowered local authorities to formulate planning schemes for areas in the
course of development.’
43
See Minister Cahill’s comments above n 1. As is discussed in Chapter 5, the minister was not in fact
advocating participatory democracy. The clue is in the reference to ‘skilled guidance.’ The McKell
Government was intent on undertaking ‘master planning’ for the State of NSW to redress the failures of
private enterprise and past governments. As the ALP notes (at 6), the McKell Government desired that:
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later, the state adopted a new strategy when enacting the EP&A Act. Instead of democracy, the
public was offered the prospect of increased ‘involvement and participation’ in planning
decision-making.44 Once again the people were to be disappointed. The people of New South
Wales are still not participants in the NSW planning system.
In her seminal work: A Ladder of Citizen Participation,45 Sherry Arnstein identified a typology
of eight levels of citizen participation in land use planning which she described as the ladder of
participation (Fig 2 below). At the lowest levels, that of Manipulation and Therapy, the
government promotes participation ‘to educate or cure the participants.’ In the middle rungs,
Placation, Consultation and Informing, participation exhibits degrees of tokenism, with no real
power in the citizens to influence the outcome. At the highest level, that of citizen control and
delegated power, the citizens ‘obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial
power.’46

‘all future development of the State of New South Wales – should be “intelligent” rather than
haphazard; in other words, it should be carried through on the basis of scientific planning.’
44
The phrase used in section 5(c) of the EP&A Act.
45
Arnstein, above n 7.
46
Ibid 217. Arnstein acknowledges that the typology is simplistic and that in reality there may be many
more rungs in the ladder, but the point of the classification is to show that to be meaningful, citizens must
have ‘enough power to make the target institutions responsive to their views, aspirations and needs.’
Arnstein’s typology has been refined by the International Association for Public Participation as the
‘Spectrum of Public Participation.’ see EDO, 'The State of Planning in NSW: With reference to social and
environmental impacts and public participation' (Environment Defender's Office, 2010) (EDO 2010
Report), 38. There are five rungs in this reformulation: Inform; Consult; Involve; Collaborate; and
Empower. Power only occurs in the final two levels. At Collaboration, there is partnership with the
community; at Empowerment, the final decision is in the hands of the public.
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Figure 2: Arnstein’s Ladder

If citizens are to be empowered in the planning process, then theoretically power should be
vested in the people either directly or through their democratically elected local councils.47 In
that way, the participation of the public in the plan-making and decision-making phases of the
planning process would approach Arnstein’s higher rungs of participation where there exists
‘degrees of citizen power.’48 Presently, the EP&A Act does not confer power on the people. The
local planning instrument is made by the minister, not the elected council. Decisions on whether
or not development should occur in the locality are now generally not determined by the
council.49 What exists, in empirical terms, is a socially exclusive system. Participation remains
at the placation rung or below on Arnstein’s ladder.50 The people lack the power to impact on
the deliberations of the decision-maker so as to affect the outcome.51
47

The comments in AJ Brown and HM Sherrard, Town and Country Planning (1959), 8 remain apposite:
‘Today the impelling force [in planning] must be the community itself, whose welfare is at stake.
Social betterment has become one of our primary political objectives.’
For Brown and Sherrard, the meeting of the needs of the people was best met ‘through their democratic
representative institutions.’
48
Arnstein above n 7, 217.
49
The pending repeal of Part 3A effected by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment
(Part 3A Repeal) Act 2011 (NSW) does not mean that all planning decisions have been returned to the
local council. As is discussed in chapter 2, the current rationale of the planning system is to facilitate
approvals via the Exempt and Complying development Codes.
50
Arnstein, above n 7, 220. That is, ‘citizens may realize that they have extensively “participated” but
have not profited beyond the extent the powerholders decide to placate them.’
51
See Tonkiss, above n 25, 59. Tonkiss argues that:
‘Politics, like other social relations, unfolds in space. To think about politics and power is nearly
always to invoke a set of spatial relations. … Urban spaces, that is, provide sites for political
action and are themselves politicized in contests over access, control and representation.’
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1.3

Theoretical Framework

Broadly, the thesis of this research engages the theoretical debate about the changing nature of
the role of the state in a global market and the direction of social policy in a post neo-liberal
world. Within that debate is the discourse about the role of social inclusion in governance. It
addresses philosophical questions about the nature of democracy. Conceptually, the thesis
grapples with the question of power in the planning system. Citizenship per se does not connote
power.52 It is the state that has power.53 It is responsible for creating the ‘legal environment.’54
Having the right to vote in an election once every four years is not participation in land use
decision-making. At the level of the neighbourhood, land use decisions have a direct and long
lasting impact.55 If the NSW land use planning system is to change, then the question of who
should have the power to control land use policy at the level of the neighbourhood becomes a
relevant question. Should it be the government, the market or the people?

In essence, the thesis addresses the question relevant to any reform of the New South Wales
planning system namely: should planning be democratic?56 Up to now it has not been.57 Under

52

Pope, above n 33, 293:
‘According to Webber, power is “the possibility of imposing one’s will upon the behaviour of
other persons.” Power may be, but need not be, exercised through economic or physical
coercion. The “power of persuasion” is also, as the phrase indicates, a form of power.’
53
Bobbitt, above n 27, 216. As Bobbitt explains:
‘[The State] came into being in order to establish a monopoly on domestic violence, which is a
necessary condition for law, and to protect its jurisdiction from foreign violence, which is the
basis for strategy. If the State is unable to deliver on these promises, it will be changed; if the
reason it cannot deliver is rooted in its constitutional form, then that form will change. A State
that could neither protect its citizens from crime nor protect its homeland from attack by other
states would have ceased to fulfil its most basic reason for being.’
54
Webster and Lai, above n 19, 70, according to market theory:
‘As the monopoly supplier of violence, the state has a fundamental role in creating a legal
environment for market-based exchange and economic growth. At the minimum this includes
making rules and sanctions that confer on individuals a) the secure right to exclusive use of
private property, b) the rights to derive income from property and c) the right to trade (alienate)
property.’
55
Robert Freestone, Urban Nation: Australia's Planning Heritage (2010), 63 notes:
‘The neighbourhood unit is inseparable from the rise of modern urban planning and design, its
ongoing evolution connecting with enduring themes such as social welfare, efficiency, public
participation, and sense of space.’
56
In doing so, it is recognised that there is a strong counter argument, well put by Elizabeth Farrelly, 'Our
cities reveal the ugly side of democracy', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 6-7 Oct 2007, 26. Farrelly
argues that:
‘Democracy makes effective planning impossible. … The solution, as with so many cultural
difficulties, lies in our preparedness to rise above narrow self-interest and become involved in
culture-making at a broader, more communal, more altruistic level.’
Either Farrelly is calling for a benevolent dictator or perhaps she is making a call for the people to
become more engaged in the political, not planning process?
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both of McAuslan’s ideologies of private property and of the public interest, there is no inherent
right in the people to participate in the processes of land use planning. Neither the ideology of
private property, nor the ideology of the public interest is democratic in their intent. Only the
ideology of public participation has that prospect. Participation is, fundamentally, an action that
requires a deliberate intention to engage with the processes of governance.

Insofar as Yiftachel suggests that planning can be categorised by reference to analytical,
procedural and substantive debates,58 the research in this work is located within the procedural
debate. It examines the evolution of decision-making procedures in the context of civic
participation in planning policy and decision-making.59 The rhetoric of the EP&A Act is
considered in the context of its practical application to the social task of participation, identified
by reference to the objects of the Act.

Because of the focus on participation, the research does not engage the analytical debate
directed to the question of what type of urban planning is best for NSW. Similarly, the
substantive debate about the impact of development authorised by the procedures created under
the Act is not examined. It is assumed that the relevant context for the consideration of the
limitations to participation is through an examination of effectiveness of participation by the
citizenry is the legal frame of reference, principally the EP&A Act. In that context, the law
referred to in this research is current to 26 March, 2011.60

57

Brown and Sherrard, above n 47, 196. Brown and Sherrard suggested, as early as the 1950s, that if we
were to judge democratic systems by their results, then ‘the chaotic conditions in our towns is the result’
of too much ‘rugged individualism.’ They argued that ‘[i]n place of a discipline imposed from above by a
despot or a bureaucrat, the individual must be prepared to discipline himself and to subscribe to behaviour
which is for the common good rather than for his selfish ends.’ Demographer Bernard Salt recently
suggested that individualism continues to curse society today – see Bernard Salt, 'It's all about me: the rise
and rise of individualism', The Australian (Sydney), 2011, 33. He suggests that in contrast to past
generations, today we expect the world to revolve around ‘us’. More particularly:
‘Not so much us as "me", to be precise. Frankly, I'm not that much interested in you; I'm far
more interested in me. And that's the transition in thinking that has taken place over the past 30
years. The first half of the 20th century was inhabited by a strange race which, get this, valued
bizarre concepts such as sacrifice and "going without". They saw virtue in subjugating
individuality in order to serve a higher cause.’
58
Oren Yiftachel, ‘Towards a New Typology of Urban Planning Theories’, (1989) 16 Environment and
Planning B: Planning and Design, 23-39. The procedural debate relates to the question: what is a good
planning process?
59
Andreas Faludi, Planning Theory (1973), 5. Faludi suggests that ‘procedural rather than substantive
theory should be regarded as planning proper.’
60
This is the date of the 2011 NSW state election at which the Liberal National Party coalition received a
record electoral swing to it in the order of 16% resulting in the loss of 32 seats for the sitting Labor Party.
The election result gave the incoming government the ‘largest majority in NSW political history’
according to Antony Green, the ABC election analyst see: http://blogs.abc.net.au/antonygreen/ accessed 1
April 2011. The only amendment to the EP&A Act since the election was the repeal of Part 3A. Whilst
assented to on 27 June, 2011, it is yet to come into force.
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Having regard to the potential scope of inquiry, space dictates selectivity. For the purpose of
examining the historical continuum, the research focuses specifically on the development of
land use planning laws in the UK and New South Wales. The examination of planning in other
jurisdictions is a matter left for later research.61 In order to appreciate the social context in which
the thesis question is located, reference is made to social commentary, including newspaper
articles. The views expressed in such publications reflect contemporary views on topical matters
of relevance to the community in the context of land use planning policy and decision-making.

Arnstein’s work informs the examination of the nature of public participation in land use
planning processes and governance generally. Bora and Hausendorf’s analytical work on the
theoretical approach to the semantics of citizenship forms the basis for an empirical analysis in
chapter 5 of the legislative procedures in the EP&A Act.62 Understanding the reason for
dissonance between the administrator and citizen roles established by the procedures mandated
by the Act helps to explain why members of the public resort to extrajudicial and political
mechanisms to alter the outcome of decisions taken within the planning system.63 It also
explains the highly emotional position adopted by members of the community opposed to
certain state policies and development approvals who consider that they have no voice in the
processes.64

61

In saying this, it is recognized that the analysis, research and conclusions will have general relevance in
that the principles examined in this research are common and apply to other jurisdictions in both Australia
and elsewhere.
62
Bora & Hausendorf, above n 11, 480. Bora and Hausendorf adopt as their ‘programmatic keyword’ for
the analysis of the language of participation the concept described by them as ‘communicating
citizenship. Under their theoretical model, the degree of social inclusion can be assessed through an
analysis of the social positions as observed in participatory decision-making procedures.
63
McAuslan, above n 5, 6. McAuslan argues that it is the conflict of the ideologies (as identified by him)
that is ‘one of the causes of the general disarray in, and disillusion with, the planning system.’ At 11,
McAuslan identifies that by increasing the expectations for participation, but by failing to ‘adapt the law’
[this]… ‘adds fuel to the flames of disillusionment and frustration with the planning system.’ It is a
commentary relevant today, having regard to the evidence before the Standing Committee.
64
Pending the publication of the Standing Committee report in 2009, the EDO published a discussion
paper ‘Planning in New South Wales: Reconnecting the Community with the Planning System.’
Throughout November 2009, the EDO conducted six workshops in Sydney and five regional locations
(Wollongong, Newcastle, Moruya, Ballina and Coffs Harbour). In August 2010 the EDO published its
report, above n 46. The main conclusion of the report (at 3) was that ‘the community generally feels
disconnected with the planning process, deeply cynical about whether it is worthwhile to engage, and
extremely frustrated about the current system.’
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1.4

Structure of the Research

By reason of the focus on McAuslan’s ideologies, the work does not undertake empirical
research. Rather, in a synoptic fashion, it examines the nature of public participation in land use
planning by taking a long view of history relying on an array of secondary sources. Through this
method, the paper undertakes a critical historical examination of the evolution of public
participation in political discourse, firstly in England and then in the colony of New South
Wales. In this way the paper seeks to present an original view in the current debate about the
theoretical role of participation in land use planning. The analysis confirms that the ideology of
public participation is yet to find expression in legislation in either Britain or New South Wales.

Chapter 2 sets the framework of the discussion in its land use planning context and introduces
the elements of the research. The historical analysis commences in chapter 3 with a
consideration of the origins of the ideology of private property founded in the ancient Roman
civilization. That society was an example of a nascent market economy operating exclusively on
the institution of private property.65 In chapter 4 the analysis considers the long struggle in
England for the right of the people to participate in governance. This chapter also examines the
historical origins of the ideology of the public interest which emanates from the impact of the
industrial revolution in Britain.

Chapter 5 details the history of land use planning in New South Wales from its colonial origins.
This history is relevant to an understanding of the particular nature of the culture of
participation in the state of NSW. Under the influence of British imperialism and the ideology
of private property there developed in NSW what Halligan and Paris have styled as the
ratepayer ideology.66 This peculiar anti-participatory approach to local governance suggests that

65

Webster and Lai, above n 19, 15:
‘The institution of private property – a set of rules governing competition – achieves two
significant functions. On the one hand, it transforms anarchy into a state of affairs in which the
full benefits of the division of labour and the associated accumulation of wealth in society are
possible by voluntary interaction. On the other hand, it also defines and protects an individual’s
liberties: the freedom to enjoy the use and exchange of possessions; the freedom from undue
interference with the fruits of labour by theft, slavery violence, or unreasonable government
exaction; the freedom from opportunism in exchanges with partners in markets or government;
the freedom from unreasonable levels of external costs arising from other individuals’
production or exchanges of goods or services; and as an option, the freedom from interacting
with others altogether.’
66
Halligan and Paris, above n 32, 60-1: Halligan and Paris note that the ‘scope of local politics has been
historically shaped by power relationships between political spheres and economic interests.’ The
ratepayer ideology is:
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if it prevails, it is likely to thwart the development of a participatory culture in local politics in
NSW for the reasons discussed in Chapter 6. In this final chapter the paper returns to a
consideration of the question of whether it is likely that the New South Wales parliament will
adopt McAuslan’s public participation ideology as the basis for any reform of the planning
system.

‘derived from the legacy of property franchises and the centrality of property to municipal
affairs. … The effect of this ideology was to limit the number of people who could formally
participate and also the content of local politics.’
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Chapter 2:

The Nature of Planning Today

‘In discussing the need to plan and how to plan we must confront the choice which society may make
between forms of social organisation which are highly centralised and authoritarian, and forms which
leave people to settle their own affairs as much as possible in their workplace and communities.’

Royal Town Planning Institute 19761

‘Participation in the debate about the future of society is decreasing while conflict is replacing dialogue
and consensus. If planning decisions are to be accepted there is a need for new approaches which will
ensure the INCLUSION of all who are affected by change;’

Royal Town Planning Institute – New Vision 20012

2.1

Introduction:

As Bates notes, the system for land use and environmental planning is the ‘framework within
which members of the public often get the chance influence strategic planning at state and local
levels.’3 In New South Wales, that framework is articulated by laws made by parliament,
principally the EP&A Act. In terms of the chance that the public has to ‘influence’ planning
decisions, the functional role of public participation under the EP&A Act is tokenistic; the
public is to be consulted and allowed to make submissions.4 The NSW planning system is
simply not structured to advance the cause of public participation.

In this chapter the major themes of the paper are introduced. It begins with a consideration of
the nature and purpose of land use planning and participation. The chapter then examines the

1

Royal Town Planning Institute, Planning and the Future, (1976), cited in P McAuslan, The Ideologies of
Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980), 265.
2
Royal Town Planning Institute, New Vision For Planning, (2007) <http:
//www.rtpi.org.uk/item/296/23/5/3> at 6 January 2011.
3
Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (7th ed, 2010), 244.
4
See in this regard the discussion in chapter 5.4 below. The discussion demonstrates that the participation
mechanisms in the Act are weak. The 2008 reforms effectively silenced the voice of the public in the
development-assessment and decision-review processes of the Act.
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concept of participation in the context of McAuslan’s ideologies. Finally, the chapter considers
the importance of history as an aid to understanding the choices that confront society in a global
age to demonstrate why participation is not a matter of history, it occurs in history.

2.2

What is Land Use Planning?

Urban planning, in its physical manifestation, has deep historical roots.5 In contrast, the
profession known as ‘Planning’ has very shallow historical roots.6 Land use planning, as an
institution, was first promoted by the Garden Cities Association formed in Britain in 1899.7
However, the profession of land use planning was created out of the social chaos caused by the
Great Depression and the Second World War.8 These significant social moments signalled the
end of laissez faire economics and the reliance by governments on the self-regulating market.9

Conceptually, land use planning is fluid and contextual. In the 1950s Brown and Sherrard
defined town planning as follows:
‘Town and Country planning is the direction of the development and use of land to
serve the economic and social welfare of a community in respect of convenience, health
and amenity.’10

5

AJ Brown and HM Sherrard, Town and Country Planning (1959), 9. Brown and Sherrard recognise the
debt we owe to archaeologists who ‘have brought to light evidence that in the dawn of history man had an
appreciation of planning, of civic architecture and of engineering.’
6
Andreas Faludi, Planning Theory (1973), 13. Faludi suggests that:
‘one of the component elements of the definition of a profession is that its skills are based on
theory.’ … ‘[planning] developed out of architecture, engineering and surveying, its area of
concern being that of “ system of land use settlement, ” to use a modern term.’
7
Andrew Kelly and Christopher Smith, 'The Capriciousness of Australian Planning Law: Zoning
Objectives in NSW as a Case Study' (2008) 26(1) Urban Policy and Research 83, 84. Ebezener Howard’s
garden city movement and the association ‘provided a launch for planned separation of conflicting land
uses, the centrepiece of Western land use planning.’
8
Leonardo Benevolo, The history of the city (1980), 928: ‘Large-scale public intervention, in order to
regulate to some extent the growth of England’s cities, only became possible in the 1930s when attempts
were made to tackle the effects of the 1929 crisis, …’ As will be seen in chapter 5, in Australia it was
post-war migration and demand for housing that proved to be the catalyst for legislative intervention. In
NSW the government introduced Part XIIA to the Local Government Act 1919 to enable the
implementation of planning schemes.
9
B. Gleeson and N. Low, 'Revaluing planning: Rolling back Neo-liberalism in Australia' (2000) 53
Progress in Planning 83, 87, 90:
‘The world society which grew during the 19th century, based on the principle that the selfregulating market was a law of nature, had catastrophically failed by the 1930s. This failure was
perceived to lie not in contingent political events such as the rise of Fascism, or even the war
itself, but in the socially destructive power of the unfettered market.’ …
(at 90) ‘The idea of societal planning, hitherto associated with dictatorial regimes, had to be
reconciled with democracy.’
10
Brown and Sherrard, above n 5, 3.
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This definition locates the discipline of planning within Yiftachel’s urban form debate – ‘urban
form solutions to metropolitan problems.’11 It is an anthropocentric definition that arguably
divorces planning from its environmental context. It suggests that planning is an exact science;
organic to the nature of urban civilization and societal organisation. The definition captures the
socio-political context within which planning systems of law have developed in the twentieth
century.

Gurran, reflecting a modern approach, reformulates the definition of land use planning as the
‘formal process regulating the use of land and the development of the built environment, in
order to achieve strategic policy objectives.’12 This explains Thompson’s comment that
planning ‘is a continuously evolving process’.13 Godden and Peel recognise the centrality of law
in land use planning processes. They assert that:
‘[A]ny understanding of environmental governance is incomplete without due
recognition of the role of political systems and institutions as key avenues for the
articulation of environmental values, for the airing and potential resolution of conflict
over environmental issues, and for the implementation of environmental reforms, many
of which will result in environmental laws.’14

Wiggins actually dismisses the use of the word ‘planning,’ preferring the term ‘environmental
management.’15 It is this type of semantic that risks casting the concept of planning into what
Stone has described as a ‘category of meaningless reference.’16 Any redescription of the
function of land use planning which correlates the profession with management only hastens the
11

O Yiftachel, 'Towards a New Typology of Urban Planning Theories' (1989) 16 Environment and
Planning B: Planning and Design 23, 34. Yiftachel, 36, recognised that:
‘Recent advances in planning knowledge, which have demonstrated beyond doubt that urban
planning affects unevenly the allocation of societal resources, are bound to gradually erode the
myth according to which planners are portrayed as neutral and apolitical experts.’
12
Nicole Gurran, Australian Urban Land Use Planning (2007), 16.
13
Susan Thompson (ed), Planning Australia: An Overview of Urban and Regional Planning (2007), 1.
14
Lee Godden and Jacqueline Peel, Environmental Law: Scientific, Policy and Regulatory Dimensions
(2010), 62-3.
15
Danny Wiggins, 'Professional Challenges in Local Planning' in Robert Freestone (ed), Spirited Cities
(1993) 25. Wiggins also argued (at 26) that it is ‘inappropriate for the profession to use the generic term
“planning”. Wiggins suggested that:
‘if we were able to recast government’s core functions, the use of land is a sufficiently discrete
functional area. The focus would be on land use but the scope would be broad, reflecting the
increasing sophistication of the field.’
16
J. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (1968), 241-246. It is not suggested that the phrase is
meaningless, rather, it is suggested that to categorise the discipline of land use planning by reference to
the tag ‘environmental management’ neuters the independence of the profession and reduces the
discipline of planning to the level of a department of government charged with responsibility to execute
the policy formulated by the government.
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demise of the discipline as a discrete academic school. By recognising the actuality that
planning is a matter of opinion, land use planning loses its theoretical foundations. That is, land
use planning becomes wholly political in character.17

In its urban context, land use planning is relational; the relationship to power cannot be ignored.
This is why Hague and Jenkins suggest that power is ‘embedded’ in the processes.18 Whilst a
system of law to regulate property rights is fundamental to a civil society,19 planning laws are
not essential to the organisation of the state. The societal institution of urban planning evolved
out of a determination by government to impose order on the ‘chaos [of] unplanned urban
spaces’ created in the aftermath of the industrial revolution.20 Chapters 4 and 5 discuss this
development.
Market theorists often argue that development of land does not need to be regulated.21 There is
an acceptance within this school of thought that the market ‘requires’, for its efficient operation,
the state.22 But the role of government within this conception is to act as the agent of the market.
The purpose of urban planning is merely to facilitate the institution of property by enabling the
operation of markets and the subdivision and transfer of property rights within those markets
mediated through the regulatory mechanism of price.23 Webster and Lai suggest that institutions

17

Yiftachel, above n 11, 36, refers to the comments of Blowers, ‘Town Planning – paradoxes and
prospects,’ The Planner, April 1986, 82, 14:
‘Planners regard themselves as experts on shaping our surroundings. But it may be that the use
we make of our land and the design of our built environment are not matters of expertise but
matters of opinion, of values rather than facts, in short, they are political.’
18
Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005), 8.
19
Jeremy Bentham, Etienne Dumont and Charles Milner Atkinson, Bentham's Theory of legislation:
being Principes de législation, and, Traités de législation, civile et pénale (1914), 146-7. Bentham’s
theory being:
‘Property and law were born together, and would die together. Before the laws property did not
exist: take away the laws, and property will be no more.’
20
Sophie Watson, 'Cities of Dreams and Fantasy' in Robert Freestone (ed), Spirited Cities (1983) , 142:
‘Order and logic were the name of the game. At its most extreme a grid system derived from Le
Corbusier’s ideas replaced chaos and unplanned urban spaces.’
21
This is the argument of neo-liberals, drawing on the theories of Hayek - see Gleeson and Low above n
9, 96:
‘Hayek argued for individualism (individual freedom from state interference), the rule of law,
the virtue of the “catallactic” workings of the market, consumer sovereignty, private property
rights, and a minimal “nightwatchman” state.’
22
Christopher Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai, Property Rights, planning and markets: managing
spontaneous cities (2003), 53: ‘the market requires the state, in particular the institutional frameworks it
creates, in order to operate efficiently.’
23
Mark Pennington, 'Land Use Planning: Public or Private Choice?' (2003) 23(2) Economic Affairs 10,
10. As Pennington notes:
‘From an Austrian [Hayekian] perspective the shifting structures of costs and benefits associated
with environmental externalities are inherently subjective and may only be revealed through the
choices that people make when confronted with a range of competing alternatives. Without a set
of relative prices signalling the significance of such alternatives, planners will not be able to
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such as private property are the ‘sinews’ of society dating back to ancient times.24 The
institution of private property dates back to at least Roman times.

It is only when the government decides to intervene in the operation of the market to distort the
outcome of property right transactions that the institution of planning emerges as a player in the
market.25 Planners cannot ‘function’ without government action (law) to favour them with
power to regulate for planned outcomes.26 The prescriptions generally relate to the use of land.27
Legislation is the only means by which development can be regulated within the territorial
boundaries of the state.28 Absent laws made by parliament, the development of land is regulated
by property rights sanctioned by law. In the absence of planning laws, development of land
occurs by application of the residual negative legal principle, namely that which is not
prohibited by law is axiomatically permitted.29
Land use planning is therefore essentially a creature of statute.30 It is the machinery articulated
in legislation by which government gives effect to its deliberate policy.31 Planning professionals
are the ‘servants’ of that machinery process.32 They worship at the altar of the ideology of

judge the “social costs” of different schemes and must rely on their own subjective preferences
to determine what will constitute an improvement in the “quality of life.”’
24
Webster and Lai, above n 21, 14. They also argue (at 63) that ‘the quality of an entire city is partly a
product of the culture of its inhabitants, including spontaneous and organised voluntary institutions.’
25
In the context of sustainable development, some like Michael J Jacobs, ‘Sustainability and Community’
(1995) 32(2) Australian Planner 109, argue (at 110) that ‘[t]here is little doubt that sustainable
development will lead to a greater, not a lesser role for governments in economic policy.’
26
Gurran, above n 12, 41:
‘All planning systems need a legal source of power to legitimise their bureaucratic and
development control functions. This source of power will typically be articulated within a major
or principal piece of legislation, or, in some cases, may be drawn from several legislative
sources.’
27
Peter Butt, Land Law (6th ed, 2010), 7. Butt notes that under common law land means ‘any area of
three dimensional space, with its position identified by natural or imaginary points located by reference to
the earth’s surface.’ As such, it is a legal construct, but one with real significance. In its legal context, the
definition of land is relational. As Jenkins notes, Paul Jenkins, 'Space, Place and Territory: An Analytical
Framework' in Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005) 19,
20: ‘Place is also a relational concept as it is defined as the relationships between elements perceived in
multiple ways through socio-cultural filters.
28
Brown and Sherrard, above n 5, 3:
‘The technique of planning must involve more than the preparation of a scheme, if action is to
follow design. It involves legislative control machinery to ensure that an adopted plan is given
effect as the years pass.’
29
See in this regard the discussion of deontic logic and axiomatic reasonings in Stone, above n 16, 195.
30
Robert Freestone, Urban Nation: Australia's Planning Heritage (2010), 43, suggests that town
planning statutes were ‘the goal of the modern town planning movement of the 1910s’.
31
G Bramley, W Brartlett and C Lambert, Planning, the Market and Private Housebuilding (1995), 38.
They describe planning as ‘a particular form of public policy intervention in the arena of private decisions
with regard to the use of land, governed by particular legislation.’
32
Faludi, above n 6, 225:

21

public interest.33 At the technical end of the spectrum, land use planning is no more than the
collection of ways to give effect to spatial concepts of urban living.34 At the policy end of the
spectrum, planning expresses the current rationale or strategy of the government of the day to
address societal problems confronting it.

Land use planning is land centric. When democratic governments formulate land use planning
policy and enact law to give effect to that policy, the implementation of the policy intersects
with fundamental property rights enjoyed by people who own land. Planning policy and law is
therefore best understood in the socio-political dimension.35 The implementation of government
policy is felt directly in the neighbourhood in which people often reside. As the Standing
Committee of the NSW Legislative Council noted in its 2009 report, decisions on whether or
not to approve development ‘can have a profound effect on individuals and communities.’36

JS Mill was undoubtedly correct when he said: ‘No man made the land. It is the original
inheritance of the whole species.’37 The difficulty that arises is that since time immemorial, man
has made property laws. The inheritance has been fractionalised ever since.38 The subdivision

‘The basis of a view which portrays planners as the servants of their political masters can be
traced to the development of bureaucracies. The implication of this view in terms of decisionmaking is that politicians decide on ends, and that planners indicate the means for their
attainment.
The instrumental view of planning, which is what the master-servant concept amounts to, is very
widespread and rests on the traditional view of the role of experts in public administration …’
33
P McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980), 261. As
McAuslan notes:
‘[D]espite pressure and suggestions to reform and alter, the broad framework of administration
and management in government is still firmly anchored to an ideology of public interest and
rejects the ideology of public participation.’
34
Bates, above n 3, 239. Bates suggests that:
‘[P]lanning is the antithesis of chaos.’ … ‘Planning introduces order, a measure of certainty and
security, and a principled framework against which applications to carry out development of
land and access natural resources
35
As Clive Forster, Australian Cities: Community and Change (1995), 71, notes:
‘Australia’s major cities are, above all, residential environments. Most of their built-up areas
consist of houses, streets and local facilities that constitute “home” for 10 million people. The
kind of housing people live in, whether it meets their needs and what they have to pay for it
largely determines their standard of living.’
36
Standing Committee on State Development, 'Report 34: New South Wales Planning Framework' (NSW
Legislative Council 2009), 151.
37
JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy, University of Toronto Press (1965), 230. Cited in David
Farrier, The Environmental Law Handbook (2nd ed, 1993), 7. McAuslan, above n 33, 5, ascribes the
‘philosophical ancestory’ of the public participation ideology to JS Mill.
38
For a recent example of the application of the subdivision principle see s 88AB of the Conveyancing
Act 1919 (NSW). This is the section which deems carbon sequestration rights to be a profit à prendre. See
also the discussion in Samantha Hepburn, 'Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of Statutory
Verification' (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 239, 246. Hepburn reviews the legislative schemes for carbon
rights in Australia and suggests that the schemes in Australia are in the forefront of recognition of carbon
rights in the context of forestry legislation. The schemes variously seek to ‘formalise the separate
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genie is out of the bottle.39 Comprehensive legal structures have been created to facilitate the
fractionalisation of land to enable even space to be alienated by way of sale.40 Webster and Lai
describe this as the application of the ‘subdivision rule’ to property rights.41

There is presently a ‘lively’ academic and professional debate about the means to achieve the
ends of spatial planning policy.42 The guardians of the ideology of public interest rail against the
neo-liberal agenda to ‘devalue’ planning by reducing it to being a mere siphon for
development.43 The guardians of the ideology of private property, in turn, disparage state
intervention questioning whether there is ‘any case for continuing intervention’ in light of its
failures.44 In this debate, the function of participation is relegated to being an island in the ‘flux
of power.’45 An adjunct to market forces providing the noisy ‘voice’ in the ‘political market’.46
But absent the articulation of policy intent (as opposed to a political slogan prior to an election),

proprietary existence of carbon rights.’ This is an example of a recent fractionalisation of property rights
by the application of the subdivision principle. Carbon rights have become valuable, and so the market is
looking for ways to commercialise the proprietary rights opportunities presented by forests. The NSW
legislation enables the offsetting of rights as part of the NSW greenhouse gas abatement scheme.
39
At common law, land in NSW was subdivided merely by deed (‘old system’ conveyancing). This gave
rise to a need to register the deed to evidence the partition (in NSW see Registration of Deeds Act 1897
(NSW). Later, formal procedures for recognising title to land subdivided by registration of an identifying
plan were created by statute – see for example in NSW: Real Property Act 1862 and 1900 (NSW); Local
Government Act 1906 and 1919 (NSW) and the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
40
In NSW see Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 and its amending legislation.
41
Webster and Lai, above n 22, 11, 89:
‘Any particular configuration of property rights over a resource is a function of the value of the
resource and of the costs of assigning effective property rights. … If the value of a resource
rises, or the cost of assigning property rights to a valued resource falls (due to technological or
institutional innovation), then there will be a demand for a reassignment of property rights.’
(89) ‘In this way, urban land and buildings evolve by subdivision. As knowledge about a
superior location spreads, the number of bids for land and buildings increases and prices rise. At
some point it becomes profitable to demolish single homes and subdivide land rights into many
smaller plots.’
42
Yiftachel, above n 11, 23-26, charts the ‘lively’ debate among planning theorists citing the
contributions of Faludi, Paris, Scott and Roweis, Simmie, and Taylor, which, he suggests, ‘have confused
students and practitioners of planning … leading to a loss of credibility in both theory and policy.’
43
See for example, Gleeson and Low, above n 9, 135. They propound that:
‘What is new, however, about the contemporary attack on planning is its conceptional and
political reach: neo-liberals desire both to contract the domain of planning (deregulation) and
then to privatise segments of the residual sphere of regulation (out-sourcing). In both instances,
the raison d’etre of planning as a tool for correcting and avoiding market failure is brushed aside
in favour of a new minimalist form of spatial regulation whose chief purpose is to facilitate
development.’
44
Pennington, above n 23, 13 (emphasis in original).
45
Gleeson and Low, above n 9, 153.
46
Webster and Lai, above n 22, 6: ‘Spontaneity in political markets depends on the inherently more noisy
signals of votes, press, lobbying and other forms of “voice”.’
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the people cannot give democratic legitimacy to the subsequent policy decision. The people
have no opportunity to vote on that new system.47

There is no manual that says that planning law must be designed according to the ideology of
public interest. There are alternative ideologies indicating that a choice is available. It is when
the people perceive that there is no democratic legitimacy to the planning policy adopted by
government that social discord is bound to arise.48 The people can feel ‘tyrannised’ because the
law made by parliament has usurped them of rights inherent to the ownership of property.49

Following the logic of Lindblom’s theory of ‘incremental planning,’ Stein suggests that
planning could be perceived as a regulatory system that facilitates a ‘battle’ between the
‘community and commercial interests vying for power, causing planning to be primarily a
political exercise.’50 But, if the people do not in fact have power in the planning system, then
arguably there is no battle. The government has the power to regulate (or not to). It is
commercial interests that have the capital to acquire property to exploit its potential. The
community is rendered a mere consumer of the product delivered by others. This explains
Flyvberg’s observation that ‘there can be no adequate understanding of planning without
placing the analysis of planning within the context of power.’51 Planning law is intimately
related to the exercise of power by the sovereign government over the use and development of

47

See in this regard the discussion in Andrew Geddis, 'Three conceptions of the electoral moment' (2003)
(28) Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 53. Normally, when there is a contested vision as to the
policy to be adopted, political parties seek a mandate from the people at an election for a policy. The
people participate by voting for the party representative that best accords with their self-interested
position. As Geddis suggests, under the ‘deliberative vision’ of voting:
‘the electoral moment is not perceived as being solely a site of conflict between competing,
incompatible interests. … Voting acts as a “contingent vicissitude”, to be used where some
decision is practically required, but members of a society find they cannot come to a consensual
solution.’
48
As McAuslan, above n 33, 11, notes ‘the failure to adapt the law to meet these increased expectations
[to participate] adds fuel to the flames of disillusionment and frustration with the planning system.’ Not
only is it in the failure to adapt the law, it is also in the failure of politicians to articulate a vision so that
the intent of the government can be discerned.
49
Property rights are recognised by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of which
states: ‘ (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’ See also John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1821),
360. Locke, in his chapter XV111, Of Tyranny, suggested:
‘As usurpation is the exercise of power, which another hath a right to; so tyranny is the exercise
of power beyond right, which no body can have a right to.’ (emphasis in original)
50
L. Stein, Principles of Planning Law (2008), 2.
51
Bent Flyvberg, Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice, (1998), cited in Robert Stokes, The
Battle for the Big Back Yard: An Examination of the Conflict Between Suburban Character and Urban
Consolidation and the use of Public Participation in Managing this Conflict (Ph. D. Thesis, Macquarie
University, 2007), 28.
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land by the people.52 It is government that enacts the laws directed towards distorting the
operation of the market to achieve, inter alia, social and economic goals, being outcomes
determined by the Government.53 The normative means by which political voice is expressed is
at the ballot box. But if there is no real choice between competing social programmes, then a
changing of the guard at the ballot box will not alter the adopted policy. If ‘voice’ is simply the
expression of dissent, then it will not result in a change of ideology.

As we move beyond the neo-liberal paradigm in planning in search of a new explanatory theory
to guide our way, the very notion of planning is being questioned.54 As Yiftachel says: ‘the
theoretical foundations of land-use planning are still excessively eclectic, deeply divided,
confused and of little help to students and practitioners.’55 What is the purpose of planning – is
it to be just a ‘functionary of the capitalist state apparatus’?56 An opportunity emerges with the
call for a reform of the New South Wales planning system for planning to become participatory
and democratic.

2.3

What is the Purpose of Participation?

Recognising the historical fact of the struggle for democratic participation in governance is
important to an understanding of the development of McAuslan’s ideologies of planning.57 Each
of McAuslan’s ideologies is founded on the paramountcy of the concept of the rule of law.
Stone formulated this grundnorm of English law as: ‘What the King in Parliament has
promulgated or authorised or permitted to be promulgated as law ought to be observed.’58

52

Godden and Peel, above n 14, 276: ‘Planning law systems, therefore, are fundamental to the regulation
of land use and human activities across Australia, operating in conjunction with the more discrete, sitebased development control laws.
53
See Stefano Moroni, 'Rethinking the theory and practice of land-use regulation: Towards nomocracy'
9(2) Planning Theory 137, 145. Moroni argues that it is simply not possible to ‘define an idea of the right
city’ because we (that is governments) cannot attempt to do so without recognising the ‘impossibility’ of
defining the construct. Moroni cites Rogge’s position on the ‘good city’ namely:
‘Given the fact of the enormous internal diversity of human population, and given the
neverending changes in tastes and circumstances, it is impossible per se for there to be
constructed a universally valid, objective definition or description of the Good City. City
planning is by definition, then, an exercise in either futility or coercion (or both).’
54
Yiftachel, above n 11, 24-27, charts the course of this debate. Yiftachel concludes (at 28) that the three
prevailing debates (analytical, built form and procedural) ‘compliment one another because in the main,
they operate on different levels of social processes and are related to largely different phenomena.’
55
Ibid 23.
56
Gleeson and Low, above n 9, 100.
57
McAuslan, above n 33, 3-5. Of McAuslan’s three identified ideologies, the ideology of public
participation is ‘the most recent and least developed’ of the ideologies.
58
Stone, above n 16, 108.
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Embedded in this grundnorm is the concept of parliamentary power. It has been long recognised
that if this power untempered by checks and balances, it can lead to tyranny.59

The French economist Frederick Bastiat (1801-50) suggested that the responsibility of
government is enormous. He argued that: ‘Good fortune and bad fortune, wealth and destitution,
equality and inequality, virtue and vice – all then depended upon political administration.’60
Over time, the burden on government has increased. Viewed through the lens of modern
parliamentary government, it is sometimes easy to overlook or forget the significance of the
power wielded by a sovereign government. In our representative parliamentary processes,
without participation in the political process our democracy is nominal.61 When a social
minority controls parliament, it makes the laws. Whoever has the ear of government calls the
tune. In the context of participation in governance, unless the community is engaged in the
political process, a social minority called the political elite controls the parliamentary processes.
This control is potentially despotic if it is used to the exclusion of the people.62

2.3.1

Ideological Conflict:

The normative discourse suggests that planning laws are necessary in the public interest. Farrier
argues that ‘the state has a vital interest’ in the regulation of land use because land (especially in
its environmental context) is not only a scarce resource, it is irreplaceable.63 Yet in a capitalist

59

J. Uhr, Deliberative democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (1998), 62. Uhr,
referencing (at 60) Edmund Burke’s ‘classic exposition of the constitutional orthodoxy’ that parliament is
the trustee of government, paraphrases Burke and summarising the position as follows:
‘A parliament which distances itself from “the public opinion” might well make for “a great,
wise, awful senate” but it would fail to serve “any popular purpose”, transforming itself from an
institution of “procuration and delegation” to one of original power. (Burke 1963, 128, 199-200;
Mansfield 1965, 138-41)’
60
Frederick Bastiat, The Law (Kessinger Publishing 2004), 46.
61
J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (2009), 747:
‘Monitory democracy certainly feeds upon communicative abundance, but one of its more
perverse effects is to encourage individuals to escape the great complexity of the world by
sticking their heads, like ostriches, into the sands of wilful ignorance, or to float cynically upon
the swirling tides and waves and eddies of fashion – to change their minds, to speak and act
flippantly, to embrace even celebrate opposites, to bid farewell to veracity, to slip into the arms
of what some carefully call “bullshit”.’
62
K Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1951), 45:
‘There is a great difference between functional and arbitrary power. Any society, however, may
rightly be called despotic which permits ruling groups and individuals to wield more power than
their functions require or allows them to use power arbitrarily.’
63
Farrier, above n 37, 7. Farrier endorses Mill’s concept that land is the original inheritance of the people.
Yet the counter argument runs that property rights are ‘sacred’.
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society, the state has also legitimated the primacy of rights to, in and over property.64 When the
ideology of property (which promotes the rights of individual owners of land) collides with the
public interest ideology (which promotes the interests of the people as a collective),65 the public
interest is meant to prevail.66 This raises an issue of control, namely: who is best placed to
determine the public interest?67
Hirst suggests that ‘[p]olitics is necessarily about power, about inequality.’68 Mannheim argues
that democracy ‘implies a theory of power’ that is about the ‘ways of distributing and
controlling communal power.’69 Planning law is equally about power; it is about the power of
the state to regulate what, if any, development occurs within the state, including what occurs in
a neighbourhood – a concept developed further in section 2.5.4 below. Planning laws do not
draw upon a participatory democratic tradition. As discussed in chapter 4, planning laws draw
upon the historical precedent of parliament, through private bills, using the power of the law to
secure and maintain control over land for private purposes.

It is at this point that the public participation ideology has relevance. If the public interest
justifies the making of planning laws, and if the state has exclusive power to make such laws,
then the state both defines what is in the public interest and makes lawful the dispossession of
the right. This is a valuable right. It is the right of the individual to determine how land in their

64

Uhr, above n, 59, 51. Uhr, referencing the Lockean conception of government, makes the point that
‘legislative power may not be used to take away subjects’ property without their “own consent, that is, the
consent of the majority.”’
65
WJV Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (1938), 247. Windeyer dates the emergence of collectivism
to the mid nineteenth century. This was a social moment when:
‘The idea that the state should not interfere with individual enterprise and freedom of contract
gave place to a realisation that the state must interfere.’
And what ‘price’ should the individual/community pay? Sometimes compensation is not enough. It is
difficult to quantify intangible rights such as the amenity of the neighbourhood. As Justice Young in the
Court of Appeal recently observed in ING Bank (Australia) Ltd v O’Shea [2010] NSWCA 71 (at [161]):
‘However, when compensation for loss of land rights is being considered, one must always bear
in mind the aphorism of Lord Sumner cited in Campbell JA during the oral argument:
“I doubt … whether it is complete justice to allow the big man … to have his way, and to solace
the little man for his darkened and stuffy little house by giving him a cheque that he does not ask
for.” (Leeds International Co-Operative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851, 872)’.
67
In Shoalhaven CC v Lovell (1996) 136 FLR 58, 63, Mahoney P noted that the term ‘public interest’ was
not defined in the EP&A Act. Citing with approval O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210, 216
(Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) the Court affirmed the following statement of principle:
‘Indeed, the expression “in the public interest”, when used in a statute classically imports a
discretionary value judgment to by made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined
only “in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may
enable … given reasons to be [pronounced] definitively extraneous to any objects the legislature
could have in view”: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning (1947)
74 CLR 492 at 505 per Dixon J.’
68
John Hirst, 'The distinctiveness of Australian democracy' (2002) 46(12) Quadrant 19, 23.
69
Mannheim, above n 62, 45.
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ownership is to be developed. When a parliament legislates to make law, it is, according to
democratic theory, exercising a power conferred by the people.70 It is the people that are
sovereign. When a parliament assumes responsibility for defining the public interest, unless that
interest is coincidental to the wishes of the people, a form of tyranny may arise.71 It is the
creation of participatory structures that protects the rights of the people against state tyranny. As
discussed in chapter 5, the absence of such structures in legislation suggests that a socially
exclusive, rather than inclusive, dynamic exists.

The right to participate in the land use planning process is recognised by the NSW government
to be a ‘fundamental right.’72 But for the people to participate, it is essential not only that the
people ideate the notion of government as the sharing of power, but also that the people actively
look for and take opportunities to participate in the structures of governance. There must be
both the opportunity to participate and a willingness to do so. Without a willingness by the
people to take such power as is ceded by government, the governing elite will retain control
over the making of laws, including planning laws.

The ‘topical’ nature of development and the fact that it occurs in the neighbourhood makes
planning relevant to the people both at a policy-making and decision-making level.73 However,
different and multiple ‘public interests’ exist at one and the same time in relation to each
proposal to develop land in a locality.74 This suggests, at a normative level, that there should be
communicative structures to facilitate dialogue between the various actors in the social system

70

Uhr, above n 59, 25. As Uhr notes:
‘deliberative institutions are less important as generators of wisdom than as conduits of consent,
providing greater certainty for the legitimacy of government which, for all practical purposes, is
retained in the hands of a small ruling group performing the related functions of executive
decision and judicial arbitration.’
71
Ibid, 75-6. Uhr suggests that under A V Dicey’s formulation of responsible government:
‘It is not clear what protective capacity a sovereign parliament has in the event that a people or
segment of people is unable to make its own case heard about oppressive legislation or illiberal
government action. … courts are only permitted to recognise rights which parliament itself has
declared.’
72
NSW Department of Planning, 'Discussion Paper: Improving the NSW Planning System ' (2007) (2007
Discussion Paper). The discussion paper was published by the government ahead of the 2008 reforms. It
notes (at 20) that the public involvement provisions ‘should remain in the legislation as a fundamental
right.’
73
The Macquarie Dictionary (1981): ‘Topical: 3: of a place, local.’ Topical is used here in the context of
place and locality. The EP&A Act regulates how the development selected by the applicant will proceed
in the place chosen by the applicant. Jenkins, above n 27, 20 suggests: ‘Place on the other hand is seen as
being the predominantly socio-cultural perception and definition of space, and is an important element of
social identity – whether individual or collective – and can be understood as social geography.’
74
Erhard Berner, 'The metropolitan dilemma: global society, localities and the struggle for urban land in
Manila' in Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland (eds), Space, Culture and Power: New identities in globalizing
cities (1997) , 103. Berner argues that a locality ‘is the focus of everyday life; it is not merely the place
where people reside but where they spend much of their life, their Lebenswelt (life-world).’

28

controlled by planning law to enable the system to function.75 In land use planning, the formal
structures that facilitate dialogue are created by legislation. If legislation does not facilitate
dialogue, then a tokenistic socially exclusive model operates.76

McAuslan’s accepts that parliament has the right to determine what is in the public interest and
to frame legislation to give effect to its policy. However, he also makes clear that where law is
made by parliament to advance the cause of public participation, then that legislative intent
ought to be expressed in the language used in the Act.77 If the participation mechanism is
absent, then despite the language used in the Act, the legislation will still manifest McAuslan’s
public interest ideology because a semantic communicative lacuna will exist between the
language and the operation of the Act.

2.3.2

What is Participation?

Whilst participation is a monolithic term descriptive of the act of taking part,78 the phrase public
involvement and participation requires an analytical context.79 For the purpose of this research,
the phrase will be treated as being synonymous with the phrase public participation. The phrase
the people is used extensively in this research. It is recognised that it is not a monolithic phrase.
Aroney suggests, in the context of governance, that the ‘social reality’ is that the phrase
75

A Bora and H Hausendorf, 'Participatory science governance revisited: normative expectations versus
empirical evidence' (2006) 33(7) Science and Public Policy 478, 483-484. Bora and Hausendorf suggest
that in semantic terms, social positions are ‘manifested as communicated expectations.’ The administrator
position is a typical social voice in the socio-linguistic framework of social positioning. The image of self
of the administrator is ‘that of a neutral, impartial, unbiased decision-maker who is obeying the law and
political will.’ The relevant actors, in the context of planning law, are the ‘competent authority (fulfilling
the role of administrator), the applicant for development and the public.
76
It is this absence of voice that causes people to resort to other ‘noisy’ means of protest such as petitions
and demonstrations. However, exercising this right is no guarantee of effecting change or influencing the
decision-maker.
77
McAuslan, above n 33, 20. As McAuslan says: ‘not only must the bare right be set out in the statute,
but some outline procedures and mechanisms must also be present.’
78
Macquarie Dictionary, above n 73: ‘participate; 1. The act of participating; 2. A taking part, as in some
action or attempt.’
79
Neither the word participation nor the phrase public involvement is defined in the Act. They are not
standard words or expressions defined in the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). The United Nations Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 includes Principle 10 which is in the following
terms:
‘Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have the appropriate access to
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information
on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.’

29

‘includes a sense of our “peoplehood” at both a state and national level.’ Similarly, in the
context of local government, the phrase connotes ‘the people of each particular locality.’80 In
this socio-political dimension, planning policy and decision-making exhibits a functional
duality.81 The people form the polity which gives the government its mandate to govern. The
people also live in the neighbourhood which is to be subjected to the planning law made by the
government.82 The phrase the people is therefore descriptive of the conceptual duality of the
people being simultaneously part of the polity and part of a local community;83 of being the
governed and the government.

Civic participation and involvement is therefore emblematic of democratic processes. Indeed, in
democratic societies, citizenship denotes the right of a person to participate in social institutions
and to exercise deliberative rights.84 Arnstein suggests that participation ‘is the cornerstone of
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Nicholas Aroney, 'Four reasons for an upper house : representative democracy, public deliberation,
legislative outputs and executive accountability' (2008) 29(2) Adelaide Law Review 205, 215, 219:
‘Our dogged attachment to local electorates, despite the results that they produce, brings us back
to the fact that we continue to think of ourselves simultaneously as both one people and as many
different people, organised into various localities and groupings at local, state and federal level.’
81
This duality has ancient roots. In early medieval times, autonomous cities enjoyed economic and
political freedom. Residents of the city were, at the one and same time, citizens of the town/city and
subject under the sovereign. The state, from the twelfth until the nineteenth century, constantly sought to
distance the citizen from their historical autonomy within towns and to subjugate them to control of the
state. See Engin Fahri Isin, Cities without Citizens (1992), 33. Isin discusses this process of
disenfranchisement. He notes:
‘towards the end of the seventeenth century, cities became subordinate to the state and were
separated from the body of citizens who had originally made up the governing bodies of the
city.’
Isin cites the 1661 Act ‘An Act for the Well Governing and Regulation of Corporations’ (13 Charles, c.
2). This Act (post Great Fire and restoration), created closed, i.e. not elected, councils of Boroughs which,
he suggests, ‘meant that the governing body was either directly in contact with the State or appointed by
it.’ This was not redressed in England until the municipal reforms of the mid nineteenth century.
82
See also J Haydon ‘The Judicial System and Public Interest in Queensland Town Planning,’ (1989) 6
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 18 (citing Malcolm Grant):
‘Planning Law prescribes the procedures – it sets the battlelines – for the resolution of conflict
over land use between the interests of private property and the prevailing “public” interest or
“community” interests. It is neither static nor a neutral system of rules, and the balance which it
sets between private and public interest and between different institutions representing the public
interest is constantly changing.’
83
Hugh Mackay, Advance Australia ... where? : how we've changed, why we've changed, and what will
happen next (2007), 286-7. As Mackay notes:
‘we are social creatures who thrive on the sense of belonging to a community. … there’s a
strong intuitive sense that we need to feel part of the local neighbourhood where we actually
live; no matter how connected we may feel in other ways, there is a special meaning of
“community” that relies on locality.’ Mackay also notes that ‘enlightened’ planners and
developers are ‘paying attention to the creation of local neighbourhood spaces.’
84
Uhr, above n 59, 6. Uhr, referencing Rawls, suggests that ‘public reasoning by a free and open citizenry
is a central feature of the good polity. Public deliberation is the political activity of shared – and in the
best of worlds – consensual reasoning...’

30

democracy.’85 Participation is different to consultation.86 Without rights of participation, we are
rendered mere subjects – in the sense of being under the dominion of a sovereign power.87
There is therefore a tension between the concepts of participatory democracy (or public
deliberation) and political representation.88 And there is a tension between the role of central
government and the rights of the individual.89 Uhr suggests that the tension is about the means
by which participation is made active.90

Planning laws demonstrate this tension. In the NSW planning system there is a tension between
the right of the state to define the public interest and dictate planning policy and the resultant
exercise of that power manifested in the approval of development. The social consequences of
the exercise of that power creates tension because of the competing public/private interest
dimension to each and every exercise of the discretionary power to zone land and/or
approve/refuse a development proposal.91
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Sherry R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation' (1969) 35(4) Journal of the American Institute
of Planners 216, 216.
86
Participation was differentiated from consultation in the UK Dorbry Report (1975), para 10.2 (cited in
McAuslan, above n 33, 16) as follows:
‘The process needs to be in effect ‘participation’ (which means taking an active part, from the
outset, in the formation of … decisions of strategic importance) rather than ‘consultation’ (which
means giving the public an opportunity to express views on planning applications).’
87
John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (1997), 76:
‘The most powerful force possessed by the individual citizen is her own government. … The
individual has no other large organized mechanism that he can call his own. There are other
mechanisms, but they reduce the citizen to the status of a subject. Government is the only
organized mechanism that makes possible the level of shared disinterest known as the public
good.’
88
Sophie Body-Gendrot, The Social Control of Cities? A comparative perspective (2000), xix, suggests
that:
‘At stake is a redrawing of what constitutes the legitimate responsibilities of individuals,
collectivities, and the state.’
89
Keane, above n 61, 731-742, traces the development of ‘monitory democracy’ to the historical epoch of
the immediate post war period starting with the development of the UN Declaration of Human Rights in
1948: ‘a new weapon to be used anywhere and everywhere against the presumption that the state had
priority over the individual human being.’ Keane suggests that since that time:
‘the age of monitory democracy [has witnessed] constant public scrutiny and spats about power,
to the point where it seems as if no organisation or leader within the fields of government or
social life is immune from political trouble.’
90
Uhr, above n 59, 11:
‘Advocates of liberal democracy have long been interested in exploring ways in which practices
of active citizenship can be devised to keep alive the prospects of popular sovereignty in fact as
well as in theory.’
91
McAuslan, above n 33, 5. McAuslan sources the public participation ideology to this tension. Reduced
to its elements, the ideology is based in the primacy of the rights of the individual over the state, it is
captured by the concept:
‘that all who are likely to be affected by or who have, for whatever reason, an interest or concern
in a proposed development of land or change in the environment should have the right of
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2.3.3

The Semantics of Participation

The wording of section 5(c) of the EP&A Act evokes a normative approach to social inclusion
in the processes created under the Act. By raising such an expectation at the surface level of
discourse brings into question whether the institutional and procedural arrangements created
under the Act to ‘increase’ involvement and participation actually allow for social inclusion.
Social inclusion is here discussed as an aspect of citizenship. According to Bora and
Hausendorf, citizenship can be defined in theoretical terms as ‘a communicative, semantic
concept that gives a specific answer to the structural question of how persons become relevant
in social systems.’92

Bora and Hausendorf have identified a theoretical approach that is open to empirical validation.
It provides an insight to assist in answering the structural question of how people are addressed
in social systems.93 Their theoretical perspective ‘combines systems theory with sociolinguistics methodology, based on shared communication theory.’94 They view citizenship as a
mode of social inclusion in social systems. In this conceptualisation, legislation is viewed as a
communication system that creates a social system described as the legal frame of reference.

Under this methodology it is possible to identify within the procedures created under the EP&A
Act: the social task or problem being addressed in the semantics of citizenship (public
participation); its function (influencing the decision-maker) and its locus of interest or reference
(the legal system created by the EP&A Act). Within this system of reference there are structures
of communication (i.e. the decision-making and decision-review processes under the Act),
which are intended to be the means by which the social task is realised by ‘provid[ing] for
direct, every day contact among competent authorities, interested parties and the concerned
public.’95

Within the legal frame of reference, the valid form of communication is prescribed by the
procedures established in the Act. As Bora and Hausendorf suggest:

participation in the decision on that proposal just because they might be affected or are
interested.’
92
Bora and Hausendorf above n 75,480.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid 483.
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‘They are the most direct form in which citizenship can be realised and can be made
tangible for the participants. They provide for direct, everyday contact among
competent authorities, interested parties and the concerned public.’96

Empirically, through the socio-linguistic framework of social positioning, it is possible to
identify structures of communications, or social positions, which allow various actors (or social
voices), to communicate. In each structure of communication there are dynamics among social
positions. The dynamic can be either active or passive. Where it is active, it can be said to be
mutually inclusive. Where it is passive, it can be said to be mutually exclusive.97 This
methodology will be used in chapter 5 to test whether the procedures under the EP&A Act are
inclusive or exclusive.

2.4

Planning Law: The Power to Control

Isin suggests that ‘citizenship originated as membership in the city as an institution.’98 The
people were citizens of the city/town before they were subjects of the state. There were, for a
time, multiple sovereignties as autonomous city/towns emerged from the fall of Roman
civilization to rival the power of kings and princes. However, beginning with the Norman
invasion, English citizens would, over time, be brought under the control of the state; to become
once again citizens with power would involve struggle.

In order for it to be propitious for a society to move from a traditional identity schema to a
cooperative compact schema, it is necessary for the individuals in the society to believe that
they can be the government.99 The people have to move to the rational action paradigm of self-
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Ibid.
Ibid 485.
98
Isin, above n 81, vii. Isin refers specifically to the city as an incorporated entity – such as the
autonomous cities of the twelfth century which had de facto status as a separate legal entity:
‘Cities and citizens emerged as the anthesis of feudal lordship and kingships that were
simultaneously emerging with cities, and stood for the supremacy of law rather than the
supremacy of will – for association rather than subjugation.’
99
L. M. Edwards, 'Ideational social capital and the civic culture: Extricating Putnam's legacy from the
social capital debates' (2009) 23 Social Epistemology 125, 139. In a traditional identity schema, a
gemeinschaft, Edwards suggests that ‘social coordination was primarily achieved through the
socialization of identities. Traditions tightly prescribed appropriate behaviour in any given circumstance
based on age, gender, kinship structure or other significant identity markers.’ Edwards suggests (137) that
Putnam’s civic culture can be described as a ‘Cooperative Compact’ where:
97
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interest. It is by embracing such a strategy of behaviour, which Edwards explains as an
ideational structure which is transferable and therefore adaptable to new contexts, that society
reaches Tocqueville’s strategy of self-interest.100 This was reformulated by Putnam as the
concept of ‘self interest properly understood.’101

Chapter 4 considers the actions of the English landed elite in the seventeenth century that
unleashed a participatory dynamic beyond their control. It resulted, ultimately, in parliament
making laws to advance the public interest.102 The history of the people’s struggle in England
for power over parliament informed their self-conceptualisation of governance.103 Out of this
process would emerge capitalism and the Westminster style of representative parliamentary
government. Australia would follow a different path. As is shown in chapter 5, the democratic
theme would infuse the polity of Australia to create its own ideation of the role of government
in the lives of the people. It was an ideation that was antipathetic to participation.104

In Britain, the people had to rise up and violently take power. In New South Wales, within a
short few years of colonisation the people had representative government conferred on them, as
if by right it was an entitlement. In Britain, participation was real, it mattered. As is discussed in
chapter 4, civic culture grew from participation in local governance. In New South Wales,
participation was nominal. Because of a general absence of local governance structures before

‘People come together to address an issue of common concern. They agree to coordinate their
behaviour and govern the compact through just rules. The maintenance of cooperation rests on
maintaining the legitimacy of the rules.’
100
Ibid 134.
101
Ibid 129. Alex Tocqueville (1805-59) was a French Aristocrat who, after touring the United States in
1831 published (1835-40) the seminal work for the period on democracy, De la démocratie en Amérique.
Putnam in Bowling Alone (1993), 167, cited Tocqueville’s comment that the Americans understood selfinterest differently to the British. According to Tocqueville:
‘Each American knows when to sacrifice some of his private interest to save the rest: we want to
save everything and often we lose it all.’
Putnam described this as “self-interest properly understood.”
102
EA Wrigley, People Cities and Wealth (1987), 54. As Wrigley notes:
‘when authority appears to be failing to fulfil its side of the bargain upon which a hierarchical
structure of authority rests, hostility towards it which was once successfully repressed, may
surface.’
103
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), 6. Bobbitt
suggests that law and strategy are not made ‘in history’. Rather, history is the ‘self portrayal’ that ‘enables
a society to know its own identity.’
104
In a lament, Tony Moore, Death or Liberty (2010), 397 says:
‘All of these rebels and reformers [political prisoners transported to Australia] agreed that a
republic was more than simply replacing the monarch with a president. A republic was about
liberty, extended to all citizens through thoroughly democratic institutions and bills of rights.
This plant, which republican poet Henry Lawson called the Young Tree Green, broke the soil in
the 1880s but was trodden down in the rush to Federation and imperial war.’
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1906, the state and not the people carried the burden of delivering necessary social
infrastructure – often supplied without cost to the people.

In New South Wales, for a long time the only avenue for the people to participate in governance
would be state parliament. But, as an institution, it was despised by the people as being ‘a
distinctly raffish and disreputable collection of politicians.’105 Even when unionists collectivised
in the late nineteenth century and formed the Labor Party, the desire for power and control
would quickly exclude the membership from having a deliberative right in the processes of
party governance.106 Such manoeuvres left little prospect for the development of a true civic
culture in the Putnam sense.107
In so far as Arnstein has argued that power has to be ‘taken by the citizens,’108 the history of the
development of representative democracy in Britain and Australia confirms the accuracy of the
intent of that statement. The analysis of the historical record in this research also suggests that
the concept of the people is elastic. When an elite obtains sovereign power it inevitably seeks to
retain that power until the citizens arise again and take power.109
Clark and other historians including Hobsbawm, O’Farrell and Moore,110 confirm that the
deliberate strategy of the British ruling class, especially after it secured its position following
the restoration of the monarchy in the seventeenth century, was to ‘concede token political
representation … to forestall more radical challenges to the dominant system.’111 In New South
Wales, whilst the accession of the political elite to power was not the result of violent
revolution, the strategy of government adopted in the colony demonstrates a similar propensity.
In the context of local governance, participation appears to have been nominal.
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John Hirst, 'Empire, State, Nation' in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds), Australia's Empire
(2009) , 149. This perception continues to linger. See Andrew Leigh, Disconnected (2010), 64-5. ‘What
matters in terms of civic engagement and social capital …[is] whether [the people] are politically active.’
Leigh then cites Chris Puplick’s 1994 book, Is the Party Over? The future of the Liberals, (1994) and the
comment Puplick attributes to ‘an early significant figure in the Liberal Party’ who said that those who
join political parties are ‘the mad, the lonely, and the ambitious.’
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Rodney Cavalier, Power Crisis: The Self-Destruction of a State Labor Party (2010), 14. Cavalier
chronicles the origins of the administration of the Labor party from its inception in the 1890’s. He
suggests that at its inception the party was controlled by its members. But at the annual conference in
1916 the party was ‘captured by a group calling themselves the Industrialists.’ After 1916 the party ‘was
under the control of affiliated trade unions’ in whose care it remains.
107
See above n 101.
108
Arnstein, above n 85, 222.
109
Mannheim, above n 62, 149. As Mannheim suggests: ‘Once tyranny is in the saddle, however, civic
resistance has meagre means at its disposal.’
110
See chapter 4.6 below.
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Anna Clark, 'Review: Changing Concepts of Citizenship: Gender, Empire, and Class' (2003) 42(2) The
Journal of British Studies 263, 266.
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It is arguable that those representing the people have never believed for one moment that the
people should actually have power.112 In Australia, the ideology of private property (particularly
its manifestation in the ratepayer ideology) would dominate political and social thought. The
apathy of the people towards participation would stifle opportunities to develop a civic culture.
Larcombe suggests that this led to the state government capitalising on the void created to
‘tamper with local government politically, and to damage its prestige.’113

Once the power to control governance is taken, the question that immediately arises is how the
power of control is to be exercised. The decision rests on the structural paradigm that wields
power. Whether or not the experience of governance is socially inclusive (or participatory)
depends upon whether the power of parliament is exercised according to either the ‘bureaucratic
or technical’ theory or the ‘participatory’ theory of democracy. It is only the latter which is seen
as ‘pluralist’ or ‘social democratic’ in its approach. 114

Modern land use planning law can therefore properly be described as a creature of the industrial
revolution; but only in a derivative form. It was the industrial revolution that created the need
for planning law. The struggle for power between the government and the people over who
should control the neighbourhoods continues. The EP&A Act signalled a paradigm shift to a
socially inclusive approach to planning. The express objects of the Act evoked the philosophy
of participatory governance. However, since its inception, parliament has ensured that it, and
not the people, has had the final say in what development will occur in the neighbourhoods of
the people.

2.5

What should the role of public participation be?

As will become apparent from the discussion in this section, to avoid what McAuslan describes
as the ‘confusion, disarray and sharp conflict’ in the planning system,115 a social policy choice
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Uhr, above n 59, 61. As Uhr notes, in the Burkean theory of representative government:
‘[T]he people lack “experience in business” and experience “of speculation in the closet”
(Burke 1963, 322). Yet despite their inexperience in government and philosophy, the people are
effectively the voice of political authority – even if sovereignty is never formally assigned to
them.’
Representation then is ‘a control for but not upon the people.’ (emphasis in original)
113
FA Larcombe, The Advancement of Local Government in New South Wales 1906 to the Present
(1973), 1.
114
M. Parnell, 'Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making' (2007) EDOSA Research Paper
<http://www.edo.org.au/edosa/research/aialpaper.htm> at 7 October 2007.
115
McAuslan, above n 33, 269.
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needs to be made in relation to the role of public participation in the land use planning
processes. The role for public participation could be as nominal as being the end consumer of a
product made available by the market. That outcome is possible under planning regimes
constructed according to both the ideology of private property and the public interest. The
conscious choice that is made in either case is to exclude public participation from the land use
planning processes. It is only in the circumstance where participation is intended to be
meaningful that consideration needs to be given to the task of making participation relevant.

2.5.1

Participation as Consumer

Under market theory, cities are such complex organisms that it is best not to try to plan for
future outcomes.116 No conscious decision is made other than the individual decision of the
transactors in the market to participate in the exchange of property rights. The role of the
government is passive. It is there to facilitate the transaction. The function of law is to uphold
the institution of property. In this reality, the people become consumers in the property market.
Every individual decision to purchase land or undertake development will impact on a locality;
but only in an incremental and unconscious fashion.117 The shape and nature of the locality will
be determined over time by the application of the ‘subdivision rule’ and by the price
mechanism.118 Public participation occurs as a function of consumerism only.119

In contrast, land use planning decisions require a conscious decision about the expected future
built form of a locality. Decisions taken by government to impose planning instruments impact
upon citizens because the plan is intended to shape the nature and character of future
development that might occur in a locality. Planning laws therefore have both societal and local
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Moroni, above n 53, 146. Moroni acknowledges the neo-liberal argument is that ‘it is both impossible
and undesirable to (authoritatively) plan complex social systems’ such as cities.
117
Juval Portugali, 'Learning From Paradoxes about Prediction and Planning in Self-Organizing Cities'
(2008) 7(3) Planning Theory 248, 257. Portugali goes so far as to suggest that cities are ‘dual selforganising systems’ (emphasis in original). Significantly, in such complex social systems:
‘the interacting elements in such systems are agent and not parts, that is, entities that have
cognitive capabilities such as learning, thinking, decision-making and the like; one of these
capabilities is planning – agents plan and take decisions according to their past experience
(learning) and their plans.’ In this system, ‘an individual, a household, a private company or the
city’s planning authority, is a planner at a certain scale.’
118
Webster and Lai, above n 22, 11.
119
As Rosemary Lyster et al, Environmental and Planning Law in New South Wales (2 ed, 2009), 28
note:
‘in a market the only type of participation that is recognized is financial participation by those
who can afford to enter the market. Clearly, the goal of efficiency, well served by the market, is
often at odds with the principle of equity.’
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impacts. For example, when a decision is made to adopt a policy to favour urban consolidation,
a deliberate choice is made by government to intervene in the operation of the market. The
government is expressing the desire to achieve some built form outcome which it perceives the
market cannot deliver without the planning instrument. In this scenario, the process does not
require the people to participate.120 The government can make the relevant decisions as the
representatives of the people, if necessary, calling in aid experts in various fields.

In this bureaucratic scenario, the citizens do not have power (in the Arnstein sense) in the
decision-making processes leading to the making of the planning instrument or the individual
decision to approve development. The people may be consulted and asked to comment, but this
is tokenistic participation. In this reality, the people are, in the planning law context, mere
subjects under law.121 The function of public participation is as consumers of the product
delivered as a result of the operation of the plan.

2.5.2

Self-Interested Participation

Whilst it may be correct, as Portugali suggests,122 that it is not possible to predict (and therefore
to legislate for) changes in localities over time, this does not mean that the community has no
interest in the resultant built form of the neighbourhood. This ‘public’ interest continues to be
reflected within daily newspapers, not uncommonly, on the front page.123 The frequency with
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Scholars such as Jacobs, above n 25, 111, would suggest that participation may be an anathema to the
desirable outcome. As Jacobs suggests:
‘personal liberty and individual action cannot secure the environmental benefits people seek. I
do not have freedom to choose clean air if the city streets are clogged with cars. My personal
liberty to spend a weekend in the countryside is meaningless if my favourite landscape has been
turned into a motorway. I do not have the choice of protecting my children from future insecurity
if everyone else continues to burn fossil fuels at current rates.’
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Keane, above n 61, 867. Keane says that a ‘cheer’ should be given to democracy ‘for democratic
power-sharing [which is] the best human weapon that has ever been invented against the folly and hubris
that always comes with concentrations of unaccountable power.’
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Portugali, above n 117, 250, notes that ‘current urban theory suggests that cities are complex, selforganising and non-linear systems and that as a consequence their future behaviour is in essence not
predictable.’
123
The examples are numerous. The debate and interest generate headlines: see News Review, 'The
Question: Should Sydney have more high-rise apartments?' Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 30-31
October 2010, 12. The SMH noted that with ‘Sydney’s population forecast to hit 6 million by 2030, the
pressure on housing will be enormous.’ Four ‘experts’ we invited to comment. Architect Craig Allchin
noted that ‘[c]hanging the city’s housing stock to a more appropriate form is an inherently difficult
process.’ Aaron Gadiel, described as a developer, suggested ‘[t]own planning laws are being used as a
tool to deprive Sydneysiders of housing choice, affordable living and good access to public transport.’
Tony Recsei, (of the political party Save our Suburbs) described as ‘the resident’, said that ‘[u]nwilling
communities should not be made to endure yet more high-rise housing and an inferior quality of life.’
Bill Randolph, described as the academic, argued that ‘[t]he current debate is unsophisticated and driven
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which planning matters are being politicised, made the subject of newspaper reports, media
comment and the subject of investigations by the Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC),124 suggests that there is genuine public interest in the outcome of planning and
investment decisions. The people seem to have an idealised notion of the neighbourhood that is
offended by unsympathetic approvals.125

Brown and Sherrard suggested, as early as the 1950s, that in democratic society participation
should be one of the ‘primary political objectives’ of the community.126 Individual decisions
made to reside in a locality, to purchase land, to build or renovate a dwelling have real meaning
to both the person who makes that decision and to their community. There is in fact a
community of interest as these decisions are interrelated. The externalities of locality impact on
the subjective enjoyment of being resident in a place as well as on the financial decision made
to invest capital in a locality and/or to exploit an investment opportunity. As Kelly observes,
amenity is a notion which ‘is easy for constituents and politicians to grasp.’127 Consequently,
decisions made by others in a locality impact directly upon the perceived amenity of the locality
and its attractiveness as an investment opportunity.128

Davies and Whinston argued, as early as 1966, that the property value implications of
residential amenity were ‘so obvious as hardly to merit discussion.’129 Historically, this is why
communities in the twentieth century sought to influence decisions made about development in

by very partial views: the developers (build anything, build often) the BANANAs (build absolutely
nothing anywhere near anyone) and the politicians (build it where we can get away with it).’
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Öncü suggests that the concept of an ‘ideal home’ is a ‘global myth in the sense of discursive construct
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government level?' (2006) 13(4) Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 243, 245.
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Otto A Davies and A B Whinston, ‘Chapter 3: The Economics of Urban Renewal’ in James Q Wilson
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the locality.130 Whether the decision is about the type of zone to be applied, or the type of
particular development proposed for a site; there is both self-interest and community interest in
the outcome of the resultant planning decision.131

2.5.3

Public Participation as ideology

McAuslan first articulated his public participation ideology in 1980.132 To invite pubic
participation suggests, at a normative level, that legislation intended to regulate development in
a locality will have a socially inclusive mechanism. If it was intended that the citizens should
have power in the plan-making and/or decision-making processes, legislative mechanisms
would be present to facilitate this.133 What is required, McAuslan suggests, is legislation which
provides for:
‘participation in such a way that the right of the public to participate [is] separate and
independent from the bodies whose proposals and plans were to be the subject of
participation.’134

The historical discussion in chapter 5 demonstrates that legislation to give effect to this ideology
is yet to be enacted in NSW. In that context, the discussion in this research is reflective of the
on-going debate which Geddes describes as being between the theories of ‘managerialism and
democracy.’135 The aim of the government, expressed in the 2009 Standing Committee report,136
is to deliver ‘Australia’s best planning system.’137 Yet the report noted that the committee ‘did
not receive much evidence to suggest how community engagement could or should be
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improved.’138 If any resultant reforms do not empower the people, then they will be, in essence,
socially exclusionary in their operation.

If democracy in operation means the ‘open weighing of contending opinions about how best to
protect the diverse interests of society against the partial interests of any ruling group,’139 then
the functional model for participation will be one which, as Bora and Hausendorf suggest,
‘prove[s] itself in terms of social positions emerging in the course of the participation
process.’140 That is, a legislative structure that is dynamic but which allows for ‘mutual
resonance among the social positions involved.’141

If the public interest in planning decisions is to be informed by participation, then it could be
assumed that the system created to determine both the nature of the local plan and also
applications for development under the local plan would facilitate the views of the community
being not just heard, but heeded.142 After all, the community is simply seeking to protect both
proprietary rights and its ‘community’ interest in the neighbourhood.143 It is at this intersection
of rights that planning law has its genesis. The subjugation of the individual’s property rights
was a concomitant outcome of the necessity to create civil society.

2.5.4

Participation to create an umwelt

The people who control the development of land create the ‘umwelt’ of the neighbourhood.144
Equality and access to power are essential to a functioning democracy.145 It is at this junction of
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property rights and land use planning laws that the concept of public interest needs to be
considered more closely.146 If land use planning is to facilitate the life of the people living in a
neighbourhood, then the planning laws should aim to respect the principle of the
neighbourhood.147
Brown and Sherrard expected that participation would lead to this occurring ‘spontaneously.’148
This is a different type of spontaneity to that which occurs by reason of the operation of the
market. Markets rely on the price mechanism and the application of the subdivision rule to
unconsciously determine the nature of the built form of the neighbourhood.149 Over time, by the
fractionalisation of property rights, neighbourhoods would form and reform. Depending on the
choices made by participants, even failed outcomes would lead to new opportunities.150

If the people and not the market are to determine the nature of development that is to occur in
the neighbourhood, then the choice comes down to the adoption of the public interest ideology
or the public participation ideology.151 It is only the latter ideology that is socially inclusive. For
that path to be taken, government will have to share power. An opportunity emerges with the
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call for reform to the structure of the current planning system. The government could change its
strategy towards participation. Or perhaps the process of review could lead to a ‘republican
moment’ in the approach of the people towards participation in planning?152

2.6

What is the relevance of History?

History gives an answer to the structural question of how people become relevant in social
systems. Democratic societies trace their roots to Athenian democracy. It was born out of
urbanisation and of the desire by the people to participate in the governance of local matters.
But as Keane notes, Athenian democracy was ‘rooted’ in two centuries of struggle by the
middle class to be seen as ‘the political equals of the old aristocratic lords of the city.’153

The Athenian democratic period also spawned a built form that is treasured today as a global
heritage. Yet Athenian democracy was itself displaced by the autocratic Roman state which
dominated the then known world subsequently for some seven centuries. As is demonstrated in
chapter 3, Roman civilization was based on capitalism.154 Out of the fall of the Roman Empire
emerged the independent cities of Europe. The medieval city would be the impetus for the
renaissance of the ideal of citizen participation. As Isin points out, it was in the twelfth century
that participation in civic affairs emerged once again as a function of governance. Cities again
‘defined the sphere of citizenship.’155
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The second millennium would see Britain discard feudalism early among western cultures.
Feudalism did not promote participation. As is discussed in chapter 4, a capitalist class would
develop out of the mercantile period of the sixteen and seventeenth centuries. This new class of
people would seek to directly participate in the governance of the nation. They would take
participation seriously. In the process, the institution of property, rooted in the Roman system of
law, would morph into what Lenin would style (in 1916) as ‘monopoly capitalism.’156

Imperialism and the emergence of nation-states from the nineteenth century, fuelled by social
change wrought by industrialisation, impelled greater state control over the lives of people.157
Within democracies such as Britain, the public interest ideology would begin to dominate over
the private property ideology. Mannheim’s ‘creative politics,’158 or as Pope characterises it, ‘the
placing of the general good ahead of personal gratification,’159 became the strategy of
governments in both Britain and Australia.160

Over time, urban planning would move from the study of heroic architectural and engineering
feats,161 and into the realm of social engineering.162 The nineteenth century would see firstly, the
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enactment of laws aimed at alleviating the poor living conditions of the bulk of the citizens;163
and secondly, the passing of land use planning laws. Initially in Britain,164 and later in
Australia,165 bureaucratic governance models evolved to regulate land development. These new
laws facilitated an intrusion by government into a domain previously the exclusive realm of the
private sector. These laws initially had participatory elements through the introduction of the
inquiry processes.166 But ultimately, planning laws remained faithful to the public interest
ideology.

stunted the intellectual development of the [planning] discipline and prevented town planning as
a professional and intellectual field from contributing usefully to the debates which eroded its
philosophical foundations.’
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2.6.1

Participation in History

In the 1960s, Arnstein formulated her ladder of citizen participation as a provocative typology.
It was done to encourage dialogue towards the empowerment of the people in land use decision
making. To Arnstein, ‘citizen participation is citizen power.’167 She was of the view that
historically, where power has been shared with citizens ‘it was taken by the citizen, not given by
the city’168. This reflects the historical reality of the struggle of the people to have a say in their
governance. Planning law was born out of the wider struggle of the people to have a voice in the
corridors of power. That struggle continues.
As is suggested above,169 it would not be until the late nineteenth century that McAuslan’s
public interest ideology would first manifest itself in legislation enacted by the UK
parliament.170 The nation-state, which in large measure had been created in the nineteenth
century by virtue of ‘popular participation’,171 used its power to control the development of land
for seemingly public benevolent reasons.172 The public interest ideology has continued to hold
sway in the corridors of power in both the United Kingdom and Australia since that time.173

The historical analysis in chapter 4 demonstrates that it took centuries for some of ‘the people’
in England to have the right to participate in government, to be ‘the state’. Once that right was
achieved, the state changed its governance strategy.174 The new political elite, whilst purporting
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to govern ‘in the name of the people,’175 in reality governed for its own self interest. It
conferred benefits on a select few under the protection of the private property ideology.176 This
suggests a close relationship exists between law and power. This pattern of governance can
trace its origins to Ancient Rome. McAuslan’s theory of the private property ideology holds true
to an analysis of the civil law of Rome.

Resolving the question of which ideology should guide land use planning law will be an
important issue in this century. The scale of urbanisation post industrialisation has continued to
grow at such a pace that it is predicted that in the not too distant future, half of the world’s
population will live in cities.177 Between 1994 and 2025 the rate of urbanisation will have
doubled.178 If that should become the reality, then new models of land use planning will have to
be devised to facilitate built forms to accommodate the anticipated population growth. Every
city in every nation will confront the problem of where to house all the people.

2.6.2

History and Modernity

What is the relevance of history to this new and emerging urban dilemma?179 It is predicted that
Australia’s population will reach 36 million people in 2050.180 That suggestion alone generates
debate.181 How will we as a society accommodate that population, will we cope?182 The
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challenge for government is how to respond.183 It is easy to suggest, as Bolt does, that the scale
of change will be such that even history will have little to offer by way of guidance.184 But
history has always been a guide to the solution to future problems. Portugali suggests that
history teaches us to be wary of planning paradoxes.185 History demonstrates that as population
grows there has always been a need, generated by demand for housing, to demolish
neighbourhoods to pave the way for development. Whilst it may seem to be a modern
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phenomenon, development pressure has historical antecedents.186 Baer recognises that ‘current
growth control disputes’… ‘re-enact and rehearse’ arguments ‘first uttered 400 years ago.’187

Whilst Bobbitt agrees that society will experience significant change in which nation-states will
give way to a ‘society of market-states,’188 he believes that history will be vital to understanding
the strategic choices facing society. Bobbitt sees the challenges of today as being
‘recombinations of choices confronted and resolved in the past.’189 Globalisation and the impact
of immigration are not new to history.190 History, viewed as it is through the lens of the
particular historian, frames the events which the passing of time has made static to explain those
events. As Monateri noted, all history is related to strategy:
‘If we remember that the understanding [of history] depends on adapting a framework,
the grouping of events depends on a theory, and the adoption of a theory depends on a
strategy.’ 191
In urban planning, strategies of the state are now implemented by land use laws.192 There are
renewed calls to change the current strategy for urban planning in NSW.193 Law is not made of
history; rather, it is made in history.194 Fukuyama was wrong when he predicted ‘the end of
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P. G. Monateri, 'Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the Western Legal Tradition'
(1999) 51 Hastings L.J. 479, 511.
192
Gleeson and Low, above n 9, 90-91: ‘The idea of societal planning, hitherto associated with dictatorial
regimes, had to be reconciled with democracy. … Such ideas provided the touchstone for public sector
planning all over the English-speaking world.’
193
Standing Committee Report, above n 36, 34:
‘There is a discernable trend in planning reform both nationally and internationally. This is a
sign of the times as all governments are confronting similar challenges. All governments have to
provide for growing and changing populations while managing and preserving their natural
resources. Similarly all governments need to meet the challenge of climate change while
fostering economic growth through sustainable development.’
194
Or as Portugali, above n 117, 254, suggests:
‘[P]redictions and plans, once produced, become participants in complex urban dynamics. This
is one of the main reasons why the ‘normal responses of market forces’ are hard to predict.’

49

history.’195 By remembering our history, we can see where strategies lead to. As Isin argues,
between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, ancient English cities were subjugated by the State.
These cities were reformulated as ‘a weapon of State authority, which interpreted local
autonomy as a creation of the State.’196 In the process, cities became ‘cities without citizens’
because local autonomy was lost.197 If we continue to atomise our conception of civic
involvement, reducing participation to the expression of an opinion in the ballot box or as a land
transaction, then there is little prospect that autonomy will be regained.

If, as is recognised by the Standing Committee report, the planning system in New South Wales
needs comprehensive reform,198 then does that suggest that the planning strategy adopted by the
state up to now has been misdirected?199 If so, what is the direction it should now take? A call
to embrace the ideology of public participation is a radical call to challenge the status quo. It is a
call to change history.200 As McAuslan suggests, it is a challenge to alter:
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Keane, above n 61, 667-70. Referencing Fukuyama’s book The end of History (1992), Keane says that
it seemed to Fukuyama that ‘[s]omething like the “end of history” was unfolding before the eyes of the
world.’ But the clocks did not ‘stand still.’ Keane suggests that what was occurring was the advent of the
‘third wave’ of democracy. See also Peter Hartcher, 'Facebook, thymos and the individual', Sydney
Morning Herald (Sydney), 25 January 2011, 13. Hartcher cites Fukuyama’s comment that:
‘[T]he triumph of democracy and the success of the market economy are due to the fact that
these are the political and economic systems that address the thymos, the deep need for the
recognition of the individual.’
Unfortunately, as history now shows, Fukayama went too far suggesting that ‘with the collapse of
communism and the triumph of democratic capitalism, human societies had reached the ultimate point of
political evolution.’ It is appropriate to heed Keane’s warning (671) that ‘history is not unidirectional, so
that waves of democratisation typically remain vulnerable to tidal reversals.’
196
Isin, above n 81, 56.
197
Ibid vii. As Isin notes:
‘We are citizens of nations. But, in the history of Western civilization, citizenship originated as
membership in the city as an institution. Both the Greek and Roman practices of citizenship were
inextricably associated with cities – polis and civitas. Yet neither the Greek polis nor the Roman
civitas was organised as a corporation. It was throughout the medieval centuries that this
association evolved into a unique practice of cities as corporations.’
198
Standing Committee Report, above n 36, 30. Unsurprisingly, the submission of the New South Wales
Government in evidence before the committee ‘argued that a fundamental review of the planning system
and the governing legislation … was not warranted nor is it a priority.’ The committee did not agree with
this submission, noting (at 31) that it could not ignore the weight of evidence and the ‘general consensus
on the need for a fundamental review …’
199
Webster and Lai, above n 22, 16, taking a general position from the perspective of the Austrian school
suggest:
‘Cities are highly complex systems and it should be of no surprise that attempts by any authority
to manage and plan by prescription frequently fail. Where such attempts do succeed it is likely to
be because the prescriptions – major infrastructure investments for example – have created
conditions within which a spontaneous, decentralised order can flourish.’
200
Mannheim, above n 62, 47:
‘Once the structure of society changes, its pressures and means of control will change
concomitantly. Accordingly, a new type of authority will be established, using new sanctions
against the non-conformist.’
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‘the existing state of property relations in society, the existing capitalist system with its
emphasis on private property and a functioning market for that property.’201

2.6.3

Participation Australian Style

In Australia, the citizenry tends to take its democratic institutions for granted.202 As discussed in
chapter 4, the right to participate in governance, even to win the right just to vote has elsewhere
entailed struggle and sacrifice.203 Australians are fortunate in that these privileges have been
conferred without violent struggle. Meaney suggests that this is due to our colonial status and
our ‘Britishness.’204 Yet there are consequences flowing from that history.

As a polity, Australians have been happy to acquiesce in being governed. We are not prone to
participate in the institutions of civic society.205 The study of history can show that it is through
participation in institutions that the skills needed to participate in governance are learned.206

201

McAuslan, above n 33, 268-9.
John Hirst, Looking for Australia (2010), 256: ‘Politics is simply there. We appear sometimes to
believe that we have politics only because a few egomaniacs want to be politicians. To be suspicious of
politicians may be no bad thing. To be suspicious of politics is unhealthy for a free people.’ Keane, above
n 61, xiii, suggests that the point that needs to be hammered home is that ‘forgetting, or remembering the
wrong things, is dangerous for democracy, and that things that seem timeless are never so.’
203
In the Anglo-Australian context, this struggle dates to end of Roman civilization in Britain in 407CE
and traces a line through the Norman Invasion of 1066, Magna Carta in 1215, the Tudor reformation and
the Civil War culminating in the Bill of Rights of 1688 and the Great Reform Act of 1832. The British
experience was also greatly influenced by the trauma of the American Declaration of Right in 1776 and
the French Revolution of 1789. Under fear of experiencing a similar fate, the British parliamentary
system was reformed in the nineteenth century.
204
Neville Meaney, ''In History's Page': Identity and Myth' in Deryck Schreuder (ed), Australia's Empire
(2008) , 363-5. Colonial Australia was the beneficiary of the struggle of others in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries for democratic rights. As Meaney notes:
‘The [Australian] colonists constructed their new political system in the classical period of
British Liberalism. … Identifying with Whig history of the English Civil War and the ‘Glorious
Revolution’ they turned to the most advanced reform movements in Britain, especially the
Chartists and Utilitarians, to find inspiration for their Antipodean commonwealth. …
Freed from the limiting prescriptive privileges of the Old World the Australian colonists
undertook to carry forward and develop further this inheritance of liberty.’
205
Leigh, above n 105, 13. Over the period between 1967-2004 the number of people that were ‘active
members’ of two or more organisations dropped from 14% to 4%.
206
Richard Waterhouse, 'Settling the Land' in Deryck Schreuder (ed), Australia's Empire (2008) , 67. This
brings the discussion back to the ratepayer ideology discussed further in chapter 5. Waterhouse, in
examining the struggle between large and small scale agricultural production in the nineteenth century
Australia, identified three different value sets:
‘one related to entrepreneurship, which involved single-minded preoccupation with
accumulating wealth as quickly as possible; another to a reluctant self-sufficiency, with
aspirations to entrepreneurship; and a third grounded in an opposition to authority, a resentment
of squatters, and (especially from the 1890s) a commitment to mateship.’
To create a participatory culture, these values need to be melded into a participatory ethos.
202

51

The experience of democracy in New South Wales has been anti-participatory.207 In the ideation
of the people, urban planning was an irrelevance because of the vastness of the continent that
had to be conquered.208 As Kelly and Stoianoff note, public attention was initially focused on
establishing a representative assembly.209 But the intent was to secure from the Imperial
parliament local power over governance to maintain control over land.210 Those large
landowners took the view, according to Manning Clark, that ‘[w]hen ever the principle of
property came into collision with the equality principle the former must prevail.’211 If the landed
elite had had their way, they would have maintained control over government to the exclusion
of the people to ensure that the property rights of those owning land were protected.212

Without government interference to shape how land is to be developed, the market will
determine the ultimate built form of the city.213 Those with capital will have the power to buy
land and develop it. Arnstein is correct. The only way that the people can share power is if it is
‘wrested’ from the powerful.214 If that is so, then to win the right to participate in land use
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The exception may be the Federation Conventions. Hirst, above n 105, 152-3, notes that:
‘Part of the inspiration of the leaders of the federal movement was that federation would carry politics to
a new level. A parliament dealing with the life and destinies of a nation would be a grander and nobler
institution than the parliaments that haggled over local infrastructure.’
The result, he suggests, was that the federation referendums were ‘an amazing democratic exercise.’
208
Waterhouse, above n 206, 67:
‘The squatting leaseholds hindered the establishment and growth of rural towns in nineteenthcentury Australia for they acted as barriers to significant population increases.’ It would be the
discovery of gold and the extension of the Railway that would ‘result in significant rural
population growth.’
209
Andrew Kelly and Natalie P Stoianoff, 'Local Government Rates in New South Wales, Australia: An
Environmental Tax' in A Cavaliere et al (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation (2006) vol III,
540.
210
Douglas Pike, Australia: The Quiet Continent (1962), 87:
‘Although pastoralists welcomed the grant of political power [in 1842], they were no better
placed to get land on their own terms, and that was what they wanted most of all.’
211
Michael Cathcart (ed), Manning Clark's History of Australia (1993), 210.
212
Ibid, 211. As Manning Clark notes:
‘This group, composed of exclusivists and emancipists, anti-transportationists and protransportationists, survivors from and inheritors of old family feuds, united in their determination
not to allow the lower middle-class men of Sydney to use the institutions of the free either to
destroy the sheep-walk of New South Wales or to create a Yankee-style democratic, egalitarian
republic.’
213
Webster and Lai, above n 22, 20-1:
‘What can be said about the congestion and evolution of the city as a whole is true of the parts of
the city. Neighbourhoods change – rapidly or imperceptibly; by intrinsic or extrinsic influences;
by market activity or government activity. Citizens standing to lose from the emerging order
may react by exit or by voice. New spontaneous order emerges in response to exit, and new
planned order emerges in response to voice.’
214
Arnstein, above n 85, 222.
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planning decisions the people may have to raise their ‘voice’ and declare their rights.215 The
question is whether or not this is possible?

2.6.4

Participation and Democracy

As Maddox reminds us, it was Aristotle that argued that the role of the state is that of ‘procuring
for us the good life.’216 The study of the history of the struggle of the people to ideate an
entitlement to, and then take, sovereignty, illuminates the difficulties confronting the people if
government will not willingly share power. Even democratic governments can have a quasityrannical nature if a political elite controls the parliament. The American Revolution was
framed around the catchcry of no taxation without representation. But even when representation
is achieved, that does not guarantee that the government will be a government of the people. As
will be seen in chapter 4, at every step, the people of England had to apply pressure to the
governing elite to make their voice heard.

If the state is to recreate the NSW planning system, should the new system be based on the
current model which is squarely based on the ideology of the public interest? If the right to
participate is a fundamental right, then should it be restricted to just a right to be consulted? Or
should the citizens be empowered in the planning process such that their contribution has the
prospect of influencing the decision-maker? If history is a guide then two things are certain:
firstly, the market is disinterested about the creation of a planned space.217 According to market
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Under conditions of perceived, if not actual, tyranny the people of England (more than once), the
United States and France (and of course, other peoples) have all at one time needed to take a stand against
government. In Australia, the skirmish that was Eureka stands in stark contrast to the measured way in
which the colonists approached federation. Violent uprising seems not to be an Australian way.
216
Graham Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice (1985), 20 (emphasis in original).
Maddox suggests that:
‘The state exists, then, for the purpose of security, but, as Aristotle argued so long ago, it
acquires the role of procuring for us the good life. There is obviously much room for controversy
about what “the good life” is, and various philosophies and creeds have their suggestions to
make. We could argue that the functions of the state should progress from the basic protection of
life and limb to providing minimal economic security for all. As soon as we go this far, however,
we enter the realm of political doctrine, for if the state is to provide goods and services to the
poor or otherwise disadvantaged, these goods have to be provided from somewhere, and bitter
controversy may result from the necessary reallocation of resources.’
217
Body-Gendrot, above n 88, 227. Body-Gendrot argues that:
‘the market does not favour cohesiveness but generates tensions: it reinforces economic polarisation and
inequalities in cities, the recomposition of space unveils power conflicts among major actors, and
hundreds of thousands of marginalized people and their children may use their “voice” as a threat to
express their claims.’
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theory, order will happen organically.218 Secondly, the state will not willingly share power with
the people.

In introducing planning legislation in 1945 the New South Wales government avowedly did so
to democratise the planning process.219 If that was the government’s intention then it failed in its
endeavours. By 1976 a new call for reform of the planning system to make provision for proper
public participation was heard by the government.220 Once again, the rhetoric of the new
legislation (introduced by a subsequent Labor government) would appeal to democratic
principles by invoking the cause of increasing opportunities for participation. Both the earlier
and later legislative models, examined in chapter 5 using Bora and Hausendorf’s methodology,
disclose that these Acts contain socially exclusionary mechanisms. If we are to avoid repeating
the mistakes of the past, we must remember our history. If the exhortation of 1945 for planning
to be democratic is to become a reality,221 then the ideology of public participation will need a
champion in parliament.

Bobbitt says that ‘history is the medium by which the legitimacy of the constitutional structure
is married to the success of the strategy of the state.’222 In the next two chapters the exclusionary
strategies of governance essential to the ideologies of private property and the public interest are
examined in an historical context. Socially exclusive strategies disempower the people. History
suggests that socially exclusive strategies are only successful under a model of governance that
allows the state to impose its rule over the people, irregardless of the concerns of the people.223
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Webster and Lai, above n 22, 20:
‘The co-operative patterns in a city adjust in response to secular changes in congestion, crime,
pollution and other social costs. Firms change suppliers, location, and market strategy.
Individuals change shopping destinations, places of schooling, locations of work, outlets for
leisure activities and modes of transport.’
219
Planning laws were first introduced in NSW via the enactment of the Local Government (Town and
Country Planning) Amendment Act (NSW) 1945 which introduced Part XIIA into the Local Government
Act 1919. Writing in 1946 on the achievements of the McKell government, the ALP suggested that the
reason for the legislation was to arrest ‘the haphazard and unregulated growth of New South Wales
during the past 153 years..’ - see Australian Labour Party, Five critical years: story of the McKell Labour
government in New South Wales, May 1941-May 1946 (1946), 48. This discussion is developed in chapter
5.3 below.
220
NSW Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 30 March 1976, Hansard 4910 Hon Mr Healey
Minister for Planning (second reading speech Environmental Planning Bill):
‘There has long been widespread dissatisfaction with the planning provisions of the Local
Government Act, 1919, which were considered to be too cumbersome and time-consuming, led
to excessive involvement of the state planning body in matters of purely local significance and
made no provision for proper public participation in the planning process.’
221
The comments of the Minister to the County of Cumberland Council quoted in Chapter 1 n 1 above.
222
Bobbitt, above n 103, 207.
223
Whilst market theorists are sceptical about rigid state governance, they view democratic approaches to
solutions of urban planning as being problematic. As Webster and Lai, above n 22, 149, suggest:
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An historical review of the origins of McAuslan’s ideologies of planning is illuminating in that
regard. That review begins in the next chapter with a consideration of the origins of the ideology
of private property.

‘[t]he danger of relying on the public to safeguard the interests of future generations through
democratic processes is that too little action emerges because of various collective action
problems.’
And this is why the ideology of public interest resonates so easily with the ideology of property.
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Chapter 3:

The Origins of the Ideology of Property

‘While many of Shanghai’s colonial-era architectural treasures are being restored, bulldozers have razed
whole neighbourhoods so the city can look as modern and shiny as possible’

Malcolm Moore1

‘Totalitarian movements find their most fertile soil in the political anomie that results from stalemated
politics and popular disempowerment.’

James Pope2

3.1

Introduction

The planning law of New South Wales is a product of modern British industrial history. The
express strategy for the historical excursus in this research into the later Roman period in
Roman Britain is to examine an emerging civil society where there was effectively no role for
public participation in the decisions made about the operation of that society. This will connect
the discussion to the examination (in the next chapter) of the long struggle over the course of the
second millennium by the people of Britain for the right to participate in their own governance.
The market theory argument,3 reflected in McAuslan’s ideology of private property, posits that
it is not necessary for the people to consciously plan for social outcomes. Despite our selfinterest, people will generally promote the interests of society ‘more effectually’ than they
intend to by the choices they make.4 The unconscious operation of the market will produce

1
Malcolm Moore, 'China's Rock of Gibraltar develops', Sun Herald (Sydney), 12 February 2010, 17. The
reconstruction was occurring ahead of the World Expo in Shanghai in 2010. Autocracies have the luxury
of being able to make grand planning decisions.
2
James Gray Pope, 'Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order' (1990) 139(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 289, 323.
3
See above, chapter 2.2.
4
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (2010), 240. As Smith argued:
‘by directing [a person’s] industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, he
intends only his own gain: and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to
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socially desirable outcomes, over time.5 In fact, Pennington argues that land use planning is not
necessary because modern liberalism ‘represents a rationally chosen set of practices designed to
maximise individual liberty and to enable the fulfilment of individual ends.’6

Yet, sometimes the ends desired by an individual are communal in nature. Today, what happens
in the local neighbourhood is often a matter where the individual, as a member of a community,
desires to assert a right to have a ‘say’ in its local political affairs. Webster and Lai suggest that
in a functioning urban market economy, the people in that market have both of Hirshman’s
choices: exit and voice.7 But is that right? Roman civilization had a functioning market
economy for centuries but the people did not have the voice option. Roman society highlights
that if we abandon land use planning to the operation of the market, then the government will be
absent from the field of play (except as enforcer of the rules of exchange). In such a state of
affairs how do people exercise the voice option?

promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for society that it
was no part of it. By promoting his own interest, he frequently promotes that of society more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.’
5
Mark Pennington, 'Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy' (2003) 51(4)
Political Studies 722, 724. Pennington, putting the Habermas position, neatly captures the competing
arguments as follows:
‘The price system operates as a veil, concealing from people how their actions impinge on the
lives of others and prevents individuals from thinking about how to coordinate their activities in
ways promoting the benefit of society as a whole. In contrast, democratic deliberation of social
affairs offers the prospect of more “holistic” decision-making practices, enabling people to
reassert active control over the direction of social and economic life through conscious collective
action (Adaman and Devine, 1997).’
Pennington goes on to argue (727) the Hayekian position that the price mechanism is superior because is
better at enabling people to learn and adapt in a ‘world of chronic ignorance.’
6
Ibid, 723. Pennington also notes:
‘Individuals are, according to this view, rational agents capable of designing a social system
conducive to the fulfilment of their ends (as, for example, in Rawlsian social contract theory)
and, if left free to do so, of acting in order to attain these ends in the most efficient way (as, for
example, in neo-classical economics).’
7
Christopher Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai, Property Rights, planning and markets: managing
spontaneous cities (2003), 19-21. Webster and Lai cite A Hirschman, Exit voice and loyalty, Cambridge
MA, Harvard University Press, 1970. This work specifically relates to employee responses to
unsatisfactory organisational situations but Webster and Lai suggest that markets (both economic and
political) respond to over-congestion by individuals making decentralised decisions (exit) and by
governments making centralised decisions in response to citizens ‘voice’:
‘Firms and individuals make demands for law and policy that better reflect their private property
and give greater security of rights over shared goods and services including neighbourhood
facilities and environments – often at the expense of other groups.’ …‘Citizens standing to lose
from the emerging order may react by exit or voice. New spontaneous order emerges in response
to exit, and new planned order emerges in response to voice.’
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The historical analysis in this chapter explores the origins of the private property ideology from
its genesis in the foundations of classic legal tradition.8 This ideology held sway in Britain until
the twentieth century when it was challenged by the emergence of the public interest ideology.
The analysis confirms that the market does not necessarily require democratic governance for its
operation.9 The market can operate effectively under a system of governance where patronage
prevails. Provided the state can maintain order, market transactions are facilitated. The analysis
in this chapter also confirms the validity of McAuslan’s proposition that the law does not
provide a ‘neutral framework for the exercise of power.’10 It is suggested that in the absence of
participatory structures to guide the operation of the market, the risk for society is that the
spontaneous order that emerges will be potentially be despotic in character.

3.2

Market Theory and Land Use

Samuel argues that Roman civilization is the ‘starting point for any society that wished to
adhere to the notion of private wealth and (to a greater or lesser extent) individualism.’11 Whilst
Colish sought to show in her well argued paper that in Roman law, legislation was used as a
‘catalyst for social change desired by the legislator;’12 the Roman state did not introduce laws
directed to advance the public interest. Roman society did not accommodate either civic
participation or the ideation of egalitarianism. It was, fundamentally, a discriminatory society. It
was built on slavery and was rigidly divided by class. The state generally did not intervene in
the private sphere; legislation was minimal. As Yntema shows, such legislation as existed was

8

WG De Burgh, The Legacy of the Ancient World (1961), 315. De Burgh posed the question what did the
establishment of the Roman Imperial system mean for the Roman world? He answered the question thus:
‘It is in the equable adjustment of taxation, in the impartial administration of law, in the
founding of cities and public works, in the unimpeded development of commerce, in the
extension of citizen privileges and local self-government, which for the first time opened up
wide prospects of advancement for all freemen, and, above all, in the effective defence of the
frontiers and maintenance of universal peace, that the true nature of the imperial system is
disclosed.’
9
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 53:
‘the market requires the state, in particular the institutional frameworks it creates, in order to
operate efficiently. … Markets and prosperity flourish under freedom of action but, without
rules, the costs of co-operating inevitably become too high.’
10
P McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980), 1.
McAuslan suggests that we should not have an uncritical acceptance of the role of law or assume that law
‘is not itself biased in any way for or against a particular philosophy or ideology governing the exercise of
that power.’ The thesis of his book was a ‘direct challenge’ to this standard orthodoxy.
11
Geoffrey Samuel, 'Roman Law and Modern Capitalism' (1984) 4 Legal Stud. 185, 187.
12
Marcia L. Colish, 'Roman Law of Persons and Roman History: A Case for an Interdisciplinary
Approach, ' (1974) 19 Am. J. Juris. 112, 127.
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‘limited to the terse enunciation of the basic principles of justice.’13 Any social change
implemented by Roman legislation was therefore directed towards propping up the prevailing
system. Even so, as Samuel argues, the Romans ‘were laying the structural foundations for our
modern western society.’14 It is from this foundation that planning law springs.15
Ancient Rome had the indicia of a functioning market economy.16 Rome was therefore the
nascent state where McAuslan’s private property ideology prevailed. It was a highly urbanised
and civilized society.17 In Roman society the people enjoyed: rights of citizenship; the benefit
of a rule of law; the institution of property; and competitive markets regulated by the price
mechanism. Money was the medium of exchange.18 Property rights were protected by the
Roman civil law system which had developed over centuries. The role of government, while
pervasive, was minimal. These are the conditions that promote the spontaneous order that
emerges under market conditions.19

The neo-liberal argument is that cities are complex social systems. The organising principle of
the theory is Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand.’20 The market is regulated by the institution of
private property.21 The market system is said to be superior because it confers ‘the greatest

13

Hessel E. Yntema, 'Roman Law and Its Influence on Western Civilization' (1949) 35 Cornell L. Q. 77,
84.
14
Samuel, above n 11, 187.
15
AJ Brown and HM Sherrard, Town and Country Planning (1959),13:
‘In spite of the centuries which divide us from the planning achievements of Greece and Rome,
the influence of their town building on all subsequent ages, including our own, has been
enormous.’
16
K Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1951), 126. Mannheim attributes to Rome
the ‘originally developed’ concept of property ownership. He believes that the Roman concept of property
‘grants to the owner unlimited use of his property including the right to destroy it, [a right] adopted in
legal reforms of the early capitalist era, and [which] has dominated the Western economic system ever
since.’
17
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 14. They suggest that cities ‘are systematic concentrations of individuals,
each of whom possessing distinct capabilities and who are densely bound together by webs of institutions
(informal and formal rules and sanctions).’ This definition aptly reflects conditions in Ancient Roman
cities.
18
Benjamin Geva, 'From Commodity to Currency in Ancient History--On Commerce, Tyranny, and the
Modern Law of Money' (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115, 140. In Geva’s view:
‘During the Roman Empire, metallic money acquired conclusively and irreversibly, the form of a
standardized small size metallic chattel, issued by the State and stamped by its authority with
certain marks and devices.’
19
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 13. Webster and Lai define this spontaneous order as:
‘the order that gives rise to families, households, clubs, firms and markets; to land and housing
markets; to urban labour markets; to neighbourhoods within cities; to transport systems that link
workers with work places; to cities themselves; and to systems of cities.’
20
Smith, above n 4, 240.
21
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 15. They define the institution of property as follows:
‘The institution of private property – a set of rules governing competition- achieves two
significant functions. On the one hand it transforms anarchy into a state of affairs in which the
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freedom to the greatest majority’ regardless of status.22 All that is needed is ‘the freedom for
individuals and firms to challenge existing market participants by offering better opportunities
than are currently available.’23 The lack of access to the necessary information required to plan
for the future in such a complex system means that success in planning is a ‘matter of chance.’24

Market theorists have a fascination for the spontaneous order that emerges from the apparent
chaos of the multitude of individual decisions made by people acting in their own self interest.25
Under this conceptualisation, by co-operating with others transacting in the market we produce
socially beneficial outcomes despite not intending to do so.26 In the context of land use, market
theorists such as Hayek, Friedman and others dating back to Adam Smith, suggest that it is the
dynamic of change and not deliberation that determines the form of the city.27 Market theory
suggests that because of the dynamic of market exchanges, the narrative of place is contested
regularly by the participants.28 Adam Smith’s invisible hand guides the outcome of these
interactions to bring about socially beneficial spontaneous order to the chaos.

full benefits of the division of labour and the associated accumulation of wealth in society are
possible by voluntary interaction. On the other hand, it also defines and protects an individual’s
liberties: the freedom to enjoy the use or exchange of possessions; the freedom from undue
influence with the fruits of labour by theft, slavery, violence from unreasonable government
exaction; the freedom from opportunism in exchanges with partners in the markets or
government; the freedom from unreasonable levels of external costs arising from other
individual’s production or exchanges of goods or services; and as an option, the freedom from
interacting with others altogether.’
22
Ibid 180:
‘A market system, however, confers the greatest freedom to the greatest majority in the sense
that the status of a person does not decisively dictate how much say he or she has in resource
allocation decisions – as is the case with co-operation based on personal relationships. Marketled cities will always be plagued by social problems of alienation, anomie and powerlessness,
yet they accommodate the generally peaceful and co-operative co-existence of a huge number of
individuals with different characters and ways of life.’
23
Mark Pennington, 'Citizen Participation, the 'Knowledge Problem' and Urban Land Use Planning'
(2004) 17(2-3) Review of Austrian Economics , 219.
24
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 16: ‘The order that emerges from government plans is therefore capricious,
and success in terms of a plan’s stated objectives is a matter of chance.’
25
Smith, above n 4, 240. Writing at the time of the American Revolution in 1776, Smith observed of
man: ‘By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it.’ In Smith’s model, the role of law is minimal. Smith suggests (at 286):
‘Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them
to divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the different employments carried on in it; as
nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interests of the whole society.’
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Pennington, above n 5, 726. Pennington argues that Hayek and the ‘Austrian School’:
‘do not assume that individuals are self-interested utility maximisers seeking to optimise a fixed
set of preferences. On the contrary, in Hayek’s view, progress is “a process of formation and
modification of the human intellect … in which our values and desires continually change”
(Hayek, 1960, p40).’ (emphasis in original)
28
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Under market theory, it is accepted that the market needs government to ensure that there are
‘rules’ to regulate competition within the market.29 The contested intellectual space is the degree
and nature of state intervention and whether the people should in fact have power to influence
decision-making at either the state or local level.30 For market theorists, it is not the role of
government to impose ‘order by the design of the few.’31 Webster and Lai suggest that marketorientated cities are superior to planned cities because ‘cities should not be managed on the
erroneous belief that planned order is the best guide to prosperity – or even justice and equity.’32
Pennington argues that the ideology of private property, unhindered by government intervention
in the private property market, best enables society to creatively adapt to social problems caused
by urban density.33 According to this view, if we let the market spontaneously evolve and if we
properly allocate property rights (even to the public goods domain), then spatial order ‘will
evolve by subdivision and aggregation of property rights.’34 The owner of the property rights

‘Spatial order emerges as individuals and firms seek locations that minimise both travel-related
transaction costs and information search costs and that balance these against congestion costs of
crowded cities. Public domain order emerges as individuals engage in collective action through
governments and other agencies to clarify property rights over jointly consumed goods
(externalities, public goods and natural resources) and thereby to reduce the costs of competition,
and in the extreme, the costs of anarchy.’
29
Ibid 53: ‘The lesson is that the market requires the state, in particular the institutional frameworks it
creates, in order to operate efficiently.’ Later (at 70) Webster and Lai confirm: ‘As the Monopoly supplier
of violence, the state has a fundamental role in creating a legal environment to market-based exchange
and economic growth.’
30
Michael J Jacobs, 'Sustainability and Community' (1995) 32(2) Australian Planner 109, 110. Jacobs,
who is not a market theorist but an advocate of sustainable development, argues for the retentions of
markets but suggests that governments ‘representing the community at large’ use the ‘power of
enforcement’ belonging to the state. Through laws and regulations, the state can ensure that uncontrolled
markets are ‘constrained’ in such a way that allow producers and consumers make autonomous decisions
that promote a sustainable society.
31
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 25. Significantly, they argue:
‘It was a natural step therefore for architects and engineers who found themselves asked to plan
whole towns, to think in terms of physical design and planned order – utopia by physical design.
The illusion started to crumble in many western countries as early as the 1960s when it became
clear that master plans with their architectural orientation were not effective urban development
or management tools in a mixed economy.’
32
Ibid, 26. They suggest (at 31) that: ‘Modern urbanisation is distinguished from its antecedents,
however, by the sophistication of its underlying market exchange systems and more specifically, their
capitalist nature.’ The consideration in this chapter suggests otherwise.
33
Pennington, above n 23, 218. The market does this in two ways:
‘First, the market acts as spontaneous co-ordinating procedure in which the changing ideas and
behaviour of individuals and firms are constantly adjusted to one another through the medium of
the price system. …
Second, the competitive market process acts as an inter-subjective discovery procedure in which
contradictory ideas widely dispersed amongst individuals and firms are constantly tested against
one another and where successful modes of action are disseminated via a process of emulation
(Hayek 1948, 1978).’
34
Webster and Lai, above n 7, 88:
In the spatially equilibrated neo-classical city … households pursue utility gains by moving
effortlessly to the city centre or to sources of local public goods. They live at higher density,
implying densification and innovation in the way existing property rights are subdivided and
new rights allocated.’
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will bear most of the transaction costs (success or failure). The resident’s involvement will be to
exercise the right of purchase (by acquisition of a subdivided right or by lease). In
neighbourhoods where the market has ‘failed’ to provide for the residents, they will exercise the
right of ‘exit’ or ‘voice.’35

Pennington suggests that there is ‘much greater scope for relying on property rights and market
process’ in support of his position that government land use planning has failed to ‘provide an
appropriate degree of experimentation’ for urban situations.36 It can be argued that Roman
civilization provides an example of an experiment in market theory outcomes.37 In ancient
Rome, economics and circumstance dictated how towns developed.38 According to Van Den
Bergh, the need to accommodate over a million people within the eight square miles of the
imperial urbs at Rome ‘necessitated high-rise building’.39 Only the rich could live in their own
home (or domus). The majority of people lived in rented insulae, large apartments of multi
storey construction.40 On the ground floor were industrial or commercial premises with
residential accommodation above. This type of accommodation seems, from the archaeological
record, to have been both aesthetically pleasing and economically attractive to the land-owner as
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Brown and Sherrard, above n 14, 125, citing H Charlton Bradshaw, ‘Restoration of Praeneste,’ (1923)
Town Planning Review, 53:
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an investment.41 Surprisingly, even modern social commentators like Farrelly can see the virtue
of these arrangements.42

3.3

Roman Law

In terms of McAuslan’s typology, Roman law was motivated by the private property ideology.
In Lockean terms, property was protected in Roman law by long established and understood
legal principles. There existed a system of law which facilitated the creation, recognition,
transfer and enforcement of property rights. However, there was no formal planning law. Absent
state confiscation for breaches of the law, a landowning citizen enjoyed the security of state
protected title. As is discussed in the next section, having an interest in land gave a citizen the
entitlement to enforce property rights, even against the state; a necessary precondition to civil
society in an urban environment. Land that was not in private hands belonged to the state as res
public or public land. The doctrine of tenure can by sourced to Roman law. Just as was the case
in England after the Norman Invasion of 1066, under Roman law territory seized by conquest
reverted to the Emperor and formed part of the Imperial Estate.

Britain was conquered in 43AD notionally by the Emperor Claudius following the military
success of Aulus Plautius and three legions. Claudius and later emperors could alienate the land
of Britain by gift or sale. If it remained part of the Imperial Estate it could be offered for lease to
private persons at public auction.43 This mechanism enabled the development of the conquered
territory in a fashion similar to the development of New South Wales following colonisation
after 1788. In the case of Roman Britain, land was regularly granted to veterans retiring from
the Roman army upon completion of twenty five years of military service. Granting leases of
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the Imperial Estate was a common way to facilitate the exploitation of mines and minerals as it
provided income both to the Emperor and the censors who controlled public land on his
behalf.44 It was an effective way to manage the public commons. Indeed, Webster and Lai
suggest that it was the ‘switch from private property rights’ that debased large tracts of land in
North Africa.45

Roman law was dynamic. Its substantial written tradition enabled trained lawyers to understand,
interpret and apply settled legal principles enunciated in earlier cases to the case at hand.
Zimmermann argues that this tradition was ‘Juristenrecht: it was not laid down in a systematic
and comprehensive enactment, but rather was applied and developed by lawyers with great
practical experience.’46 It was a very sophisticated system of jurisprudence, unlike any other
culture in the world of classical history.47 As Monateri notes, ‘jurisprudence was a national
science, because it was controlled by the same men as was political administration.’48

Romeo-Britons of the fourth century would have keenly understood the implications of the pax
romana.49 Over the previous centuries, the administration of civil society had become
specialised and heavily bureaucratised. Wherever Rome went, the system of Roman law
followed. The provinces were regulated by the lex provinciae a set of statutes common for the
provinces.50 By the fourth century, the office of praetor (or magistrate) had developed a form of
equitable jurisdiction which would also have applied in the provinces. As Culp Davis explains,
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this jurisdiction evolved ‘for the purpose of relieving the rigidities’ of the ius civile.51 In the
provinces, it was the Governor, legatus Augusti, who dispensed justice. The Governor was
directly responsible to and was appointed by the emperor.52

3.3.1

Roman Civil Law

Samuel notes that in Roman civil law, the ‘acquisition and keeping of property – of wealth –
was not the concern of the state.’53 The administration of the civil law, which included: contract,
property, mercantile, family and succession; was the domain of the courts and not the state.
Roman law recognised the ordinary right of contract to sell land res aliena.54 Actions could be
brought against municipal authorities for breaches of property rights.55 Land was a special
category of property known as res mancipi in that it could only be transferred by formal means.
It was in the law of property and contract, Bodenheimer argues, that the ‘particular genius’ of
Roman jurists found its ‘fullest expression.’56 Law would not develop to a level of
sophistication, in terms of its scale and complexity, until the eighteenth century and the
emergence of the British Empire.

Civil law was concerned with things which were in patrimonio or in commercio. Some things
were not capable of being reduced into private possession – res communes (belonging to the
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community such as market places, theatres and race courses), res pubicae (belonging to the state
such as rivers ports and highways) and res universitatum (belonging to mankind such as air,
running water and the sea).57 The law was pronounced by the governor in the courts of law
found in the towns and cities of the Empire. Legal disputes were resolved according to a highly
refined system of private law which was procedurally akin to the common law with formalised
causes of action and the equitable jurisdiction ‘introduced by the authority of a magistrate’.58
Provided an actionable interest could be identified, a remedy existed. There was even an actione
populares whereby a private citizen could take action to protect a public right, but generally, the
civil law operated within the sphere of private, not public law.59

3.3.2

Administration of Roman Civil Law

Monateri would see the developments of this late Roman period not as the refinement of Roman
law but of a culture that incorporated the legal systems of other, arguably more advanced,
systems to supplement the defects of its own.60 But even if that be correct, the Roman legal
system nonetheless had reached a level of sophistication that it had the capacity and flexibility
to accommodate that necessity. It is unarguable that by the fourth century regular courts had
already been in existence for centuries administering a system of written pleading, court
administration and judicial execution and enforcement of judgments. True it is that the system
was available only to those who could bring themselves within the jurisdiction, but that such a
system existed as part of the apparatus of the state was in itself an achievement.

In civil matters, in order to obtain redress against another person, it was necessary to bring an
action to enforce a legal right. Citizens enjoyed that privilege and the law protected and
enforced property rights. Jurists and forensic advocates were ‘prestigious constituents of
Roman society.’61 Brundage suggests that Roman citizens relied, just as citizens do today, on
the skills in the arts of persuasion to ‘charm, dazzle, cajole, entice, or bamboozle a judge or
jury.’62 Whilst historically the Lex Cincia of 204 BCE prevented the charging of fees for legal
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representation (on the basis of Roman tradition that those with knowledge of the law should
make that knowledge freely available), this impediment was ignored in practice and was
replaced in 47CE by Senatusconsultum Claudianum. This Act set a maximum fee of ten
thousand sesterces for advocates with those that charged more being liable to prosecution for
extortion.63
The Romans thus had a sophisticated legal system which remains the foundation of western
legal thought.64 In terms of its content and structure, Bodenheim argues that the Roman system
of law had successfully imparted ‘a considerable measure of stability to the social system
without indulging in undue dogmatism and conceptual rigidity,’65 As a system of law, it came
close to the ideal. Whilst compiled later in point of time, the size and content of the Justinian
Digest (527 – 534 CE) gives some insight into the complexity and detail of Roman law.66 When
Emperor Justinian directed the digest to be compiled, only a proportion of the known Roman
law was codified. The digest compilers reviewed some 1522 books of Roman law compiled
over the prior six centuries,67 to produce a digest consisting of fifty books divided into titles
according to subject.68 It was published under the name Corpus Iuris Civilis and combined
statute law, annotations and opinions of classical jurists.69

3.4

Roman Planning Law

The suite of property rights available to Roman citizens did not confer a right of participation to
citizens to become involved in decisions about the ordering of the town. Citizens had no power
expressed in tradition or law to a say in what the town would look like or how it would function.
The English socialist Richard Tawney suggested that in densely populated urban communities
‘someone must make the rules and see that they are kept, or life becomes impossible and the
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wheels do not turn.’70 Whilst this applies today,71 it can be seen from the above that this axiom
applied equally to Roman society.

3.4.1

Roman Planning Law

In matters of town planning, Roman towns and cities were designed according to historical
precedents, the earliest examples of which are the pattern book of Vitruvius.72 The design was
based on the Imperial city, with a rectangular grid pattern to accommodate ‘the forum, temples
theatres baths’ and residential precincts.73 In the context of development, the power to decide
what occurred in a vicus or locality resided either in the government, represented by the army
or, once the province was established, in the hands of the governor appointed by the Emperor
and the citizens who owned and controlled the land within the town.74

Roman civil administration had by the fourth century become highly bureaucratic. Indeed, in
contrast to the civilized excellence of the law, Previté-Orton notes that ‘centralization and
despotism required the services of an immense, hierarchic bureaucracy’.75 As Monateri
explains:
‘[B]ehind the legal process there was the Patronage, and it is Patronage which really
explains the features of Roman Law. Patronage is a social system dividing the
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inhabitants into patrons and clients, the former protecting the latter in their social
activity.’76

Upon conquest the legions would establish a fort. These strongholds, functionally, would be a
point from which a service centre would be established to serve the garrison. Often, vici would
evolve into a town. Whilst colania were generally towns established by Rome, existing
settlements could be recognised as towns by being granted the status of civitas capital. Within
colania full Roman law applied. Civitas Capitals could retain some aspects of customary law.

Urbanisation created the platform and provided an audience for ostentatious displays of wealth.
Roberts argues that ‘the provision of spectacular games was the way for a rich man to bring to
bear his wealth to secure political advancement.’77 For those who did not have such wealth, but
who could still count themselves as part of the upper class, the other path to success in the
imperial service was through legal studies.78

With urban expansion, larger towns could petition Rome to be granted municipium or city
status. It is where the word municipal derives from. In Celtic Britain it was an artificial
institution, introduced by the Romans. 79 The size and functionality of a municipium depended
upon its administrative purpose. Thomas identifies that Verulamium (St Albans) is the only
community in Britain known to have reached that status, but he also suggests that London and
probably Leicester also acquired that status.80 By the fourth century CE, London was a well laid
out, walled Roman city. It was the financial and administrative centre of Britain, eclipsing
Colchester. Coins were minted at the London mint and the city acted as the hub of civil
administration, including the sophisticated system of private law which had evolved over
centuries.81 Within its walls lived Roman citizens and slaves together with assorted skilled
artisans employed in the industrial enterprises serving the city. By this time, these people were
living in ordered cities organised around Cathedrals, Courts, markets, industrial enterprises and
facilities common to other Roman cities.82 To the north, in Northumbria, York was the centre of
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military organisation for the whole of Britain. Within Roman Britain, smaller cities/towns had
emerged over the centuries located along the Roman road system, usually at a distance of about
a days travel from each other. These centres catered for the commerce of the region by being
market centres, accommodating travellers in inns, the faithful in churches and the public in civic
facilities.83

The urbanisation of Britain then was limited but geographically extensive. Only a small
proportion of the overall population lived in a town. Thomas, citing Frere, suggests that only
15% of the population lived in circumstances which exposed them to strong Roman
influences.84 Provincial areas such as Britain were, by the fourth century, largely autonomous
economic regions.85 Britain, unlike other Roman provinces outside of Britain, retained the sense
of a military garrison.86 Celtic society continued within Britain, but the military presence of
Rome subdued its tendency to inter-tribal warfare. Instead, commerce flourished between
Roman and Celtic people, providing an economic basis for agriculture and trade.

3.4.2

Planning Law in Action

The Roman civilization of the third century accommodated the ‘greatest concentration of
humanity ever known in the western world.’87 That mass of humanity posed the same sort of
questions about urban living posed today, how to regulate the interactions of people within this
living organism?88 In the Roman civilization, these interactions were regulated by property
laws.
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In the absence of ‘planning law’, Hall identifies how under the Roman system the ‘initiative’
had to be taken by some ‘interested party.’89 In the example of the action against the municipal
authority referred to above,90 the owner of the dwelling in the upper storey had to commence the
proceedings to restrain the authority. But the existence of the right of citizens to enforce such
legal rights did force municipal authorities to make what we might now term as ‘planning
decisions’ under the common law. In Rome, an area of the 14th region trans tiberium was set
aside from other residential land and assigned to the tanners to protect up-market dwellings
from foul smells associated with that industrial activity.91 City amenity was also protected.
Amoenitis refers to the embellishment of the townscape. Statues erected for amoenitis, for the
adornment of the town, were not allowed to be taken down by anyone. The public had a right to
enforce amenity.92 A very early example of the right now recognised in the EP&A Act which
allows any person to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act.93

Just as amenity is important today, it was important in Roman times. Even in rural areas, the
reach of the law extended to protect purely aesthetic values. A lessee of land for usufructary
purposes could invoke the law to protect their right to use the land for aesthetic purposes
coincidental with the exercise of their property right. Roman law recognised a lessee’s right to
relax and recuperate so as to enjoy the land in its natural state. Even though the lessee’s
usufructary right derived no monetary interest in this pursuit of this aesthetic purpose, the law
protected the amenity right attaching to the property right flowing from the lease.94 Similarly,
the person who had the right of dwelling or habitation on an estate enjoyed rights protected by
law to go riding and to be carried about on the estate outside the area of the dwelling.95

3.4.3

Monuments before the Fall

Roberts hypothesises that we cannot imagine ‘just how unprecedentedly splendid much of the
empire must have looked.’96 As Rome was an urban civilization, much of this magnificence
was expressed in built form in the towns and cities. Millions of people occupied these towns and
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cities across the empire, but there was no specific planning law developed either by statute or by
the courts. Aside from the law of contract and nuisance, the private property ideology was in
full play.

If the future is one that is without planning laws, then we must also consider the potential social
consequences. The Roman poor lived in the upper storeys and the wealthy closer to the ground.
It is likely that the itinerant and visitors were accommodated in between. 97 In contrast to utopic
visions, the urban poor were visible and numerous.98 As Van Den Bergh suggests:
‘The really destitute lived in shacks, in huts erected on top of or against public
buildings, which were regularly demolished by city officials, in tombs and public
lavatories. These were often regarded as a fire hazard by the authorities and torn down,
but were also sometimes allowed to remain if they were not considered an obstruction.
In such cases the inhabitants were even charged rent.’99

In a society ruled by Adam Smith’s unconscious invisible hand, there may be a social price to
be paid for allowing the market to determine outcomes.100

3.5

Lessons from Rome

Samuel is of the view that ‘Roman jurisprudence gives an excellent insight into modern political
and ideological structures.’101 He also makes the point that ‘Roman jurists had provided an ideal
conceptual framework for the industrial revolution; and a conceptual framework which had the
great advantage of apparently locating the whole of the industrial and economic basis of society
beyond the realm of politics.’102 Whilst this may be arguable, as a model for analysis, the
exercise of comparison is useful.
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Whilst theoretically Roman citizens were entitled to enjoy the peace and order of the Pax
Romana, it was only through the aggregation of power and influence that the voice of only some
of the people could be heard in civic matters. While Previté-Orton extols the virtues of the
system of Roman law saying that it was a ‘common possession of the citizens, binding the
Empire together by its civilized excellence,’103 it was not so ideal for all citizens. The people
were not participants in the civil affairs of governance; they were subjects under the law.104

As in Athenian society before it, participation in civil society in Roman times was restricted to
Roman citizens. However, unlike Athenian society, Roman citizens, by the time of the fourth
century, no longer participated in the affairs of Government. Roman citizens had become, as
Hobbes was later to identify, a society under the dominion of a forceful sovereign.105 Monterari
suggests that the government of Rome was in truth an ‘autocracy tempered by legally
permanent revolution.’106 Even amongst Roman citizens, there was no equality before the law
because of the reliance on power and patronage.107 Citizens in the lower castes: lesser
landowners; tradesmen and traders in the towns and cities; peasant free-holder in the regions,
had to be ‘chained to their hereditary tasks so as to support the overladen State and provide it
with funds and food to carry on.’108

Roman citizens had no legal mechanism to withdraw their consent to be governed other than the
extra-judicial act of revolution or assassination.109 The public was simply subjugated by the law
to the needs of the state. Machiavelli recognised the efficiency of this state of affairs.110 The
Roman republic ended with Augustus in 27 BCE. The Imperium continued afterwards for some
four hundred years. Socially, Imperial Rome reflected the structure of England in the late
103
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medieval period up to the Tudor period. The Roman civilization is therefore a classic example
of state tyranny under the rule of law. It demonstrates the lesson that even with civilization,
extended peace internally and a market economy, society can still fail of its promise.111 Despite
ideal market conditions, the ideology of property was not able to deliver an urban environment
free from the ills of social distress and degradation. Yntema describes the late Roman period as
the epilogue.112 As succinctly summarised by Previté-Orton, Roman civilization was at this time
the ‘senility of a civilization and its inducements to action.’113 Whilst it was a time of ‘private
munificence and municipal extravagance … it was largely unproductive expenditure’ by the
privileged few.114 As Wieacker notes, it was the period of ‘Byzantine absolutism which began
with Constantine the Great.’115

In terms of land use planning, Roman Britain enjoyed the benefits that flowed from
colonisation. The Empire had a sophisticated urbanised culture that lived in cities and towns,
some of which had been established for hundreds of years.116 Roman civilization exhibited high
culture, art and literature. Roman engineering was brilliant.117 It’s built urban form magnificent,
though it’s housing standards may not have met the standards of its public buildings.118 Rome
invented the model of pre-planned towns and exported the concept throughout the Roman
Empire.119 With the Roman occupation of Britain came roads, towns and civil administration, in
short, civilization and urbanization.120 But these benefits were not enough to sustain the cities of
the Empire.
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Citizenship alone, without participation in government, does nothing to relieve the burden of
subjugation. If citizens are rendered mere consumers, then the exit option is the most attractive
one, provided it is available. Free subjects were vacating Roman cities and towns. Thomas notes
that ‘a general decline in town life had set in by the middle of the fourth century.121 Market
theorists would correctly point to the burdens of bureaucracy and taxation as a root cause. From
the third and fourth centuries, successive Emperors had been forced to resort to making law
through constitutions to bolster the finances of the empire and to ensure obedience to the
state.122 Under the burden of an unequal system of taxation, which Roberts says made increasing
demands on dwindling resources,123 the utility of citizenship was questioned by the citizenry.
The real point is that even after four hundred years of capitalism, the social outcomes postulated
under market theory did not eventuate. The market kept repeating its cycles. What destroyed
Roman civilization was the inability of the society to provide a measure of the Aristotlian ‘good
life’ for the majority of the people.124 Perhaps this was because the Romans, unlike the
Athenians, left the polis to the operation of the market?125

In Roman society, the curiales, the tax collectors, had become a caste ‘as hopeless as any in
history.’126 Diocletian had been forced to make it a hereditary burden passed down from father
to son.127 By the fourth century, the middle class had disappeared. As will be seen in the next
chapter, it is from the middle class that the pressure for rights of participation emerges.
Bodenheimer goes so far as to suggest that by the fourth century ‘private ownership of land and
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business enterprises was extensively replaced by governmental ownership.’128 As Previté-Orton
notes, Roman citizens lived ‘[l]ike beasts at the water-wheel, they plodded a dreary round to
haul up the taxes needed by their rulers.’129

It was in the towns that the impact of this malaise was perhaps the greatest. Without an
operative economic function, a town or city was a ‘luxury only maintainable in times of
prosperity’.130 The evidence of significant Roman cities and towns throughout Britain is
testament to the fact that civil society in Britain was administered by Roman law.131 In Roman
Britain, excavations of Roman remains illustrate how towns designed and laid out for growth in
the first and second century were never fully occupied.132 Despite two centuries of relative
peace and civilization from the second century, there is no evidence of population growth.133

By the fourth century, the intrusion of the state into the economic affairs of the people had,
according to Bodenheimer, created ‘a system resembling state socialism’ in that the economy
had been ‘converted into a state-controlled and planned economy’.134 As citizens in these urban
areas realised that the demands made of them to pay for the administration of the civilisation
‘grew every decade more disagreeable, more profitless and more oppressive,135 they chose to
flee to the country.136 Churchill describes these clusters as the ‘efflorescence of Rome.’137 It was
in the regions of Roman civilization that the beginnings of the medieval polity would be
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established.138 Churchill pictures life in Roman Britain in idyllic terms saying that in Roman
Britannia, ‘there was law; there was order; there was peace; there was warmth; there was food,
and long-established custom of life.’139 The historical evidence suggests to the contrary, in that
the general mass of people rejected this utopia. Roman civilization had a functioning system of
law, but that was not enough to provide an incentive to participate in the economics of the city.

3.6

Conclusion

Whilst Roman society ultimately failed due to the burden of bureaucracy and taxation, Roman
civilization existed for many centuries before that under market conditions. The analysis in this
chapter suggests that in order for the people to have the voice option, it requires the creation of a
system which allows participation in order that that voice may be expressed.140 Participatory
mechanisms are necessary to balance the unconscious impacts of the market in operation.

After the fall of Rome in the fifth century there was a new struggle between the Anglo-Saxon
common law and the Danelaw. It was during these ‘dark ages’ that the people ideated a form of
participation in governance.141 Violence had obliterated civilization but tribalism would foster a
form of participation in civil affairs. England would be organised into shires and hundreds. The
concept of one people, not a subjugated people, began to emerge. It was a necessary step
towards the ideation of the people having the sovereign right to govern.

The primary lesson of Roman history is that the law is a function of the power of the state.
Rome was a state where there was citizenship without participation. These were the conditions
for despotic state rule. The architecture of the classic Roman period suggests that in terms of
built form, the private property ideology can produce outstanding results.142 Rome is
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remembered for the magnificence of its built form. On one view, this is how grand our cities
could be if we empowered a ‘committee of experts’ to guide the government as to the best urban
form for our cities.143 Under despotic conditions,144 the state has power to enforce its will on the
people.145 Monuments may be the legacy of such a state.146

As will be seen in chapter 4, planning law facilitates the strategy of the state. It legitimates the
policy of government. In democratic theory, what legitimates the policy of the government is
whether it is a government of the people. By definition, it is suggested that to be a government
of the people, the people must have power over the government. By extension of this argument,
if land use planning is to subserve the people, then the people will have to have power over
decisions about the nature of development in the neighbourhood.147 The historical analysis in
this chapter has shown that the attainment of a functioning system of law, even one which
assiduously protects property rights, does not guarantee a functional social system. Where law
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exists for the sole purpose of protecting property rights, McAuslan’s private property ideology,
the opportunity for despotic state rule and the subjugation of the people exists.148
Locke was wrong when he suggested that wherever law ends, tyranny begins.149 As Nelson
Mandela notes, the rule of law is not a sword of justice but ‘a tool used by the ruling class to
shape society in a way favourable to itself.’150 Tyranny begins when those with power to make
law abuse the privilege afforded to them.151 Democracy begins when the people have the right
to participate in their governance. In the next chapter the struggle for that right is examined.
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Chapter 4:

The Long Struggle for the right of Public
Participation

‘Property and law were born together, and would die together. Before the laws property did not exist:
take away the laws, and property will be no more.’

Jeremy Bentham1

‘I went from having an idealistic view of the law as a sword of justice to a perception of the law as a tool
used by the ruling class to shape society in a way favourable to itself.

Nelson Mandela2

4.1

Introduction

This Chapter examines the development of participation in the form of parliamentary power in
England over the course of the second millennium. In this time England would experience first
a religious revolution, then a civil war and then the industrial revolution. English society would
move from a traditional social schema based on rigid class distinctions to a cooperative social
schema based on democratic principles. The people would rise to take power from the sovereign
only to find that the political elite would seek to steadfastly hold onto power.3 Through this
process, the ideology of parliament as the instrument of managed social change would emerge.

The political revolutions of the seventeenth century would shift the power of governance from
the sovereign to the people, expressed in the will of the House of Commons. McAuslan’s public
interest ideology would be born out of the struggle of the people to have a say in the affairs of
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government. The narrative of this chapter charts the evolution of British society from feudalism
to capitalism. It would take almost a millennium for a civic culture, a new social compact,4 to
develop in England to the point where the law could articulate McAuslan’s public interest
ideology in the expression of planning laws.

The industrial revolution would be the impetus for parliament to use the law as an instrument to
favour the interests of the new landed elite. Laws such as the Enclosure Acts would transform
the nature of land ownership; parliament would override common law protections to facilitate
economic development.5 Through the private bill procedure discussed in this chapter,6
parliament would grant new rights over land. Planning law would be born out of the economic
imperative of the industrial revolution. Through law, a new civil order would emerge.7

4.2

The Norman Invasion

By the seventh century CE, the country of Britain was arranged internally into shires (already
administered by an ‘alderman’), which were made up of hundreds comprising the vil or towns,
corresponding to a parish.8 Larger towns were known as burhs, or as we know them, boroughs.9
Isin suggests that only a few English cities had attained the status of liber burgus or free city by
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the time of the Norman invasion.10 The regularity of foreign incursions into England during the
Dark Ages had probably inhibited the growth of truly independent cities in the European
tradition.

Whilst territorial wars might change allegiances, depending upon which force had prevailed, the
administrative arrangements within the shires of England became more settled as a
commonality of administrative principles across the kingdoms emerged.11 With this
commonality emerged the concept of one people. It would be facilitated by the spread of
literacy in the upper classes and the clergy. Unlike developments in the Continent occurring at
the same time, ‘laws, documents and the like were written in the native tongue until the Norman
conquest.’12 Each member of the community had a common but identified right to use
unenclosed strips of land. These strips were scattered amongst those used by his neighbour so
that all might have a share of the good and the bad land. These plots were clearly marked. The
villagers also had rights in common to use the waste lands which surrounded the village.
Windeyer reminds us of an ancient warning: ‘cursed is he that removeth his neighbour’s land
mark.’13
Fleming argues that within the territory of the lord’s manor, the lord presided over his court. 14
The lord would determine disputes between villagers and tenants. In order to eke out a
livelihood, the tenant bound themselves to the lord with solemn obligations and was owed in
return protection. Within the vil, the tenant had recourse to common land and community
assets. Windeyer suggests that by the time of the Norman invasion, many of ‘gentle’ birth and
freemen had bound themselves to the lord and they were not at liberty to go outside the vil
without leave of the lord.15 In contrast, those living in boroughs and larger towns enjoyed a
measure of greater personal freedom.16 The trade-off was a life lived in higher spatial density.
Towns and cities rarely had large open spaces (except the town square in front of the
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jurisdictional privileges to its citizens (burgesses) in return for a certain amount of tax (tallage). … by the
end of the twelfth century charters were widespread.’
11
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Cathedral).17 Towns and cities conformed to a regular pattern usually located about a day’s
journey along the old Roman highways. As Russell notes, ‘the distribution largely followed
Zipf’s theory of the economy of time and movement.’18
The Norman invasion would bring feudalism and order through control over land.19 The peace
which followed the Norman Conquest was due in no small measure to administrative reforms
introduced to the realm by William and his successors.20 The reforms created servile
conditions.21 The concept of executive government can be dated back to William's Curia Regis
or Royal Court. Laws or edicts made by the King in Council had universal application within
the conquered territory.22 Municipal custom yielded to these laws, but otherwise, so long as
local customary laws did not offend against the principle of ultimate Royal rights, the relations
between people were in large measure governed by customary law, that is, the common law.23
As Bodenheimer notes, this common law tradition draws upon Roman law.24

17

JC Russell, 'Population in Europe 500-1500' in CM Cipolla (ed), The Fontana Economic History of
Europe (1973) vol 1, 28. ‘The average population density of cities was about 100-200 persons to the
hectare.’
18
Ibid, 29-30.
19
Christopher Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai, Property Rights, planning and markets: managing
spontaneous cities (2003), 71-2:
‘The establishment of a new regime is often followed by land surveys to define or redefine
landed properties, as in the case of the eleventh century Norman conquest of Britain.’ …
‘Feudalism consolidated rights to land, labour and capital in the hands of feudal lords who
supplied protection, shelter and land and made decentralised production decisions on their
patch.’
20
Flemming, above n 8, 21: ‘What the Norman Monarchy introduced to England then, was management
of a monumental magnitude.’
21
Richard A Posner, 'Blackstone and Bentham' (1976) 19 Journal of Law and Economics 569, 584, cites
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 4, 420:
‘so complete and well-concerted a scheme of servility, it has been the work of generations for
our ancestors, to redeem themselves and their posterity into that state of liberty which we now
enjoy: … a gradual restoration of that ancient constitution, whereof our Saxon forefathers had
been unjustly deprived, partly by the policy, and partly by the force of the Norman.’
22
Shael Herman, 'Legacy and Legend: The Continuity of Roman and English Regulation of the Jews
Symposium: Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law' (1991) 66 Tul. L. Rev.
1781, 1799. Herman notes that from the time of the Norman Conquest ‘much Roman law had reached
England in canonical texts, as well as through the contributions of Vacarius and other civilians.’
23
A concept thoughtfully summed up by du Parcq LJ in Smith v Harris (1939) 3 All ER 960:
‘The common law of this country has been built up, not by the writings of logicians or learned
jurists, but by the summings-up of Judges of experience to juries of plain men, not usually
students of logic not accustomed to subtle reasoning, but endowed,… as a general rule, with a
great common sense and if argument has to be put in terms which only a school-man could
understand, then I am always very doubtful whether it can possibly be expressing the common
law.’
24
Edgar Bodenheimer, 'Influence of Roman Law on Early Medieval Culture, The' (1979) 3 Hastings Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 9, 26. The subtlety of thought required to understand complex legal concepts was
developed in medieval universities gradually working its way into the common law tradition.
Bodenheimer suggests that Henry de Bracton, who published the first comprehensive treatise on the
English common law in 1250, ‘borrowed extensively from Roman law,’ being influenced by the legal
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William, by the fact of conquest in 1066, acquired by operation of law the land of the Saxon
Kings who resisted him. No allodial land remained.25 Power in the territory of Britain was
centralised in the King. From this time hence, all land would be held of the King under the legal
fiction and doctrine of tenure. Pollock and Maitland explained the principle in their History of
English Law in 1898 as follows:
‘The King himself holds the land which is in every sense his own; no one else has any
proprietary rights in it; but if we leave out of account this royal demesne, then every
acre of land is ‘held of’ the king. The person whom we may call its owner, the person
who has the right to use and abuse the land, to cultivate it or leave it uncultivated, to
keep all others off it, holds the land of the king either immediately or mediately.’ 26

Until the civil war of the seventeenth century, the King and the Executive Council would
control England. Only freemen, those owning land, had power in this system. Land ownership
was narrowly held. If you could not exercise control over land, you could not participate. Whilst
feudalism held sway its cascading power relationships would deny the people the right to
participate in society. But, paradoxically, feudalism would promote the freedom of towns. This
freedom would allow a freedom of thought and action. The people participated in trade and
commerce. Land ownership was the prerequisite for both enfranchisement and for being elected
to parliament. For many centuries, representation in parliament served only self-interested
purposes, namely to gain access to power. The function of law was to legitimate this power
relationship. In the administration of the law, the private property ideology was the grundnorm
which directed the application of the law. The power of the state was directed to the protection
of property.27

historians at the Bolognese university. This reception of Roman law occurred at a time when, it is
suggested, England had no theory of contracts.
25
P Butt, Land Law (4 ed, 2001), 59. Allodial land is free of tenures, it is absolutely owned. It was
sourced to the lands held under Dane law. It was held by Viking freemen. By virtue of the conquest, no
allodial was held because all of the land of England became subject to the doctrine of tenure.
26 nd
2 ed (1898, reprinted 1953) vol 1, 234. Cited by Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1991-2)
175 CLR 1, 46.
27
Market theorists justify this arrangement of power on the basis of the allocation of scarce resources, see
Webster and Lai, above n 19, 23:
‘The power to regimentalise individual property rights into collective organisations such as
legions, firms, cities and even states, lies with the owners of the rights that are most scarce.’
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4.3

The legacy of Feudalism

The history of the second millennium highlights the struggle in England by the elite to attain
and maintain sovereign power over the people. In that struggle, the law was used as an
instrument to maintain the legitimacy of power. This understanding correlates with Nicholson’s
view of law as the ‘manipulation of ideology.’28 As has already been seen, history plays an
important role in this process. Bobbitt contends that history ‘is the distinctive element in the
ceaseless, restless dynamic by means of which strategy and law live out their necessary
relationship to each other.’29

The second millennium would be a period in which England would, in social epistemological
terms, move gradually from a traditional identity schema, a gemeinschaft,30 to an ideational
schema which Edwards describes as the cooperative social compact, that is, a civic culture.31 To
develop such a culture, the people would first need to understand and believe that they had a
right to participate in government.32

28

Bradley J. Nicholson, 'Relfections on Capitalism, Property, and the Law of Slavery' (2002) 27 Okla.
City U. L. Rev. 151, 153. Nicholson suggests that the Marxian view of law is that it: ‘has a “hegemonic
role,” in that ruling classes exercised their power through mastery of political culture; law thus was a
method of securing and ensuring political control through the manipulation of ideology.’
29
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), 5.
30
Fran Tonkiss, Space, the City and Social Theory (2005), 12. Tonkiss suggests that Gemeinschaft refers:
‘to a mode of interaction where social ties are based on mutual dependence, and where
individual’s relations with others take place within and derive meaning from the larger group.’
This concept is to be contrasted to Gesellschaft, ‘a formal mode of interaction which tends to the
impersonal, instrumental and voluntary.’
31
Edwards, above n 4, 139.
32
It would be the Enlightenment of the fifteenth century which first exposed the English to ideas radically
different to the feudal notions which had been received into English society as a result of the Norman
invasion. The emergence of liberal democratic structures of governance in the nineteenth century was the
product of the preceding religious, social and industrial revolutions. These radical changes transformed
English society and created an ideational social structure favouring democracy and government based on
the rule of law, with power shared between a representative parliament and the courts.
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4.3.1

Pre-Feudal relationships

Participation in governance has ancient historical roots. On the eve of the Norman Conquest,33
the tradition had developed in England that the King of England would act in consultation with
the Witan. Previté-Orton describes this body as the council of wise men comprising the
Bishops, earls and important thanes, all of whom had extensive land holdings. The
Witenagemot was the early form of parliament at which laws that the King intended to
promulgate were discussed.34 Windeyer suggests that whilst the Witan had power to dispense
justice, ‘it was a rare and extraordinary jurisdiction.’35 Even though its role was advisory,
Previté-Orton suggests that ‘its real assent to laws, grants, and policy was essential if they were
to be accepted in the provinces and carried out.’36 True it is that force (or the threat of force)
held this unity of purpose together, but this historical precedent of the sharing of power also
reflects the social need for order. This social need arose out of the collective memory of the
disorder of the previous centuries after the fall of Rome highlighted in chapter three. It would
resurface again in the early nineteenth century.37

4.3.2

Arrangements under Feudalism

England became ‘the most outstanding example in history of the systematic, complete and
uniform application of feudal theory.’38 But to maintain order, William I allowed the hundred

33

Previté-Orton above n 12, 151-153. The Norman French that invaded and conquered England traced
their lineage back to Clovis. Clovis succeeded his father Childeric in 481 and became a king at the age of
15. Previté-Orton suggests that Clovis was:
‘a treacherous barbarian, insatiable with dominion and conquest. Without attributing any
uncanny foresight, we may perceive that he displayed a clear insight into the forces at work in
his day, a shrewd calculation, faithless diplomacy and a geographical instinct reminiscent of
Constantine.’
Yet, in 511 Clovis issued a written Latin codification of the customary law of the Salian Franks. PrevitéOrton suggests this was ‘a sign of Episcopal influence’
34
Previté-Orton, above n 12, 401.
35
Windeyer, above n 11, 9.
36
Previté-Orton above n 12, 401.
37
Posner, above n 21, 601, suggests that the contest between ‘order’ and ‘welfare’ would later define the
differences between Blackstone and Bentham. As Posner notes:
‘An implicit theme of the Commentaries is maintaining social order, that is, so distributing and
organising political power as to avoid the extremes of tyranny and civil war and thus minimise
the role of violence and threats in the society. Bentham seems to have had very little interest in
this problem. He was concerned with the (analytically at least) distinct problem of welfare or
utility.’
38
Windeyer, above n 11, 36.
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and shire moots to continue thus preserving the customary law of the English. These moots
were regular monthly meetings of the freemen of the community that operated as popular
courts; they were an early example of the people sharing governance.39 The administration of
government was exercised by the Curia Regis or the King’s Court.40 Windeyer notes that the
regular members of the court were the ‘great officers of the kingdom.’41

Around 1200 a significant change occurred in the administration of the courts; it was a change
that disenfranchised the majority of the people. Access to the law was restricted to the landed
class. From this time, only those subjects that were ‘free’ (thus freeman) could be heard before
the court.42 According to Gillingham, the villeins, those who did not own land, were classified
as servile persons.43 These people, tenants having no rights to land, had just the right to use
land. The genius of the administrative change brought about by the Normans lay in the power
relationships which were created between king and subject. Law was a ‘civilizing agent in
society.’44

Under feudalism, the person to whom the land was granted by the king had the power to grant
lesser tenures and to alienate the land by indenture.45 When consent was given to a villein to

39

Fleming, above n 8, 21. As Fleming notes:
‘William’s regime did not, however, ride roughshod over local customs and laws. In so far as
they did not infringe his golden principle of ultimate royal rights, he respected them.’
40
Ibid, 9. Windeyer, above n 11, suggests (37) that William did not bring the feudalism of the Continent
to England because ‘to permit in England the conditions of France and Germany would be to set up rivals
for himself.’
41
Ibid, 43. Windeyer suggests that these were ‘the Justiciar, the Chancellor, the Chamberlain, the
Constable, the Marshall and certain officials, who from and early date were called ‘Justices’ but whose
work was not exclusively judicial. In a rather fanciful sense, the Curia Regis was the successor of the old
Witan.’
42
Previté-Orton, above n 12, 587, suggests that in 1069 there were ‘vast confiscations’ which saw ‘the
transfer of land and power from English to Norman lords.’ According to the Doomsday book of 1086, the
King held directly about one fifth of the land. The barons (mostly Norman) held about half of the land
and the church held about a quarter of the land.
43
John. Gillingham, 'The Early Middle Ages (1066-1290)' in Kenneth O Morgan (ed), The Oxford
Illustrated History of Britain (2000) , 163.
44
Previté-Orton, above n 12, 606. Previté-Orton says of this outcome (and despite the exclusion of the
majority of the people from access to law), that the result of the changes brought about by the Normans in
administration of the law was ‘singular’. Taking a wider view, he says:
‘The gradual suppression of the provincial and customary laws by the English Common law,
based on the successive decisions of the king’s judges and developing by precedent from year to
year into a national system. Ancient custom, Roman and Cannon Law, might influence it, but
growth was independent, a measure of advancing civilization and union.’
Posner, above n 21, 583, observes that by Blackstone’s time, Norman rules were seen as ‘oppressive
institutions.’ It was the duty of judges to ‘strip away the Norman incrustations … to restore the common
law in its pristine Saxon form.’
45
Flemming, above n 8, 25. Indentures were created as a means of providing proof of title:
‘Two copies of the transaction would appear on the same sheet. You would then cut the
document in half along an irregular, wavy line resembling a bite, and the parties to the deal
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quit his land holding in the lord’s manor, the lord recorded the transaction and a copy was given
to the transferee as proof of their title to the surrendered land.46 The documenting of even this
lowly transaction maintained the social order. By recording in land transactions fealty to the
Sovereign, social order was affirmed. The practice was unique to the English.47

A very different ladder of participation applied. At the lowest level, that of the villein, the
peasant tenant had no right to the land but only the right to the use of it. Not only would they
never own it, they were also unlikely to acquire sufficient income from working the land to
climb the social ladder and become freeman. Freemen could acquire rights to and over land by
purchase. However, such rights would not usually be available in respect of manorial land as
that was held by the lord. Accordingly, the opportunity to own land arose in the towns which
were often free of manorial control. Towns were places where commerce enabled men to
become people of means.
The feudal relationship of mutual obligation would evolve into a form of social contract.48 This
contract bound the classes within society and created a unified system of government divided
between the manorial system of internal administration within the lord’s domain, and the
national system of administration, exercised through the King’s curia.49 This would remain
England’s traditional identity schema for centuries.50 As Previté-Orton confirms, in feudal
society ‘land-tenure determined political rights.’51 Those who had land, had power.52

would take one half each. In this way, at any time in the future, the deed could be proved by
placing together the two halves.’
46
Butt, above n 25, 65. It is from this practice that the concept of the counterpart deed or indenture arises.
The two parts to the document made the whole agreement capable of proof by matching the counterparts
along the separation line cut when making the deed.
47
Windeyer, above n 11, 37. Windeyer suggests that whereas in the Continent the sovereign ceased to be
‘leader and judge of the people,’ in England ‘[a]ll men there owed allegiance to the king, not merely to
their immediate overlords.’
48
Rutherford Platt, Land Use and Society: Geography, Law and Public Policy (1996), 64. Platt suggests
that feudalism worked because it was a ‘socioeconomic institution that would ensure that land would be
productively utilized to sustain both the local population and the superstructure of nobility.’
49
Later, Jean Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract, 1762, (also cited in Jon E Lewis (ed), The New
Rights of Man (2003), 302), would write about the Social Contract. Rousseau argued that ‘the social order
is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights.’ Rousseau’s radical thoughts on freedom and liberty
would be the clarion call of the American and French Revolutions. Yet, the concept of the social order
runs deep in western thought. It would be the breach of the perceived social contract by Charles I that
would be the justification for the overthrow of the crown at the time of England’s own revolution in the
seventeenth century.
50
Edwards, above n 4, 139. Edwards describes the schema as gemeinschaft:
‘Tradition divides people into categories. These are often organised hierarchically. Tradition
decrees appropriate behaviour of people in each category and relationships between categories.
Social cohesion centres on maintaining the categories and their norms of behaviour.’
51
Previté-Orton, above n 12, 418.
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4.3.3

The role of Towns

There was greater scope for personal freedom in the towns. Historically, towns and cities had a
functionality which correlated to a specific purpose, for instance, maritime port, manufacturing
or mining centre, defence, education administration or market trade.53 Towns were connected
functionally to nearby regional areas that supplied necessary inputs which could not be sourced
locally. Originally, the function of the town was to operate as a market.54 As Roberts points out,
as the population of towns grew, towns came to perform a more significant role as ‘cultural and
economic engines.’55

Towns became a centre for civil society and education. Thrupp suggests that up until the late
medieval times in England, industry was largely confined to rural areas.56 It would be in the
cities and towns that new ways of thinking would be nurtured.57 Le Goff argues that the ‘mental
attitudes of the medieval town were indispensable to the growth of capitalism and to the
industrial revolution.’58 Indeed, Roberts suggests that from the thirteenth century, the word
urbanitis came into use to describe city life in a way ‘which carried more meaning than that of
simple physical residence in a town.’59 Economic freedom could be obtained in a town,60 and
with it, personal freedom from economic enslavement under feudalism.61
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Patrick O'Farrell, Ireland's English Question (1971), 116. O’ Farrell argues that it could be said that the
English had a ‘religion of property, to which England’s political classes were firm devotees – firmer than
they were devotes to religion as such.’
53
Walter Minchinton, 'Patterns and Structure of Demand 1500-1700' in Carlo M Cipolla (ed), Fontana
Economic History of Europe - The Emergence of Industrial Societies (1973) vol 4(1), 101. However,
Gillingham, above n 43, 161, argues that even as early as 1300 new towns and villages ‘were founded by
local lords who expected to make a profit out of the money rents and tolls they planned to collect.’
54
Isin, above n 9, 17. Although Isin suggests that the city was created ‘as a means of seeking relief from
surrounding feudal lordships, kingdoms and other jurisdictions of all sorts.’
55
J M Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (1997), 155.
56
Sylvia. Thrupp, 'The Middle Ages' in Carlo M Cipolla (ed), Fontana Economic History of Europe
(1972) vol 1, 237.
57
Alister McGrath, In the Beginning, the Story of the King James Bible (2002), 38, attributes to Jacob
Burckhardt (1818-97) the comment that it was during the Renaissance period of the fourteenth century
that ‘human beings first began to think of themselves as individuals’ (emphasis in original).
58
Jacques Le Goff, 'The Town as an Agent of Civilization c.1200 - c. 1500' in Carlo M Cipolla (ed), The
Fontana Economic History of Europe (1973) vol 1, 94.
59
Roberts, above n 55,155.
60
Isin, above n 9, 21. As Isin notes:
‘During the twelfth century some English cities gained the status of liber burgus (free city),
which meant the possession of autonomous law-making, taxing and trading, in short, governing
powers.’
61
Le Goff, above n 58, 81, suggests that by the late middle ages ‘towns had recovered the great monetary
role that had been theirs in antiquity.’
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Towns were either of historical origin with established rights or they were ‘new’ towns, laid out
by the lord who created it.62 Within the town, custom regulated the relations of its people.
Socially and legally, unless the freedom of the town had been purchased by charter, feudalism
dictated the limits of the rights, duties and freedom enjoyed by people.63 The King’s law
enforced the laws of the kingdom. 64 Generally, the common law of contract and property
governed exchanges of goods and market forces determined the allocation of resources. There
were laws regulating public health issues and building regulations. Roberts argues that the
forerunner to zoning laws is the late medieval town’s practice of restricting foreigners to
specific areas of the town ‘to provide for the management by segregation of strangers.’65 In
London, this was ‘in the area of Whitechapel near Mark Lane.’66

But what was especially relevant in towns was the economic imperative. To facilitate commerce
it was possible for towns to petition the King for charters of independence. In effect, the right of
freedom of action from the lord was purchased from the crown.67 The wealth generated in towns
inspired the growth of a middle class of people.68

4.3.4

The Role of Law

The private property ideology, protected by law dispensed in courts of justice under the
authority of the King, sustained the economic interests of both the land holders and the state.
According to Blackstone, under the common law, ownership of land conferred significant rights
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Thrupp, above n 56, 242. Thrupp identifies that in these new towns, the right to develop the land was
exploited by merchants and craftsmen, thus ‘the enterprise of speculative building’ was undertaken by the
landless as a means of economic advancement, the Nobles who owned the land being prepared to have
the benefit of long ground leases.
63
Platt, above n 48, 72. A charter generally secured the right to hold a market; the right to organise a
merchant guild; freedom from feudal tribute and the right to coin money and regulate weights and
measures. ‘Even serfs who fled their manors and resided in towns for a year and a day were legally
released from their feudal bonds and gained the status of freemen.’
64
D. W. Bromley and M. Cernea, 'Management of Common Property Natural Resources - Overview of
Bank Experience' in L. R. Meyers (ed), Innovation in Resource Management - Proceedings of the Ninth
Agriculture Sector Symposium (1989) 29. As Bromley and Cernea observe:
(at 34): ‘when one has a right one has the expectation in both law and in practice that their
claims will be respected by those with the duty’ to do so. … (at 42) ‘Private property would be
nothing without the requisite authority system that makes certain the rights and duties are
adhered to’.
65
Roberts, above n 55, 155.
66
Le Goff, above n 58, 77.
67
Previté-Orton, above n 12, 720. Previté-Orton suggests that in the years shortly before the Magna
Carta, King John sold charters to some 50-60 towns as a means of raising revenue.
68
Ibid, 1062. Over time, this class became, as Previté-Orton notes, ‘a hard and money-seeking generation,
little inclined to chivalry or scruples.’
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to exploit it almost without restraint.69 As the economic basis of the economy remained
agrarian, it was initially the landed aristocracy that retained the power to make decisions about
the exploitation of land.70 The law, the use of legal discretion as a concomitant right of social
power, patronage and rigid class distinctions were all features of the feudal societal landscape
reflecting a social order reminiscent of the Roman civilization. Commoners were subjects under
the law and subject to the law. Major offences, and there were many to choose from, were
capital crimes. Mercy was the prerogative of the crown.
Yet the system of law was local and functioned at the community level.71 There was
participation by the people in their local governance.72 In the shires and towns, the initial
prosecution of an offender was the responsibility of the victim. The magistrates relied on the
community to arrest and then guard prisoners on the way to the gaol or to court.73 To climb the
social ladder of participation in governance, what was required was the luck of birth or the
steady accumulation of money to enable a person to buy land. Those unlucky in birth had to
have a strategy to achieve upward mobility. Owning land gave a person the entrée to participate
in civil society, which meant being seen at the court. That gave a person access to power
because historical circumstance had forced sovereign power to be shared. The first serious
check to absolute monarchical power had occurred at the making of the Magna Carta in 1215.
The right to participate in government was claimed and won at Runnymede, albeit even if it was
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John G Srankling, ‘Owning the Centre of the Earth’ (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 979, 982-3, argues
that the doctrine was first formulated by Blackstone in his 1766 work Commentaries on the Laws of
England. Under the cujus est soleum doctrine, the owner of land enjoyed rights not just over the land, but
both above and below it. As Sprankling notes ‘[i]t is not a principle of Roman Law.’ For its time, it was
revolutionary. It was a view based on religion: “The earth therefore and all the things therein, are the
general property of all mankind … from the immediate gift of the creator.”’ Sprankling argues (1005)
persuasively that an analysis of decisions ‘reveal a picture of subsurface ownership that is inconsistent
with the centre of the earth theory.’ Peter Butt, Land Law (6th ed, 2010), 8 argues that there is reference to
the doctrine in a 1285 contract for sale of land in Norwich. He also suggests that ‘by the time of Lord
Coke’s Commentary of Littleton (1628) the maxim was well established’ (even if it was –citing Sir Percy
Winfield, Winfield on Torts 1st Ed 1937 – ‘an “unfortunate scrap of latin” that had clogged the law’s
development’).
70
Platt, above n 48, 66-7. Platt argues to the contrary suggesting that the manorial system was only
‘symbolically subject to the power of the lord, overlord and crown.’ This was because feudalism was a
finely balanced system – ‘the best example in all history of a land management system that was selfperpetuating and sustainable.’ Platt’s argument ignores the fact of the legal power held by the lord in this
dependent and servile relationship.
71
Windeyer, above n 11, 9: ‘The outstanding characteristic of both the hundred moot and the shire moot
was that they were popular courts. That is to say they drew their authority from the customary law of the
people. They were the meetings of the representatives of the freemen of the community.’
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Isin, above n 9, 21. Isin, citing S Reynolds, An introduction to the history of English Medieval Towns,
(Oxford, 1977), 121, indicates that: ‘although the methods by which the mayor, officers and councils
were chosen are usually obscure, it is clear that they were chosen in a congregation of the whole city.’
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Cynthia Herrup, 'Law and Morality in Seventeenth-Century England' (1985) Past & Present
102, 108. Herrup notes that ‘[f]ormal authority in legal matters belonged only to men who held some
property.’ But this could extend to husbandmen, artisans yeomen and minor gentry.
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by a ‘well to do class of self-interested people.’74 The sovereign was forced to accept that the
people had rights. Fleming suggests that the event at Runnymede ‘was a powerful symbol of the
rising of a society against the whim and spasm of the ruling conscience.’75 Power was,
however, shared amongst only a small class of people. They held tightly to their rights.76 It
would only be the accumulated wealth from trade and commerce in the sixteenth century that
would ultimately challenge this position of power.

A century after Runnymede, some of the people were able to participate in governance. Griffiths
notes that the House of Commons achieved a permanent status as part of the parliament from
1337. The innovation did not just happen, it was a manoeuvre designed by the sovereign to tap
into the wealth of townsmen and smaller landowners.77 Unsurprisingly, it was driven by the
nascent recognition of the political reality (taken up with gusto by the American revolutionaries
in the eighteenth century) that there should be no taxation without representation. The king
recognised that there was ‘advisability [in] having the weight of a representative assembly
behind controversial or novel changes in the law or in economic and social arrangements.’78 By
making law with the assent of the people, the basis of the concept of political participation, it
would guarantee or assure acceptance of the measures passed by parliament.79

4.4

The impact of the Tudor period

The Tudor period would be seen as the time when the power paradigm in England based on a
supreme sovereign dispensing patronage and clientage was at its zenith. As Churchill glibly
notes, it was not an ‘age of party politics.’80 Rather, the king came to fully represent the law.
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Flemming, above n 8, 43.
Ibid.
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Roberts, above n 55, 251. As Roberts notes, ‘the collective wealth and social influence of English
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Coke would frame it thus: ‘a King’s crown is an hieroglyphic of the laws.’81 The king became
the personification of the law.

4.4.1

The Role of Patronage

Participation in government in the sixteenth century meant being at court where power resided.
Patronage was, according to Guy, the ‘principle weapon of political control.’82 The focus of
politics remained the attainment and maintenance of power; the law was a tool to be used by the
executive to achieve its aims. Parliament sat only when the sovereign summonsed it to
convene.83 When assembled, the king would consult parliament, but he expected that the
sovereign’s will would be respected in Bills submitted. Parliament, at least the commons, had
not yet found its voice.84 Webb suggests that membership in the House of Commons became
popular at this time for the landed gentry and aristocracy for the practical reason that it put one
at the centre of things. Webb goes so far as to suggest that this was the time when ‘the country
gentleman and his cousin, the lawyer … captured the House of Commons.’85

It is here suggested that Henry VIII’s decision to divorce his wife Catherine of Aragon without
the dispensation of Rome marked a turning point in the power relationships between the
sovereign and parliament. By usurping the primacy of Rome, Henry was able to achieve a
redistribution of land the like of which would not be repeated until the Whig taxation reforms of
the late nineteenth century.86 But the execution of this land policy would make the sovereign
dependent on the law making power of parliament. To achieve his personal aims, the King
needed to secure the consent of parliament to legislation that would become known as the Act
of Appeals.87 Henry VIII later professed that the Act made him ‘King and Sovereign,
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recognising no superior in earth but only God, and not subject to any laws of any earthly
creature.’88 Yet, because this supreme authority was conferred by parliament, the precedent
created would be the source of trouble for the monarchy in the future. Religious reformation
may have been the motif used by Henry to achieve his aims, but the realpolitik of the
reformation laws passed by parliament was to ensure that Henry had, as Bobbitt argues, ‘the
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence’ within the state.89 Henry achieved this aim by
manipulating religious ideology. He successfully made Catholicism ‘a conspiracy against the
State, a political enemy.’90

4.4.2

A New Role for Parliament

The effect of Henry VIII’s reforms was that Henry, by law, was free to dispossess himself of a
Queen, and the Roman church of its lands. By patronage, Henry was then able to legitimately
alienate confiscated lands to his ‘favourites’.91 The constitutional impact of Henry’s reformation
legislation was significant. It institutionalised limits to the legislative prerogative of the king. As
Roberts notes, Henry’s reliance on parliament would make ‘it more difficult for later kings to
act without parliament’s support on major issues.’92

Raffield suggests that the sixteenth century saw the end of feudalism and the emergence of ‘a
strong centralised executive within a recognisable nation-state.’ These reforms included the
‘standardisation and systematisation of common law and the legal profession’93 (although not
even being the First Minister would be a protection from the capricious use of the law by the
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king).94 However, the ideation of the concept of the rule of law as a separate monolithic concept
would germinate in the minds of lawyers. The Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke would later be so
bold as to suggest to King James (in 1608) that:
‘The law is the golden metewand and measure to try the causes of your majesty’s
subjects, and it is by the law that your majesty is protected in safety and peace.’95

The precedent set by Henry of seeking the consent of parliament to difficult constitutional
changes, coupled with the rising independence of the mercantile class (which had begun to
infiltrate the House of Commons), would combine to strike at the institution of the monarchy.
Following the death of Elizabeth I, the reluctance of parliament to grant the sovereign the funds
required to conduct foreign and domestic policy would culminate, in the seventeenth century, in
a constitutional crisis. It would foment the notion that ‘a free man may not make themselves
subject to any mortal man,’96 This radical idea would ultimately result in the trial, conviction
and sentencing to death of Charles I for crimes against the people of England, including the
allegation that the king was a ‘tyrant, traitor and murderer.’97

4.5

The Impact of Mercantilism:

The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are described as the mercantile period. At an
ideological level, the issue that came to be violently agitated in England during the later part of
the mercantile period was the constitutional basis for government. The centrality of parliament
to the processes of government would become the focus of struggle over the coming century.
By the close of the Mercantile period, England would have fought a civil war with its sovereign,
rejected republican rule under Cromwell and consented to being ruled by a foreign King,
William III, invited to the throne by a sovereign parliament intent on ensuring that the king’s
rule over the people would be subject to a constitutional settlement.
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4.5.1

Trade brings Wealth, Land and Power

The sixteenth century was a period of great social change. Herrup suggests that the century was
marked by ‘exceptionally sharp social stratification as well as challenges to authority both
within and outside the ruling classes.’98 Glamann describes this period as the beginning of the
Mercantile Era, which extended until the eighteenth century. During this time trade was the
‘great wheel driving the whole engine of society.’99 On the land, an agricultural revolution was
occurring. In the towns and cities, mercantilism was making the prosperous middle class as
wealthy at times as landed aristocracy.100 Indeed, wealth was the door through which the
prosperous business person could acquire status by purchase, including titles, to become landed
aristocracy in their own right.

The seventeenth century would start with England being ruled by Elizabeth I, a protestant queen
but head of a state recognised in the established international order as ‘a first class power’.101
The mercantile period would ultimately see the creation of the British Empire. Ferguson
colourfully describes the period as marking ‘a transition from piracy to political power that
would change the world forever.’102 The British Empire would rival the Roman Empire in terms
of its reach and dominance over world affairs. De Maddalena notes that during the mercantile
period, ‘business methods were introduced into farm management; constant efforts were made
to adjust production to market conditions, considerable capital was expended on improvements
to farm property such as irrigation channels, better byres and stabling, etc.’103 Elton argues,
unsurprisingly, that ‘it was the aristocracy not the urban middle class, who made the most out of
the changed circumstances.’104
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Mercantilism would concentrate on overseas trade and the establishment of joint stock
companies to defray risk. Elton is of the view that it was an age ‘naturally constructed for
entrepreneurial success.’105 England’s agricultural economy was well placed to take advantage
of the opportunities. As Glamann observes, ‘the chief function of English foreign trade was to
sell English cloth and to export English wool.’106 The trade was assisted by the fact of it being
superior to continental product whilst being cheap and competitive. The foreign demand for
English goods drove mercantile adventurers to find new markets and fuelled the English
pirateering and privateering traditions. What began with the stealing of Spanish gold,107 led to
the creation of an overseas empire based on trade.108 Whilst the sale of the produce would
benefit the landowning aristocracy, the export profits benefited the mercantile class. The crown
benefited from the sale of the licence to participate in the trade. The class which suffered the
most was the peasantry and workers in towns.

4.5.2

The Struggle for Sovereignty

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the landed mercantile class saw the opportunity of
power and social advancement through participation in the House of Commons. With the death
of Elizabeth I in 1603, the uncertainties of succession and the struggle for power would see the
rule of law subsumed into the bitterest struggle for power over the next century.109 Participation
in government became visceral. One’s life and property depended upon the choice that was
made.

Whilst historically, the town ‘oligarchies’ would oblige the local peer, Bushman suggests that
there was at this time an ‘awakening’ to the opportunities associated with controlling borough
seats.110 The merchants and tradesmen of property were not as pliable as the established clique.
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In the towns, the lesser gentry and merchants were prepared to press for their charter rights.111
Political organisation had begun.112 Bushman notes that those who ‘most often spoke against the
crown’ served on committees and believed in the popular right to election, thus setting up a
tension between the ‘court party’ and the rising mercantile class.113 The historical device to
secure power in the hands of the few had been ownership of property. However, as more of the
mercantile class acquired land, it posed a political threat to the established elite. Even Oliver
Cromwell was aware of the threat of ‘democracy’ noting that:
‘The ‘multitude of burgesses from decayed or inconsiderable towns doth give too much
… opportunity for men of power to frame parties in Parliament to serve particular
interest[s], and thereby the common interest of the whole is not minded…’ 114

The mercantile period is therefore marked by a growing ideation in many of the people,
especially the mercantile class, that the people (but understood as meaning themselves) had a
legitimate right to a say in the electoral process. In the period between 1621 and 1679, ten
different bills proposing electoral reform of the commons would be brought forward for debate
in the House of Commons, with none proceeding. Essentially, the mercantile class were
pressing for change, for a sharing of political power. They did not want others to speak for
them. At the same time, there was growing social unrest because of enclosures, rising rents and
changing economic conditions, creating an atmosphere for radical reform.115 Instead of reform
through parliamentary processes, more dramatic events would unfold.
111
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Political circumstances dictated that James I, and later his son Charles I, in the absence of
parliamentary support, had little choice during their reign but to exploit traditional prerogatives
to raise the funds necessary to pursue domestic and foreign agenda.116 This further provoked the
anger of the mercantile class by extending taxes such as ship money to inland regions (never
before taxed), and by granting for reward trading licences and monopolies.117 At a time when
the ideology of liberalism was nascent, the constant interference with the market by the crown
without the consent of the parliament caused deep unrest. It is also perhaps an early example of
the motivational force of the user pays principle.

4.5.3

The uprising of the Landed Gentry

As Seed notes, ‘[w]hat matters in terms of any political practice is the present.’118 The
mercantile landed class had wealth, they had ideas and they were aware of notions from abroad
about government. Taylor suggests that ‘it was always the gentry who took the lead’ in
organising petitions sent either to King or Parliament.119 They knew that reforms of government
had to be fought for.120 As a class, they were more likely to be puritan. The mercantile class
started to find voice in the Commons as more and more puritans were elected to Westminster.
Dixon argues that Puritans had, by this time, become so essential to the economics of the nation
that ‘to purge the nation of this people, may be to purge out more of its vitals then the strength
of the State can bear.’121 Religious convictions would lead Puritans, as a class, to the view that
the King had broken his social contract with the people. Hume would later assert that the
puritans were of a religious class that was possessed of an:
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‘inflexible intrepidity, with which they braved dangers, torments, and even death itself;
while they preached the doctrine of peace, and carried the tumults of war, thro’ every
part of Christendom.’122

When Charles I interfered in the religious affairs of Scotland he brought about a civil war.123
The new model army under Cromwell defeated the forces of Charles I and in 1646 Charles, in a
tactical manoeuvre, gave himself up to the Scottish army to allow negotiations to follow.124
Fearing the release of Charles, the army (led by Cromwell), purged parliament in December
1648 to stop the negotiations. At the beginning of the following year the king was tried for
treason by the parliament known as ‘the rump.’ In January 1649 it declared that ‘the commons
of England assembled in Parliament, being chosen by and representing the people, have the
supreme authority of this nation.’125 Exercising its assumed authority, the rump of the House of
Commons, in the name of the people, put the sovereign to trial under the common law upon a
charge of being ‘a tyrant, traitor, murderer and a public and implacable enemy to the
Commonwealth of England.’126 Where Henry VIII would use the law to rid himself of an
inconvenient queen in the sixteenth century, parliament would now use the law to rid itself of an
obdurate sovereign.127

The century therefore marks an epoch change. The people had begun to identify with the
concept of popular power.128 They began to conceive a logic or schema about a new social order

122

Hume, History of Great Britain,(1754-62), 71-72. Cited in Seed, above n 89, 449. Hume would also
argue that ‘it was to this sect, whose principles appear so frivolous, and habits so ridiculous, that the
English owe the whole freedom of their constitution.’
123
AC Grayling, Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights that made the
Modern West (2007), 65. ‘The prelates of the Church of England wished to impose uniformity of
observance and Church structure on Scotland; the Presbyterians wished to impose their alternative on
England.’
124
Black, above n 117, 140.
125
Lockyer, The Trial of Charles I, (London, Folio Society 1974), 76-7. Cited in Robertson, above n 83,
140.
126
Ibid, 149.
127
Windeyer, above n 11, 184. Windeyer notes:
‘English law had made the king of England its subject. And Parliament was now the
acknowledged overlord of the law. Charles II, not wishing to go on his travels again, was wise
enough to recognise this.’
128
James Gray Pope, 'Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order' (1990) 139(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 289, 293:
‘A form of political participation is popular if it is not limited to elites. Again, the example in
pure form would be an assembly of the whole people. And again, less pure but more common
examples include demonstrating, withholding patronage, and refusing to obey just laws. Here,
however, the defining characteristic is not directness, but inclusiveness. A form of participation
may be popular but not direct – as in the case of voting for representatives, or direct but not
popular – as in the case of bribing public officials.’

100

based on representation and the sharing of power to make law.129 The seventeenth century
represents the period when there was an ideological struggle between the executive and
parliamentary branches of government as to which branch would speak for the public interest.
Parliament exercised its Hirschman voice. There would be no exit option taken. Keane sees the
change as being significant in democratic terms:
‘But despite all the setbacks and degradations, and the unfair gains made by a rising
propertied middle class and a gentry that dominated local government, the fundamental
change that came over England was the permanent humbling of the Crown and its
Church, in favour of the visible appearance of the common man and common woman
on the stage of political history.’130

In the context of participation, as formulated by Arnstein, at Runnymede it was the Barons who
had risen up and taken power. At Westminster in 1649, the Commons, comprising the landed
gentry, rose up and took power. The sovereign power would no longer be wielded exclusively
by the landed aristocracy. The soldiers of the parliamentary army had wanted democracy.131
Instead, Cromwell would wrest power from both the commons and the army.132 Black suggests
that Cromwell and the army leaders ‘sought control as well as responsibility’ for government.133
But, after only a decade of bureaucratic rule under major generals, who were intent on
delivering ‘a godly and efficient kingdom,’ the protestant ‘cultural revolution’ failed.134
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4.5.4

Constitutional Monarchy

It was the rule of Charles II after the Restoration that crystallised opposition within parliament
once and for all against absolutism and popery.135 The ideology of absolutism was repugnant to
the ideology of representative government. The Triennial Act 1641 (Eng),136 had already
compelled the crown to convene parliament regularly. By 1680, according to Churchill, ‘the
sombre warfare of creeds and sects’ had been succeeded ‘by the squalid but far less irrational or
uncontrollable strife of parties.’137 When Charles II died in 1688 leaving a Catholic heir,
parliament once again revolted. It is described as the Glorious Revolution but Langford
describes it in the following terms:
‘it seem[ed] to resemble a coup [rather] than a genuine shift of social or political
power’… ‘a conservative reaction of a selfish oligarchy.’138

When the crown was offered to William of Orange he accepted it together with the Bill of
Rights 1689 (Eng).139 By the Toleration Act 1689 (Eng)140 dissenters were allowed to again
practice their own religion and to participate in society.141 After the glorious revolution there
followed two decades of parliamentary struggle between the newly formed Whig and the Tory
parties. Langford describes this period as ‘the most intense and unremitting electoral conflict’ in
which time there were twenty elections.142 Participation in and through parliamentary processes
was being practised by more of the people.
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As Langford suggests, after this time, the crown ‘owed their title to the determination of the
propertied class.’143 The prerogatives of the sovereign were now constrained,144 the control of
the army and the power to tax were both now subject to parliamentary authorisation.145 It was
the time of the supremacy of Walpole who, ‘through the skilful use of influence and even
bribery,’ brought an apparent stability to government in contrast to the chaos of preceding years
– the ‘natural culmination of forces working in favour of the executive’ branch of
government.146 As Black notes, ‘[i]f this political system maintained social inequality, that was
very much what those with power expected.’147 The social imperative gave Parliament the
legitimacy to do so and the rule of law would enforce it. The citizens of the towns once again
became the subjects of the sovereign. No longer a republic under law, England was now a
constitutional monarchy. As Roberts notes, ‘[t]he legislative sovereign, the Crown in
Parliament, could do anything by statute.’148 That power would initially be effectively
controlled by the landowning aristocracy. But, that too would change. As Phillips and Wetherell
note, a distinguishing feature of British politics of this time was the early emergence of
enfranchisement of greater numbers of voters and regular elections enabled by the Triennial Act
of 1641.149

4.5.5

Rotten Boroughs

An extension of the right to vote did not mean that there was a flowering of democracy. It was,
in fact, a corrupt system which was subject to many abuses including ‘constituencies open to the
highest bidder, undue influence exercised by local magnates or borough mongers and generally
unprincipled political behaviour.’150 Spigelman seeks to balance this view by suggesting that
what was occurring, while corrupt by modern standards, was ‘then regarded as normal
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conduct.’151 Whilst this may be correct, it still suggests that the ideology of the ruling elite was
focused on narrow self-interest, rather than any broader concept of public interest.

What had changed was the ideation of government in the minds of many people. The political
gemeinschaft had changed. With the trial and death of Charles I, the spell of tradition was
broken. Keane aptly describes the change:
‘From that day forward, and not only in England, symbolic regicide, carried out in
public, with or without masked executioners, promised that humble folk who had been
subject of a Crown were transformed into citizens with straightened spines, who lived in
a country as Albert Camus later famously put it in The Rebel, in which the throne of
sovereign power forever remained empty.’152

In the eighteenth century there would be a significant change in the administration of
government. Phillips and Wetherell argue that there is a body of work which identifies that in
the Hanoverian eighteenth century, ‘the quality of political relationships in the constituencies
was public, participatory, and partisan.’153 A social conscience would emerge in the nineteenth
century as the impact of the industrial revolution manifested itself in profound social
dislocation.154 Parliament, however, would only enact social legislation when the threat of
political revolution forced its hand. The ideology of power would remain paramount, but it
would be tempered by the emergence of the public interest ideology, as defined by parliament.

4.6

The impact of the Industrial Revolution:

The historian Macaulay (1800-1859), when a member of parliament in 1832, argued that
government ought not to be based on the arbitrary exercise of power but upon its principled
exercise. His position was that ‘[p]eople crushed by law have no hopes but from power. If laws
are their enemies, they will be enemies to laws.’155 This ideology of the rule of law is the
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predominant ideology of government in Australia today. It is an ideology which is patronising
in its elements because of its exclusionary dynamic. It masks the threat it poses to the people if
the power which is wielded by parliament is not done so justly or equably.156 The law is an
amorphous concept; it has no form outside that which the government gives it. It is not possible
to strip law of its semantic nature so as to give it an independent existence outside the function
of the law making power of government.157 The rule of law thus means different things to
different lawmakers, a point not lost on McAuslan when he formulated his ideologies of
planning law.158

The tumults of the seventeenth century had resulted in a significant change in the demographic
of the landowning classes. In the aftermath of the restoration, there was, according to
Hobsbawm, a ‘concentration of landownership in the hands of a limited class of very wealthy
landlords, at the expense both of the lesser gentry and the peasants.159 Churchill suggests that by
the time of the restoration of the monarchy in 1688 there had been such large scale land sales
due to the previous conflict that:
‘there came about a lasting redistribution of landed property, which, though carried out
within the same class, provided a core of self-interest among the new proprietors round
which in after years the Whigs and their doctrines gradually gathered. The dualism of
English life after the restoration found its secular counterpart in two kinds of gentry,
divided in interest, traditions and ideas, but each based on landed property. Here was
one of the enduring foundations of the long-lived party system.’160
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This new landed class was ready to exploit the economic opportunities of the mercantile age.
Feudal notions of mutual obligation meant little to this new landed class. For this new
propertied class, property ownership and the rights attaching to ownership of land gave access
to power and profit.161 The pursuit of profit would be an ideology of its own. As Hume would
later state: "Nothing is more certain than that men are, in great measure, governed by
interest".162

4.6.1

Economic Transformation

The significance of the economic transformation of the English economy in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth century is that it was facilitated by laws made by parliament. The Acts
passed by parliament gave the promoter the legal legitimacy to exploit opportunities which the
common law would otherwise not sanction. Through statutes made by the people’s
representatives, feudal social notions yielded to a new economic imperative.163 The invention of
the steam engine, the macadamising of roads and the growth of markets all created economic
opportunities which, to exploit them to the full, the means of production and of access to
resources had to be rationalised. Exploitation of inventions like steam engine railways, canals
and macadamised roads necessitated linear routes which, unfortunately for those in the way of
progress, had not been the pattern that the pre-industrial landscape had evolved into.164 In a land
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use planning context, the only way to enable the exploitation of the opportunities was through
the law making power of parliament. The real impact of the industrial revolution in England
would therefore lie in the social consequences of that rationalisation and the central place of
parliament in facilitating change.

The commons had provided a means for the people to produce food. However, a process of land
enclosure had begun in the previous centuries as a means of ‘buttressing unsteady rent-rolls.’165
Webb suggests that enclosures had always entailed a degree of coercion. Enclosures had been
on going ‘as the landowners of a village agreed to it or as dominant men forced their smaller
neighbours to give in.’166 By the late seventeenth century, the willingness of the people in the
villages to agree to such proposals had been sapped by the impact of change. Deane notes that it
was the rising corn price that stiffened the resistance to enclosures.167 This fact is likely to
suggest the explanation for the push by landowners to pursue enclosures to exploit the
opportunity culminating in the Passage of The Inclosure (Consolidation) Act 1801 (UK) (the
Enclosure Act).168

Those who owned the land took the opportunity to enclose it, drain it and thus to reduce the
common land (and therefore the means of common production) into their legal possession.169
Others used the land to build the factories to make the goods for export by means of mechanised
industrial processes. Hobsbawm asserts that in Britain, ‘resistance to capitalist development
ceased to be effective by the seventeenth century.’170 The modern age had arrived. Deane goes
so far as to suggest that in England, the economic system under the industrial revolution ‘was as
near being the proto-type of a free-market, labour-abundant economy as there has ever been.’171

The owners of land, who now controlled parliament, could take advantage of the opportunity of
new improvements in agricultural methods, industrial process, means of production and export
opportunities by exploiting the law making power of parliament to coerce the social change
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deemed necessary.172 As is explained in the next section, law made by parliament became a
fundamental driver of social change. But it was legislative change that advanced the interest of
private property, based on McAuslan’s private property ideology. It would be laws enacted by
parliament facilitating economic change that led directly to the need for social legislation
brought about by the social conditions caused by that process. What began as the mechanism to
facilitate private interest outcomes, morphed, by the nineteenth century, into the use of
parliament to legislate social change deemed by it to be in the public interest. Ultimately, this
led to the enactment of planning laws.173

Arguably, the industrial revolution created an ‘explosive’ climate where both at the micro and
macro levels of society, private bills were needed for a multiplicity of projects in a diversity of
areas.174 The exploitation of opportunities in the agricultural economy precipitated an
acceleration of the drift of population to the towns and cites where scientific revolutions had
initiated the industrial revolution in manufacturing creating a demand for labour. Deane argues
that ‘there is no doubt that the English economy had been transformed out of all recognition
between 1740 and 1840.’175

4.6.2

Social Transformation

English society, which had already been transformed by the strife of the Civil War, the
Restoration and the Glorious Revolution, now suffered a further transformation. Black amplifies
this point suggesting that ‘[t]echnology was like a freed genie, bringing ever more changes.’176

171

Deane, above n 167, 223.
Langford, above n 138, 410. Langford suggests that Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England, published in 1765, and was the publication that: ‘had announced with uncompromising clarity
the unbounded legal authority of the Crown-in-Parliament.’ This view was strongly contested by
Bentham who wrote his Fragment on Government denouncing Blackstone in the strongest of terms –
accusing him, amongst other things, of being a ‘shameless apologist of the status quo’ - see the discussion
in Posner, above n 21, 570.
173
Platt, above n 48, 67. Rutherford Platt notes that as early as 1235 ‘Parliament adopted a series of
special acts authorising specific tracts of land to be enclosed or “privatised” to the exclusion of
commoners, who were forced to choose between working as hired labourers or seeking employment
elsewhere.’
174
Deane, above n 167, 166-170. See also UK Court Project Report, above n 164, Section 9.2.1.
Legislation authorised the construction of Canals from as early as the eighteenth century. The UK
Parliament passed the Inclosure (Consolidation) Act (UK) and Railway Act (UK) in 1801; the Gas Light
Act (UK) and Coke Companies Act (UK) were enacted in 1810 and the Tramways Act(UK) was passed in
1870. All were necessary to facilitate the infrastructure to enable economic development. Each Act
overrode private and common rights.
175
Deane, above n 167, 166. Langford, above n 138, 378, puts the period of significant change as the
decades between 1760 – 1780.
176
Black, above n 117, 221.
172

108

Globalisation and the technological revolution would follow. In truth, society is still
experiencing the flux of change deriving from the industrial revolution. Those that had income
and wealth had already taken the opportunity to purchase housing.177 By the end of the
seventeenth century they were joined by the rural poor who had migrated en masse to the towns
where they were barely able to be accommodated in rented housing.178 As Deane also notes, the
distinguishing feature of the industrial revolution in England was that:
‘the changes concerned developed together, and on a scale that was sufficiently farreaching and persuasive to set off a continuing and cumulative process of change and
growth. It was the sheer scale and persistence of economic change that was new.’179

The cost of the English having to fund the war and embargo against the American colonists, the
French and the Dutch led to increasing government debt and to a financial crisis and social
unrest in England in the late eighteenth century. Pressure built for parliament to reform itself
under threat of reform being imposed by social revolution.180 Langford suggests that the
emergence of the Association movement of 1779-80 ‘brought reform nearer than at any time in
the ensuing fifty years, and at its height in 1780 it achieved an extraordinary degree of national
consensus.’181 The association movement is the best example of the emerging voice of the
disenfranchised people under conditions which in many ways oppressed the people.182 The
association movement was broad in its interests ultimately extending to include the garden city
association.183 The vitality of the association movement confirms the observation noted by
Putnam, affirmed by Edwards, that the development of a vibrant associational life in a society is
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central to the development of a civic culture.184 Hobsbawm recognises that at this time the
British parliament was controlled by ‘an oligarchy of landowning aristocrats.’185 Yet it would be
France and not Britain that would experience violent revolution as the voice of the people rose
to overthrow the government in 1789. In response, the English ruling class, being fearful of the
path France took, quickly developed a new ideation. Edwards describes it as a ‘cooperative
compact’ and suggests that it is the ideation that ‘underpins and is implicit in classical
democratic ideology.’186 Whilst both the English and French models of social revolution would
involve devolution of power to the people, it was achieved by very different means.

At the end of the seventeenth century only five English towns had a population of ten thousand
people. By the start of the nineteenth century there were twenty seven, with London increasing
in size from half a million people to one million people over the same period.187 By the 1830s
industrialisation had drawn thirty percent of the population into towns.188 This was the greatest
concentration of people in urban areas in Europe at that time.189 Forty percent of this population
was employed in manufacturing.190 One attraction of urban living was that when wives and
children were working, the household income could be robust.191 But with urban growth, fear
of the mob intensified.192 Parliament was intent on control. Its actions were not about creating
what Webb describes as ‘a better life to the people of England.’193
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4.6.3

The Rise of the Middle Class

Langford notes that the lifestyle of the upper and middle classes ‘made the inequalities of a
highly commercial, cash-based economy glaringly plain.’194 Deane acknowledges that
eighteenth century entrepreneurs depended heavily on family and friends for capital, thus
keeping economic power within the landed wealthy.195 Langford describes early attempts of the
English poor to ‘fight back’ against the tide of change, but he acknowledges that it was a losing
battle.196 When power is centralised in the hands of a few, it is often difficult to achieve balance
in the social context. Examples of the benevolent oligarchy are few. Usually the result is, as
Pope suggests, the ‘forceful political intervention of the citizenry.’197

The events in France in 1789 would focus the minds of both Whigs and Tories. Both sides of
parliament rallied to the Crown. The government became very wary of the people.198 Advocates
of people’s rights and liberties such as Thomas Paine were tainted as ‘dangerous radicals’.199
Moore suggests that to those within parliament, people ‘supporting the goals of the [French]
revolution were supporting terror, mob rule, even regicide.200 Despite the strict measures
adopted by the government to control society, some continued to gamble with their liberty to
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bring about social change.201 Harvie cites Pitt’s ‘reign of terror’ in the early years of the
nineteenth century as an example of parliament’s intent to suppress democratic thinkers.202
Moore identifies Margarot, one of the ‘Martyrs to Liberty’ transported to New South Wales on
the Surprize in 1794, as an example of the people parliament had in mind. As Moore notes,
Margarot had argued (before his transportation):
‘with precision in the London Corresponding Society that “unequal”, “partial” and
“inadequate” representation resulted in oppressive taxes, unjust laws, profligacy with
public money and limitations on liberty.’203

The surprise is that social change occurred in Britain without violent revolution. Harvie
suggests that revolution was avoided because of the efforts of the Clapham Sect, headed by
Wilberforce, to convert the elite.204 Moore similarly identifies this time as a period when the
Christian evangelicals ‘found vindication for social justice and the equality of all in the
Gospels.’205 The justification of the political elite in support of the denial of liberty and resultant
social inequities was, as Deane suggests, that the system had its ‘economic advantages.’206
Langford describes the change that occurred as the English ruling class manifesting ‘a serious
minded, Evangelical enthusiasm’ for reform.207 Once again, religion would play its part in the
movements for social reform.208

It can be easily demonstrated that in the nineteenth century, the landed rich became much
wealthier. In fact, it was the deliberate investment of the landed class in productive capital
formation in the nineteenth century that drove the industrial revolution. As Deane suggests
201
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without irony, ‘if this surplus had gone to the poor it would have been difficult to get it out of
current consumption and into capital formation.’209 This new middle class had the ear of
power,210 and it sought to exploit its position to the exclusion of workers.211 As only the
landowning classes could stand for parliament before 1832, power was concentrated in their
hands.212 But pressure to listen to the needs of the middle class had been rising.213 Langford’s
view is that the ‘sovereign power of cash’ meant that there was a ‘steady assimilation of small
professional and business families [which] altered the precise make-up of the landed class
without significantly affecting its overall character.’214

Black is of the view that the nineteenth century saw the middle-class setting the legislative
agenda.215 The objective of the reforms of this period was ‘the consolidation of an urban
middle-class [political] base.’216 It is here suggested that the parliamentary elite devised the
means to hold onto power by enacting successive social reforms which benefited the middleclass more so than working class people. The middle class had champions in parliament. Harvie
argues that the purpose of the reforms of this period was ‘to concede enough … to stave off
political explosions.’217 This is exemplified by the passage of the ‘Catholic emancipation Act’ in

‘there is some truth in the traditional view which associates movements of political freedom and
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1829.218 O’Farrell suggests that this Act was a ‘grudging concession’ granted under threat by
O’Connell to unleash Catholic mob violence both in Ireland and England.219

The impact of the industrial revolution is hard to overstate. It caused a transformation in the
social conditions of English society. This is the market theory position. The social conditions
created by economic development were the subject of spontaneous market readjustment.
Webster and Lai suggest that this spontaneity led to the emergence of the garden city
movement.220 But even if that be correct, it was the resultant social conditions caused by
unrestrained market conditions that created the problems the association sought to address. Saul,
in his book Unconscious Civilisation, references the appalling social conditions caused by the
impact of the Industrial Revolution. He posits the question whether what he describes were
‘temporary conditions’ being ‘the unfortunate, inevitable disorder of revolutionary change’?221
Saul goes on to advance the argument that it was a series of people-led reforms enacted through
Parliament that brought social change. This argument is supported by Berveling and Taylor.222
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got far worse for a very long time. For example, the development of the mechanised cotton mills
created much of the market for slaves to pick American cotton….. the sugar and cotton field
slaves represented a major revolution - the enslaving of a race purely for economic reasons…
The long term pattern of the Industrial Revolution was to institute a lower financial standard of
living and declining conditions of life. The result was a full century of unimpeded social decline
and disorder. At life expectancy levels then common, this represented many generations, a long
term pattern, not a temporary adjustment. What's more, during this long, unimpeded run, the
economic forces were unable to establish a stable balance. The market simple repeated,
repeatedly and mechanically, the cycle of slow build to a boom followed by bust. The market
did not and does not learn because being devoid of disinterest, it has no memory. There can be
no such thing as a natural market equilibrium.’
222
S Berveling and L Taylor, 'Land Use Planning, Development & Building Control ' in P Stein QC AM
et al (eds), Butterworths, Local Government Planning and Environment Service NSW (2004) vol C
Commentary, [450,011], C60,153:
‘The first main statute dealing with building regulation was the Public Health Act 1848 (UK),
introduced in response to the urban aftermath of the Industrial Revolution. This gave rise to a
series of enactments each dealing with separate issues such as building layouts and external
space requirements. The various mechanisms were consolidated into the Public Health Act
1875’.
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4.6.4

Social Reform through Parliamentary Reform

Until the ‘Great Reform Act’ the King and the Aristocracy had ‘indirect control’ over many
votes of those electing members to parliament.223 Absent a champion in parliament, the people
were left to more traditional forms of protest in order to raise their voice. The Gordon riots of
1780, led by Lord George Gordon of the Protestant Association, ‘held London at it mercy for
nearly a week and engaged in an orgy of murder and destruction.’224 Langford argues that the
conservative reaction ‘so marked in England during the following years’ can be dated to this
episode of some of the people rising against exclusion from parliamentary power.225

Parliament’s response to the rising voice of the people was typical. As Harvie notes, ‘what ever
the governing elite thought about economic doctrines, as magistrates and landowners their
watchword was stability, their values still pre-industrial.’226 Langford makes the point that that
Burke pushed through a ‘handful of reforms abolishing some of the more notorious sinecure
places and providing for a more intensive scrutiny of crown finances,’227 as a means of putting
off the need to effect real reforms. The expansion of institutions ‘with a meritocratic ethos’,
particularly in the civil service, the universities, schools and the army were implemented as a
means to forestall more radical solutions.228 Keane observes that these measures were as if ‘the
Westminster model vaccinated itself against the French disease.’229
But the mood for reform would not be stifled.230 Tolstoy’s comment in War and Peace
(published in 1869) that ‘great movements stem from millions of individual decisions reached
by ordinary people’ captures the sentiment of the time.231 The combination of economic change,

223

As Posner, above n 21, 580 confirms,
‘the votes for the members of the House of Commons were indirectly controlled by the king and
a few of the more powerful aristocrats. English government of the period appears to have been
far more oligarchic than Blackstone lets on.’
224
Langford, above n 138, 415. The August 2011 riots in London (and other cities) can perhaps be seen in
this light as a continuation of history – except that unlike the early nineteenth century, transportation to
the colony of New South Wales is not an option for the British government
225
Ibid..
226
Harvie, above n 155, 420.
227
Langford, above n 138, 412.
228
Black, above n 117, 217.
229
Keane, above n 120, 554.
230
Alan DiGaetano, ‘Creating the Public Domain: Nineteenth-Century Local State Formation in Britain
and the United States’ (2006) 41(4) Urban Affairs Review, 427, 436. DiGaetano suggests that:
‘the early 1830s witnessed a renewed call for political reform, in which political unions of
middle- and working-class men demanded an extension of suffrage. Mobilization around
suffrage reform led to civil unrest, most notably the 1831 Reform Bill riots in Bristol and
Nottingham.’
231
Cited in Harvie, above n 155, 420.

115

food shortages following the Napoleonic wars and the passage of the Corn Laws Act of 1815 led
to great social unrest.232 Moore suggests that ‘[t]he army had to protect parliament from angry
mobs unable to afford bread.’233 Citing Hobsbawn and Rudé, Moore identifies these protests as
‘primitive egalitarianism.’234 As Keane explains:
‘Until the end of the eighteenth century the commoners knew nothing of the language of
democracy. But they did know about bargaining by collective riot: satire and mockery,
violence directed against people and calculated damage to things.’235
The social unrest led to parliamentary interventions and the passage of ‘illiberal legislation.’236
Moore identifies that this period saw parliament enact legislation in 1820 that ‘greatly enhanced
the state’s power to suppress drilling [marching], meetings and seditious libel.’237 Yet there
were also voices for reform. Elements in the English parliament recognised that what was
needed was not so much as radical reform but rather societal reform. It was the time of the
‘philosophical radicals.’238 Utilitarianism became the catchcry.239 Langford sources the
enthusiasm of this group to ‘the business classes of the new industrial England.’240 The
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movement for the abolition of slavery spearheaded by Wilberforce, with the support of Pitt the
younger, is the prime example.241

And it would be in the parishes and boroughs of England, the place where the civil
administration of the locality occurred, that the ideation would form in peoples minds as to how
they could attain a role in government.242 In the counties, the crown appointed the Lord
Lieutenant. This appointment gave the person who held the position the right to bestow
patronage such as in the appointment of justices of the peace. The significance was that these
local administrators, for which no salary or payment other than the honour of appointment was
received, had the status of crown officials. They had power to make bylaws. In combination
with the vestry (or parish) council, they served as a ‘virtual legislature for their locality.’243

The administration of towns was more complex. Webb suggests that by the eighteenth century
municipal government had ‘declined into self-serving and unresponsive oligarchies.’244 The
Municipal Corporations Act of 1661 had excluded dissenters from being entitled to take a
position in a municipal corporation. Given that this Act excluded many in the mercantile class
who would not profess to being Anglican, it is not surprising that Webb notes that few
corporations were active by the nineteenth century.245
Benthamite theory merged with the aspirations of those people that had democratic intent.246
Throughout the nineteenth century, reformist (Whig) and loyalist (Tory) ideologues would
agitate for control both in municipal affairs and in parliament.247 Harvie correctly suggests that
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identifying protagonists at this time as ‘left’ or ‘right’ is to impose a ‘criteria of a later age.’248
But it is possible to date the emergence of the ideology of parliament as an instrument of
managed social change to this period.249 This is evident in the passage of the Reform Act 1832
(UK) and in social legislation such as the Factory Act 1833 (UK) and the Poor Law Amendment
Act 1834 (UK). That the passage of these reforms was a means of preserving the power of the
state in the hands of the landed and mercantile elite does not detract from observation that the
people began to see the role of parliament in different terms.250 It is perhaps, for present
purposes, particularly significant that the period saw the passage of the Municipal Corporations
Act 1835 (UK).251

4.6.5

UK Municipal Reform

By the reforms introduced by the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835,252 municipal affairs
became subject to a rate-payer franchise. Following the report of the English Royal Commission
conducted under Lord Parkes, one hundred and eighty four municipal corporations in England
were replaced by elected councils ‘chosen by rate-paying householders that had been in
residence for three years.’253 Forty one large towns, many being industrial towns including
Manchester, Bradford and Birmingham, obtained representation for the first time.254 As Webb
notes, ‘by mid [nineteenth] century the corporations themselves were requesting private acts of
parliament granting very broad powers, for, among other things, housing, slum clearance, and
the operation of gas and water works.’255 Accordingly, it is possible to see this time as the
beginning of the ideation of a different ideology, the emergence of a cooperative compact
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amongst some members of the political elite to create a more representative state. The early
legislative reforms did not bring equality. On one view it was easy for the landed classes to hold
onto power. As Harvie notes, the aristocracy supplied:
‘much of the membership of both political parties at Westminster, occupying almost all
of the upper posts in the empire, running local government in the counties, and
officering the army – the navy was less socially exclusive.’256

The unpaid nature of parliamentarian service naturally excluded from participation all but those
who could afford to not to work.257 This, in part, guaranteed that the established elite would
continue to dominate parliament ‘for almost a further half century’.258 Up until this time, the
dominant ideology was the attainment and maintenance of power through control of the
franchise.259 Despite the working-class protest movement of Chartism and the publication of the
people’s charter in 1838, little progress towards equality was made. There was little enthusiasm
in parliament for the Chartist principles of universal male suffrage, abolition of property
qualifications and annual elections.

It would be the Municipal Corporations Act that first gave political voice to the people (in the
capacity of the middle-class) by giving them a measure of control over their own affairs.260 The
act fostered participation by ‘encourag[ing] the party politicization of corporations.’261 As Webb
suggests: ‘If one is looking in England of the [eighteen] thirties for a striking expansion of the
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political power of the middle classes, one must look not to the reformed parliament but to the
towns.’262 The Second Reform Act 1867 (UK),263 extended the franchise to males living in
towns.264 The process was effectively completed by 1884-5, when the same limited suffrage
was extended to adult males in the counties. This reform led to almost two thirds of the male
population in the counties being enfranchised.265 This, in turn, led to a nationalisation of
political choices. As Phillips notes, ‘many of the holders of both franchises [municipal and
national] viewed all political choices in essentially national terms.’266

4.6.6

The Impact of the Reform Acts

The Reform Act of 1832 was a defining moment when politics shifted from being ‘local
factional and idiosyncratic’ to reflect modern politics where ‘political principle defined in
national terms by the parties at Westminster’ administered by party apparatus in each electorate
determines the outcomes.267 As Lord Nelson ruefully commented in 1833 ‘[t]he mischief of the
reform is that whereas democracy prevailed heretofore only in some places, it now prevails
everywhere.’268 Windeyer expressed the view that the Reform Act led to democracy.269 It is
equally arguable, as Clark contends, that the Reform Act was just another manoeuvre, ‘a classic
example of the British state conceding token political representation to excluded classes in order
to forestall more radical challenges to the dominant system.’270 Phillips and Wetherill go so far
as to suggest that the change was ‘accidental.’271 But it is undeniable that the reforms of this
period introduced a fundamental change in the dynamic of parliament. Phillips and Wetherell
262
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analysed voting behaviour pre and post the Reform Act of 1832. Their work shows that in the
eighteenth and extending into the nineteenth century, the electorate was very changeable. That
is, before the Reform Act, of those that could vote they were loyal not to parties but to
themselves – their vote could be bought. But after the passage of the Reform Act in 1832
(which occurred only after the King threatened to swamp the House of Lords),272 this changed.
Statistical analysis of voting patterns demonstrates that the Reform Act had a ‘powerfully
politicizing impact’ on the electorate with ‘an initial Whig or Tory vote locked electors into
virtually lifelong patterns.’273

Similarly to the impact of the industrial revolution, the political reforms of this period led to
greater change. Over the course of the century, beginning with the middle class, the needs of the
people became relevant. Harvie suggests that:
‘[t]he great surge of middle-class political awareness exemplified in the Anti-Corn Law
League in the 1840s had made it clear to politicians that the old political structure could
be maintained only if it came to terms with middle class expectations.’274

But urbanisation also led to the rise of collectivism. The working classes expressed their voice
through participation in organised trade unions; their frustrations were expressed through
support for organised sport like association football.275 From as early as the eighteen twenties,
labour had been organised in Lancashire with the formation of the National Association for the
protection of Labour. This was followed closely, in 1833, by the formation of the Builders’
Union, which spread throughout the industrial regions. Owen formed the Grand National
Consolidated Trades Union in 1834 only to see the government respond by transporting to New
South Wales six agricultural labourers, the ‘Todpuddle Martyrs’ from Dorchester, for forming a
union. The government’s initial response would lead to the failure of the attempt to create a
national union.276 But the arrest and mass movement that arose to secure the freedom of the
Todpuddle six represents, according to Moore, ‘a moment of symbolic transition.’ It marked the
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beginning of a drive for a different type of liberty, namely ‘the freedom from the unequal power
of employers.’277

The abolition of various taxes on advertisements (1853), Newspapers (1855) and paper (1861)
opened the way for the explosion of the dissemination of information to the masses via
newspapers led by the penny and then half-penny press.278 The number of morning papers rose
from 8 in 1856 to 21 in 1900.279 By the close of the nineteenth century, the emergence of a new
ideology of socialism would also test the established order. The Fabians would articulate the
aim of attaining ‘a centrally planned economy and labour market, administered by an elite of
trained professionals, who would eliminate inefficiency, the trade cycle, and its by-products
such as unemployment and poverty.’ 280

Democracy, in the sense of universal adult suffrage, would not occur until the twentieth century.
But the pressure for the right of the people to participate in their governance was the focus of
political struggle in England during the nineteenth century. Over this period the people would
be ‘democratised.’ Arguably, McAuslan’s public interest ideology was therefore born out of the
contest of ideas as to who was to govern.281 It can be seen that the right to participate was so
important that it turned ‘liberals into radical republicans.’282 In contrast (as will be seen in
chapter 5), in the colony of New South Wales a different social compact, one that was
antagonistic to participation, would be created.
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4.6.7

Land Reform

By the mid nineteenth century the ideology of liberalism and laissez faire principles dominated
English political thought and practice. The application of market theory had led to some towns
being well planned. Civic-minded local councils could establish parks, libraries, concert halls,
and baths.283 As Morgan notes, ‘[n]o town with civic self-respect neglected to obtain
parliamentary authority for an improvement commission, equipped with extensive powers of
rebuilding.’284 London, with the obvious exception of its slums,285 was restored and adorned.286
The Georgian architectural influence was evident not just in London, but through out the United
Kingdom in places like Edinburgh’s New Town and Bath.287 But this was not the normative
outcome of the application of market forces. Many areas were left ‘to the mercy of the
speculative builder.’288 These were the places where the land-owner was unlikely to live
personally. This suggests that what made a difference in land use planning terms were both land
ownership and the quality of civic participation by land owners in matters concerning a locality.

In 1876 the survey of land ownership established that at that time eighty percent of the land of
England was owned by a few as seven thousand people.289 It was the land owners of this period
who decided the quality of built form outcomes in a locality in Victorian England. As Brown
and Sherrard note:
‘Never has the art of town building sunk lower than in the Victorian period. Vast
aggregations of people were herded together in narrow courts and alleys devoid of
sunlight, ventilation, sanitation and open spaces.’290
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To complicate matters, the market failed at a time when the population in cities had boomed.
The period between 1873 and 1896 is described ‘the great depression in trade and industry.’291
Local authorities were delegated important powers by parliament to combat social problems
both in towns and in rural areas. The measures aimed to attract people back to areas depopulated
by earlier relocation to the towns or emigration to the colonies.292 As will be discussed in the
next section (at 4.7.3 & 4.7.4), market failure would lead to pressure for social reform. This is
best illustrated by the 1894 Whig reforms that introduced graduated death duties. This
legislation had a devastating effect on the land owning classes. Webb suggests that in the
period between 1909 and 1921, a quarter of English land was sold, a redistribution of wealth
‘not seen since the sixteenth century’ (at the time of the dissolution of the monasteries).293
Step by step, power was also being redistributed.294 The emergence of planning laws at the
beginning of the twentieth century would follow the period described by Tocqueville (1805-59)
as the ‘great democratic revolution.’295 It would be a revolution which allowed participation by
representation; it fell well short of participatory democracy.296

4.7

Planning Laws out of Private Bills

The historical source for the exercise of state power to interfere with the market in relation to
the development of land is the private bill mechanism. It was the first time that legislation was

‘If the British city nevertheless remained an appalling place to live in, exceeded only by the
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used for the purpose of regulating the land use ‘in order to achieve strategic policy
objectives.’297 The private bill mechanism was created by UK parliament in the early eighteenth
century. However, the initial use of legislation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was for
the purpose of facilitating the ideology of private property. Yet by the early twentieth century in
Britain, it is undeniable that the legislative mechanism was being utilized to facilitate the
ideology of the public interest.298

Faced with having to deal with the multiplicity of petitions for site specific legislation,
parliament devised an administrative means to facilitate development. That mechanism retained
to parliament an absolute discretion over whether or not the bill was to become law. As Webb
explains, through the private bill mechanism, parliament could deliver the means to rationalise
the economic landscape of the country.299 Formerly, the dispensing of such discretionary
largesse had been the prerogative of the crown.300 However, the Sovereign did not dispossess
the people of their rights to enjoy the land (whether as individuals or, by custom, in common
with others).301
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mere custodians of land, and as such, their wishes must yield to those of the community as a whole, as
represented by government.’ The history of the private bills passed before parliament was seized of a
need to consider the public interest demonstrates the difficulty which confronts society when confidence
is placed solely in parliamentary institutions to both define and protect that public interest.
299
Webb, above n 85, 61. Webb says that ‘the private bill was the only way to accomplish certain things
now done by routine administrative or judicial action.’
300
Until 1689 and the enactment of the Bill of Rights, the Sovereign could and did interfere with the
market by conferring favours and granting monopoly rights. Generally, the grant of a trading or monopoly
right usually created an additional right. Churchill, above n 80, 113, suggests that:
‘For some time the crown had eked out its slender income by various devices, including the granting of
patents and monopolies to courtiers and others in return for payment. Some of these grants could be
justified as protecting and encouraging inventions, but frequently they amounted merely to unjustified
privileges, involving high prices that placed a burden upon every citizen.’
301
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2008] HCA 5, [29]. The High
Court cites with approval the observations of Viscount Radcliffe in the Privy Council decision of Burmah
Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, 115. The High Court held that ‘in the United Kingdom the
Crown never claimed or sought to exercise in time of peace a right to take land, except by agreement or
under statutory powers, even if it was required for the defence of the realm.’
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4.7.1

Clauses Acts302

By the seventeenth century, the English parliament was a sovereign parliament. Just as is the
case in modern Australia, parliament’s laws override the common law.303 It had always been
possible in England to petition parliament through a private bill to seek legislative intervention
to create a right or entitlement that did not otherwise exist. Traditionally, legislation such as that
petitioned by local authorities in respect of infrastructure improvement (wharves, harbour or
river works) generally benefited directly the local communities. It could readily be anticipated
that changes sought by such legislation were generally supported by the local community.
Hume's self interest was at play at the local level.304

However, in respect of legislation petitioned by promoters of economic development in the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of local communities had to be coerced
into accepting the benefits of industrialisation.305 The landed parliamentarians recognised that it
was unlikely, in the absence of such legislation, that communities which would be directly (and
often adversely) affected by infrastructure projects such as swamp drainage, commons
enclosures, railways and roads would willingly give up their private and common rights to enjoy
the use of such land.306 For the good of the people, we are asked to accept, parliament facilitated
the exploitation of economic opportunities.307
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UK Court Project Report, above n 164, section 9.2. A clauses Act was a template procedure that
created the statutory framework for a Bill ‘to which subsequent private bills could refer thereby reducing
their length and complexity.’
303
Churchill, above n 80, 262. Churchill advances the argument that:
‘Parliament had not striven to make itself omnipotent, nor to destroy the traditional powers of
the Crown, but to control their exercise so that the liberties of parliament and of the individual
were safeguarded and protected.’
However, he also recognises that Coke’s dream of a ‘Supreme Court of Common Law declaring what was
or what was not legal had been extinguished’ by the restoration.
304
David Hume, above n 162, 81.
305
Windeyer, above n 11, 8. The resultant decision to enclose land was seen to be in the public interest, as
defined by parliament. Windeyer might correctly suggest that the pre-industrial agricultural system was a
‘wasteful system of agriculture’, but it provided a means for the villager to participate in the cash
economy. Similarly, legislation to facilitate railway development would be beneficial to a wider section
of the community; but to those directly affected by the route of the railway, the fact of being able to be
heard amounted to little: the railway still came. The interests that were directly benefited from these acts
were private interests. Social policy was being outsourced to the private sector.
306
Deane, above note 167, 191. Indeed, Dean suggests that rising corn prices in the second half of the
Eighteenth Century provided an incentive for small farmers to resist dispossession.
307
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, section 9.2.1:
‘The linear character of the canal, railway and road networks that were developed required
inevitably the exercise of coercive powers. The land owners could not be expected to co-operate
unconditionally in surrendering land to the greater commercial enterprise of the railway
companies or the turnpike trust, and the only mechanism available to the promoter of such a
scheme was to secure the necessary powers under Parliamentary legislation to acquire land
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This point is illustrated by a consideration of the Enclosure Acts. There were as many as 3,360
enclosures authorised by separate private bills passed by parliament under the reign of George
III (1760-1820). Culp-Davis argues that ‘the exercise of discretion may mean either
beneficence or tyranny.’308 This descriptor applies equally to these early planning laws.
Enclosure facilitated economic development, a benefit to the petitioner.309 The dispossessed, 310
having no recourse to law,311 were in the hands of the politicians.312 They were tyrannised.313

Much as was the case in Ancient Rome (discussed in chapter 3), the function of the law was to
protect those who could successfully assert that they had rights to or in relation to property.314 In
a jurisprudential sense, as Stone notes, there would only be utility in going to court if there
existed a legal lacuna, ‘a space devoid of law,’315 which needed filling by the decision of a

compulsorily subject to an obligation to pay compensation to the owner, and to construct and
operate a railway, without being liable to action for nuisance from those with land alongside the
route.’
‘For the previous two centuries it had been local authorities who alone had the willingness or
ability to promote improvement works such as harbour or river improvements and who sough
Parliamentary powers not only for the works themselves but also to levy a special rate on ships
to meet the costs.’
308
Kenneth Culp-Davis, Discretionary justice: a preliminary inquiry (1969), 3. Arguably, when the
minister exercises discretion such as that allowed under Part 3A of the EP&A Act, a similar situation
pertains.
309
Langford, above n 138, 380. Langford suggests that the economic impact of the parliamentary
enclosures can be exaggerated, mainly because they were in number ‘less significant than the relatively
silent non-parliamentary enclosure which had been proceeding for decades and even centuries.’ This
observation merely confirms the pervasiveness of the displacement. As the commons were enclosed, the
capacity of the villagers to make a living was curtailed, whilst many of the villagers accepted being
reduced to the status of tenant labourers, many also found their way to the towns in search of
employment.
310
Moore, above n 5, 32. As Moore notes:
‘The precursor to the creation of the English working class was the application of capitalist and
scientific principles to farming – an agricultural revolution that greatly increased yield, profits
and population, but disposses tenant farmers who were evicted from their smallholdings.’
311
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, section 9.2.1. The report notes that the right of the villager was
to lodge a petition against the proposal. The petition was then debated in parliament and referred to a
select committee to ‘take evidence on the Bill.’
312
Black, above n 117, 165. Thus, through the enclosure of land, it became easier, as Black suggests, to
control both the land and the people working it to the profit of the landowner. The fact that there were
public hearings did not lead to the retention of common land. The process that had been created was
designed to enable enclosures to occur over the complaints of those directly affected
313
Ibid 180. Black cites Robert Sharp, a Yorkshire village schoolmaster as saying: ‘I have seen long and
said often that the rage for enclosing open fields and commons was one great cause of the Ruin or poverty
of the rural population.’ At a societal level, the surface level of discourse, enclosures dispossessed the
people from access to common or shared resources and made the yeoman farmers labourers.
314
As McAuslan, above n 158, 3 suggests:
‘Property owners turned to the courts not just because they were institutions provided for the
resolution of conflicts, but because lawyers and the common law they had fashioned over the
centuries were very much concerned with the protection and preservation of rights of property.’
315
Stone, above n 157, 188.
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court.316 The enclosure of common land did not give rise to any such novel legal issues. The
right of the community to use common land was an ancient right.317 Resort to the common law
or equity for authority to dispossess a person of such a right would not result in the court
sanctioning the action because of common law authority.318 The promoter of an enclosure
proposal therefore could not appeal to the common law to sanction such an enclosure. Whilst
the common law admitted of growth and change, this being Stone’s conception of the
achievement of the common law,319 reliance on judicial creativity under the common law would
not, by itself, promote economic growth as quickly as the change occurring in society.320 Put
simply, it was not the function of the common law to devise a means to enable or facilitate
economic growth.321 As land owners became aware of the opportunities of new agricultural and
industrial methods and opportunities emerging in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
they vigorously petitioned parliament for what could be said to be planning permission (as we
understand the concept today) to enclose and develop land.
The novelty of the Enclosure Act was that it was a ‘clauses Act.’322 Later private bills could
refer to the Enclosure Act and its provisions to facilitate the administration of the process of
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J Spigelman, 'Lord Mansfield and the Culture of Improvement' (Paper presented at the Big Ideas
Forum, Sydney, 2008), 8. Spigelman suggests that there was such an emergent need in the area of
commercial law, which Mansfield filled by the creative use of the law applied in commercial disputes.
Mansfield’s overriding principle was ‘if there was no existing rule, the law would adopt the customs of
the particular trade.’
317
Windeyer above n 11, 8. Windeyer notes that the use of commons dates to the period ‘when the kings
of Wessex were rulers of England.’ It persisted in many English parishes until the eighteenth century.
318
Walker v Commonwealth, above n 301. As Previté-Orton, above n 12, 606, notes, under Henry II
reforms, ‘no man should be disseised of his free tenement unjustly and without judgment’. These rights
were protected by the king’s writs of Novel Dissesin and Mort d’Ancestor.
319
Stone, above n 157, 211. As Stone notes:
‘Certainly, in the homeland of the common law, the English judicial achievement in maintaining
the process of continuing self-renewal of precedent law, needs to be seen against the general
English background. We mean the oft-noted capacity of Englishmen, both at the top and at he
grass roots, to achieve a consensus in the prevailing moral and political ideas, that is, their
capacity not only to build moral and political traditions, but also to keep modifying these without
disastrously shattering consensus.’
320
Spigelman, above n 316, 9. Spigelman may disagree in that he suggests that Mansfield achieved such
an outcome during his tenure as Chief Justice. Spigelman argues that in Mansfield’s 32 years of
presiding, ‘the flexibility and resilience of English commercial law was established’ through judge made
law. This reflects Posner’s view of Blackstonian theory, see Posner, above n 21, 584. Posner suggests that
in Blackstone’s model, there was ‘heavy reliance on legal fictions as the agency of reform.’ He cites the
development of the law of real property which, while affected by the rubric of feudal concepts, was
adapted to facilitate the ‘creation of a free market in real estate.’
321
Samantha Hepburn, 'Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of Statutory Verification' (2009) 31
Sydney Law Review 239, 240-1. As Hepburn observes: ‘Common law courts are not indulgent in the
recognition of new or novel land interests…’ However, ‘new forms of property rights can be recognised
by statute.’
322
See above n 302. The Enclosure Act (41 George III, c. 109) set the general ‘planning’ framework.
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land enclosure.323 Parliament created, for the first time, an administrative mechanism to
facilitate a volume of work. Whilst each Bill had to be separately presented to parliament (for
the particular area of concern), by reason of the volume of these separate Bills, the Enclosure
Act facilitated the administrative processes. The bills presented to parliament were not confined
to enclosures. A wide variety of projects could be the subject of a private bill. Often the subject
matter of the Bill, whilst relating to a specific parcel, had elements common to other petitions
for similar types of development. However, a specific Bill was required in respect of each
project. The volume of work dictated that some administrative system be established to enable
parliament to process the volume of work.324 Functionally, what parliament was endeavouring
to achieve was a system that created both the right and also the administrative process pursuant
to which the right would to be exercised.

4.7.2

Departmental Supervision

In the mid-nineteenth century parliament devolved administrative control over the private bill
process to the executive arm of government.325 However, the topical focus of Private Bills
meant that little co-ordination or supervision of the outcome occurred. What would later be
recognised as distinctly separate functions, namely the plan making function and the
development approval function, was yet little understood. Parliament directly retained the power
to ‘grant’ the approval. Before 1846, evidence on private bills was heard at the bar of the House
of Commons.326 After 1846, the work of determining and reporting on the factual matrix of the
petition was undertaken by the department. The departmental review became a Ministerial
recommendation to the house. If the Parliamentary committee dissented from the
recommendation, reasons had to be stated. To facilitate parliament being informed, a public
enquiry was held. As departments reported to Ministers, this was the beginning of executive
review over parliamentary actions in matters of development. Nonetheless, the mechanism
created to obtain the legislative imprimatur to a scheme was cumbersome and unwieldy.327
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UK Court Project Report, above n 164, Section 9.2.1. Each subsequent bill was specific to a locality
and required its own passage through parliament.
324
Ibid, section 9.2.2. ‘From 1846-51, the House of Commons reviewed a number of different ways in
which the load of private and local legislation might be reduced.’
325
Windeyer, above n 11, 248. Windeyer notes that the complaint about this development is that it led to
‘government by regulation.’
326
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, section 9.2.1.
327
Ibid. The procedure for private bills was complex, as the report notes:
‘The promoter of private of local legislation was required to lodge a petition, in either the House
of Commons or House of Lords, and those who objected to the scheme could then lodge a
petition against it. After a debate on the floor of the House, the petition would be referred to a
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Public inquiries performed neither an administrative nor judicial function. The purpose of
public inquiries was to gather information locally, hearing objections and taking the evidence
which would otherwise have been given at the bar of the House. An exclusionary dynamic is
manifested. The precedent created was the manner in which the public would be heard. In terms
of Arnstein’s ladder discussed in chapter 2, the mechanism was clearly in the non-participation
zone, at the rung of therapy. This tradition continues to be paid lip service to today.

4.7.3

Empowering Local Government

As is discussed above, the industrial revolution generated significant social change.
Coincidental with the year of the 1848 revolutions in Europe, the UK parliament would move,
for the first time, to address the social conditions which had been eroding the fabric of social
order. Heine, writing in 1842,328 elegantly captured the mood of the times when he wrote:
‘In the silence one can hear a soft monotonous dripping. It is the dividends of the
capitalist continually trickling in, continually mounting up. One can literally hear them
multiply, the profits of the rich. And one can hear too, in between, the low sobs of the
destitute; and now and then a harder sound, like a knife being sharpened.’ 329
Parliament acted to forestall a greater evil; revolution.330 The Public Health Act 1848 (UK),331
was the forerunner to legislation designed to facilitate and give effect to the regulation of urban
space. The Public Health Act allowed the community to petition for the creation of a Board of
Health. Local councils became responsible to provide clean water, sewers and clean streets. The

select committee, which would take evidence on the Bill. Upon the conclusion of the
proceedings in one House, the matter would move to the other House and the process would
commence all over again.’
328
Significantly, 1842 is the year that the Imperial Parliament passed the reforms to the constitution of
NSW creating, for the first time, a partially elected Legislative Council: see New South Wales
Constitution Act 1842 (UK). It was also the year that the NSW Legislative Council passed the Sydney
Incorporation Act 1842 (NSW).
329
Cited in Geoffrey Bruun, Revolution and Reaction: 1848-1852 A Mid-Century Watershed (1958), 85.
Bruun suggests that in 1848 ‘the proletarians who manned the barricades in 1848 were more interested in
the right to work than in the right to vote. Their slogan was not “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” it was the
more desperate and defiant cry, “Bread or Lead.”’
330
Keane, above n 120, 487. As Keane explains, the period of the 1840s was a time of famine, inflation
and unemployment in Europe (including England), ‘caused by sudden industrialisation and the rapid
spread of market economics into the heartlands of country and city life.’ In short, Keane suggests that ‘the
child of social democracy was born of hard times.’
331
11 & 12 Vict. c 63.
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Local Government Act 1858 (UK),332 authorised local authorities to bring water and sewerage
infrastructure to their areas with power ‘to promote a draft [provisional] order to carry through
their objectives.’333 Urban areas were thus brought under management by local authorities,
bodies which had a measure of community control through direct participation in the political
process. However, Benevolo describes the authorities as attacking the various problems
‘without taking into account their interrelationship and without having an overall vision of the
town as a single organism.’334

That this legislation was pre-empted by deteriorating social conditions is not without its own
significance. The fact that the response of the government was bureaucratic and paternalistic
demonstrates parliament’s desire to maintain control. The manner in which this control was
achieved was by ‘regulation.’335 It is also arguable that a set of social conditions had been
created by the industrial revolution which required parliament to respond in order to maintain its
position of power.336 The social legislation enacted by the UK parliament at this time can
therefore be seen to be a manifestation of the ideology of parliament as the instrument of
managed social change.337 That is, the impetus for the emergence of the public interest ideology
was the desire of the parliamentary elite to maintain power. Viewed in that context, the

332

21 & 22 Vict. c.98.
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, section 9.2.3. Provisional orders would replace the private bill
procedure. As the Departmental report notes:
‘Provisional Orders … provided for objections to be made, originally to the local justices, but in
due course to the Local Government Board, which was formed in 1871. A Provisional Order
requires, first, the giving of public notice in two successive weeks in local newspapers. Where an
objection was made, the Board was required to hold a local inquiry, and to permit all persons
interested to attend and to make objections. Their inspectors had wide ranging powers. They
could administer oaths, and require the attendance and examination of witnesses, and the
production of papers and accounts. … the character of the provisional order procedure was that it
was conducted on behalf of Parliament, rather than as a separate procedure.’
334
L Benevolo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning, (1967), xii. Also cited by Andrew Kelly, The role
of local government in the conservation of biodiversity (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2004),
198.
335
Anne Bottomley and Nathan Moore, 'From Walls to Membranes: Fortress Polis and the Governance of
Urban Public Space in 21st Century Britain' (2007) 18 Law and Critique 171, 196. As Bottomley
suggests:
‘Regulation is concerned with ‘what’ is in need of control (or ‘why’ or ‘how’ attempts are made
to control it), as well as ‘with whom’ alliances are forged so as to (at least seemingly) try to
achieve control over ‘it’.
336
Moore, above n 5, 196. As Moore notes:
‘By 1831 Lord Gray’s Whigs, as the traditional liberal-leaning party, decided that parliamentary
reform could be delayed no longer, and had better be led from the top, than seized by revolution
from below.’
337
Hall, above n 180, 704. As Hall suggests:
‘around 1900 there was a major shift in social policy … Benthamism lost its primacy to new
concepts of state intervention, developed especially by social democrats who formed the Fabian
society in 1884, and who were instrumental in shaping London County Council policies after the
Progressive victory of 1894.’
333
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government sought to interfere in the operation of the market to refashion the social contract
(thereby changing the role of the state) but only for the unarticulated purpose of maintaining
power.338 Sheail argues that the turning point was 1875.339 The state would facilitate the
delivery of public benefits, but its vision of the public interest was the dominant (and arguably
only) vision.340 If parliament reflected (and not just represented) the people, there would be a
mutuality of interest. The difficulty was that this was not always the case.341

4.7.4

Parliament as the Instrument of Managed Change

During the nineteenth century the polity of England had been gradually democratised through
social reforms initiated by parliament beginning with the widening of the franchise in local
government elections.342 The reform movement in England would continue over the balance of
the century to press for social change leading to a suite of other social legislation in the second
half of the nineteenth century.343 It is here suggested that the Acts passed by parliament were
directed to alleviating the disquiet of the lesser classes, not the absence of a sharing of power.344

338

Platt, above n 48, 162. By way of example, Platt suggests that the poor laws reforms were motivated
by a desire to ‘centralise relief not to make the poor more comfortable, but rather to centralise relief to the
poor and to ensure that the system promoted rather than discouraged working for a living.’
339
John Sheail, ‘Interwar Planning in Britain’ (1985) 11(3) Journal of Urban History 335, 342. Sheail
cites a 1928 study of Justice and Administrative law by Robson as the basis for Sheail’s conclusion that
the Public Health Act 1875 (UK) marked a ‘turning point,’ a ‘fundamental and permanent shift in
society.’ He notes that this Act instituted the practice of allowing an administrative appeal to the minister
(whose decision was final) rather than to the Courts. The procedure soon ‘became commonplace for all
social legislation.’ He suggests that ‘trial by Whitehall’ was not a ‘temporary or accidental intrusion into
the mellowed sanctity of the British constitution.’
340
Uhr, above n 199, 66. Uhr notes that Burke’s justification was that:
‘Established parliamentary government must learn to sift out the “real rights” from the
“pretended rights” advanced on behalf of the people. Parliament thus understood has a
responsibility to attend to the wants as distinct from the claims of the people (Burke 1883, II,
301-8, 332-6, 359)’
341
Moore, above n 5, 196. The pressure for change continued after the passing of the Reform Act. Moore
suggests that ‘Chartism emerged from the failure of the Great Reform Act of 1832 to enfranchise
working-class Britons who had played their part in the reform cause.’
342
Harvie, above n 155, 458. As is indicated in chapter 3.5, by the 1880s, up to two thirds of adult males
had been enfranchised for local government elections, mainly as a means to stave off political explosions.
343
The legislation included the following Acts: Second Reform Act (1867); Elementary Education Act
(1870); (secret) Ballot Act (1872); Factories Act (1874); Public Health Act (1875); Food Act (1875);
Third Reform Act (1884); Redistribution of Seats Act (1885) and the Workers Compensation Act (1897).
Keane, above n 120, 556, goes so far as to suggest that the reforms were introduced ‘to widen
participation within the actually existing civil society, and to reduce or at least eliminate some of its many
incivilities.’
344
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War Peace and the Course of History (2002), 233. Bobbitt
argues that because industrialisation had created large corporations, it became ‘feasible for the State,
through regulation, to temper the profit motive with concern for social welfare.’

132

Utopian ideals were a feature of the late Victorian period.345 The work of the Garden City
promoters assisted the ideation of the city as a single organism. By 1899, just a year after
Ebezener Howard published Tomorrow, a Peaceful Path to Real Reform, a Garden Cities
Association had been formed. The Garden City movement quickly became ‘an establishment, a
movement without opposition.’346 Town planning would emerge to become the next focus of
government activity. When the Liberals, with the support of the new Labour party, took office
in 1906 there was a decisive shift in the ideology of parliament. Black suggests that the new
government was ‘determined to undermine the power and possessions of the old landed elite,
and keen to woo Labour and the trade unions.’347 This was a government that wanted to have a
role in devising solutions to problems of social welfare. State intervention in the functioning of
the market became a popular and possible solution.

The Whig government had intervened in the market in a most radical way by imposing
graduated death duties which, as indicated in the previous section, had had the effect of
redistributing land ownership in the early twentieth century. It was only at the end of this reform
period that planning legislation of 1909 was introduced into the English parliament. Through
law, urban planning would become ‘an instrument of the welfare state.’348 War and economic
depression in the twentieth century would give parliament the impetus to refashion the social
contract again. Mannheim would urge the adoption of ‘democratic planning’ principles, to
rebuild society by planning for freedom.349 Viewed through this historical lens, it seems that it
was only once the people, metaphorically, had some ‘skin in the game’350 (by having access to
land ownership and the franchise), that there was an impetus to introduce urban planning
345

R. Home, 'Land readjustment as a method of development land assembly: A comparative overview'
(2007) 78(4) Town Planning Review 459, 476. Home cites comments made in the early meetings of the
Town Planning Institute in London of the period 1905-1920 and the comment ‘as the object of the Town
Planning scheme was to benefit the community, private ownership of land should be plastic in the hands
of the Town Planner.’
346
Kelly, above n 334, 199. Kelly cites W Armytage, Heavens Below (1961), 383 in support of this
proposition.
347
Black, above n 117, 214.
348
Ruth Glass, 'The Evaluation of Planning: Some Sociological Considerations' in Andreas Faludi (ed), A
Reader in Planning Theory (1973) , 50.
349
Mannheim, above n 257, 29:
‘planning, but not restrictionist so as to favour group monopolies either of entrepreneurs or
workers’ associations; … planning for social justice rather than absolute equality, … planning
not for a classless society but for one which abolishes the extremes of wealth and poverty, …
planning that counteracts the dangers of mass society by co-ordination of the means of social
control but interfering only in cases of institutional or moral deterioration defined by collective
criteria,…’ (emphasis in original).
350
Here used in the sense of having something at stake. The etymological roots of this phrase are opaque.
Quoteland.com identifies an early reference to this phrase in ‘Town Talk,’ The Oakland Tribune, April 20
1912 but notes that this cannot be the source of the phrase. It also notes the relationship of the phrase to
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legislation. Significantly, this new legislation would not have a socially inclusive mechanism to
facilitate public participation in the policy or decision-making processes, the people would be
‘planned for’ by government.

4.7.5

UK Planning Legislation

The Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1909 (UK),351 Town & Country Planning Act 1932
(UK)352 and the The New Towns Act 1946 (UK),353 were part of a social legislation moment.
Wilcox notes that slum clearance, not town planning, was the main purpose of the 1909
legislation.354 For the reasons advanced in this chapter, it could not be reasonably argued that
parliament acted simply because it perceived that the market had failed. But for the pressure
applied to government through the various reform movements and trade unions, the private
property ideology would have prevailed. As Black notes, late Victorian society ‘did not seem
beneficent to the growing numbers who were becoming both emancipated and politicized.’355

In enacting The Housing, Town Planning etc Act of 1909, parliament drew upon the historical
experience of the clauses Acts. The legislation empowered the Minister to delegate functions to
the department. Through the Office of the Planning Inspectorate public inquiries were held into
planning matters.356 Municipal authorities were also given power to create what were called, for
the first time, planning schemes. Local authorities were given power, sanctioned by law, to
acquire land for the purpose of the scheme. The scheme did not take effect until after the
Provisional Order was notified and laid before both houses of parliament. The Local
Government Board retained power to conduct enquiries into a scheme with the Board having
the final say. The grand ideal of the Act reflects parliament’s intention to define the public
interest. The Minister, when presenting the bill to the House said its intent was to secure ‘the

the verb ‘to skin’ and the connection as far back as 1812 to swindling and cheating someone.
http://fourm.quoteland.com/eve/forums/a/tpc/f/99191541/m/7811039581 at 12 Sep. 2010.
351
9 Edw. VII. c. 44.
352
22 & 23 Geo. V. c. 48.
353
9 & 10 Geo. VI. c.46.
354
M Wilcox, The Law of Land Development in New South Wales (1967), 177:
‘the main purpose was to amend and extend the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890-1903
which enabled local authorities to effect some slum-clearance and provide some accommodation
for members of the working classes within their areas.’
355
Black, above n 117, 208.
356
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, s.9.2.3. The Planning Inspectorate was created in 1909.
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home healthy, the house beautiful, the town pleasant, the city dignified and the suburb
salubrious.’357

4.7.6

Early growth of the Ideology of Public Interest

The Town and Country Planning Act 1932 (UK) extended the provisions of the 1909 Act so that
‘schemes might be made with respect to any land, whether urban or rural, with the general
object of controlling the development of the land.’358 Where a scheme would divest local
landowners, they had a right of appeal to the Board which had power to conduct a public local
inquiry. Whilst mediated through the office of the Local Government Board, the Provisional
Orders Scheme retained to parliament the power to make the ultimate decision, a nexus first
created in the eighteenth century pursuant to the private bill procedure.

Over time, administrative necessity would erode the nexus. The separate powers of local
authorities would be centralised into the central executive government. This process was
accelerated by the Second World War.359 Kelly notes that ‘scheme preparation became
compulsory in 1943,’360 perhaps suggesting that there was resistance by the people to the
initiatives of parliament. Whereas under the 1909 Act a local planning scheme went to
parliament, under the 1947 Act it went to the Minister for approval. Gradually, power would
coalesce in the executive. By 1948 the UK Department of Local Government had assumed the
powers of local authorities and of parliament in that the power to initiate strategic planning
issues had devolved to the department. Instead of a private bill procedure, the department only
had to submit to parliament a draft statutory instrument for approval under the negative or
affirmative resolution procedure. The executive arm of government now had the necessary
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Kelly, above n 334, 200, citing the comments of the President of the Local Government Board when
presenting the Bill to the UK Parliament. It seems that the achievement of the legislation was muted,
mainly because of the voluntary nature of the schemes. Property owners simply did not vote for
councillors intent on radical reform.
358
Viscount Simonds, 'Town and Country Planning' in Lord Goddard, Lord Evershed and Lord Merriman
(eds), Halsbury's Laws of England (3 ed, 1962) vol 37, 169.
359
M Cole, 'Local Government Reform in Britain 1997-2001' (2003) 38(2) Government and Opposition
181, 190. In fact, Cole suggests that since the middle of the nineteenth century ‘[t]he autonomy of local
government has been eroded by a succession of national governments.’ However, Cole accepts that ‘local
authorities … retained substantial autonomy and the capacity to frustrate central government policy
initiatives.’
360
Kelly, above n 334, 201.
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powers to implement a national policy at the local scale.361 As a result of these administrative
reforms, and as the UK Court Project Report notes:
‘Parliament had transferred to the Minister all of its functions in relation to overseeing
the use and development of land, and was left with relatively slender power of
supervision of the Ministerial exercise of those functions.’362

The process of centralisation also impacted upon the process to obtain development approval.
Under the 1947 Act, applicants for planning permission who were aggrieved of the decision by
the authority had a right of appeal to the Minister (Secretary of State).363 In the majority of
cases, the appeal was referred to the planning inspectorate for resolution.364 The inspectorate
was not independent of the government; it was an agency of the executive. It operated under the
direction of the minister. The role and function of the planning inspectorate was to act as the
primary organ of government to administer and determine development appeals.365 The public
had no formal role at all in the decision-review process. The public could only make
submissions and seek to be heard at a public hearing if it were convened. It was not a socially
inclusive model. If a public hearing was convened, the applicant had the right to have the
inspector conduct a hearing locally, usually at the council premises.366 Inquiry proceedings
usually included a site inspection. Unless an appeal was made to the High Court by either the

361

Cole, above n 359, 198-9, intimates that this control has continued as the reforms of local government
of the late twentieth century were being stymied ‘by continuing adherence of central government to
traditional British notions of the strong state,’ and a lack of ‘real commitment to reinvigorating local
democracy’ by ministers.
362
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, s.9.2.4. As the report notes: ‘The 1946 Act transferred
significant powers to the Executive, and removed entirely the former power of Parliamentary
investigation and approval.’ The role of the public in the processes created by the Act is delightfully
described in the following exchange between the Minister of Town and Country Planning addressing a
public meeting in 1946:
‘I want to carry out a daring exercise in town planning – (jeers). It is no good you jeering: it is
going to be done – (applause and boos). (Cries of “Dictator”)… the project will go forward. It
will do so more smoothly and more successfully with your co-operation. Stevenage will in a
short time become world famous – (laughter) … while I will consult as far as possible all the
local authorities, at the end, if people are fractious and unreasonable, I shall have to carry out my
duty – (voice: Gestapo!).’
363
Town and Country Planning Act 1946 (UK), s16(1). Halsbury, above n 358, 332. The Act stopped
short of compensation for loss of view. ‘An owner of adjacent land whose amenities may be spoilt and the
value whose land may be diminished by the proposed development is not a person aggrieved.’
364
Victor Moore, A practical approach to planning law (9th ed, 2005), 176.
365
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, s.9.2.5.8. As an administrative body, the exercise of its powers
was scrutinised by lawyers utilising traditional administrative law tools to determine if its processes were
lawful, tending to judicialise the process. The Courts required the inspectorate ‘to demonstrate, in its
written reasons, that they have properly applied and understood current policy or given valid or adequate
reasons as to why that policy should not apply in the particular case’.
366
Town and Country Planning Act (UK) 1947, s104.

136

applicant or the local authority, the decision of the Minister (or delegate) was ‘final’ and beyond
legal challenge.367

4.7.7

Judicial Review

As the reach of parliament grew, ultimately developing into the welfare state, the role of the
courts as agencies of review also grew. The 1846 Select Committee identified that
administrative law had become an area fit for inclusion in university studies.368 Land use
planning decisions were early recognised as being administrative decision. As a matter of law,
land use decisions were decisions of the minister. The right to challenge the exercise of
administrative discretion was wholly dependent on the statute that created the administrative
function. In relation to planning decisions, the only person given an administrative right to
appeal was the person who made the application.369

Britain developed an extensive jurisprudence in the area of planning law. In the Coin Street
Case,370 the UK High Court reiterated the approach of the court to its powers when exercising
judicial review over the minister’s decision:
‘Cases like Sainsbury Ltd v Secretary of State for Environment and Colchester Borough
Council show that the tendency of the Court is to scrutinise the decision of Ministers in
greater detail than formerly and with increasing reference to the rules of natural justice.
Even so, the underlying principle remains in tact, namely, that the controlling process of
town and country planning over development of land is an administrative (and not a
justiciable) process and that the Secretary of State is to have the last word because, in the
ultimate analysis, it is Government policy which is being placed in issue when an appeal to
the Secretary of State is lodged….. the planning merits are not for the courts.’

In R v London Borough of Harringay,371 the UK court of appeal reinforced the principle that the
court was not a ‘court of appeal from the planning committee’ with power to ‘substitute’ its

367

Halsbury, above n 358, 332.
S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and administrative law (3 ed, 1977), 511.
369
UK Court Project Report, above n 164, Section 10.4.3. As the report notes: ‘By that simple rule, there
is excluded any right of third party appeal.’
370
Greater London Council and Ors v Secretary of State for Environment and Great Coat Commercial
Estate Ltd [1983] JPL 793 at 798.
371
R v London Borough of Harringay; EP Barrs and Faherty (1983) (unreported Court of Appeal
O'Connor L J) cited in Desmond Heap, 'Statutes to 1990' in QC Lockhart-Mummery, Christopher et al
(eds), Encyclopedia of Planning Law and Practice, Local Government Library (2010) vol 1, [1-390].
368
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view over that of the planning committee. This principle would be followed in the leading
Australian High Court decision in Peko Wallsend.372 This classic legal reasoning obscures the
impact of the ideology of the public interest on the capacity of the people to participate in land
use decision-making. As McAuslan notes:
‘No strain is involved therefore in seeing the debate on open government as being an
extension of the debate on public participation in planning, for public participation can
only be meaningful if there is full disclosure of information prior to the public
participation and conversely, full disclosure will almost always inevitably stimulate
public debate and discussion even if it was not made with that end in mind.’373

Thus from the outset the people were not given a procedural voice, in semantic terms, which
could resonate in the mind of the decision-maker. Both at the level of policy (or plan making)
and at the level of project assessment (decision-making), the people remained at Arnstein’s
tokenism rungs in the ladder of citizen participation. The long struggle for the right to
participate in governance had been won. But in this victory, the people lost the right to have a
say in the nature of development occurring in the neighbourhood. An analysis of the early UK
planning legislation reveals that by the mid twentieth century in England, the public interest
ideology was an entrenched feature of its processes. It would be this scheme that the New South
Wales government would turn to when it determined to enact planning laws.374 The
development of Australian planning law from its colonial origins is considered in the next
chapter.
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Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, (1986) 162 CLR 24, 40-41. Australia followed
English principles of administrative law and distinguished between reviewing the merits of the decision
under challenge and the manner in which the decision was arrived at. It is only the latter that is
reviewable in judicial review proceedings in Australia.
373
McAuslan, above n 158, 215.
374
Kelly and Smith, above n 183, 84. Kelly and Smith argue that ‘Australian planning systems slavishly
followed the UK model.’ They also note that ‘[w]hilst the British System underwent major change to a
more policy-based approach after the Second World War … all Australian systems clung to a strict
“zones and standards” approach.’
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Chapter 5:

Participation – The Australian Experience

‘The NSW Government’s powers that permit one person to decide what is suitable development for
approval by that same person – notwithstanding conflict of interest – and without any meaningful public
participation and with limited judicial review, have no place in any democratic State.’

Phillip Ruddock former federal Attorney-General1

‘In most cases where power has come to be shared it was taken by the citizens, not given by the city.
There is nothing new about that process. Since those who have power normally want to hang onto it,
historically it has to be wrested by the powerless rather than proffered by the powerful.’

Sherry Arnstein2

5.1

Introduction:

The struggle of the people in Britain to participate in their governance was not reflective of the
Australian experience.3 A very different social dynamic applied because the people sent to New
South Wales were not the vanguard of a conquering army.4 Rather, they were the detritus of
England.5 At its inception in 1788, New South Wales was a prison; that was its functional social

1

Quoted, presumably with permission, in the advertisement ‘Stop the Plunder of Sydney Harbour’
frequently published in 2010 by the Banangaroo Action Group, Sydney.
2
Sherry R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation' (1969) 35(4) Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 216, 222.
3
John Hirst, 'Empire, State, Nation' in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds), Australia's Empire
(2009) , 146-7. Hirst notes:
‘In Britain, government was closely linked to the social order. … In Australia, … Government
was both more singular and more abstract.
A government that plants a new society will always be different from a government ruling an
established order. The particular form taken by the state in Australia reflected the time of its
foundation. It was liberal in its orientation, because its controllers at Whitehall and on the spot
were influenced by the growing authority of liberal ideas in the imperial metropole. The
acceptance of responsibility for the well-being of convicts and free migrants came from the new
humanitarianism. The commitment to economic advancement, and the means to achieve it, was
inspired by the spectacular growth in the British economy.’
4
WJV Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (1938), 252. In fact, the first fleet that arrived in Botany Bay
consisted of 299 ‘free’ persons (Windeyer says mostly officers and marines) and 717 convicts.
5
Tony Moore, Death or Liberty (2010), 34. Moore suggests that the social conditions caused by the
industrial revolution caused a break down in social order. ‘Whilst not political in the sense of organised
agitation, the delinquency and criminality of the lower classes was framed as a social problem that
required governmental action.’ Transportation was the answer. As Moore also notes (at 36):
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schema. But British traditions were incorporated into the colony of New South Wales.6 Law was
still the instrument to maintain the legitimacy of power.

The superabundance of land in the colony meant that it was necessary, for the survival of the
colony, that land be granted to, acquired and/or occupied by lesser classes, including
emancipated convicts. Emancipists would, until the gold rush of the 1850s, outnumber the free
settlers.7 This sharing of the land would lead to the creation of a different social relationship
between the people inter se and between the government and the people.8

In this chapter the history of local governance and the development of land use planning law in
New South Wales are examined. The participatory mechanisms incorporated into the Local
Government Act 1919 (NSW) and the EP&A Act is considered in detail. To assist in
understanding whether the mechanisms are inclusive, a brief assessment is undertaken in section
5.5 of the semantics of the legislative scheme in accordance with the methodology adopted by
Bora and Hausendorf.

5.2

Uncharted Territory: Law Land and Control

Upon colonisation in 1788, the laws of England, as far as was practicable, were received into
New South Wales.9 As Brennan J pointed out in Mabo v The State of Queensland [No 2] (1992)
(Mabo):
‘The tender concern of the common law of England for British settlers in foreign parts
led to the recognition that such settlers should be regarded as living under the law of
England if the local law was unsuitable for Christian Europeans.’10

‘the vast majority of convicts over the eighty-year period of transportation were indeed
incorrigible recidivists, earning a living as criminal professionals and habituated to dishonesty
and casual viciousness.’
6
Ibid 396: ‘Australia was bequeathed an inspiring legacy. Liberalism, republicanism, trade unionism,
working-class politics, democracy, responsible government and post-colonial nationalism all arrived in
the colony in chains.’
7
John Hirst, Looking for Australia (2010), 201. Hirst says that:
‘The founding population was composed of three ethnic groups – English, Scots and Irish - …
who still bore much antagonism towards each other. … The Irish in Australia were potentially an
out-group, Catholic in religion and generally poorer and less educated than the rest of the
population. Relations between the two groups were always uneasy.’
8
This can be dated to the early governorships of Phillip and Macquarie. Windeyer, above n 4, 257,
suggests that Macquarie believed that ‘emancipation when united with rectitude and long tried good
conduct, should lead a man back to that rank in society which he had forfeited.’ This belief would become
his bane.
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It is not without significance that New South Wales was uncharted territory. There would be
over eighty thousand of convicts arrive up until 1840.11 They had neither rights nor expectation
to participate in the affairs of government. They were administered by a governor who had
received a commission from the crown.12 The governor was accountable to the colonial office in
London. His powers were express, being limited to the commission he had received.13 Yet in
New South Wales the governor, by virtue of circumstance, assumed the authority of the
sovereign,14 dispensing justice and allocating land.15 Atkinson reminds us that the ‘conquest of
Australia involved both cartographic and legal innovation.’16 The Mabo decision has refined our
understanding of radical title.17 But regardless of whether or not the land of New South Wales
was ‘owned’ by the crown upon colonization,18 as a matter of pragmatic reality it was the
governor that had the power to alienate land. To do this it was important that the land of the new
colony was mapped for the purpose of fractionalising the land. Mapping facilitated the land of
9

Ibid 250. Windeyer says that the colonists ‘carried with them that law in force in the homeland at the
time of the original colonization, except such parts of it as are not applicable to their new situation.’
10
Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1991-2) 175 CLR 1, 35.
11
Douglas Pike, Australia: The Quiet Continent (1962), 45.
12
Mabo, above n 10, 37. As Brennan J notes, this created an immediate practical problem

in that there were doubts about the nature and extent of the authority of the governor to
apply English law within the settlement because there was no local legislative authority
to make law.
13

Windeyer, above n 4, 251. Windeyer confirms that ‘[s]ome curious questions were raised because of
the uncertain limits of the governor’s authority.’ It was put to rest only in 1828 with the passage of what
has become known as the Imperial Acts Application Act (Act 9 Geo. IV c. 83).
14
RM Younger, Australia and the Australians: A Concise History (1982), 54. Younger suggests that the
governor ‘possessed extraordinary powers and the individual who opposed him, no matter how wealthy or
powerful, had no legal way of securing redress within the colony.’ Windeyer, above n 4, 255, supports
this view. He suggests that the powers made the governor ‘an absolute autocrat.’ Yet the issuance of
orders and proclamations by the governors was the basis of civil governance until 1824.
15
Hirst, above n 3, 147. More significantly, Hirst notes that the social character of government in the
colony was different. He says:
‘In Australia the government was one person, the Governor, who was detached from, and
superior to, all groups in the local society. Yet government was much more than the person of
the Governor; he embodied the full authority of the British government … Government was both
more singular and more abstract.’
16
Alan Atkinson, 'Conquest' in Deryck Schreuder (ed), Australia's Empire (2008) , 51.
17
Mabo, above n 10, 48:
‘As the sovereign enjoys supreme legal authority in and over a territory, the sovereign has power
to prescribe what parcels of land and what interests in those parcels should be enjoyed by others
and what parcels of land should be kept as the sovereign’s beneficial demise.’
18
Ibid 43. In particular, see the discussion: Crown title to colonies and Crown ownership of colonial land
distinguished. Brennan CJ disagreed with the earlier view expressed by Isaacs J in Williams v Attorney
General (NSW) (1913) 16 CLR 404, that when Governor Phillip received his commission in 1786 the
‘whole of the lands of Australia were already in law the property of the King of England,’ as being
‘wholly unsupported.’ Brennan’s view was that the acquisition of territory is the province of international
law whereas the acquisition of property is the province of the common law. Applying the feudal doctrine
of tenure, Brennan CJ (at 48) attributed to the Crown the ‘radical title to all land in the territory over
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the colony being reduced into possession so that it could be alienated, by grant or sale.19 The
grace and favour of the Governor meant the difference between owning land or not.

Individual parcels of land have no utility unless they are related to other parcels, to
infrastructure such as roads and to a legal frame of reference to secure the benefits of
ownership. Aggregations of separate parcels, linked to community infrastructure, create
neighbourhoods. Without neighbourhoods, the formation of community becomes problematic. It
is in community, as Tocqueville observed of the Americans, that civic culture develops.20 The
problem in the colony was that the English free settlers who came to New South Wales
encountered, in the context of their perceptions, virgin territory in so many ways. The ordered
agricultural society, culture and patterns of settlement with which they were familiar did not
exist. There were no settled parishes, boroughs, pastures, towns, roads or infrastructure. There
were none of the legal traditions familiar to them in this new land. None of the indicia of the
civilization they had left behind existed. In New South Wales a new history,21 a new
gemeinschaft,22 would be created.23
Convict transportation would cease in 1840.24 The Imperial government would be swayed by
Wakefieldian ideas.25 The colony would be left to the market but its governance would

which the Crown acquired sovereignty,’ this enabled the crown to grant land in the exercise of its
sovereign power.
19
As Robert Freestone, Urban Nation: Australia's Planning Heritage (2010), 48 notes, the gridiron plan
‘dominated town design’ because ‘it was an efficient means of carving up land to attractive dimensions
for rapid sale and resale.’
20
J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (2009), 306-311. As Keane explains:
‘[Tocqueville] noted that these civil associations were small-scale affairs, and yet, within their confines,
individual citizens regularly “socialise” themselves by raising their concerns beyond their selfish, tetchy,
narrowly private goals. Through their participation in civil associations, they come to feel that they are
citizens. They draw the conclusion that in order to obtain others’ support, they must lend them their
cooperation, as equals.’
21
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), 6. Bobbitt argues
that ‘without its own history, its self-understanding, no society can have either law or strategy, because it
cannot be constituted as an independent entity.’
22
L. M. Edwards, 'Ideational social capital and the civic culture: Extricating Putnam's legacy from the
social capital debates' (2009) 23 Social Epistemology 125, 139. In a Traditional Identity Schema ‘social
cohesion centres on maintaining the categories [of social relationship] and their norms of behaviour.’
23
Hirst, above n 7, 134. Hirst argues that Captain Arthur Phillip began the process by instituting a
colonial police force staffed with convicts. As Hirst notes, Phillip ‘established the pattern of making
convict status as unimportant as possible, which was the key to the easy escape Australia had from its
convict origins.’
24
Windeyer, above n 4, 194. Windeyer cites the observation of Governor King that ‘three-quarters of the
population of New South Wales in his time consisted of persons “spared from an ignominious death by
the humanity of the laws of England.”’
25
Hirst, above n 3, 165-6:
‘The plan proposed in 1829 by Edward Gibbon Wakefield (and its variants) created a device which
effectively employed a tax on land (by way of land sales) to subsidize and control labour migration (by
generously assisted passages). This solution yielded a general social return which attracted capital and
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eventually be structured along a libertarian representative model. However, participation in
government would not be about Tocqueville’s self-interest properly understood (as described by
Putnam).26 The colony of New South Wales would pursue a different path.27

5.2.1

Early Governance

The Imperial Parliament gave legislative governance to New South Wales by the New South
Wales Act 1823 (UK).28 This Act established a nominated Legislative Council with power to
make laws for the colony and created a Supreme Court to administer the law.29 Government by
decree of the governor was replaced with government by a nominated elite.30 This was a
structure of governance familiar to the British people at the time. It was a structure that did not
countenance democracy, let alone participation.31 Its ideology was about power and control of
the levers of power.32 By the time of the colonisation of New South Wales, the free market

enterprise. … The Wakefieldian specifications ensured an ideal balance between the sexes, a particular
occupational profile, and some monitoring of age, character, and origins.’
26
Edwards, above n 22, 129 (Tocqueville’s self-interest is discussed in chapter 2.4 above).
27
Peter Hartcher, 'Enough porkies, it's time for a few home truths', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 1820 December 2009, 11. Hartcher suggests that:
Australia ‘is a bloody miracle. … Australia’s white settlement set it up for failure. … Charles
Darwin was confident that our convict genes were our destiny – “it can hardly fail to
degenerate”’ Darwin wrote in 1836. From these beginnings, he notes that ‘the country developed
into a law-abiding, harmonious, tolerant society.’ ‘We shrugged off the ruinous British class
system, developing an aristocracy of merit rather than rule by an entitled idiocy. Egalitarianism
is a deep well of national strength.’
Hirst, above note 7, 137, suggests, that what developed was the ‘odd Australian conjunction: a social
democracy willing to accept paternal authority.’ Philip Cox, 'Is there a uniquely Australian approach to
urban design?' (1995) (17) Urban Futures (Canberra) 20, 23, cites J M Freeland’s essay, Peoples in
Cities, where Freeland suggested that: ‘The Australian character and culture are epitomised in the suburb
– a compulsive gregariousness combined with an aggressive individualism’.
28
4 Geo. IV, c.96.
29
Windeyer, above n 4, 258. As Windeyer notes, pursuant to the Act, ‘letters patent, known as the
Charter of Justice, were issued’ creating the Supreme Court. In a development similar to the practice of
ancient Rome which transplanted its legal system, Windeyer goes on to observe (at 261) that the court
‘became one of the king’s ordinary courts of justice with jurisdiction and procedure similar to the courts
of Westminster.’
30
Younger, above n 14, 190. Younger suggests that the nominated members of the Legislative Council
were all from the exclusives group, that is:
‘the wealthy landowners, ex-officers or capitalist immigrants, or merchants-turned-landowner.
All the effective leadership came from the Macarthur family, while most of the civil service
members had the same general view point.’
31
P McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980) McAuslan,
above n 3, 2. Ideology being the ‘disguised or hidden values’ motivating the law.
32
Moore, above n 5, 394, suggests that in Britain:
‘[A] government dedicated to the gospel of free trade in property resisted freedom to write and
speak, imposing onerous licences, and when that failed laws of sedition that allowed writers,
journalists, poets and pamphleteers to be dragged off to gaol in the dead of night. These illiberal
laws lasted well into the mid-nineteenth century and ensured that many of the political prisoners
transported to Australia were some of the finest orators, wordsmiths and propagandists of their
age.’
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ideology dominated social and economic thought in Britain. The ideological struggles of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century had resulted in the capitalist laissez faire ideology of the
industrial era. It would be the dominant social ethos in Australia from its inception. Liberalism,
as the principal of governance, would be adopted earlier than in Britain.33

But liberalism and access to land would create social tension. Manning Clark observes that in
the colony there was a ‘career’ to be made for the industrious.34 Land was, until the 1830s,
given away by grant of the governor to encourage development; although after Macquarie it was
more difficult for emancipists to enjoy this opportunity.35 As early as 1828 Governor Darling
proclaimed the layout of country towns before there were populations to occupy them.36 From
the outset in NSW, the government also set about to create the necessary local infrastructure
such as road, ports, bridges and administration.37 The landed free settlers became worried that

A good early example in New South Wales is the attempt by Governor Darling in 1827 to censor the
press. Bills introduced by him into the Legislative Council were refused the necessary certificate by the
newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Francis Forbes. His role under the 1823 constitution was to
declare whether laws were ‘repugnant’ to the laws of England. See in this regard the discussion in
Michael Cathcart (ed), Manning Clark's History of Australia (1993) (Manning Clark), 111-113.
33
Hirst, above n 3, 144-147. As Hirst explains (146-7), Liberal principles were applied in Australia in
advance of the reception of these ideas in Britain:
‘The British government which sent the Governors did none of these things in its own country.
The function of government had changed in Australia. It was not primarily to keep order within
and defeat enemies without. Rather, it was an etatist instrument to develop the country, and a
resource on which settlers could draw to make a success of their own pioneering.
The social character of the government also changed; or rather it did not have a social character.
In Britain, government was closely linked to the social order, since it was constituted by the
aristocracy and gentry and their connections. In Australia the government was one person, the
Governor who was detached from, and superior to, all groups in the local society. Yet the
government was much more than the person of the Governor; he embodied the full authority of
the British government … Government was both more singular and more abstract.’
34
Manning Clark, above n 32, 49. Clark notes (at 51) that by 1810 ‘a few ex-convicts by the exercise of
industry and cultivation had raised themselves to a state of affluence.’
35
Ibid 99. Manning Clark suggests that after Macquarie was replaced by Brisbane in 1823:
‘All those elements in the old convict system which had aggravated ill feeling between the
emancipists and the exclusives during the era of Macquarie were to be dropped. Land grants to
exhibit-convicts were abolished. Brisbane was instructed [by Lord Bathurst] not to appoint an
emancipist as a magistrate until that man proved himself by meritorious discharge of other civil
employment, and until he had been able to form a full estimate of his private character. The
Simeon Lords and the Samuel Terrys could store up for themselves treasures on earth, but they
must not expect to break bread at the Governor’s table or hold high office in the colony of New
South Wales.’
36
Cox, above n 27, 21. According to the proclamation in the Gazette: ‘wherever practical, the streets were
to be rectangular and the cross streets at right angles to the main street.’ Street widths of one hundred feet
(with carriage way of sixty six feet) were mandated, though Surveyor Mitchell ‘preferred a narrow street
in a country subject to hot winds, dust and scorching sun.’ Freestone, above n 19, 49 attributes Governor
Darling’s regulations of 1829 as marking ‘the beginnings of the quarter acre block.’
37
Ibid. Cox suggests that Captain Arthur Phillips street layout of 1792 was ‘the first attempt at town
planning an urban design.’ Typical of plans in NSW, it was not given effect to as ‘the luxuries of urban
design were dropped for civic expediency.’
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emancipated settlers would subvert the traditional order.38 The cessation of free land grants
would coincide with a push to create a more ‘traditional’ society as the ideas of the nineteenth
century social engineer Wakefield gained prominence after 1830. Many immigrants became the
beneficiaries of assisted passage chosen for their utility to the economy of the colony.39

The free settlers had pretensions to create a social order reminiscent of England; a society in
which the control over the wealth would be in the hands of an elite.40 They aspired to become
what would later be derided as a ‘Bunyip aristocracy.’41 These exclusivists initially had the ear
of the Imperial government and sought to entrench their power position through control of the
nominated legislative council.42 Their efforts to transplant British class distinctions would be
obstructed by the ready availability of land and an equality of opportunity. Land may have
ceased to be granted for free, but it could still be purchased. In England, ownership of land (as a
rule) became the key to participation in civil society. In contrast, in the colony, ownership of
land did not engender any feeling of obligation to contribute to the development of a civic
society.43 The colonial experience was, according to Kelly and Stoianoff, ‘antagonistic’ to local
control over civic affairs.44 Governance was something done by the government, not by the

38

Manning Clark, above n 32, 144. Clark suggests that for years the ‘Tory landowners’ would toil with
the conundrum of how ‘to transfer power over land and immigration from the Governor in a nominated
council to their own group without increasing the power of the bourgeoisie?’
39
Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand (2000), 59. As Sinclair notes:
‘Wakefield wrote of “the Art of Colonisation” and hoped to make it an objective and
experimental science, much as Bentham and the ‘philosophical radicals’, on whose teachings he
was brought up, hoped to discover a science of politics. But though his economic and political
theories derived in part from the doctrines of the utilitarians, he was in many respects an old
fashioned mercantilist. At home he sensed the threat of revolution in the unemployment, low
wages and grim living conditions which afflicted the poor. The rich were alarmed by radical
political movements and hungry mobs, while they were uneasy about the stern competition for
existence amongst themselves.’
40
Younger, above n 14, 196. Younger suggests that ‘Australia remained out of reach of the poorer
Englishmen’ up to 1830 suggesting that opportunities were only available for men of property.
41
Moore, above n 5, 206. Moore notes that the term is attributed to ‘democrat journalist Daniel Deniehy.’
He suggests that ‘Sydney’s bourgeois merchants and working-class artisans had a different vision for
New South Wales’ based on the principle of a limited franchise. Hirst, above n 7, 238, says that William
Wentworth’s plan for a local aristocracy was ‘laughed out of court’ when it was put forward. Notably,
Wentworth himself had turned a full half circle from his early years when he championed the cause of
emancipists.
42
Younger, above n 14, 204-5. The ‘exclusives,’ led by James Macarthur, had sought in the 1830s to use
influence in England to exclude emancipists from the limited franchise for election to the Legislative
Council. Later, it would be property qualifications that would be used as the means to exclude the people
from participation in local governance.
43
Freestone, above n 19, 105, suggests that:
‘ There was no Australian tradition of philanthropic capitalism aimed at ensuring living
environments for factory workers on a par with overseas initiatives like the “Bradford-Hallifax”
school of model industrial village builders.’
44
Andrew Kelly and Natalie P Stoianoff, 'Local Government Rates in New South Wales, Australia: An
Environmental Tax' in A Cavaliere et al (eds), Critical Issues in Environmental Taxation (2006) vol III,
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people.45 In the colony, a social compact based on equality of voice,46 not dependent on class
would become a touchstone for Australians.47 It is a compact that has the potential, as Craiutu
suggests, to ‘degenerate’ into selfishness.48

5.2.2

The Emergence of the Ratepayer Ideology

The ratepayer ideology, introduced in chapter 1, emerged out of the overt resistance by the
people to attempts by the government to create a local government structure in the colony.49
This resistance would successfully delay the implementation of municipal government until
1906 when the state government finally mandated the creation of municipal governments
throughout NSW. The people willingly accepted parcels of land granted by the crown, squatted
on other crown land and bought land from others when it became available because of the

540. They suggest that the ‘[a]ntagonism to property taxation was a direct result of the community’s
historical reliance on the Imperial government to finance local infrastructural services.’
45
Younger, above n 14, 190. Governors Brisbane and Darling took a different approach to Macquarie.
Younger says that initially ‘there was not the slightest possibility of an emancipist being appointed to the
Legislative Council.’
46
Equality is a necessary precondition to democracy. Jon E Lewis (ed), The New Rights of Man (2003),
376-7 cites Tocqueville as saying:
‘The more equal social conditions become, the more do men display this reciprocal disposition
to oblige each other. In democracies no great benefits are conferred, but good offices are
constantly rendered: a man seldom displays self-devotion, but all men are ready to be of service
to one another.’
47
Moore, above n 5, 396. Moore argues that: ‘It is not surprising that New South Wales boasted robust
liberal radicals so early in its history, when the seeds were sown by the defiant Scottish Martyrs and
officers of the United Irishmen.’ Windeyer, above n 4, 253, confirms this view. Windeyer suggests that
while the majority of convicts were sent for ‘offences, more or less serious,’ … others ‘for example the
Scotch Martyrs, the Irish exiles and the Dorchester labourers’ were sent for political reasons.
48
Aurelian Craiutu, 'From the Social Contract to the Art of Association: A Tocquevillian Perspective'
(2008) 25 Social Philosophy and Policy 263, 277. To avoid that outcome what is required is a strong civil
association tradition. As Craiutu notes:
‘Civil associations, Tocqueville believed, are particularly needed in democratic times
when people are equal, independent, and individually weak, and when they tend to prefer
equality over liberty and wholeheartedly embrace individualism as a way of life. If left
unchecked, this passion for equality could develop into a real threat to liberty, while
individualism, a peculiarly democratic phenomenon fueled by the passion for equality, tends to
degenerate into pure egoism or selfishness.’
49
Andrew Kelly, The role of local government in the conservation of biodiversity (Ph. D. Thesis,
University of Wollongong, 2004), 73. Kelly, citing the ratepayer ideology, suggests that municipalisation
would have meant having to contribute to the cost of infrastructure provision. As Kelly notes:
‘Many landholders who amassed wealth through profitable land uses and/or escalating property
values owed much of their success to facilities provided by government, such as roads and
bridges, without having contributed to their costs. As a result they were unwilling to embrace
municipalisation.’
B. J. Bridges, Aspects of the career of Alexander Berry: 1781-1873 (PhD thesis Thesis, University of
Wollongong, 1992), 85, confirms the selfishness of the colonists. He suggests;
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economic opportunity it provided. As towns grew and as urbanisation became part of the fabric
of society, the need for essential infrastructure grew. But, the new landed class resisted paying
for this infrastructure; they saw this as the responsibility of government in the new colony.50
Landowners consequently benefited from ‘soaring property values due to government-funded
roads and bridges’ that connected the emerging economy to established ports and trade routes.51
Kelly and Mant suggest that the landed class resisted municipalisation because of the ‘grim
spectre of property taxation.’52 The landless people did not have to be enlisted to the resistance
because of disenfranchisement by operation of law.53

The Sydney City Incorporation Act 1842 (NSW) gave Sydney the status of a city. But the Act
limited the franchise to property owners who derived rent of greater than twenty five pounds per
annum.54 Eligibility for office was further restricted to those having assets of more than one
thousand pounds or an income of fifty pounds per annum. This exclusionary legislation did little
to encourage civic participation, setting the example for local government into the future.
Mayne suggests that the wider Sydney population held local government in contempt, fuelled
by the press ‘catering to the prejudices of the unenfranchised majority.’55

Kelly and Stoianoff suggest that resentment to participation in local governance was even
‘stronger’ in areas remote to Sydney.56 The New South Wales Constitution Act 1842 (UK)
contemplated the creation of a series of ‘District councils’ throughout the colony to facilitate
local governance. Governor Gipps sought to avail himself of these new powers by proclaiming
some 28 District Councils. Kelly describes these as ‘phantom’ councils because of the ‘utter

‘The aspirant gentry were ‘go getters’ on the make and while some had been imbued with
notions of leadership, command and social responsibility during service careers as a group they
lacked the British aristocracy’s sense of obligation and service.’
50
Hirst, above n 3, 148. The ‘wide electorate made it easier for more people to make demands on the
government – for roads, bridges, railways and local services.’ In Hirst, above n 7, 239, Hirst also makes
the point that ‘[i]t was because [the colonists] were so certain that their British rights were protected that
the Australians expanded the activities of the state so unconcernedly.’
51
Kelly and Stoianoff, above n 44, 541.
52
Andrew Kelly and John Mant, 'Towards more effective structures at the local level' in Robert Freestone
(ed), Spirited Cities (1993) , 239
53
The voluntary incorporation model proposed a land based franchise commensurate with the imposition
of direct taxation based on land holdings.
54
Manning Clark, above n 32, 211. The Act was exclusionary. According to Clark, it ‘conferred the vote
on every male person of the full age of 21 years who for one year had occupied a house, warehouse,
counting-house of ship of the annual value of £25.’
55
A Mayne, ‘“A Most Pernicious Principle”: the Local Government Franchise in Nineteenth-Century
Sydney’, (1981) 27 Australian Journal of Politics and History, 160. See also Kelly, above n 49, 75.
56
Kelly and Stoianoff, above n 44, 541:
‘The system was, however, an utter failure. Opposition to rating proved to be even stronger away
from Sydney, especially where landholders had benefited from soaring property values due to
government-funded roads and bridges that brought their estates closer to town and market.’
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failure’ of the exercise.57 The Legislative Council opposed Gipps’ attempts and rejected the bills
because they would have imposed higher taxation on the members of the landed class. Younger
notes that even though Gipps was instructed by London to institute the councils by letters patent
(to override the actions of the Legislative Council), both ‘he and his successor felt this course
unwise, and they took no action.’58 By 1847 only one council had succeeded in imposing a
rate.59

The discovery of gold hastened calls for self-governance but not local governance. Manning
Clark suggests that the decision of the Imperial parliament to confer self-governance in

1855 was made to dry up a ‘prolific source of revolution.’60 But achieving this status
without struggle meant that the necessary ideation in the minds of the people that they were the
government was absent.61 In England it took almost a millennium for power to be exercised by
‘the people’ through representative democratic structures. In NSW it took only seventy years.62
A significant proportion of the population receiving the right had no experience of governance
except as subjects under law. As Hirst notes, after self-governance the ‘style’ of government
‘remained paternal and managerial.’63 Yet, the absence of a municipal structure meant that the
local member of parliament was left with the obligation to petition parliament for even minor

57

Kelly, above n 49, 76-78. As Kelly notes (at 78): ‘Widespread financial paralysis due to legislative
problems and community antipathy guaranteed the inevitable demise of district councils.’
58
Younger, above n 14, 206. Bridges, above n 49, 423, also observes that:
‘[Alexander] Berry was to say years later that Gipps, at one time a popular governor, entirely
lost standing with the public and ruined his health by persistent attempts to introduce a ruinously
expensive general system of municipalities.’
59
Kelly, above n 49, 78.
60
This is not to suggest that social pressure for self-governance did not exist, it did. See also Manning
Clark, above n 32, 220. Clark sees this as the ‘English genius for compromise, or the policy of the
embrace of moderates and the isolation of revolutionaries by the established order.’ And see Moore’s
comments below n 62.
61
R. Andrews, 'Civic culture and public service failure: An empirical exploration' (2007) 44 Urban
Studies 845, 847. As Andrews notes: ‘A civic culture first presupposes the active interest of local people
in the public affairs of their area.’
62
Moore, above n 5, 396. Moore believes that whilst the impact of Canadian patriots hastened selfgovernment for the colonies, nonetheless the principled stand taken by Australian political prisoners
benefited our democratic system:
‘The adoption of universal male suffrage decades ahead of Britain comes direct from the Chartist
programme, as did other Australian innovations such as short parliaments and the secret ballot.
The early embrace of trade unionism by the colonial working class owes much to the Todpuddle
Martyrs, and in creating on of the world’s first Labor parties the unions were following in the
tradition of working-class political action pioneered by so many Chartists exiled for their
activism.’
63
As Hirst, above n 7, 233-6 suggests:
‘The Australian colonists had no experience of government as a system of placemen, pensions,
fees and private enrichment. The British officials who ruled under the governor’s control were
remarkably efficient and honest. … The transition of the Australian colonies to self-government
was managed as part of the ordinary business of government. … The style of government
remained “paternal and managerial.”’
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matters such as road repairs because there was simply no other authority with responsibility for
the task. In areas where the ratepayer ideology was strongest, this was not a concern to the
people.64

In an effort to shift the focus of attention, the colonial parliament of New South Wales made its
own attempt to create a local civic culture with the enactment of the Municipalities Act 1858
(NSW).65 Permissive, and not compulsive, incorporation had become settled policy of the selfgoverning colony.66 The 1858 Act permitted the voluntary incorporation of a municipality upon
the petition of fifty householders and in the absence of a ‘sufficient counter-petition.’67 The
1858 Act did not facilitate participation by the people generally as the franchise was once again
limited to rate-paying landholders. This aspect, according to Kelly, attracted ‘strident public
criticism.’68

5.2.3

The risks of Participation

As Halligan and Paris note, ‘[t]he scope of local politics has been historically shaped by power
relationships between political spheres and economic interests.’69 In areas where there was
embryonic civic culture, there were pitfalls to participation in local governance.

The citizens of Shoalhaven saw the opportunities of the 1858 legislation. Alexander Berry, a
member of the Legislative Council, was the largest land holder in the district and thus he was
64

Kelly, above n 49, 78-79. Kelly suggests that in sparsely populated areas, the land owner’s energies
were instead ‘directed at conquering a seemingly inhospitable environment.’
65
AJC Mayne, Fever, Squalor and Vice: Sanitation and Social Policy in Victorian Sydney (1982), 49,
referencing editorial comment in the Sydney Morning Herald and the parliamentary debate on the debates
Municipalities Bill of 1856, notes that the argument against giving municipal councils in New South
Wales deliberative functions was that:
‘[Whilst municipal institutions in Britain had] once enjoyed considerable responsibilities
because in a pre-democratic age, they formed popular bastions against arbitrary government,’
that function, according to the Attorney General, had ‘passed away, so that “municipal bodies
now existed not for general government but for the carrying out of [administrative] matters of
local concern.”’
66
FA Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government in New South Wales 1858-1906 (1973), 252.
Larcombe suggests that the compulsory incorporation model:
‘had acquired a somewhat sinister connotation through its association with the district council
system introduced by Gipps in 1843. … ‘Henceforth permissiveness became settled policy while
compulsion became a matter for clandestine discussion.’
Whilst there were 192 voluntary municipalities, by 1906 only 0.9 per cent of the state was affected by an
incorporated council.
67
Kelly, above n 49, 80.
68
Ibid 81.
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perceived to have an ‘ample pocket’ to extract ‘great sums as rates to finance the venture.’70 A
petition of 103 signatures was quickly organised and despite Berry’s counter-petition, the
Municipality of Shoalhaven was proclaimed in September 1859.71 Berry successfully sought a
declaration from the Supreme Court that the municipality was invalidly incorporated as it
contained portions of both towns and rural districts, contrary to the Act, which allowed only the
incorporation of towns ‘or’ rural districts. Kiama, Goulburn and other municipalities suspended
operations pending the outcome of the appeal to the Privy Council in London.72 The council
wanted to appeal but having regard to the outcome in the Supreme Court, the proceedings in the
Privy Council had to be taken in the name of the mayor and the councillors.73 The appeal was
unsuccessful. Even though the Court disagreed with the Supreme Court on the interpretation of
the Act, as territory had been included in the petition that had not sought inclusion, the
incorporation was declared by the Privy Council to be illegal. The mayor and councillors were
personally liable and had to pay the costs of the proceedings. Berry enforced his entitlement to
costs and distrained on their possessions. If there was needed a good example as to why the
people should not participate in local government, Berry’s case was it.74

The motivation of the state government to impose local governance had been to shift the
obligation and cost of providing and administering local infrastructure and services from itself
onto others. Local government functions were unpopular because they were a direct cost sought
to be passed on to the people.75 When the 1858 Act was replaced by the Municipalities Act 1867

69

John Halligan and Chris Paris, 'The Politics of Local Government' in John Halligan and Chris Paris
(eds), Australian Urban Politics (1984) 58, 60.
70
William Bayley, Shoalhaven, A History of the Shire of Shoalhaven (1975), 88.
71
Bridges, above n 49, 17. Bridges suggests that Berry held to the view ‘that towns were dehumanising
and undesirable.’ This, coupled with the fact that Berry would have to pay substantial rates (which
Bridges notes (474) at over two thousand pounds per annum) would explain Berry ‘strong opposition’ to
the incorporation of the municipality.
72
Ibid, 495. Bridges discovered that following the successful result in the Supreme Court and Berry’s
action to recover costs from the alderman, the Cowper government paid out of the ‘unforseen contingent
fund’ £1,222 ‘on condition that the council seek leave to appeal to the Privy Council and repay the money
unless that tribunal also ruled the municipality to be illegal.’
See also FA Larcombe, The Advancement of Local Government in New South Wales 1906 to the Present
(1973), 9. Larcombe notes that the implications of the Shoalhaven decision extended to Sydney with the
Camperdown council also suspending operations ‘until the passage of the Municipalities Act 1867.’
73
Bayley, above n 70, 88-9. Bayley indicates that the Mayor and Councillors had petitioned the
government for assistance as the boundaries had not been drawn by them but rather, by the government
officer. The argument was that under the Act, once elected they were required to take their place or face a
twenty pound fine. Bridges, above n 49, 501, notes that in 1864 the NSW government paid the sum of
£1000 into the Privy Council as security for costs.
74
Bridges above n 49, 514, observed that the ‘Shoalhaven Municipality affair had a profound effect on
local government.’ For example, Larcombe, above n 68, 9, notes that Camperdown (population 300), the
smallest municipality under the 1858 Act, having suspended operations pending the outcome, was then
amalgamated with the neighbouring Cook Municipality in February 1870.
75
Hirst, above n 3, 149:
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(NSW), the government compounded the difficulties for participation by allowing cumulative
voting (it was an enticement to the wealthy to support municipalisation).76 Persons holding
sufficient land could have up to four votes at elections.77 As Kelly says of municipal councils
created in the nineteenth century, they:
‘became the stronghold of a begrudging propertied class in built-up areas who insisted
their contributions … would boost land values, boost businesses and help feed local
prosperity.’78
In the result, the state made ‘little call on citizenship.’79 Whilst initially it was the landed few
who resisted contributing to the civic life of the community, those of lesser classes who became
property owners realised the personal advantages to them in not having to contribute to
municipal infrastructure.80 For those in the towns who could not meet the franchise
requirements, their disenfranchisement from power engendered a disinterest in participating in
the civic culture because such matters were made irrelevant to them.

‘The colonial government did all their work without imposing direct taxation. Until the late
nineteenth century there was no income tax and no company tax. … But local government did
tax directly; its revenue came from rates collected on land. This was the chief reason why it did
so little, and why in so many places it did not exist all. Few wanted to give local government
more responsibilities because that would increase direct taxes.’
Bridges, above n 49, 514, suggests that Berry’s opposition to municipalisation, namely the injustice of
raising rates on land owners in one locality and to expend it in another, ‘was very soon echoed and to this
day remains a potent cause of dissatisfaction with local government.’
76
This was not a novel idea. As John A. Phillips, 'England's 'Other' Ballot Question: The Unnoticed
Political Revolution of 1835' (2008) 24(S1) Parliamentary History 139, 152 notes, a similar antidemocratic initiative was introduced in Britain by the passage of bills promoted by Sturges Bourne in
1818 & 1819 (58 Geo. 111, c. 69, and 59 Geo. 111, c.12). These acts were directed to regulating vestry
(parish council) meetings which, following the Napoleonic wars and rapid urbanization, had descended
into the chaos of ‘mob control.’ The adoption of such mechanisms to avoid mob rule would have been
known to members of the NSW parliament.
77
Kelly, above n 49, 82.
78
Ibid 85.
79
Hirst, above n 7, 239:
‘The characteristics of the Australian state as they were formed under imperial rule were
accentuated rather than abandoned or modified with self-government. Such a state made little
call on citizenship. The citizens had not created the state and were not called upon even as
taxpayers to take a very active part in it; their most characteristic stance was as supplicants for
their share of the cornucopia.’
80
Kelly, above n 49, 79. The resistance continues. Kelly cites the comment attributed to ‘a prominent
citizen’ of Tibooburra in a 1997 SMH article ‘Tibooburra Fights for its Council-Free Zone’ arguing
against municipalisation proposed at that time:
‘[w]e don’t need for anything out here. We have the best dirt roads in NSW. We don’t need a
council and we don’t want to be dictated to. The town has been here for 120 years and we have
never needed a council.’
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The ideation of the people in New South Wales therefore draws upon these historical roots. As
Wakefield noted, the people of the colony were a ‘new people’.81 These people would rather
‘walk through the streets up to [their] knees in mud than pay a penny in taxation.’82 The refusal
to support the establishment of local government structures and consequential lack of
experience in municipal governance, coupled with the entrenched belief in the ideology of
property,83 explains the development of the ratepayer ideology in New South Wales.84 From
uncharted territory to urban form; New South Wales today is clearly the product of its history.85

5.3

NSW Planning Legislation:

As can be seen from the previous section, historical circumstance dictated that it would become
the role of government, not the private sector, to provide and fund the infrastructure to enable
the commerce of the colony to prosper. Government responsibility was founded on the need to

81

Sinclair, above n 39, 60. Wakefield believed that because the imperial government had not deliberately
planned for the creation of a British society in the colonies, a ‘new people’ were emerging. In
Wakefield’s A Letter from Sydney in 1829 he described these new people in derogatory terms suggesting
that they were a people:
‘whose opinions are only violent and false prejudices, the necessary fruit of ignorance; whose
character is a compound of vanity, bigotry, obstinacy, and hatred most comprehensive, including
whatever does not meet their own pinched notions of right; and who delight in a forced equality,
not equality before the law only, but equality against nature and truth; an equality which, to keep
the balance always even, rewards the mean rather than the great, and gives more honour to the
vile than to the noble … We mean in two words, a people who become rotten before they were
ripe.’
82
Kelly, above n 49, 74. Kelly is citing comments made at a public meeting called in Sydney 1835
opposed to measures to set up a local authority to provide infrastructure and health services.
83
Hirst, above n 3, 146. Hirst argues that a constant concern of the Colonial office was restraining the
demand of the colony on the imperial purse:
‘The Governor’s job was to promote the development of the economy, which would enable the
colony to pay its way and bring more benefit to Britain. There was a notable harmony between
what the British government wanted of the governors and what the settlers wanted of the
Empire.’
84
Kelly and Stoianoff, above n 44, 549. Citing the ‘benefit principle’, a ‘municipalised version of the user
pays principle,’ Kelly and Stoianoff suggest that:
‘Throughout municipal history, ratepayer interests have articulated the benefit principle to argue
that it is inequitable for landholders to bear the burden of funding non-property related services.’
See also Mayne, above n 65, 43. Mayne argues that ‘[s]ensitivity concerning taxation made ratepayers
particularly subjective in their assessments of municipal services and amenities they were thus funding.’
He cites the petition presented to the City Council in 1875 requesting it to undertake roadworks in the
Albion Estate in Surry Hills. The residents, noting that the council made ‘very considerable revenue’ from
rates and fees petitioned on the basis that: ‘it is but fair that the contributories of this increase of revenue
should receive in return something like a quid, pro quo.’
85
Jonathan King, Waltzing Materialism (1978), 107. Jonathan King, a descendant of Governor King,
grandly laments:
‘Australians had the opportunity to start from scratch, learn from mistakes, implement new town
plans imaginatively, and respond to the beauty of the sparkling bays and golden beaches, the
quiet grandeur of the eucalyptus forest, and build anew, unfettered by the constraints and
prejudices of the past. That they failed to do this is on the last continent to be settled is one of the
tragedies of modern human civilization.’
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commercialise the economic opportunity of the colony to become a supplier of raw materials to
Britain and to open a market for its manufactured goods. The incorporation of liberal ideas
coupled with apathy towards participation meant that the government governed the people, and
governed them well.86

5.3.1

A New Role for Government

Like the Romans who came to Britain, the British came to Australia and planned towns and
built infrastructure;87 but they did not impose crippling taxation.88 Town planning could be said
to have begun with Governor Phillip in that an initial plan for Sydney was drawn by him, but it
was not followed.89 Instead, it would be Macquarie, inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment,
who would set about defining the Colony.90 Macquarie did not have the means to fund his
programme but through innovation, Macquarie found a way.91 Subsequent governors embarked
on their own civic construction projects building ‘roads and bridges, improve[ing] ports,
encourage[ing] exploration, survey[ing] lands for settlement, and provid[ing] settlers with their

86

Hirst, above n 3, 150. Hirst comments that:
‘“The government” remained without social character; it was an impersonal force for good. …
They [the people] were very conscious of being British subjects and the local state, however
utilitarian in its daily workings, protected their British rights and liberties and hence their
freedom from the state.’
87
Freestone, above n 19, 10. Freestone argues that ‘[s]urveyors in either the field or head office were the
main town planners of the colonial era.’
88
Hirst, above n 3, ‘Until late in the nineteenth … The government collected its revenue from taxes that
were hardly noticed – duties collected on imported goods – and from the sale of crown lands.’
89
AJ Brown and HM Sherrard, Town and Country Planning (1959), 24, suggest that Captain Phillip was
the first to attempt town planning with ‘a design for the layout of Sydney streets prepared in 1792.’ The
design was not followed and Sydney ‘was largely developed by chance.’
90
Cox, above n 27, 21. Cox argues that the ‘most inspired attempts for an urban design for Sydney were
by Governor Macquarie and his architect Francis Greenaway.’ One interesting aspect to the reign of
Macquarie is that it epitomises why, in later years, there was such resistance to the imposition of local
government on communities and the development of the ratepayer ideology. Macquarie ‘proved’ to the
people of New South Wales that the government was responsible for the provision of infrastructure such
as towns, roads and ports without the burden of taxation being cast onto the people to pay for it. If
Macquarie could, in ten brief years, achieve so much, why couldn’t later governors do the same? As
Michael Duffy, 'The Visionary we need right now', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 30 December
2009, 4, eulogises:
“Macquarie was the Augustus of the southern hemisphere. … He replanned the towns that were
already there, created new ones and erected 200 main buildings, … He left NSW with 300 miles
of good roads.’
91
L Sharon Davidson and Stephen Salsbury, Australia's First Bank (2005), 19. Australia’s first bank was
the initiative of Macquarie. The ‘first shareholders and directors were government officials and merchants
associated with Macquarie, including ex-convicts or emancipists.’ London declared the original charter
invalid but the bank survived and was reconstituted.

153

workforce.’92 The colony would also have its own bureaucracy to administer this
infrastructure.93

5.3.2

Involuntary Local Government

As noted in the previous section, the initial attempts to create a voluntary incorporation model
for local government comprehensively failed to engage the people of New South Wales. Neither
the 1858 Act nor the 1867 Act created mechanisms that gave voice to the people who actually
lived in the locality.94 In the result, the government was free to take advantage of
circumstance.95 But faced with having to attend ‘to every petty little local requirement in every
locality’ parliament, led by Premier Carruthers,96 forced local government onto the people
through a suite of legislation known as the Local Government Act 1906 (NSW) (the 1906 Act).97
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Hirst, above n 3, 146-149.
Macquarie’s successor Darling wound back many of the reforms. See Brian H Fletcher, 'Administrative
Reform in New South Wales Under Governor Darling' (1979) 38(3) Australian Journal of Public
Administration , 251-2. Darling replaced the convicts, they being, in his opinion, persons ‘who had
forfeited every claim to character.’ He then created, effectively, a Civil Service ‘modelled on that of
Ceylon and Mauritius,’ with departmental offices under his supervision. Governor Darling also increased
the salary of the positions to attract free employees, and obviously, these could not be catholic. Fletcher
notes (259) that:
‘Darling substituted a centralized, tightly-organized administrative system for the loose
organisation that had existed under Brisbane. He placed his own office on an efficient basis and
instituted a system of minutes and memoranda to convey official instructions to the Colonial
Secretary, whose office was reorganized to enable it more effectively to discharge its functions.’
94
Mayne, above n 65, 42-3:
‘A property-based system of plural voting, linked with special property qualifications and
absence of payment for municipal office, generally limited active participation in local
government to wealthy men. … it was alleged local councils had, in the absence of a widely
drawn electoral foundation, become a battleground for selfish cliques whose interests extended
no further than determining the occupancy of the mayoral chair.’
95
Giving local community’s voice would impede the ability of government and its allies to take action.
Slums held the threat of disease which affected rich and poor alike. Shirley Fitzgerald, Sydney: A Story of
a City (1999), 81, suggests that after an outbreak of bubonic plague in 1900, the state government took
the opportunity to seize privately owned waterfront property. She notes that ‘in the name of public health,
large tracts of the waterfront, maritime housing, stores, churches and pubs were resumed and much was
knocked down.’ The episode was justified because:
‘The city was no place for people to live. Suburban living became the fashion, and those who did
remain in the inner city area were increasingly seen a living lives which were less than
satisfactory.’
Freestone, above n 19, 214 notes that by 1917, resumptions by the Sydney City Council ‘had displaced
about 9000 residents and destroyed thousands of houses.’ Such actions understandably politicised the
people most likely affected. Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community, an Australian
History (1985), 281-9, notes:
‘Catholics were over represented in the poorer congested inner-city areas.’ The actions of
government and ‘the facts of economic and social life were driving Catholics into the Labor
Party, although none too quickly and not without much misgivings.’
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Gary Lewis, ''Million Farms' Campaign, NSW 1919-25' (1984) 47(Nov) Labour History 55, 55. Lewis
describes Carruthers as a ‘solicitor, investor’ He ‘was by political nature a Liberal Free Trader moving
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The 1906 Act was not an ambitious piece of legislation. Generally, councils were to act as
‘glorified roads trusts, with power to collect waste in urban areas.98 Unlike earlier legislative
models, the 1906 Act introduced a ‘benefit-related’ tax base in that rates were assessed on the
unimproved capital value.99 The philosophy of the Act was to encourage development.100 Kelly
and Stoianoff suggest that the assumption was that ‘land values would reflect the extent of
benefits accrued from public expenditure.’101

There was power in section 108 of the 1906 Act to declare an area an ‘urban area.’ This
declaration enabled the council to exercise the ‘additional functions’ specified in section 109,
which extended to building regulation.102 It was a rudimentary urban planning law. In the
absence of such powers, there was no law which otherwise regulated the use of land apart from
the common law of nuisance.103 Wilcox, also cited in Kelly, says the powers under section 109
were ‘widely acquired’ and became a ‘core council function.’104

towards an increasingly conservative position as he aged.’ Carruthers resigned as Premier in 1907. Lewis
notes, ‘[a] Royal Commission into the Lands Department found that Carruthers, when Secretary for
Lands, had been ‘excessive’ in his granting of leasehold extensions to pastoralists, had assisted the
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Legislative Council in 1910 ‘on the nomination of Governor Sir H Rawson, without the advice of the
government.’
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‘the amount of the capital sum for which the fee-simple estate in such land would sell, under
such reasonable conditions of sale as a bona fide seller would require, assuming the actual
improvements (if any) had not been made. …’
100
Kelly and Stoianoff, above n 44, 11. Kelly and Stoianoff note that the 1906 act was based on the
‘Georgist Principle’ referring to American Henry George ‘who influenced the financial architecture’ of
the Act based on an ‘incentive to develop’ philosophy.
101
Ibid 542.
102
The powers under s109 were wide but generally related specifically to public health, building, amenity
and infrastructure functions. However, sub-section (xxxiv) did extend power to authorise the
‘rearrangement and beautification of the area, and the acquisition of land, streets, buildings, etcetera,
therefore, together with the sale or lease of land or buildings after such rearrangement.’
103
S Berveling and L Taylor, 'Land Use Planning, Development & Building Control ' in P Stein QC AM
et al (eds), Butterworths, Local Government Planning and Environment Service NSW (2004) vol C
Commentary, C60,152. Berverling and Taylor argue that prior to 1945 ‘land owners were legally entitled
to use their land … subject only to the laws of nuisance’. But see E. Freyfogle, 'Eight Principles for
Property Rights in the Anti-Sprawl Age' (1999) 23 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review 777, 779. Freyfogle cites the 1879 decision in Bryant v Lefever 48 QBD 380 where the English
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The 1906 Act was recast in 1919 becoming the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) (the 1919
Act). Even though by this time the British had passed its first town planning law, the public
interest ideology did not find its way into the NSW Act.105 Part XII of the Act expressly referred
to ‘Town Planning,’ but the work of Part XII related to the regulation of subdivision of land and
the opening of roads. Pursuant to section 309, the Governor was empowered to proclaim an area
as a ‘residential district.’ Upon proclamation, the uses of land prescribed by the section as
‘incompatible with residential environments’ were prohibited within the proclaimed area.106
But with these exceptions, the 1919 Act generally confined the role of local government to
being the lesser arm of government responsible for the ‘three Rs’, rates, roads, and rubbish.107

5.3.3

Building Control

Part XI of the 1919 Act regulated buildings.108 Land use, with the exception of areas declared
residential districts, remained unregulated.109 Pursuant to section 341, the applicant for approval
had the right to appeal against ‘the decision of the council or any neglect or delay’ of the council
to determine the application for building or subdivision.110

Court of Appeal refused to label as nuisance the blocking of access to wind draft by a newly erected
timber warehouse next door on the basis that ‘for the benefit of the community’ landowners “have and
must have rights” to use property in whatever ways such property was “commonly and lawfully used.”’
104
M Wilcox, The Law of Land Development in New South Wales (1967), 423. And see Kelly, above n
44, 91.
105
This was despite the nascent interest in town planning locally. Freestone, above n 19, notes that
‘[v]oluntary town planning associations were formed in every [capital] city between 1913 and 1916.’
106
Robert Stokes, The Battle for the Big Back Yard: An Examination of the Conflict Between Suburban
Character and Urban Consolidation and the use of Public Participation in Managing this Conflict (Ph.
D. Thesis, Macquarie University, 2007), 17. Stokes suggests that this legislative scheme led to ‘ad hoc’
decisions of a planning nature ‘in response to health and amenity concerns about the spread of low cost
and tenement style housing.’ Paradoxically, he notes (at 158) that in 1928 s309 was amended by the Local
Government (Amendment) Act 1928 (NSW) which inserted s309 (f) to allow councils to prohibit ‘any
building for the purpose of a residential flat building.’
107
See Tanveer Ahmed, ‘Bona fide democracy begins on your doorstep,’ Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney), 9 September 2008, 11. Ahmed cites the common catch cry that councils ‘are caricatured as
being concerned with the “three Rs” rates, roads and rubbish.’ His article, whilst noting the importance of
local government, suggests that the apathy towards participation in local government continues because
of the perception that the role of local governance is confined to these functions.
108
Berverling and Taylor, above n 103, [450,010] C60,152.
109
L. Stein, Principles of Planning Law (2008), 6. As Stein notes, unfettered land use rights historically
relate to the laissez-faire doctrine and the ‘bundle of rights’ attached to the ownership of land.
110
The precursor to this right in NSW can be sourced to the appeal right created by the City of Sydney
Improvement Act, 1879 (NSW). Mayne, above n 65, 148, notes that the prospect of regulation of
buildings caused such complaints from developers about ‘arbitrary’ regulation by ‘autocrats’ that by the
time the Bill was passed in 1879 it included provision for the creation of a specialist Board to hear the
appeal ‘of any person “dissatisfied with the conduct proceedings or decision” of Corporation officials.’
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The rights of the public to participate in the decision-making process were severely curtailed.
Under the 1919 Act the public did not have a right to be notified of the application or to make
submissions. Decisions of the council made under the 1919 Act could not be challenged in
judicial review except on the fiat of the Attorney General.111 The system for processing
applications is ominously close to the current system.
The work of Goodall and others,112 points to a continuing disconnect in the early years of the
twentieth century between the government and the people on the issue of urbanisation.113 The
emergence of progress associations to advance the cause of urban expansion suggests that the
local communities sought a voice for its concerns external to the local government structures
which the government had sought to impose.114 Curiously, apart from Labor party affiliations, it
does not seem that there was a push to co-ordinate action to politicise the concerns by way of a
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Unlike the provisions of section 123 of the EP&A Act (the open standing provision), a person had to
have legal standing to commence judicial review proceedings. An illustration of this is found in the
discussion in Mutton v Ku-Ring-Gai MC (1973) 1 NSWLR 233; 241-2:
‘An act of the local corporation is justiciable in two main circumstances. First, when the exercise
of power directly affects individual rights, the decision will be potentially reviewable. See de
Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 2nd ed, p 273. There are a multitude of examples
of this to be found in the Local Government Act. Secondly, when the act of the corporation is
ultra vires the act will be reviewable. In the first case the act may be impugned in the courts by
the individual whose rights are affected. In the second case the act may be directly impugned by
the Attorney General or by some person who has special interest in that he suffers special
damage….However, if individual rights are not affected, the courts do not, at the instance of the
Attorney General or otherwise, undertake a general supervision of the acts and decisions of local
government bodies.’
112
Heather Goodall et al, 'Making the City Green: The Creation of Public Greenspace in Suburban
Sydney, 1940-1992' (Paper presented at the State of Australia's Cities Conference, Brisbane 30 November
-2 December 2005).
113
Robert Freestone and David Nichols, 'From planning history to community action: metropolitan
Adelaide's internal reserves' (2001) (29) Journal of the Historical Society of South Australia 21, 23. The
work of Freestone and Nichols on the ‘internal reserves’ of Adelaide in the early twentieth century
supports Goodall. They note:
‘Residents’ responses to internal reserves were, however, ambivalent. Like many planning ideas,
what seemed sensible in theory often foundered in practice. Confusion over the exact purpose of
internal reserve areas, the tendency for locals to neglect them or use them as rubbish dumps, and
local councils’ unwillingness to take on maintenance responsibilities were important reasons for
the internal reserve’s eventual fall from grace.’
114
Goodall, above n 112, 4. Goodall argues that:
‘The increasing populations in the 1910s and 20s were settling in a dense pattern, fostering close
knit communities and facilitating community organization. The local progress associations were
both expressing and shaping the local sense of these emerging communities and of what they
understood to be “the public.” It did NOT include Aborigines. A number of the Progress
Associations protested in 1926, seeking council intervention, although unsuccessfully on that
occasion, to remove Aboriginal residents from their land on Salt Pan Creek. The Depression
slowed this process of community formation and assertion but it was to remerge strongly
through the 1930s. It was a sense of community which was racially limited and class defined,
with the Anglo-Irish component of the population self-consciously beginning to flex its
demographic strength to exert control over the direction in which the community might
develop.’
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formal challenge to unseat members or to make matters an ‘election issue.’ As Goodall notes,115
the concerns ‘generated a concerted protest which was invariably expressed in terms of class
and local entitlement.’116 This suggests that the ratepayer ideology precludes the taking of such
political action because a necessary first step is participation in the political process.117 As
Larcombe observes ‘public apathy has been an anathema to local government ever since its
inception.’118 The ideology of property embedded in the 1919 Act and market forces would
ultimately determine the settlement pattern of New South Wales for the ensuing forty years. The
people would not embrace local government.

5.3.4

The Public Interest Ideology Arrives in NSW

The legislative regime of the 1919 Act remained the sole regulatory instrument relating to urban
planning in NSW until 1945. But before the Second World War had finished, perhaps
anticipating a better future,119 the NSW Government added Part XIIA to the 1919 Act by
enacting the Local Government (Town and Country Planning) Amendment Act 1945 (NSW)
(Part XIIA). The Minister for Local Government clearly articulated in 1945 that it was the
government’s express intention that land use planning would be democratic. The people were
to be part of the planning system ‘to the greatest extent possible.’120

However, the amendments creating Part XIIA did not contain a statutory mechanism to facilitate
that democratic ambition.121 Stokes, citing the parliamentary debate, suggests that the 1945 Part
XIIA legislation ‘was welcomed primarily as a slum control mechanism.’122 But the statute was
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In the specific case of the association formed to protect a ‘national park’ area on the Georges River.
Goodall, above n 112, 22.
117
In Tocuuevillian terms, this should emerge from a strong association tradition. See Craiutu, above n
48, 285. Craiutu suggests that:
‘unlike Marx who rejected civil society (which in his view was nothing but the realm of greed
and selfishness), Tocqueville correctly grasped that the long apprenticeship of liberty depends to
a significant degree on the science of association that draws precisely on those bourgeois
virtues—self-restraint, temperance, self-interest rightly understood—that Marx despised and
rejected.’
118
Larcombe, above n 72, 1.
119
Younger, above n 14, 643. Younger notes ‘[i]n Australia and in New Zealand, almost forgotten hopes
and a reformist zeal were revived. This time a better world would be fashioned.’
120
Australian Labour Party, Five critical years: story of the McKell Labour government in New South
Wales, May 1941-May 1946 (1946), 52.
121
Freestone, above n 19, 24: ‘Although planning was promoted on a rhetoric of participation, few
effective opportunities were presented.’
122
Ibid 18. Stokes cites the comments of the Member for Parramatta in the parliamentary debate: ‘we
should not allow people to congregate together on the very borderline of slumdom itself.’ New South
Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 February 1945, Hansard 2005, (G C Gollan). It
may have been hyperbole. A contrary view is suggested in Clive Forster, Australian Cities: Community
116
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broader than that. The structure of Part XIIA, the forerunner to the EP&A Act, was modelled
on the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1932 (UK). The Minister had the power to
make the planning instrument. He delegated to councils the authority to make the decision as to
whether or not development occurred in a locality, based on the range of permissible
development identified in the planning instrument. Seen in that context, urban planning law in
New South Wales was firmly entrenched within the executive, not the parliamentary, branch of
government.123

With the enactment of Part XIIA the ideology of the public interest would displace the ideology
of property as the dominant social institution governing the development of land. In contrast to
the minister’s comment, it would be the government and not the people that decided what was
‘in the public interest’ locally.124 The County of Cumberland planning scheme was not
subjected to local scrutiny before its implementation. As Forster notes, it was an ambitious
plan:
‘It aimed to coordinate the suburbanisation and decentralisation of housing,
manufacturing and retailing, and the more equitable supply of services and facilities. It
also sought to develop strong suburban regional centres and to restrict outwards sprawl
by establishing a green belt of protected non-urban land.’125

There was little public participation in the processes created by Part XIIA. Apart from the
public being invited to ‘make representations’ on the draft scheme,126 the public did not have the
opportunity to participate in the plan-making phase. The matters to be taken into account in
assessing an application pursuant to section 313 did not include public submissions. The public
did not even have to be notified of the making of an application.

and Change (1995), 11. Forster argues that cities in Australia ‘did not generally contain the large areas of
slum housing that Engles and others noted in Britain,’ though infant mortality was high, Australia did not
have similar ‘mortality and morbidity rates’ as Britain.
123
This is evident in the ALP’s review of the achievements of the McKell government, above n 120, 48.
As the review notes:
‘The haphazard and unregulated growth of New South Wales during the past 153 years had to be
arrested.
…
The government therefore decided that this State would, for the very first time in its history, be
developed according to a master plan.’ (emphasis in original).
124
Even though in 1945 planning was to be democratic, suggesting local control, in a forerunner to state
planning policies, the government legislated in 1949 to override residential district proclamations.
Pursuant to the Local Government (Regulation of Flats) Act 1949 (NSW), an owner could convert a
building into a number of residential flats notwithstanding a residential district proclamation made at the
request of a local government area prohibiting such development.
125
Forster, above n 122, 22.
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The post war years were a period of rapid population expansion.127 The County of Cumberland
planning scheme of 1951 was the government’s response to calls from garden city proponents in
the inter war period such as John Sulman for better urban planning in Sydney.128 The scheme
was bureaucratic in design and manifested a clear public interest ideology. That is, the scheme
reflected the government’s view of what it perceived was in the best interest of the community.
It was patronistic in approach. The government would protect the people from themselves. The
lack of opportunity to participate in the process caused distrust,129 but also led to agitation for
change.130 In terms of Arnstein’s ladder, citizen participation would be elevated from
manipulation to informing, the lowest degree of tokenism.131

Stokes suggests that the scheme reflected what he describes as the ideology of suburban
character.132 Through the use of negative zoning provisions, councils were able to prohibit
residential flat developments in local government areas so as to protect the amenity or the
suburban character of a locality. Goodall notes that there was community resistance to the
County of Cumberland plan and its green belt provisions because the plan conflicted with the
desires of the progress associations which preferred to:
‘facilitate subdivision and foster “development” of the newer suburban centres, as well
as the popular sense of the rising need for housing which had been generated from the
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See section 342F(3).
Forster, above n 122, 15. Forster suggests:
‘the sprawling, decentralised, automobile-dependent, ethnically diverse cities most of us live in
today are mainly a legacy of the 1950s and 1960s.’
128
As Freestone, above n 19, 13 notes, Sulman’s 1890 paper ‘The Laying-out of Towns’ was ‘a critical
breakthrough’. Yet, in terms of built form, what was actually achieved was a determined project to supply
affordable housing through the establishment of the Housing Commission which, at its height in 1946-7,
was constructing some 400 fibro homes per month – see Five Critical Years, above n 120, 102.
129
Nicole Gurran, Australian Urban Land Use Planning (2007), 22-3:
‘The 1960s was a period of great social and political change and planning itself was soon
regarded by many to be the antithesis of rational science. … There was a distrust of the type of
planning that emerged from bureaucracies in an autocratic, top down manner, without
opportunities for public participation.’
130
In 1970 Part XIIA had inserted into it section 342ZA to require councils to give public notice of the
making of an application for approval to construct residential flat buildings. Pursuant to sub-section (6)(b)
the council was required to ‘consider any objection to the granting of the application’ – see Local
Government (Further Amendment) Act 1970 (NSW).
131
Arnstein, above n 2, 217.
132
Stokes, above n 106, 41. Stokes contends that ‘the Australian preference for home ownership and low
density living can be conceived as an ‘ideology’ of ‘suburban character.’ He argues further that this
ideology ‘reflects and embodies the ideology of private property.’ In the context of the County of
Cumberland Scheme, Stokes, citing Wilcox, above n 104, suggests (67):
‘Suburban character was recognized and protected through the categorisation of land into zones
“to ensure that its private use will be one which conforms with town-planning principles and the
amenity of the area.”’
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Depression evictions and camps and the new, post war optimism to establish new
families in the district.’133

The County of Cumberland scheme reflects the tension then emerging between the dominant
ideology amongst the people (that of private property) and, for the New South Wales
government, the new ideology of government (that of the public interest). Forster suggests that
the scheme was ignored by other government departments and local councils.134 The fact that
the County of Cumberland scheme was stymied by the actions of government departments and
local councils reflects the strength of the private property ideology at the time.135 This is
supported by the nature of development which was in fact promoted under the scheme.136 At the
time the scheme was introduced, there had been a debate raging for decades on the nature of
municipal governance for greater Sydney. The introduction of Part XIIA must be located in this
historical context.137

Part XIIA was the legislative mechanism to give effect to the planning scheme. Section 342C of
the Act authorised a council, by resolution, to decide to prepare ‘a scheme with respect to any
land within its area.’ The Minister could, pursuant to section 342D, direct councils to make a
scheme. Whilst approval of the scheme was under the control of the Minister, who had to
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Goodall, above n 112, 7.
Forster, above n 122, 22-23. Local councils ‘tended to favour local interests rather than the intention of
the metropolitan master plan.’
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Freestone, above n 19, 146 cites the observation of RS Luke, Chairman of the Cumberland County
Council between 1951 and 1958, on his experience of the Council:
‘The initial hallelujah chorus of “I believe in planning” began to be tempered by the refrain –
“provided it does not affect my property.”’
136
Forster, above n 122, 23, suggests that: ‘Large areas of nineteenth century cottages were demolished
and replaced – in classic modernist style – with blocks of high-rise flats that still dominate the skyline.’
137
Larcombe, above n 66, 202-3. Larcombe devotes over a chapter to the ‘debate’, conducted over a
number of decades, regarding the need for a ‘Metropolitan Government’ for Sydney. In Chapter 5 (159)
He notes that there were ‘three movements for a larger Sydney area.’ One for larger metropolitan
municipalities, one for the creation of a county council structure based on the English system and one for
the creation of a single metropolitan authority. He says of these movements (160) that they were ‘a series
of spasmodic endeavours gaining attention each time enthusiasts drafted plans, interested local alderman
attended conferences or pressure was exerted on government to appoint investigation commissions and
introduce legislation, a pressure the Labor Party was eager to accept because of political opportunities
latent in such a scheme.’ The debates were riven along political lines and, at times, turned on the extent of
the franchise to be granted in any election for members. The period between 1941 and 1948 saw the
return of the McKell Labor Government and the introduction of a bill to amalgamate metropolitan
councils and create a Greater Sydney Metropolitan Council consisting of two members of each of the
forty six parliamentary electorates within the County of Cumberland, with full adult franchise for election
of members. Professor Bland, who Larcombe says (203) was ‘an ardent advocate for the extension of
local government’, opposed the proposal because it ‘“renders tenuous a principle of local government by
creating large areas quite beyond the scope and interest and active participation of the average citizen.”’
Larcombe notes (204) that by 1947, ‘the Government now become adamant that no further regard would
be paid to the people’s wishes.’ It introduced legislation to amalgamate sixty six metropolitan councils
into thirty nine areas.
134
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approve the resolution before it could take effect, the content of the scheme was potentially
wide. Section 342G(2) authorised the scheme ‘to contain provisions for regulating and
controlling the use of land and the purposes for which land may be used.’ Sub-section three
listed a range of matters that could be included in the plan, but the sub-section made it clear that
the list was ‘without prejudice to the generality of sub-section two.’138

Pursuant to section 342F(2) public notification was to be given only of the fact ‘that the scheme
has been submitted.’ Section 342F(3) gave the public a period of three months to ‘make
representations.’ The following subsection required the council to ‘consider all representations
made’ and could refer the plan back to the planning committee in charge of the plan ‘where any
alteration of the scheme is considered necessary’. The planning scheme, as finally adopted was
to be submitted to the Minister who was required by section 342I to refer the scheme to the
Advisory Committee for report, but the Minister retained full power under section 342J to make
the plan, with or without alteration, or to reject it. As such, the right to make a submission
appears rather meaningless.

Pending the making of the scheme, Division Seven of Part XIIA regulated ‘interim
development.’139 In the absence of a resolution to adopt a planning scheme, only buildings and
subdivisions were regulated by the Act. Where a resolution to make a scheme had been
adopted, or where the Minister had directed the making of a scheme, the council had power to
approve applications for interim development.

Section 342V authorised council to approve the application for interim development, with or
without conditions, or it could refuse the application. Council was deemed to have refused the
application if it did not determine it within two months. This deeming provision could be
suspended if the council elected to postpone the consideration of the application pursuant to
subsection two but the applicant and the Minister had appeal rights to the Land and Valuation
Court against that decision. The Minister could also ‘call in’ the application for determination
by him pursuant to sub-section three.
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Section 342G(3)(l) permitted the scheme to contain provisions for:
‘The zoning of land and the prohibition in any zone of the erection, construction, carrying out or
use of any structure or work upon the land or the use in any zone of any land for any specified
purpose or for any purpose other than a specified purpose.’
139
Section 342S defined interim development as meaning ‘development of land to which a scheme
applies between the date upon which a resolution of a the council … has taken effect … and the date of
the coming into operation of the scheme. …’
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5.3.5

Participatory Mechanisms under Part XIIA

The Act provided in section 342V(4) that where an application for interim development was
refused, the council ‘if it thinks fit, make a contribution towards any expense or damage’ that
the applicant may suffer as a result of the council’s decision. Pursuant to section 342V(5), the
applicant had a right of appeal to the Minister against the refusal of an application, or against
any conditions of approval. There was no mechanism for the public to make representations or
to be notified of the making of an application.

With the enactment of Part XIIA an urban planning regime for NSW was created wholly within
the 1919 Act. Building remained regulated under Part XI, subdivision was regulated under Part
XII and land use was now regulated under Part XIIA. For the first time in New South Wales
history, a person would have to seek the consent of a statutory authority for the use of land. The
concept of spatial regulation would be the mechanism to regulate development. The council and
the Minister were constrained only by the limits imposed in the planning schemes. The
legislation drew heavily upon the British model contained in the Town and Country Planning
Act 1932 (UK) discussed in chapter 4. The planning scheme provisions created by Part XIIA
were cumbersome and they were not widely used by local councils.140 Despite the Minister’s
optimistic exhortation to democracy when he addressed the County of Cumberland Council in
1945,141 the opportunity for public participation under the legislative scheme remained limited
or non-existent. Being invited to make a representation is hardly democratic in the context of
process. Councils did not initially embrace the benefits in regulating the use of land preferring
to allow the market to determine the future planning of a locality. Where the power was used, it
was exercised by Councils to protect and enhance property rights by excluding undesirable
development. As Kelly argues, ‘[l]and use planning could be fitted snugly within the
“ratepayer” ideology.’142

The existing mechanism contained in the 1919 Act for obliging the council to determine an
application in respect of building and subdivision applications was adapted to the determination
of land use applications under Part XIIA.143 A decision of the council in respect to an
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NSW Report to the Minister for Planning and Environment required under s20(1) of the NSW
Planning and Environment Commission Act 1974 (November 1975) (November 1975 Report), 28
‘Experience subsequent to 1945 clearly showed that the procedure adopted was unduly cumbersome.’
141
See chapter 1, n 1.
142
Kelly, above n 49, 97.
143
This approach was similarly retained as the mechanism in the EP&A Act upon its enactment in 1979
for the determination of development applications.
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application for land use approval under Part XIIA was, after the 1962 amendments to Part XIIA,
subject to the right of appeal in section 341 of the 1919 Act referred to above. Accordingly, the
decision-making processes also exhibited a social exclusionary dynamic in that only the
applicant for development had the right to challenge the decision.
It took until 1960 for the first planning scheme to be gazetted.144 In 1962 the Local Government
Act was amended to force councils to regulate land use. The amendment allowed the Minister to
make an Interim Development Order (IDO) which applied to all councils. The IDO imposed
‘temporary’ land use controls pending the completion of a comprehensive Planning Scheme
Ordinance (PSO). An IDO was a ‘boiler plate’ planning instrument which introduced to many
local government areas its first ‘table of uses’. IDOs generally adopted a set of standard
provisions regulating development known as the ‘model provisions’ which had been gazetted by
the government. Local councils were thereafter obliged to administer the IDO via the provisions
of Part XIIA pending the gazettal of the PSO. Many councils were content to rely solely on the
Interim Development mechanism.145

5.3.6

Planning Appeals under Part XIIA

Until the enactment of Part XIIA, the appeal against the council decision provided by section
341 lay to the District Court. With the enactment of Part XIIA, the appeal was to be made to the
newly constituted Land and Valuation Court and the Local Government Appeals Tribunal, both
of which were created in conjunction with the amendments to the 1919 Act. The wording of
section 341 of the Act suggested a de novo appeal.146 But from earliest times, the District Court
adopted a cautious approach. In Travena v Woollahra MC,147 (Travena) White DCJ held (at p
155-6):
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Kelly and Mant, above n 52, 242.
Some NSW councils will only abandon their IDO as its planning scheme as a result of the single LEP
process being rolled out by the government in conjunction with the 2008 reforms.
146
s.341 provided:
342(1) Any applicant for approval(a) to erect any building,
(b) to open any new public road,
(c) to subdivide any land
May appeal to the Land and Valuation Court against the decision of the council or any neglect or
delay of the council to give within forty days after service of the application a decision with
respect thereto.
(2) Such court may summons witnesses, hear evidence and determine the matter, having regard
to this Act, the ordinances, the circumstances of the case, and the public interest.
147
(1923) 6 LGR 153.
145
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‘The Council is a body chosen by rate payers under the law to decide this class of
question as well as a host of others relating to the good government of municipal area,
and I do not think that the legislature intended that control of these subdivision matters
should be entirely taken from the Council and entrusted to the judges of the District
Court.
….
I do not think that [a council's] decision should be set aside unless the Court comes to
the conclusion, as a result of hearing evidence and consideration of the circumstances,
that its decision, imposes an altogether unfair burden upon the appellant, or is based
upon some misapprehension either as the facts or the principle to be applied, or has
proceed upon some personal or other ground not connected with the merits of the
proposal.’ 148
In Summers v Hornsby SC,149 Roper J applied the dicta in Travena, affirming the cautious
approach of the District Court to the review power in respect of appeals to the Land &
Valuation Court.150 Accordingly, over time, the judicial approach to the Court's role on appeal
created a practical circumstance where, in effect, the applicant carried a positive evidential
burden into the tribunal. In Foreman v Sutherland SC,151 Else-Mitchell J held:‘Time and time again the judgements of this Court have referred to the fact that the
implementation of Town and Country Planning schemes require a balance of public and
private rights and interests …. where the development consent has been refused on
some ground of public interest the burden falls upon an appellant to advance reasons
which will displace that public interest.’152

The ideology of the pubic interest resonated in the courts. By requiring an applicant to displace
a positive evidential burden, the court was upholding the primacy of the public interest over
private property interests. The post war migration and population boom had led to a spike in
demand for housing accommodation which manifested itself in the unprecedented growth of

148
This view corresponds with the views of the former Lord Mayor's Frank Sartor attacking the powers of
the Land and Environment Court in merit appeals expressed in the provocative 2001 City of Sydney
publication: See F Sartor, 'City of Sydney Occasional Paper', (Sydney), January 2001, Issue 2.
149
(1946) 16 LGRA 40.
150
Although T Hale, in an unpublished paper ‘Policy Politics and Decision-Making in the Land &
Environment Court,’ suggests (at p 10) that the Land & Valuation Court limited the application of
Trevena ‘to amenity issues or council policy.’
151
(1964) 10 LGRA 269.
152
Hale, above n 150, 11.
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residential flat and unit development in Sydney.153 Burnley suggests that in the period 1964-75,
thirty percent of construction activity was devoted to residential flat development. The
ubiquitous ‘six pack’ became the dominant expression of this built form.154

Stokes identifies that this trend to approve residential flat development ‘engendered a fierce
groundswell of opposition’ with the residents of ‘traditional low-density suburbs’ organising
‘resident action groups’ to protest and agitate against multi storey residential development.155
Freestone suggests that the ‘most radical and dynamic contestation’ were the green bans
imposed by the Builders Labourers Federation.156 The only participatory mechanism available
to the people to prevent such undesirable development was the ability to apply pressure to local
councillors to refuse development. The exercise by councils of the discretionary power to say no
to development meant that many appeals were brought before the Land and Valuation Court.157
By 1974 there was, in the area of planning, a multiplicity of potential jurisdictions to ventilate a
planning dispute. It was not uncommon for a dispute to be commenced on appeal to the Land &
Valuation Court, to be adjourned to enable the Supreme Court to determine a point of law and
then to be sent back to the Land & Valuation Court for final determination (only to await the
appeal on a question of law from that Court to the Court of Appeal).

5.3.7

Pressure for Reform

There was clear community dissatisfaction with the land use system created under Part XIIA.158
But whether or not pressure from below, from the people, led to the legislative change is
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In Five Critical Years, above n 120, 100, the ALP calculated that by the war’s end, NSW was about
‘160,000 homes“short” – 80,000 of them not built because of the depression, 80,000 of them not built
because of the war.’ (emphasis in original).
154
I H Burnley, 'Immigration and housing in an emerging global city, Sydney, Australia' (2005) 23(3)
Urban Policy and Research 329, 337. Burnley suggests that apartments accommodated a disproportionate
number of migrants because:
‘apartments facilitated settlement, for they were cheaper than the gentrifying inner city. …
Apartments and cottages on low cost land, social institutions and networks, and decentralising
industrial and retailing employment meant that the west became the primary receiving area for
lower income LOTE immigrants after 1970.’
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Stokes, above n 106, 130. The action groups formed the Coalition of Resident Action Groups to lobby
and petition the government.
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Freestone, above n 19, 29. As Freestone notes: ‘Green bans were conceived not as permanent boycotts
but as holding actions to permit a more even playing field of negotiations.’
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Ibid 159. And as Stokes above n 106, 109 notes:
‘By the late 1950s, litigation between resident groups, councils, and developers required judges
to determine the public interest in permitting residential flat development’ as councils sought to
stem the flow of applications via the refusal mechanism.
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Standing Committee on State Development, 'Report 34: New South Wales Planning Framework'
(NSW Legislative Council December 2009) (Standing Committee Report), 21. The report notes:
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debateable.159 It was arguably the administrative complexity and the perceived failure of the
system that led to a renewal process.160 As Berveling & Taylor observe:
‘In short, to most judges, practitioners, commentators and members of Parliament the
system as constituted was seen to be increasingly unworkable. There was bipartisan
support for the overhaul of the existing system.’ 161

The Environmental Planning & Assessment Act and its cognate legislation (including the Land
& Environment Court Act) was the outcome of that overhaul.162 Whilst there was extensive
public consultation prior to parliament considering the EP&A Bills in 1979, it was parliament
(the then newly elected Labor Government) that determined the final form of the Act. It set out
to create a comprehensive system for resource management in the sense that it attempted to

‘At the same time, the rise of resident action groups, movements for social justice and public
participation in government, environment and heritage protection and green ban movements in
Sydney and Melbourne, all shaped a new climate for planning.’
Forster, above n 122, 121, believes that the 1970s was a time of renaissance for local government after a
long period of criticism as ‘inept, inconsequential and often corrupt.’ He suggests that ‘[l]ocalism and
“small is beautiful” came into vogue, as resident’s associations and other pressure groups took a more
active part in local politics.’
159
The enactment of the EP&A Act was arguably the result of a ‘republican moment’ as described by
James Gray Pope, 'Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order' (1990) 139(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 289, 367. It was a time when
the citizenry arose to ‘disrupt cosy relationships among politicians, administrators, and interest group
lobbyists.’ Against this is the fact that the calls for reform of the Planning system came from across the
spectrum of actors. As is noted in the Minister for Planning and Environment, 'Towards A New Planning
System for New South Wales' (NSW Government, 1974) (The green book), 4:
‘Calls for change have come from a wide variety of individuals and organizations and it would
be fair to say that there is a demand for fundamentally rethinking the planning system. This
desire for change was the main reason for an investigation into planning machinery at State and
local government level by a Government Parties Committee, which submitted its report in July
1973.’
160
In the debate on the bills in the Legislative Council in 1979 the opposition, while acknowledging that
it had commenced the process of review and that the system needed reform, stated that the current system
‘contained the worst features of both the American [proscriptive and rigid] and the United Kingdom
[discretionary and uncertain] systems without their corresponding advantages.’ NSW, Parliamentary
Debates, Legislative Council, 21 November 1979, Hansard 3356 (W J Holt).
161
Berverling and Taylor, above n 103, [600,005], C180, 022. This is precisely the complaint being made
now by the Standing Committee Report above n 158, 24, 29 and 51. As the Standing Committee report
notes (at 24):
‘Many Inquiry participants argued that the EP&A Act and the planning framework has suffered
from too many issue-specific amendments over the years. The conclusion drawn by most
participants was that the Act and the planning framework now required an overall review of the
entire system.’
At 29, the committee notes that in evidence to the Committee the former Minister for Planning, Mr Frank
Sartor, ‘had always been of the view that a rewrite of the EP&A Act was warranted.’ Ultimately, at 51,
the committee recommended an independent expert and representative group ‘undertake a fundamental
review’ of the Act and to formulate recommendations for change (see recommendation 1 of the
committee).
162
Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (7th ed, 2010), 8. Arguably, it was at the forefront of
what Bates describes as the ‘great [environmental law] social revolution.’
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promote and regulate all development occurring in the state, but within environmental
constraints. As the Minister explained in the second reading speech,
‘The essential aim of the bills is to create a system of environmental planning under
which decisions on land use and resource management are made within the physical
capacity of the environment in order to promote the economic and social welfare of the
people of New South Wales.163

The government of the time clearly envisaged a transparent land use planning process with a
novel role for the court. The court was to become an institution that gave ‘guidance’ to councils
in relation to both planning appeals and the law in relation to planning. In his second reading
speech the Minister for Planning & Environment, D.P. Landa, said of the intention to create the
Land & Environment Court:
‘The Court is an entirely innovative concept, bringing together in one body the best
attributes of a traditional court system and of a lay tribunal system. The Court … will
be able to function with the benefits of procedural reform and lack of legal technicalities
as the requirements of justice permit. … The Court will establish its own body of
precedents on major planning issues, precedents sorely sought by councils and the
development industry but totally lacking in the now to be abolished Local Government
Appeals Tribunal.’ 164

As will be seen in the next section, the participatory mechanism in the new act was virtually
indistinguishable from the mechanism contained in Part XIIA with the singular exception of the
open standing provision that meant any person could bring a matter before the court without
first having to obtain the Attorney General’s fiat.

5.4

Participation under the EP&A Act:

There was a moment in the consultation process for the EP&A Act when there was the
possibility of participation being taken to a higher level than tokenism. In the 1974 report
commissioned by the Liberal government into the planning system (the green book), it was
suggested that:
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NSW Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 November 1979, Hansard 2882, (Hon Mr
William Haig Minister for Corrective Services).
164
Cognate Environmental Planning Bills second reading speech NSW, Parliamentary Debates,
Legislative Council, 21 November 1979, Hansard 3355 (Hon Mr David Landa).
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‘The most complete form of involvement is public-decision making. This may in fact be
achieved by presenting alternatives, from which people can choose the preferred one.
The difficulty of this practice lies in the undue influence by an articulate minority,
unless the choice was by referendum which would be costly and time consuming if used
in every case. However it would be relatively easy where a small number of residents or
users, who could all be consulted, could decide on some local matters.’165

By the time of the second report in 1975, this suggestion had been had become a citizen
initiative. The government was suggesting that ‘local residents [could] initiate a local detailed
plan for their area. If this happened, the residents could present a proposal to the council which
should indicate its attitude and then deal with it.’166 The final report to the (Labor) Minister,
published in November 1975, merely suggested that:
‘Local government should be responsible for planning decisions at the local level so
long as their decisions conform with the requirements set down for the State and for the
Region, or sub-region, in which a local council is located.’167

For those interested in civic participation, it was a brief moment.

5.4.1

The EP&A Act in 2011

The EP&A Act (and its complimentary legislation such as the Land and Environment Court Act
1979 (NSW)) was radical in its approach to social inclusion in planning processes. The
language of the Act clearly creates the impression that the people are relevant to the planning
process.168 The introduction of an open standing provision in section 123 of the EP&A Act,
which allowed any member of the public to bring a challenge in the LEC both against and to
enforce decisions made under the Act, was unique in Local Government processes. Previously,
a person had to have legal standing, that is, sufficient interest in the proceedings.169
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Green book, above n 159, 21.
Minister for Planning and Environment, 'Proposal for a New Environmental Planning System for New
South Wales (Second Report)' (NSW Government, 1975), 10 (the White Book).
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NSW Planning and Environment Commission, 'Report to the Minister for Planning and Environment
required under s20(1) of the NSW Planning and Environment Commission Act 1974' (1975), 42.
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As Stein J noted in Curac v Shoalhaven City Council (1993) 81 LGERA 124, at 128:
‘Reasonable opportunities for public participation in plan making and in the development process are
crucial to the integrity of the planning system provided under the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act.’
169
An illustration of the principles formerly applicable is found in Mutton v Ku-Ring-Gai MC (1973) 1
NSWLR 233; 241-2: ‘However, if individual rights are not affected, the courts do not, at the instance of
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The language of the Objects of the EP&A Act also manifested a new, socially inclusive
approach. However, successive reforms to the EP&A Act over its history,170 culminating in the
2010 further amendments,171 have eroded the relevance of the people in the processes of the
Act.172 Presently, the public does not have a participatory role in the decision-making process
either at the plan-making or development assessment stages. Once the plan makes development
permissible, the probability is that development will be approved.173 If the decision made is to
approve development, then except for a limited range of significant development known as
‘designated development,’174 the public do not have a right under the Act to challenge the grant
of consent in merit review proceedings.175 The voice of the community is stifled.

The government stated in 1979, when introducing the EP&A Bill, that the intention of the
EP&A Act was to create a regulatory system for resource management within the physical
capacity of the environment, whilst providing increased opportunity for public participation and
involvement.176 Under the EP&A Act, the planning instrument is made by the executive branch
of government.177 It is the ‘plan’ or instrument that makes development permissible. Once a
plan or instrument is made, an application for development consent may be made.

the Attorney General or otherwise, undertake a general supervision of the acts and decisions of local
government bodies.’
170
The history of the reforms is set out in the NSW parliamentary paper by Holly Park, 'NSW Planning
Framework: History of Reforms' (NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2010).
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See Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment (Development Consents) Act 2010.
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Standing committee report above n 158, 24. The committee noted:
‘many Inquiry participants argued that the EP&A Act and the planning framework has suffered
from too many issue-specific amendments over the years. The conclusion drawn by most
participants was that the Act and the planning framework now required an overall review of the
entire system.’
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This is the express thrust of the NSW Department of Planning, 'Discussion Paper: Improving the NSW
Planning System ' (2007) (2007 Discussion Paper). It is echoed in the Standing Committee’s report in the
context of ‘cutting red tape’ and making the system ‘more efficient.’
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Designated development is prescribed by Schedule 3 of the EP&A Regulations 2000.
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Andrew Edgar, 'Participation and responsiveness in merits review of polycentric decisions: A
comparison of development assessment appeals' (2010) 27 Environment and Planning Law Journal 36,
50-51. Edgar notes that ‘according to the LEC’s process, objectors are effectively sidelined.’ When they
can participate, their evidence ‘is given little or no weight.’ The process relies on the Council to call
expert evidence to counter-balance the evidence of the proponent.
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NSW Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 April 1979, Hansard p 4278 Hon Mr Haig
Minister for Corrective Services :
The essential aim of the Bills is to create a system of environmental planning under which
decisions on land use and resource management are made within the physical capacity of the
environment in order to promote the economic and social welfare of the people of NSW.
177
The phrase ‘Environmental Planning Instrument’ (EPI) is defined in section 4 of the Act. It includes
State Environmental Planning Policies (SEPPs) and Local Environmental Plans (LEPs) but excludes
Development Control Plans (DCPs). Section 24 regulates the making of EPIs. SEPPs are made by the
Governor. LEPs are made by the Minister (or his delegate). DCPs are made by councils – see s74C.
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Development is defined very broadly in section 4 of the EP&A Act.178 Seen in the context of
that definition, what is created under the EP&A Act is a site specific or topical (as in place
specific) system for the regulation of development. Once an Environmental Planning Instrument
(EPI) (which includes a Local Environmental Plan (LEP)) makes a specific type of development
permissible (as opposed to making development prohibited), it is the applicant for development
who determines whether, and if so, what type of development is proposed for a specific parcel
of land. Whether an application for development is required, and if it is, whether the application
requires a ‘determination’ depends on the nature of the proposed development and the
requirement of the planning instrument. The Standard Instrument LEP now mandates the
inclusion in Part 3 of any new LEP instrument the details of ‘exempt’ and ‘complying’
development.179

If development is ‘exempt’ (for example development in the nature of a pergola or a fence),
then pursuant to s76 of the Act, that type of development can be carried out without first having
to submit an application for determination. Similarly, ‘complying development’ (which
includes a two storey dwelling), also does not require merit assessment.180 Provided the nature
of the development meets ‘specified predetermined development standards,’181 then all that is
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Presently development is defined to mean:
(a)the use of land, and;
the subdivision of land, and
the erection of a building, and
the carrying out of a work, and
the demolition of a building or work, and
any other act, matter or thing referred to in s.26 that is controlled by and environmental planning
instrument, but does not include any development of a class or description prescribed by the
regulations for the purpose of this definition.
Although ‘work’ is not defined, s.4(2) of the Act also provides:A reference in this Act to: …
(d) a work includes a reference to any physical activity in relation to land that is specified by a
regulation to be work for the purpose of this Act but does not include a reference to any activity
that is specified by a regulation not to be a work for the purposes of this Act
179
The particular type of development that ‘exempt’ and ‘complying’ is described in the State
Environmental Planning Policy (Exempt and Complying Development Codes) 2008. Exempt
development is ‘minor’ development such as sheds, pergolas fixed BBQs and fences. Complying
development refers to a broad range of development previously the subject of merit assessment including
single and two storey dwellings, alterations and additions to dwellings and subdivision of land. According
to the Department of Planning Fact Sheet ‘How are Neighbour’s rights protected?’ issued 15 December,
2008, it will be the code that protects neighbour’s rights – even though there is no mechanism to ensure
this. Reassuringly, the fact sheet states: ‘it is recommended that you discuss your proposed plans with
your neighbours before undertaking any building work.’ However, the code also provides that neighbour
notification is to occur as a matter of process only after the complying development certificate issues.
Clause 3.39A of the code stipulates that two days notice of the commencement of works approved under
a certificate must be given to neighbours. What neighbours are supposed to do upon receipt of that notice
is one of the curiosities of the legislative scheme.
180
See s84A.
181
See s76A(5)
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required is for the development to be certified, by either the council or an accredited certifier.
The development may then proceed to construction without further assessment. There is no
administrative decision made about the merits of such development. All other development is
development that requires consent under the Act. Carrying out development without consent is
an offence against the Act.182 Presently, the decision-maker can be the Minister, the Planning
Assessment Commission (PAC), a Joint Regional Planning Panel (JRPP) or the Council (or its
internal delegate), depending upon whether the application for development is made under Part
3A or Part 4 of the Act.183

It is the making of an application for development or for the project under Part 3A (or its
replacement) which invokes the procedures for seeking consent to a development proposal. The
involvement of the public and its participation in the decision-making process is dependent
upon procedures to bring to the attention of the public the fact of the making of the application
(usually by notification of the lodgement of the application). Participation is limited to the
making of a submission about the development (unless it is designated). Presently, the public
does not have a participatory role in the decision-making process either at the plan-making or
development assessment stages. Once the plan makes development permissible, the probability
is that development will be approved.184

5.4.2

Participation in Plan Making

Upon the enactment of the EP&A Act, the power to initiate the making of a local plan was
reposed in the local council.185 The draft LEP could not be made until the expiration of the
period prescribed by the then section 60 for the making of written submissions.186 It was only if
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See s76A
See s75D in relation to Part 3A applications and s78 in relation to Part 4 applications. It is
acknowledged that Part 3A is to be repealed. Whilst the Part 3A repeal Act received assent on 27 June,
2011, only schedule 2.26 (relating to the extension of the EP&A Regulation to 1 September, 2013) is in
force. The proposed State Environment Planning Policy (State and Regional Development) 2011 has not
yet been made.
184
This has been made more likely since the reforms introduced by the former Chief Justice Peter
McLellan in 2003. See P McLellan, 'Future Directions for Property Law' (2004) 57 Environmental Law
News 5, 10. As His Honour noted in 2004:
‘The future evolution of the appeal processes of the court must ensure that so far as possible, the
process is not a contest. … The “culture” must be one where problems are solved.’
185
Now it is the Minister who initiates the making of the plan. Currently, all councils are in the process of
remaking the local instrument to conform to the requirements of the adopted Standard Instrument LEP –
see Standard Instrument (Local Environmental Plans) Order 2006.
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AJ Nott, Environment Planning and Development Law (1982), 50. The decision would be by ordinary
resolution – see s54(1). The minister retained power to direct the making of a plan – see s55(1).
183
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the council ‘considers that the issues raised in submission are of such significance’ that a public
hearing could be convened.187 At its highest then, the system allowed, as Farrier notes,
‘generous opportunities to comment.’188 This is not a position of power.
Currently, SEPPs are made by the Governor.189 The plan making provisions are contained in
Part 3 Division 4 of the EP&A Act. It is the Minister that makes the LEP.190 Generally, it is the
Council (and not the public) that is responsible for developing the local plan. The Department of
Planning encourages councils to use the ‘gateway’ process to ‘test’ whether LEP proposals are
‘viable’.191 It is the Minister that determines viability. If a proposal is viable, the Minister issues
a ‘Gateway Decision.’ It is only after that decision is made that the process continues and
participation occurs.192 Participation is restricted to consultation. There is no right to require the
convening of a public hearing. The Department of Planning states that the gateway process will:
‘create strengthened confidence in the local plan making process by providing greater
transparency and efficiency. This confidence will lead to the protection of local
communities and growth of the New South Wales economy,’193
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Ibid 55. See s67. Nott noted that there was no judicial duty placed on the council, he further states that:
‘the only ground of challenge available to him must either be that the council did not in fact consider the
report [pursuant to s67] and the submissions and the matters raised at the public inquiry (and there would
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David Farrier, The Environmental Law Handbook (2nd ed, 1993), 61. Farrier describes the NSW
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more limited. Although there are exceptions, the general thrust of the New South Wales
approach to planning is to grant generous opportunities to comment at the plan-making stage, but
to restrict them when it comes to decisions about specific projects.’
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See s56. Guidelines have been issued by the Department - see NSW Department of Planning, 'Local
Plan Making ' (NSW Government, 2008).
192
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Council [2003] NSWCA 322, Spigelman CJ at [59] and Tobias JA at [176]. The Act was amended as a
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How this will be achieved through the gateway process is not explained. The approach is
bureaucratic and very paternalistic towards participation. The Standing Committee noted in its
2009 report that engaging the community in strategic planning ‘is a challenging issue.’194 Yet
despite some three hundred pages of report, the committee also observed that ‘the committee
did not receive much evidence to suggest how community engagement could or should be
improved.’195 Arnstein would suggest that the community needs to be empowered.196
Empowerment begins at the rung of partnership and rises through the rung of delegated power
to the ultimate rung, citizen control.

Partnership requires for its effectiveness the capacity for the power-holders to negotiate with an
organised citizen power-base.197 The logical organised power base representing the local
community ought to be the local council. Yet, for participation to be active, that implies that the
council should have some mandate from the community about the content and make up of the
plan. What should be paramount should not be the council’s view of what is in the community’s
best interest for the neighbourhood; rather, it should be the community’s view, as articulated to
the council.198 This is something more than making a submission under the Community
Strategic Plan provisions of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW).199 It requires that the
community value participating in the making of the local plan.

5.4.3

2008 Reforms

Generally speaking, until the 2008 reforms of the EP&A Act, it was the local council that was
invested with the function and duty under the Act to determine the widest range of development
applications. In 2008 the NSW Government took the view, in the context of development
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Ibid 221.
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Standing Committee Report, above n 158, 35. In evidence to the committee, Michael Harrison,
Director, Strategy and Design at the City of Sydney Council said:
‘Council experienced difficulties incorporating higher density development [into its strategic
plans] because without a mandate for a requirement for higher levels of design quality, it was
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See s402 of the Act. The council is required to identify in the plan ‘the main priorities and aspirations’
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have the status of an Environmental Planning Instrument. This means that even if the Community
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assessment and review that the ‘right’ of the public should only be to have a say ‘commensurate
with the level of impact and significance of the development.’200

In contradistinction to the intention stated in the objects of the EP&A Act to increase
opportunities for participation, the 2008 reforms to the EP&A Act removed a substantial body
of decisions from the development approval process.201 The 2008 Amendment Act introduced a
new Part 2A to the Act which creates additional layers of bureaucratic assessment of
applications.202 The Minister for Planning constituted five Regional Panels by making the Joint
Regional Planning Panels Order 2009 on 26 June 2009.203 The first decision by a panel was
made by the Southern Region Panel on 24 September, 2009.204

The 2008 reforms modified the decision-making process for the determination of the balance of
the applications made under the EP&A Act. The introduction of Joint Regional Panels to decide
applications formerly determined by councils means that the ability of the public to politically
engage the council in the democratic process is removed. The 2010 Amendments have made
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2007 Discussion paper above n 173, 60.
The amendments were effected by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment Act 2008
(NSW) (2008 Amendment Act). Not all of the amendments effected by the 2008 Amendment Act will
come into law. In the last days of the 54th parliament in 2010, the government passed the Planning
Appeals Legislation Amendment Act 2010 (NSW) (the 2010 Amendment Act). In the 2008 Amendment
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November 2010, Hansard 27686 (Second Reading Speech), Michael Veitch.
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council’s ire’, SMH (Sydney), 30-31 May 2009,6:
‘Soon, however, they will have additional powers [by reason of amendments introduced by the
Minister to Parliament on May 13 2009]. They will be able to write the detailed guidelines for
smaller sections of a local government area and specific types of development.…
But the president of the Local Government and Shires Association, Genia McCaffery, said this
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further in-roads to the ability of councils to defend ‘no’.205 The NSW Government set out its
rationale for reforming the NSW planning system in its 2007 Discussion Paper ‘Improving the
NSW Planning System’ (2007 Discussion Paper).206 The 2009 Standing Committee report
supports the thrust of the reforms, taking up the rhetoric of the 2007 Discussion Paper and the
aim of achieving ‘Australia’s best planning system.’207 Whilst the then government
acknowledged the importance of the planning system to the community, it is suggested that the
amendments appear to be a clear departure from the commitment to public involvement in the
planning process encapsulated in the objects of the EP&A Act. As Pearson and Williams note,
the reforms have meant that local government has lost ‘a significant part of it consent authority
function.’208

If the role of public is limited only to active participation in the development (but not making)
of plans,209 with no role in the application assessment process then this suggests a policy change
by the government in relation to public participation. It is plain from the 2007 Discussion paper
that the role of the public in the decision-making and decision-review processes is viewed
negatively. Participation is described as being exercised in an ‘adversarial and discouraging’
manner.210 The Government noted a perceived ‘expectation that the community should be
entitled to veto development even when such development complies with the planning intent
and controls’.211 This is unsurprising when the people had no effective role in the making of the
planning controls.
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5.4.4

Notification

Before the 2008 reforms the vast bulk of applications for development were regulated by Part 4
of the Act. Insofar as a determination was required, the Act made the council the consent
authority.212 In respect to such applications, councils had the capacity in its LEP, or in a
Development Control Plan (DCP) or adopted policies, to make provision for such applications
to be notified. This brought the application to the attention of the public and enabled the public
to make a submission in relation to the development proposal. Pursuant to s79C(d) of the Act,
such submissions form part of the material evaluated by the decision-maker and are material
which the decision-maker is bound to take into account.213 The exclusion of notification
provisions means that the public will not now know that an application for development has
been made until after the application has been determined.214 The current explanation for there
being no general right to be informed of the lodgement of an application for development is that
the Government believed that the ‘[p]reparation of simple advisory documents and education
campaigns could assist in defining what the rules are about development in an applicant’s
backyard, as well as the backyard of their neighbour.’215

There is an elegant simplicity to the logic. There is no need to confer an administrative
discretion if the development ‘complies.’ Complying development should simply be approved
without scrutiny.216 As the Minister said when introducing the NSW Housing Code on 12
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The procedure for making such applications is set out in s78.
Though the task of setting aside a consent on the ground that a submission was not taken into account
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LGERA 277 at [79]-[80] per Basten JA. An applicant challenging the grant of consent carries the onus of
identifying ‘some matter specified in s79C … as a mandatory consideration, and then … [has the
obligation to] demonstrate that it has not been taken into account.’ In judicial review proceedings the
advertence to the submissions in the report may be enough to put a consent beyond legal challenge.
214
EDO, 'The State of Planning in NSW: With reference to social and environmental impacts and public
participation' (Environment Defender's Office, 2010) (EDO Report 2010), 18. The EDO 2010 report notes
that the ‘first step for effective community engagement is notification.’ Accordingly, to deny the right to
notification is fundamentally anti-participatory and contrary to the Rio Declaration principle. It is
suggested that the mechanism adopted is deliberate to frustrate effective access to judicial and
administrative procedures.
215
2007 Discussion Paper above n 173, 79.
216
Under the authority of the SEPP (Exempt and Complying Development Codes) 2008 there are now the
following ‘complying development codes’:
the General Housing Code
the Rural Housing Code
the Housing Alteration Code
the General Development Code
the General Commercial and Industrial Code
the Subdivision Code
the Demolition Code
213

177

December 2008: ‘If a proposed house meets set standards which limit its potential impact on
neighbours and the look of a street, it should not be tied up in red tape.’217

5.4.5

Public Participation and Accountability under the EP&A Act

In the context of democratic theory, the normative approach to accountability is the ballot box
and the judiciary. To seek a mandate for policy initiatives, prospective representatives publish
their position and electors differentiate between candidates based on policy platform difference.
In implementing policy, government is constrained to acting within power conferred by
legislation. Actions in excess of power are reviewable in judicial review. Decisions made by
ministers and councils to approve development are similarly constrained by administrative law
principles.

The decision review mechanism in the EP&A Act has two aspects. Firstly, there is a mechanism
for a ‘merit review’ of a determination to refuse consent to development. This is by way of an
appeal de novo to the LEC.218 Secondly, there is a mechanism for judicial review by application
to a judge of the LEC in respect of a decision made by a consent authority.219 Generally, unless
the development is of a particular character known as designated development, the public does
not have a right to initiate a merit review.220 By reason of the open standing provision of s123 of
the Act, the public do have a general right to initiate a judicial review of a decision made by a
consent authority, which includes the Minister.221

217

The Hon Kristina Keneally MP Minister for Planning, ‘Presentation at NSW Housing Code Forum,’
Sydney 12 December 2008.
218
See sections 97 and 98 of the EP&A Act.
219
Arguably, judicial review, in the context of democratic theory, is anti-democratic. Joseph M. Farber,
'Justifying Judicial Review: Liberalism and Popular Sovereignty' (2003) 32 Cap. U. L. Rev. 65. As Farber
notes, ‘judicial review carried out by [un-elected] judges significantly limits citizen’s power to influence
political outcomes.’ For this reason, the courts are keen to limit the scope of the enquiry under judicial
review to avoid a de facto merit appeal. The Court of Appeal held in Anderson v Department of
Environmental Change (2008) 163 LGERA 400, at [47] that:
‘It is obvious that [the use of terms like real, proper and genuine to evaluate the decision] is
fraught with the danger of a slide into impermissible merits review.’ The correct approach is to
undertake ‘an evaluative process based exclusively on what the decision-maker has said or
written.’
220
Designated Development is prescribed by Schedule 3 of the EP&A Regulations. The draft 2010
Regulation proposes, according to the Department’s fact sheets (n 202 above), ‘minor changes are
proposed to the classes of development identified as designated.’ The EP&A Act, s98, sets out the third
party appeal right. The right is limited to those persons who made a submission against the development.
221
Demonstrated most effectively by the recent successful challenge to the making of the Ku-Ring-Gai
Town Centres Plan – see: Friends of Turramurra Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 128
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The effectiveness of the entitlement to seek a judicial review is found in the recent challenges to
the decision-making process to give effect to the redevelopment of an area in the Hunter known
as Huntlee. In Gwandalan Summerland Point Action Group Inc v Minister for Planning
(Gwandalan),222 Justice Lloyd struck down the Minister’s consent to a major project application
upon the basis of apprehended bias. In the view of the court, the Minister had accepted a ‘land
bribe’ in the negotiation phase of the application. Subsequent to the decision, the government
announced a proposed rezoning of the site to resolve legal uncertainty.223 To facilitate
development in accordance with the adopted Lower Hunter Regional Strategy, the Minister
entered into a Voluntary Planning Agreement (VPA) pursuant to s93F of the Act. That
administrative step was itself the subject of a successful judicial review challenge.224 Whilst it
may seem surprising,225 the door remains open for a valid decision to be made authorising the
rezoning.226 Subject to the submission of a further development application, the development
contemplated by the strategy may yet eventuate.

222

[2009] NSWLEC 140. Lloyd J declared the consent granted by the Minister to be void as it was tainted
by apprehended bias flowing from the Minister’s earlier decision to enter into a MOU in relation to the
same development. Unsurprisingly, the former Minister was ‘perplexed’ by the decision – see Frank
Sartor, 'Let's have a little sanity - and a new planning act', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 3 September
2009, 11. Mr Sartor noted that land swap agreements were ‘not unusual’ – ‘The new environmental lands
would be a great win for future generations. Good policy? Yes. Land bribes? Certainly not.’ … ‘None of
this is going to help investment in NSW. We need to bring sanity back, and soon. And again, it shows
why we need a new planning act.’ As a post script, His Honour retired not long after the decision was
handed down. The Chief Judge of the Supreme Court nominated Justice Lloyd for a position of Acting
Judge. The government subsequently refused to re-commission Justice Lloyd – see Joel Gibson, 'Judge
rejection 'threatens' court independence', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 8 March 2010, 3. No reason
was given by the Attorney-General. On 3 December 2010 Frank Sartor announced his retirement from
Parliament. In his valedictory speech Mr Sartor described Justice Lloyd’s comments as ‘a gratuitous and
defamatory comment that has done himself and the court no credit.’ See Sean Nicholls, 'No Regrets:
Sartor steps down from tough gig', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 4-5 December 2010, News 6.
223
Kelsey Munro, 'Catherine Hill Bay Project Gets Go-ahead', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 29 July
2010, 6.
224
See Sweetwater Action Group Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 106. Justice Biscoe found
that both the decision of the Minister to recommend amending the Major Developments SEPP and the
amendment made by the Governor (gazetted on 31 December, 2010) were void, in part, because the
Minister wrongly took into account an improperly made Voluntary Planning Agreement made between
the Government and the Developer.
225
It is useful here to note the observation of Tobias JA in Calleja v Botany Bay City Council [2005]
NSWCA 337, at [25]: ‘any attempt to always find planning logic in planning instruments is generally a
barren exercise.’
226
This is not an uncommon occurrence. The landmark case in the LEC in relation to the court’s powers
in judicial review was the series of cases involving the Parramatta Council’s decision to approve the
proposal to redevelop Parramatta Stadium. The LEC struck down the consent and the Court of Appeal
upheld the decision (see below n 224). A subsequent application was approved (validly) by the council
and the Stadium was built. In a similar vein, Cowra Council had three attempts to lawfully approve
development for a cattle feed lot see: Noble v Cowra [2001] NSWLEC 149; Noble v Cowra [2003]
NSWLEC 178; Noble & Anor v Cowra [2006] NSWLEC 583. When Parramatta council was
unsuccessful in the High Court (see R&R Fazzolari v Parramatta City Council (2009) 165 LGERA 68) in
being able to implement its proposal to compulsorily acquire land for redevelopment, the NSW
parliament amended the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW) to rectify the
outcome – see Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Amendment Act 2009 (NSW). The council
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Seen in that context, there are significant limitations in judicial review proceedings. They are
not a challenge to the merits of the decision. The administrative defect may be remedied by an
effective exercise of the administrative power and, most significantly, the challenger bears the
legal onus of proof to establish the administrative law grounds to vitiate the consent.227 If there
is further reform of the planning system but the only recourse to law available to challenge a
consent is judicial review proceedings, then it is suggested that this will decrease, not increase,
the opportunities for public participation in the decision-review process. This is also the view of
Pearson and Williams as noted in their review of the 2008 reforms.228 It will remain the position
if any new reforms to the system do not broaden the opportunities for merit review.

Presently, even with the 2008 reforms, the right in favour of the developer to seek a merit
review has been retained. If the outcome of the bureaucratic process is not an approval for
development, then the result can be challenged. Whether the exercise of such an appeal right is
a ‘second go’ is debateable.229 Developers exercise the right to a merit appeal at their peril in
that it throws open to the Court the whole of the application. If such a process is activated by the
applicant for development, then the public has an opportunity in the decision-review process to
engage the decision-maker because third party objectors then have the right to seek separate
representation.230

has only now acquired all necessary land to enable the project to proceed – see Matthew Moore,
'Parramatta's $1.6 facelift ready to go', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), July 30-31 2011, 9.
227
Parramatta CC v Hale (Hale) (1981-2) 47 LGERA 319: 345 (Mason P):
‘Where it is a collegiate body which makes the s.91 [now s80] determination, s.90 [now 79C]
requires that the collegiate mind, in granting its approval, shall have considered the s.90 matters.
Proof of a state of mind, whether by person or collegiate body, may be a matter of difficulty, but
the person who seeks under s.123 to bring down a decision, must discharge that onus however
difficult that may be and he must do so in accordance with proper legal requirements and by
inference, not suspicion. The responsibility to make the consent determination is given to a
responsible authority, which will normally be a council democratically elected. The Court
exercising jurisdiction under s.123 does not sit on appeal from its determination. A conclusion
by a Court finding a breach of s.90 by way of inference is one to come to only after anxious
consideration, but when the inference is available and ought to be drawn, the Court should, in
service of the policy which underlies the Act, not hesitate to give effect to the inference it has
drawn.’
228
Pearson and Williams, above n 208, 34: ‘The capacity of the court to review the merits of
administrative decisions, interpret the application of policy and statute, and provide guidance to decisionmakers and other interested parties has been severely undermined by the latest planning reforms.’
229
This was the position of the former minister Frank Sartor when he was Lord Mayor of Sydney – see
Nadia Jamal, ‘Sartor seeks curbs on “out of control” planning court’, SMH (Sydney), 23 August 2000, 6.
230
See Double Bay Marina Pty Ltd v Woollahra MC (1985) 54 LGRA 813. Leave of the court is required
and the ‘rights’ of the objectors are limited and qualified but, once the developer lodges an appeal, it
crystallises the objectors' right to participate in the proceedings. More recently though the extent of this
right was questioned. In Morrison Design v North Sydney CC (2008) 159 LGERA 361, Preston CJ held
(at [53]):
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In the context of process, it is clear that the intent of the 2008 reform of the EP&A Act was to
remove scrutiny of applications so as to speed up the approval process.231 The development
industry had complained about the time taken to assess ‘residential approvals’,232 which
comprise the majority of all development applications. 233 The Government responded and
aimed to create a system ‘robust enough to deal with a much larger range of proposals than at
present.’234 A target was set namely 30 per cent of all development applications to be
complying/exempt development applications within two years, rising to 50 per cent of all
applications within four years.235

The objects of the EP&A Act were not specifically amended by the 2008 reforms. However,
there has been an implied watering down of the objects. The role of public participation was
diminished. Whilst the reform agenda may have been consistent with ‘trends’ in other
jurisdictions,236 the government had no mandate from the people for the reforms. In contrast, the
new government elected in March 2011 has sought a policy mandate to ‘return local planning
powers to local communities.’237 That mandate is yet to be implemented.238 It will require

A mere dissatisfaction with the merit outcome of a determination by a consent authority does not
entitle a person who objected to be joined as a party so as to be able to continue to argue its
particular submission.
231
This notwithstanding that the standing committee report, above n 158, 151, recognised that:
‘Decisions on whether or not to approve, or modify, development applications can have a
profound affect on individuals and communities. Individual applicants are affected because their
right to develop their land is constrained by decisions made by consent authorities. Approved
development can also affect the amenity of adjoining or nearby property owners or the broader
community. As such the right of appeal or review decisions is a fundamental element of the
planning framework.’
232
2007 discussion paper above n 173, 17. The Discussion Paper also notes (at p 74): ‘The development
industry has said that it does not use complying development because it is just too complicated’.
233
Ibid 71. The Government’s reasoning was expressed as follows:
Given that more than 60 per cent of all development applications are for either new housing, or
alterations and additions to existing houses, the residential building sector is the most likely
development type that can benefit from a streamlined use of the complying development path.
234
Ibid 72.
235
Ibid 81. This target was reinforced by the then Minister when introducing the legislation in May 2008.
The rhetoric is maintained in the Ministerial Press Release announcing the draft 2010 Regulation - see
Tony Kelly, ‘Streamlined Process to Improve DA turn-around Times’ (Ministerial Press Release, 17
September 2010): ‘An independent analysis of our changes shows they have the potential to slash
processing times for the majority of applications by up to 36 days and cut $316 million a year from
landowner holding costs’ (emphasis in original).
236
The standing committee report, above n 158, references (in chapter 2) the ‘trends in planning’ and the
‘agenda’ set by the Council of Australian Governments towards ‘reducing complexity and red tape;
standardisation of instruments; and increasing ministerial involvement in strategic planning initiatives,
but nowhere is it referenced to a source of authority in a policy taken to the people at an election.
237
NSW Liberals and Nationals, 'Putting the Community Back into Planning' (2009), 1.
238
However, the process has begun – see The Hon Brad Hazzard MP, Minister for Planning &
Infrastructure, 'Overhaul of the Planning System Heralds a new era in NSW' (Media Release, 12 July
2011).
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legislation to give effect to the articulated policy position. The semantics of any new legislation
will be important.

5.5

Semantics of Participation

It is the thesis of this research that for participation to be relevant, it must be meaningful. In the
context of the social task of participation being addressed under the legal frame of reference, the
semantic structures of communication (or social position) contained in the Act are the means by
which the social task of participation is realised. Social positions allow actors to communicate
in either an active (inclusive) or passive (exclusive) manner. Where the actors ‘voice’ is allowed
by the Act to ‘resonate’ so as to alter the decision-maker’s position, then it can be said that a
mutually inclusive mechanism exists.239 If a social position is impervious to another position in
the structure of communication, then it can be said that an exclusionary dynamic prevails. It is
here that McAuslan’s point is well made; a right to participate is ‘meaningless if the planning
authorities [are] able to determine the extent and mode of participation.’240 This point can be
easily demonstrated by considering the social positions in the merit assessment of development
applications.

5.5.1

Inclusion under the 1919 Act

In assessing the legislative scheme created by the 1919 Act (and Part XIIA referenced in section
5.3 above) in accordance with Bora and Hausendorf’s semantic methodology referred to in
Chapter 2.3.3, it can be seen that a socially exclusive dynamic was established. At the surface
level of discourse, the social position of administrator was delegated to the council.241 Whilst
the citizens of the locality in which development was to occur could be conceived as being
relevant actors, only the applicant for development had a valid form of communication in the
system of reference. If the answer to the application was yes, that was the end of the process.
Only the applicant for development enjoyed the right of appeal against the refusal of the
application by Council. The citizens had a passive role; they were given no voice that could
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A Bora and H Hausendorf, 'Participatory science governance revisited: normative expectations versus
empirical evidence' (2006) 33(7) Science and Public Policy 478, 485.
240
McAuslan, above n 31, 20.
241
Bora and Hausendorf, above n 239, 484: ‘The image of self is that of a neutral, impartial, unbiased
decision-maker who is obeying the law and political will.’ Bora and Hausendorf (at 482) define the social
level of discourse as ‘what is made noticeable by the participants.’
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influence the decision-maker. They did not have a general right to be notified or to make
submissions. They could not even challenge a legally ‘wrong’ decision without the fiat of the
Attorney-General.

5.5.2

Inclusion under the EP&A Act

An almost identical situation applies under the EP&A Act. Pursuant to Part IV of the EP&A, the
administrator position is occupied by the council (or now the PAC/JRPP). The applicant for
development is given an active role, the role of proponent. It is the applicant who determines
whether or not the decision-making processes are invoked. Once again, if the decision is yes,
that is the end of the process. It is the applicant for development that determines whether or not
an appeal is taken against no. The people are given the same passive role in the process as they
had under Part XIIA. They have no role either in the assessment of the application (other than to
make a submission if given the opportunity). They do not have a right to initiate a merit review
of any decision by the administrator to approve development unless the application relates to
designated development. In semantic terms, whilst the administrator and the applicant have a
powerful voice in the process, the people have no such power. All that the people can do is to
accept the final decision.

This position is contrasted to the mechanism created under the open standing provisions. Here
the voice of the citizens is active and powerful. The Act facilitates the voice of the people being
heard by giving an unrestricted right to any person to bring a matter before the court. In that
forum, all the relevant actors, that is, determining authority, applicant for development and the
applicant in the proceedings, have an equal voice.

5.5.3

Absence of Voice

It seems therefore that the NSW parliament has always created land use legislation with an
exclusionary social dynamic.242 Whilst the legislation may give the public a right to be
consulted, their voice has never had administrative resonance or power to influence the
decision-maker unless a breach of the Act occurs in the decision-making processes. Power is
242

S. Willey, 'Planning Appeals: Are Third Party Rights Legitimate? The Case Study of Victoria,
Australia' (2006) 24 Urban Policy and Research 369, 387. Willey cites Professor Malcolm Grant of
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retained in the hands of parliament to enable it (and not any other body such as the council or
the community) to determine whether or not development is permissible in a locality (affecting
each ‘site’).243 Whilst lip service is given to determining the view of the people, the role of
balancing the competing (and conflicting) policy goals (namely ‘progress’ as against the status
quo) is retained by parliament; but exercised in its name by the executive branch.

In the context of what development is to occur in a locality, because parliament has the power to
define both the public interest and the nature and role of participation, parliament’s will always
prevails. This supports Nicholson’s view of law as the manipulation of ideology.244 It is the
path to state despotism.245 As courts are obliged to give effect to laws passed by parliament,246
valid decisions of the executive to make ‘the plan’, and decisions made by councils (and the
PAC or JRPP) to approve ‘the development’ will be enforced by law. 247 There is accordingly no
citizen power in these processes. Unsurprisingly, historical precedent is being followed. From
the inception of planning laws the people have been excluded from positions of power in the
planning system. The people have never had a voice in the processes, meaning a voice which
could resonate in the mind of the decision-maker to affect the outcome. If the ‘valid’ form of
communication, in semantic terms, is ‘prescribed by law and procedure,’248 then the public has
no means of communication with the administrator. The arguments of the people raised against
a proposal do not have equal status with the arguments of the executive (in relation to the

Cambridge University in support of his contention that such systems ‘do not reflect the ideals of
participatory democracy.’
243
A situation which is intensified by the mandating of the Standard Instrument process and the adoption
of a state-wide vocabulary in the standard dictionary.
244
Bradley J. Nicholson, 'Relfections on Capitalism, Property, and the Law of Slavery' (2002) 27 Okla.
City U. L. Rev. 151, 153.
245
Keane, above n 20, 328. Citing Tocqueville (commenting on the US melding of money and politics
post the civil war):
‘Government meddling in the affairs of civil society would choke the spirit of civil association
and result in a new form of state despotism. Unlike past despotisms, which employed the coarse
instruments of fetters and executioners, this new ‘democratic’ despotism would nurture
administrative power that was ‘absolute, differentiated, regular, provident and mild’. Peacefully,
bit by bit, by means of democratically formulated laws, government would morph into a new
form of tutelary power dedicated to securing the welfare of its citizens – at the high price of
clogging up the arteries of civil society, thus robbing citizens of their collective power to act.’
246
Nicholas Cowdery, 'Australian avoidance of the rule of law' (2006) 44(8) Law Society Journal 63, 63.
Cowdrey suggests that:
‘The rule of law does not have much to do with law and order and it does not mean simply rule
by law (that is, if there is a law on the subject then it must be followed – remember Germany in
the 1930s: oppression was sanctioned by a democratically elected leader, but it was not a law
that was just and therefore conforming to our notions of the rule of law.’
247
As Andrew Kelly and Christopher Smith, 'The Capriciousness of Australian Planning Law: Zoning
Objectives in NSW as a Case Study' (2008) 26(1) Urban Policy and Research 83, 85 note: ‘there is
considerable support for the notion that if a development is permissible under the relevant planning
instrument, approval is guaranteed.’
248
Bora and Hausendorf, above n 239, 484.
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making of the plan), or with the arguments of the applicant for development (in relation to the
nature and scope of development proposed for the neighbourhood).249

Adopting the ideology of public participation would address this deficit. However, it would
necessarily require a sharing of power. When legislation, such as the EP&A Act, expressly
refers to increasing opportunities for public involvement and participation in the processes
created by legislation, then a social expectation is created that parliament intends to facilitate,
not frustrate, social inclusion. What, then, does the government mean when it suggests in its
policy that citizens are to be ‘empowered’?250 If it doesn’t mean an equal voice via the
legislative mechanism at both the plan-making and decision-making level, then what does
empowerment mean?

If legislation is to reflect the public participation ideology, then it will have mechanisms, in
semantic terms ‘communicative structures’,251 to enable meaningful dialogue (resonance) to
occur between the various actors in the system. Each of the social positions being the
government, the council, the applicant for development and the people are valid. If we are
aiming to produce the ‘best’ planning system,252 then we must create by legislation semantic
structures that actually empower the people, not just the bureaucracy and the applicant for
development. The Act must allow the community to ‘enter the conversation’ and to affect the
outcome of decisions being made about development in the locality.253 The test for resonance is
whether the expression of ‘no’ by the people has power to affect the decision.254 When we have
done that, then we will have created a system where development proposed for the
neighbourhood will reflect and meet the needs of the people living in that locality.

249

Ibid. Bora and Hausendorf suggest that in a valid form of communication, ‘[a]rguing about facts with
equal status for every argument is the legitimate form, which can be disturbed by interference with
political interests and strategies.’
250
Liberal National policy document above n 237, 1.
251
Bora and Hausendorf, above n 239, 483.
252
Standing Committee Report, above n 158, 34. The Standing Committee accepted that the ‘best
planning system’ was one which met ‘the social, economic and environmental expectations and needs of
the local community.’ (Emphasis added).
253
Pope, above n 159, 345-6:
‘It is not easy to divert citizens from private pursuits or politicians and administrators from the
cosy routine of interest group bargaining. When disempowered groups try to “enter the
conversation,” as Michelman points out, “we” may sometimes feel that they “seek to disrupt it.”’
254
At present, what is important is procedural compliance. The mechanism for making the plan is clear.
As Spigelman CJ remarked in Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council [1999] NSWCA 6, [38]:
‘the detailed scheme of consultation and public exhibition in the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Act, makes it clear that Parliament regarded the procedural steps as of considerable
significance for the integrity of the process of formulating local environmental plans.’
There is no mechanism that makes submissions important. Section 79C requires only that they be taken
‘into consideration.’ Having taken them into account, the decision-maker can ‘ignore’ them.
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There is no tradition that planning has to be democratic in its processes. McAuslan’s public
participation ideology suggests a radical way of ideating the role of planning; it requires the
people and the government to reject the status quo. As can be seen from this chapter, the nonparticipatory roots of planning law run deep. Power is entrenched in the government and in its
bureaucracy. In that context, how likely is it that power will, in Arnstein’s terms, be given up
‘by the city’?255 This question is addressed in the next chapter.

255

Arnstein, above n 2, 222.
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Chapter 6:

Should Planning be Democratic?

To what extent does democracy require citizen participation in – and veto over- decisions about the
future of neighbourhoods and disposition of private property?

James Q Wilson1

‘If democracy fails, then it is ultimately the citizen who has failed, not the politician.’

John Ralston Saul2

6.1

Introduction:

In this chapter the discussion returns to the core of this thesis. A call to repeal section 5(c) of the
EP&A Act poses the theoretical question, should planning be democratic? There are deeply held
and divergent views on the nature and purpose democracy in land use planning and the
allocation of power to make decisions about development in a locality.3 McAuslan’s ideologies
of planning frame the competing theoretical arguments.

The New South Wales planning system remains the same melange of competing ideologies that
McAuslan believed in 1980 to be the central cause of the ‘disarray in, and disillusion with, the

1

James Q Wilson, Urban Renewal: the record and the controversy (1966), xiv. Wilson posed the
question in the context of urban renewal thus:
To what extent does democracy require citizen participation in – and veto over- decisions about
the future of neighbourhoods and disposition of private property?
2
John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (1997), 82. Saul also noted that: ‘The politician can
always find a new place in a new configuration of power – witness the growing attachment of the elected
to private sector interests.’
3
By way of some example: market theorists like Christopher Webster and Lawrence Wai-Chung Lai,
Property Rights, planning and markets: managing spontaneous cities (2003), 178 suggest that
‘transaction costs also rise with the degree of democracy.’ Conversely, the government and the
community disagree on the role of participation. In the report published by EDO New South Wales,
'Reconnecting the Community with the Planning System' (2010)(EDO 2010 Report), 34, it is suggested
that it was ‘apparent the DoP and the community have different views on what is the ‘end point’ of a
consultation process.’ John Wiseman, 'Designing Public Policy after Neo-liberalism?' in Paul Smyth, T
Reddel and Andrew Jones (eds), Community and Local Governance in Australia (2005) , 69, categorises
the ‘diverse range of new citizen and community engagement strategies.’ These range from engagement
as consultation to engagement as participatory and deliberative democracy.
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planning system.’4 The historical analysis undertaken in this research has demonstrated that
despite periodic exhortations to democratic principles, planning law has never been
‘democratic’ in the sense that McAuslan theorised as the public participation ideology. Planning
law has never been ‘a vehicle for the advancement of public participation.’5
The neo-liberal view asserts that cities are ‘complex social wholes.’6 It is the magnitude of the
complexity that makes it impossible for the people ‘to hold sufficient committee meetings’ to
gather the necessary information to make the plan.7 The argument runs that it is not possible to
consciously plan for social outcomes. Accordingly, it is better for the citizens to participate in
an urban planning market by allowing the price mechanism in the market to facilitate creative
choices prescribing only such rules as are necessary to protect the institution of private
property.8 In contrast, land use planning law seeks to effect a redistribution of property rights
by regulating the use of land in the public interest. That public interest is determined by the
government.9 However, powerful social and economic forces still drive government policy.10
Gleeson and Low suggest that under the sway of neo-liberal ideology ‘it must surely follow that
economic and socio-political power will be the new arbiters of who wins and who loses in the
land economy.’11

4

P McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law, Urban and Regional Planning Series (1980), 6.
Ibid 5.
6
Mark Pennington, 'Citizen Participation, the 'Knowledge Problem' and Urban Land Use Planning' (2004)
17(2-3) Review of Austrian Economics , 221:
‘The principle difficulty with [Lindblom’s] particular view of citizen participation, however, is
its failure to explain adequately how the relevant process of adjustment is to take place in the
absence of market generated relative prices.’ (emphasis in original)
7
Ibid.
8
Webster and Lai, above n 3, 15: ‘Unlike the prescriptive rules that govern much of the planned order of
the state, the rules necessary to ensure that individuals use their private property rights (including the right
to their own labour) for the benefit of others are simpler, fewer, more abiding and more universal.’
9
Nicole Gurran, Australian Urban Land Use Planning (2007), 24. Gurran, reflecting on the development
of Australian cities, identifies the tension that necessarily exists when the state has:
‘a desire to facilitate “free market” economic development … through a system of land
allocation and later regulation of land use through bureaucratic planning that purports to promote
the “public good”, by encouraging the accumulation of private wealth through individual
property rights.’
10
For example, see the Report, Standing Committee on State Development, 'Report 34: New South Wales
Planning Framework' (NSW Legislative Council 2009) (The Standing Committee Report), 132. The
committee suggests that despite ‘widespread community dissatisfaction’ with the Part 3A procedures,
‘because of its significance, there is a need and, as evidenced during the Inquiry, scope for improvements
to its application and assessment processes.’
11
B. Gleeson and N. Low, 'Revaluing planning: Rolling back Neo-liberalism in Australia' (2000) 53
Progress in Planning 83, 129.
5
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By necessity, the NSW government acknowledges that its decisions ‘directly impact at the heart
of local communities.’12 The government justifies its strategic policy position by asserting that
investment worth twenty billion dollars is regulated by the planning system. That is, the
government wants to keep control over what development occurs in the neighbourhood because
of the value of the investment in land. In seeking to retain control, the government denies any
opportunity for planning to become more democratic, more participatory. Once again history
repeats itself.13 The fear of the ‘mob’ is apparent. By making planning democratic, the
executive would lose control over land development. The efficient operation of the market
would be compromised. Is it a question of tactics? Whilst it might be an overstatement, it could
be suggested that in New South Wales, the previous government had mobilised its forces
against democratising planning. If planning is to be returned to local communities in NSW then
the fear of participation must be addressed. 14
To make planning inclusive and participatory it is necessary to sever a Gordian knot.15 The
difficulty is that Australians have a propensity to allow government to govern. The ratepayer
ideology is entrenched. It has been demonstrated by this research that the ideologies of property
and of the public interest are snug bedfellows. It is therefore unlikely that the people of NSW
will seize the nettle and take advantage of any ‘republican moment’ to institute a wide ranging
reform of local government.16 Unless such an event occurs, the government will remain in
control of the neighbourhood. The bureaucratic and not the participatory theory of governance

12

NSW Department of Planning, 'Discussion Paper: Improving the NSW Planning System ' (2007), 49
(2007 Discussion Paper).
13
Sir Peter Hall, Cities in Civilization (2001), 655:
‘There is a certain terrible permanence in our failure to run our cities. What can be said with
certainty is that essentially, imperial Rome displayed many of the characteristics of the
twentieth-century developing world: the opulence of the few and the grinding poverty of the
many; the public services theoretically available to all, but exploited by the rich; the basic failure
of the economy – and underlying the economy, technology – to deliver adequate living standards
and adequate lives to the average man and woman.’
14
See in this regard Anne Bottomley and Nathan Moore, 'From Walls to Membranes: Fortress Polis and
the Governance of Urban Public Space in 21st Century Britain' (2007) 18 Law and Critique 171, 204.
Bottomley, citing M. Foucault, Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, R Hurley trans, (London,
Penguin Books 2002) 211, argues that:
‘once the problem of governing is posed (that is, state power confronts the novel problem of the
regulation of a population), governing ceases to be a matter of law and becomes a matter of
tactics.’ – ‘in the battle for the hearts and minds, the rule of law gives way to a quasi-martial
law.’
15
The Macquarie Dictionary (1981): ‘to devise and use instantly a drastic solution to a problem.’
Attributed to the King of Phyrgia ‘who tied a knot which was to be undone only by the one who should
rule Asia. It was summarily cut by Alexander the Great in 333 B.C.’
16
James Gray Pope, 'Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order' (1990) 139(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 289, 319. See section 2.5
above.

189

will prevail. Land use planning will not become inclusive in its processes.17 If that is the case,
then the answer to the question posed by the thesis of this research is yes.

6.2

What has History taught us?

History teaches us that those with wealth and power control the development of land. Without
power, citizens are subjects under law. With power, citizens become responsible for their
governance and the outcomes they, as a polity, choose. They become, in Aristotelian terms, of
the city.18

The absence of participatory mechanisms in democratic governance creates the fertile ground
for government by patronage. It was the feature of Roman society.19 It continued to be a feature
of British society into the modern period.20 Arguably, NSW is still experiencing aspects of this
phenomenon. If it is the quality of participatory mechanisms that marks the difference between
subjugation under a rule of law and the protection of democratic rights, then the incorporation
of participatory mechanisms into the legislative model is an absolute necessity.21 To have a right
to participate is to have power.22 A state whose strategy was consistent with the ideology of

17

See for example, Michael J Jacobs, 'Sustainability and Community' (1995) 32(2) Australian Planner
109, 112. Jacobs argues that there has to be a ‘reinvention of collectivism.’ Under this reformulation, the
‘people acknowledge and identify with the community on whose behalf [collective action] is undertaken.’
18
Graham Maddox, Australian Democracy in Theory and Practice (1985), 2. Maddox, commenting on
Aristotle’s oft quoted phrase ‘Man is a political animal’ notes:
‘For the ancient Greeks the word “political” meant “of the city”, “of the polis”, the institution in
which people normally lived their lives. Aristotle’s argument was that man is a creature born to
live in complex organisations with his fellow creatures, in community and harmony, through
compromise, but united through a common purpose, which is to live a shared life.’
19
P. G. Monateri, 'Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the Western Legal Tradition'
(1999) 51 Hastings L.J. 479, 545. Patronage, Monateri suggests, ‘really explains the features of Roman
law.’
20
K Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (1951), 229. Mannheim points out that in a
society based largely on patronage:
‘it is very likely that a great number of “yes-men” will be found in it. … the ‘rebellious will be
squeezed out – they will be considered misfits – and those who submit will gradually forget how
to stand on their own feet.’
21
There seems to be little argument that in terms of democratic theory, participation is the ‘corner-stone’
of democracy. As Sherry R. Arnstein, 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation' (1969) 35(4) Journal of the
American Institute of Planners 216, 221, notes, the question is whether or not, the people should be
‘planned for’ or whether power should be redistributed to the people. Participation begins with effective
consultation. Laws made to advance the public interest must at least conform to that requirement. This
would be consistent with Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. Whether it should be more than consultation
is the question.
22
J. Uhr, Deliberative democracy in Australia: the changing place of parliament (1998), 11. Uhr
references the experiments of Fiskin into ‘deliberative democracy’ and suggests that:
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public participation would be a state where the principles of open government prevailed; the
government would be accountable to the people. As McAuslan argues:
‘a more open government affects the whole climate of public life by increasing the
possibility of the public accountability of officials, increasing general public awareness
of issues of public policy and increasing the possibility of successful challenges to
government decisions by a whole range of individuals and groups.’23

But planning laws are made by the powerful: by government and its allies. It has been
demonstrated in chapter three that planning laws are not organic, they are not necessary to
facilitate the orderly administration of cities and towns. What is organic to cities is ‘relentless
evolutionary change’.24 The historical analysis in this research has established that to function, a
state (and whether a city-state or nation-state) only needs an identity and a system of laws.25 The
history of the Roman civilization shows that participation by the citizenry in the governance of
the state is not necessary for there to be urban planning. Provided the state can enforce its laws,
it will be able to continue its legitimacy and give effect to its strategies. The private property
ideology only requires governance, not participation in governance, to enable the market to
operate efficiently.

Participation by the citizenry is similarly not an essential element in relation to land use policy.
In an urban environment, all that is required is for someone to ‘make the rules.’26 As is shown
by the Roman civilization discussed in chapter three, it is easier to make grand architectural
statements when there is no civic participation in urban planning.27 As Previté-Orton notes, the

‘This version of deliberative democracy rests on the belief that the policy process must be
reformed by opening it up to a wider range of deliberative sources and by forcing elected policymakers to account publicly for their decisions to accept or reject various community proposals.’
23
McAuslan, above n 4, 215.
24
Webster and Lai, above n 3, 14:
‘The institutions that make cities attractive to individuals and keep urban society from the
anarchy of uncontrolled competition have been evolving since the earliest stages of civilization.
These institutions are subject to relentless evolutionary changes as co-operative motivations
(individual needs and demands) change and as the number of individuals co-operating steadily
rises.’
25
Phillip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History (2002), 6. Without
identity, ‘a society cannot establish its rule of law because every system of laws depends upon the
continuation of legitimacy, which is an attribute of identity.’
26
R Tawney (1981) cited in Gleeson and Low, above n 11, 89. As indicated in chapter two, Tawney’s
view was that ‘someone must make the rules and see that they are kept, or life becomes impossible and
the wheels do not turn.’
27
Elizabeth Farrelly, Blubberland: The Dangers of Happiness (2008), 177. As Farrelly notes:
‘The sad and prickly truth is that cities cannot be effectively planned, much less made beautiful,
by democratic government. … ‘This link between beauty and tyranny is not just happenchance.
It is directly causal.’
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Roman period was marked by ‘[p]rivate munificence and municipal extravagance.’28 Yet the
magnificence of its physical structures did not bring equality, liberty or participation. The
ideology of property was sufficient to organise the interactions of people within that market
based society.29 But as a society, it did not necessarily meet the needs of Roman citizens. Power
was retained in those who controlled ownership of land. In a society ruled by the private
property ideology, the state does not seek to be accountable to the people. It does not confer
power to the people to make decisions about governance, let alone development. Independent
cities with autonomous local administration emerged after the fall of Rome.30 These cities were
the crucible for participatory models of governance.31

The historical analysis in chapter 4 highlights why Arnstein suggests that participation is power.
The process of wresting control begins when the people ideate that the individual has
significance in society.32 This is the point being made by Ndebele – that the ‘people’s sense of
the contingency of power is precious.’33 It would take a further millennium from the fall of

28

CW. Previté-Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History (1955), 20. Previté-Orton notes that
‘encouraged’ by the government, ‘[t]emples, baths basilicas for public businesses, theatres,
amphitheatres, and spectacles were lavished on the townsmen by their wealthier fellows and their
magistrates.’
29
Edgar Bodenheimer, 'Influence of Roman Law on Early Medieval Culture, The' (1979) 3 Hastings Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 9, 10. Bodenheimer argues that the Roman legal system had given Roman society ‘a
considerable measure of stability.’
30
Leonardo Benevolo, The history of the city (1980), 291:
‘The traders and artisans who inhabited these cities – the bugesses (bourgeois) – were in the
majority from the very beginning. They therefore began to try and free themselves from the
feudal political system and obtain conditions that would favour their own economic activities:
freedom of the individual, judicial autonomy, administrative independence, and personal
taxation proportionally related to income, the revenue from which could be used to finance
works in the public interest…’
31
Engin Fahri Isin, Cities without Citizens (1992), 49:
‘Let us make no mistake about it: the modern city as a corporation retained the principle of
separation of the city from its citizens. The city was governed by an elite. While in the
autonomous city, citizens among themselves decided who belonged to the city and who was to
govern; in the early modern city it was the State administration who appointed a governing elite
that exercised power over the citizens.’
32
John Sheehan and Garrick Small, 'Aqua Nullius' (Paper presented at the 13th Pacific-Rim Real Estate
Society Conference, Freemantle, Western Australia, 21 to 24 January 2007),6. Sheehan and Small
suggest that:
‘The modern era has been dominated by the notion of the superiority of the individual, begun by
John Wycliffe (d 1384), accelerated by Niccolao Machiavelli (d 1572) and systematised in the
eighteenth century by the Enlightenment philosophers. In legal theory, William Blackstone
(1769) Commentaries on the Law of England reflected the modern inclination, while Frederick
Karl von Savigny (1814) established the German historical school on the premise that law was
not a construct of reason but convention that responded to the society’s needs of a time.’
33
J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (2009), Keane records a conversation between himself and
South African Novelist Njabulo Ndebele on the benefits of democracy. Ndebele suggests that democracy
per se is not a good thing, however he says:
‘democracy is the closest people get to an experience of faith: the sense that against every kind
of obstacle, they have to get on with things, keep searching for what will in the end work,
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Rome for that idea to reach fruition in the context of representative democratic structures. Even
‘passive’ participation can be powerful.34

Religion played a significant part in the development of the ideation of the individual in the
mind of the English over the course of the second millennium.35 Whilst it was beyond the scope
of this research to undertake an analysis of this contribution, the significance of that
contribution needs to be recognised.36 What can be said is that religion and religious freedom, as
well as the desire to compel uniformity of religious belief, was the crucible in which the
ideological beliefs of the people would be formed. Religion would be the engine that drove the
Empire.37 Out of the contest of ideas would be spawned the structure of democratic government
which, refined over centuries, would result in the Westminster system. The law was a tool in the
weaponry of the factions, but force of arms achieved that which rational argument could not.
Participation in governance was wrested by force.

The mercantile period was the juncture of history when the ideology of property was twinned
with the law making power of parliament.38 Until this time, the common law protected the
property rights of landed people. In accordance with legal theory, judges of the common law did
not ‘make’ law; they merely interpreted it (although the contrary is arguable).39 In the
mercantile period, parliament wrested the power of governance from the sovereign. As law has
no form outside the substance given to it by parliament, and as parliament was by this time
supreme, parliament could override even the common law protections over property to advance

knowing that although they don’t know exactly where they are going things won’t happen if
their arms are folded. … people’s sense of the contingency of power relations is precious, that
possibility is felt most intensely when they have tasted its opposite.’
34
Hall, above n 13, 37. Hall argues that Athenian democracy involved elements of passive participation
because of the level of education required to speak in the assembly. He suggests that ‘what Athens
demanded of the average citizen was passive democracy: listening and voting.’ Participation at this level
was the key to no one group having monopoly power over the polis. At the level of land use planning, it
suggests that the policy must be ‘put’ to the people so that it can be endorsed.
35
Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and Western Civilization (1951), 28. Butterfield suggests that ‘modern
political liberty may be said to emerge from the politico-ecclesiastical controversies of the Middle Ages.’
36
AC Grayling, Towards the Light: The Story of the Struggles for Liberty and Rights that made the
Modern West (2007), 17. Grayling cites Lord Acton as believing ‘that the struggle for religious liberty in
the sixteenth century made a major contribution to the birth of liberty in modern times.’
37
Hilary Carey, 'Religion and Society' in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds), Australia's Empire
(2009) , 188. Citing the work of Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven,
1992), Carey suggests that religion ‘was essential to the business of Empire’ and that ‘it was as heirs to
this tradition of Protestant triumphalism that the first convict settlements in Australia were planned and
executed in the late eighteenth century.’
38
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (2010), 212. Adam Smith himself noting that parliament had been
‘peculiarly attentive’ to the needs of commerce and industry at the time he was writing in 1776.
39
As Lord Wright observed ‘ I have often wondered how this perpetual process of change can be
reconciled with the principles of authority and the rule of stare decisis’ cited in J. Stone, Legal System
and Lawyers’ Reasonings (1968), 230.
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the self interest of the landed elite who now controlled parliament. As has been examined in
chapter four, planning laws have their genesis in the self-interested private bill legislation of the
eighteenth century.40

6.2.1

Govern us but govern us well

The analysis of the history of the second millennium in England in chapter 4 has also
demonstrated that laws are the servant of the powerful.41 During the early years of the industrial
revolution, the law making power of parliament transformed the English economy and its
society. Law was fundamental as the driver of social change. This process is here described as
the ideology of parliament as the instrument of managed social change.

What history does show is that when parliament makes planning laws, it chooses whether those
laws are intended to serve the interest of private property or the interest of the public. The
public interest, like law, has no substance outside the form given to it by another. It is defined
either by the government (the bureaucratic method) or by the people (the participatory
approach). The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 demonstrates that up to the present, parliament has
expressly reserved to itself the power to define the public interest.42 There has been no sharing
of power via the creation of participatory mechanisms.

40

L. M. Edwards, 'Ideational social capital and the civic culture: Extricating Putnam's legacy from the
social capital debates' (2009) 23 Social Epistemology 125, 128. The functional social schema that applied
before this time was centred on the maintenance of the traditional power relationships. Social capital was
paramount in this society. The sovereign had the greatest social capital. Power was centralised in and
around the sovereign and the administration of government depended on the dispensation of patronage.
Corruption was the predominant feature of administration. It would not be until the eighteenth century
that an ideology of government as a deliberate instrument of managed social change would emerge.
Before this time, it is possible to see the role of Ministers, Parliament and ‘placemen’ representatives
having a single self-interested purpose. In an ontological sense, the political actor’s goal in any choice of
action was to ‘maximise their self-interest as defined by their personal utility function’ to the sovereign.
41
Smith, above n 38, 49. Smith refers to Hobbes aphorism that ‘wealth is power’ but notes that a person
of great fortune ‘does not necessarily acquire or succeed to any political power.’ It is the power to
purchase ‘command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour which is then in the market’ that
enables a wealthy person to command power.
42
Which reinforces JS Mill’s point, referenced by Uhr, above n 22, 73, that ‘each and every political
regime tends to promote the “class interest” of the dominant social group.’
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The history of the nineteenth century highlights that McAuslan’s public interest ideology was
born out of a desire to maintain power; it was not the product of enlightened altruism.43 What
drove parliament was the fear of the mob.44 Historically, towns were the nursery that fomented
the mob. It was in towns that the ideation of government by the people for the people emerges.45

In England, participation in local affairs led to parliamentary power. But not before some had
suffered the loss of liberty and been transported to Australia.46 Yet it is undeniable that by the
mid nineteenth century, the people had demanded power over local affairs. Once power was
acquired after the enactment of the Municipal Corporations Act (UK) of 1835, the middle class
set the ‘political agenda.’47 Urban amenity, a decidedly self-interested factor, became a focus of
government. Laws became ‘regarded as simply [an] expedient for this or that purpose, and as
properly based on the voluntary consent of citizens endowed with equal civil and political
rights.’48

Unlike England, which had to suffer bloody revolution before power was shared with the
people, Australia would be spared that fate. Because of its historical circumstance, the colonies
in Australia would be fast-tracked into democracy in the mid nineteenth century. However, this
did not lead to the development of a participatory culture in the governance of the colony. The
analysis in chapters 5 shows that the gemeinschaft that developed in the colony was one which
was anti-participation. In contrast to England, the people in Australia did not want to participate
in local governance. In the newly developing colony, a ratepayer ideology would prevail which
would hinder the development of a truly civic culture. In this uniquely Australian culture, local
governance was not sought, it had to be imposed. The people resisted by apathy.

43

This point is demonstrated by the motivation to pass the Municipal Corporations Act in 1835. As John
A. Phillips, 'England's 'Other' Ballot Question: The Unnoticed Political Revolution of 1835' (2008) 24(S1)
Parliamentary History 139, 150 notes:
‘Thus the Quarterly Review’s assumption that the Whigs intended the Municipal Corporations
Act to transfer power from the legitimate party in England’s towns, the Conservatives, ‘the party
of the Constitution’ dedicated to the defense of Protestantism, to the Whigs, a mere
parliamentary party, proved amply justified. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Whigs actually
realized their ambition in large measure. The reformers benefited from the destruction of the old
corporations because the national party structure had been transferred successfully from
parliamentary politics to the local political arena.’
44
See in particular the discussion in chapter 4.6 above.
45
R.K. Webb, Modern England from the Eighteenth Century to the Present (2 ed, 1980), 228. Webb
suggests that the Municipal Corporations Act (UK) of 1835 extended political voice in the administration
of towns to the middle class.
46
The Todpuddle Six, the Irish political exiles and the Scottish Martyrs are but examples.
47
Jeremy Black, A New History of England (2000), 203.
48
Keane, above n 33, 309. Though this is not to say that this transformation occurred without struggle. As
Keane also notes (168-9): ‘the opponents of democratic representation fought tooth and claw, and with
considerable success, against its perceived inefficiencies, its fatal flaws and supposed evils.’
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The ready availability of land, and its alienation to all classes (even the emancipated), defeated
early attempts to introduce class distinctions which prevailed in England. This dynamic led to
the ideation of a different social compact in Australia. The vastness of the continent to be settled
militated against the formation of a civic culture similar to that which existed in Britain. The
privilege of ownership of land in colonial New South Wales did not engender feelings of social
obligation to participate in civic affairs.49 As is shown in chapter 5, participation remained about
self-interest.50 The ideology of private property was enthusiastically embraced. Hirst suggests
that in the emerging culture of Australia, the function of government as understood by British
tradition changed. He says that ‘[I]t was not primarily to keep order within and defeat enemies
without; it was a resource on which settlers could draw to make money.’51 Large sections of
colonial society would accept self-exclusion from the structures of governance as the price for
the liberty to pursue individual economic reward.52

In late nineteenth century Australia, isolation would inspire politicians and government officials
to aspire to a common goal of federation as a self-interested means of protection from intrusion
by non-British European powers.53 As Manning Clarke notes, the push for federation was not
the product ‘of popular hunger for independence.’54 Federation would deliver a greater sense of

49

John Hirst, Looking for Australia (2010), 237. Hirst describes the settlers’ preference for no local
government as ‘an Australian innovation in political philosophy.’ It is also arguable, as Rodney Cavalier,
Power Crisis: The Self-Destruction of a State Labor Party (2010), 2, does, that the experience of being
emasculated members of a party was a disincentive in itself.
50
Uhr, above n 22, 62. Uhr notes that the edifice of representation rests on the accountability of the
elected members to the electorate.’ In New South Wales, as Hirst, above n 49, 148-150, suggests:
‘disreputable men had gained seats’ such that ‘[r]espect for parliament evaporated.’ He also suggests that
the ‘1880s was the heyday of drunks and demagogues’ in parliament.
51
John Hirst, 'The distinctiveness of Australian democracy' (2002) 46(12) Quadrant 19, 25-6. Hirst
reminds us that:
‘Until late in the nineteenth century there was no income tax and no company tax. All the money
you earned you kept. Government was not a burden that you had to pay for, it was a magic
pudding; you could cut slice after slice and there was always more.’
52
Absent the rising voice of the people, the government defined the public interest. Tony Moore, Death
or Liberty (2010), 208, suggests that ‘New Liberalism had embraced state intervention as necessary to
preserve Australia from class conflict, to foster manufacturing and to ameliorate some of the anti-social
aspects of capitalist modernity.’
53
Stuart Ward, 'Security: Defending Australia's Empire' in Deryck Schreuder and Stuart Ward (eds),
Oxford History of the British Empire (Companion Series): Australia's Empire (2009) , 239-41, cites the
‘Irish-Australian social reformer’ Edward O’Sullivan, who argued for federation in 1895 saying ‘what
does it matter what reforms we attempt to make … if, after all, we are liable to a sudden attack by an
overwhelming force.’ Ward argues that:
‘Parkes took the Edwards report (on the scant defences of the colonies) as his point of departure
in his celebrated “Tenterfield Speech” of October 1899, in which he called for a Federal
constitution in order to “preserve the security and integrity” of the colonies.’
Ward also says that Parkes advanced no other argument for Federation other than the security threat.
54
Michael Cathcart (ed), Manning Clark's History of Australia (1993) (Manning Clark), 405. Manning
Clark argued that:
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identity to the people than was experienced under the colonial government; it would foster the
growth of nationalism but it would stifle republicanism.55 Not without political struggle,
conventions in the last decade of the nineteenth century would see the federation proposal put to
the people for endorsement. Once again, as it had been in the past, government would be given
to (and not taken by) the people.56 In its drafting, the original people of the country were
excluded from citizenship. The Imperial parliament enacted the Australian Federation by
passing the Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900 (UK) with the assent of Queen Victoria. As
Hirst muses, did the people ‘value’ the prize?57

Regardless of the fact that representative democracy had been achieved by 1901 (both at a State
and Federal level), participatory democracy is yet to be achieved.58 The ideation in the people of
they being ‘the government’ is yet to fully take form. In the early years after self-government,
unionism would provide a sense of belonging to the working classes but even this opportunity
would be curtailed by power seeking elements.59 As Younger notes, ‘solidarity’ was closely
linked with trade union principles and ‘introduced a much more thorough degree of political

‘The moves towards federation were the product of neither of popular hunger for independence
nor of any widespread determination that Australians should claim responsibility for making
their own history. In fact, as Alfred Deakin observed, the prospect of federation had failed to
rouse public enthusiasm. The federalists, he wrote, were striving against “the inexhaustible
inertia of our populace as a whole.”’
55
Moore, above n 52, 397. Moore argues that ‘traditions that the transported radicals, rebels and
protesters fertilized’ were still-born in the rush to Federation and that whilst revived in the 1990s, they
have now ‘withered and die[d].’
56
Keane, above n 33, 167. As Keane notes:
‘Representative democracy was in fact the child of bitter power conflicts, many of them fought
in opposition to ruling princes, churchmen, landowners or imperial monarchies, often in the
name “of the people.” Struggles in support “of the people” produced great strife during the
second age of democracy.’
57
Hirst, above n 51, 27. Hirst argues that it is a distinguishing feature of our democracy. He also suggests
that politicians ‘are a very mixed bag indeed, not identified with any one group in society, so distinct that
they were a group in themselves - the despised politicians.’ But he leavens this by also noting that in
Australia, ‘government is without social character, it is an impersonal force.’ Notably, the Australian
experience shows that sometimes power can be given to the people without violent struggle. The question
this poses is whether the prize is valued by the people?
58
Uhr, above n 22, 84. Uhr says that ‘the functions of political representation extend beyond simply
determining who should rule; as many of the Australian constitutional framers appreciated, ruling is only
part of the larger function of representation.’ Earlier (at 11), Uhr suggests that:
‘Civic participation has remained a reassuring ideal even though liberal democracies have
typically not generated widespread popular participation in the political process, or even in the
electoral process.’
59
Andrew Leigh, Disconnected (2010), 74, cites WG Spence the founder of the Shearer’s Union,
speaking in 1909 on unionism:
‘Unionism came to the Australian Bushman as a religion. It came bringing salvation from years
of tyranny. It had in it the feeling of mateship which he understood already, and which always
characterised the action of one “white man” to the other. Unionism extended the idea, so a man’s
character was gauged by whether he stood true to Union rules or “scabbed” it on his fellows.’
Cavalier, above n 46, 1-14, says that there was never a ‘golden age’ for members of unions, and that after
1916, control of the Labor party by its membership was displaced by control by the affiliated unions.
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organisation than any other party or political pressure group had achieved.’60 The Australian
experience led to the early definition of party politics as the mode of representative government;
however, this did not mean participatory democracy in the sense of participation in politics.61

6.2.2

Property and Ideology are Snug Bedfellows

In the context of land use planning history in NSW, the County of Cumberland Planning
Scheme marks a turning point. The pull of the private property ideology abated allowing the
public interest ideology to secure a foothold. Just as in England fifty years before, the state
government intervened in the operation of the market by introducing planning laws.62 This
enabled the government to centrally define the public interest. Goodall notes that there was
community resistance to the measures.63 But it was not manifested in political action. The
ideology of public interest accommodates the ideology of private property, they are snug
bedfellows.64

The historical evidence in chapter 5 suggests that the ratepayer ideology still resonates strongly
in the psyche of the people of New South Wales.65 Edwards, reconstructing Putnam’s study
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RM Younger, Australia and the Australians: A Concise History (1982), 401.
Cavalier, above n 49, 56. As Cavalier notes, the Labor party ‘below’ has disappeared, ‘parliamentary
parties have become self-perpetuating oligarchies.’ This is supported by Leigh, above n 59, 76. Leigh has
graphed the decline in union membership from half the workforce in 1982 to just 19% of the workforce in
2008.
62
The deliberate intention of the McKell Government was to redress the perceived failure of the market
as a consequence of the depression and the Second World War. As the ALP itself noted, Australian
Labour Party, Five critical years: story of the McKell Labour government in New South Wales, May
1941-May 1946 (1946), 5:
‘Perhaps the most characteristic and significant feature of this Government was its determination
to work on the basis of a master plan.
…
There would be no more merely haphazard development in industry; in the growth of cities and
towns as huge jumbles of confusion.’
63
Heather Goodall et al, 'Making the City Green: The Creation of Public Greenspace in Suburban
Sydney, 1940-1992' (Paper presented at the State of Australia's Cities Conference, Brisbane 30 November
-2 December 2005), 7.
64
McAuslan, above n 4, 265. McAuslan suggests that the ideologies of private property and public
interest have:
‘a common interest in combating the ideology and practice of public participation, for just as the
ideology threatens the power and position of the bureaucracy in government so also it threatens
the power and position of private property in society.’
65
The continuation of apathy is most recently demonstrated by the responses to both the Standing
Committee call for submissions and the EDO’s workshops held in late 2009. Mr Haddad, the Director
General of Planning acknowledged to the Standing Committee, above n 10, 89 that:
‘One area of consultation that we are still struggling with is consultation at the strategic level.
We find that when we put our policies out or plans out we are not getting the engagement
sufficiently and then, of course, people engage more at the specific development application
61
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Making Democracy Work to differentiate between its rational choice and constructivist
elements, has shown that the existence of a civic culture ‘is strongly correlated with people’s
ideological beliefs about how their society should be governed.’66 Hirst, citing Almond and
Verba’s study, identifies that a good civic culture ‘requires a balance between the participant
and subject orientations.’67 In short, it is dependent upon participation by the people.68 The
historical absence of a participatory civic culture in New South Wales has allowed various
governments to eschew adopting the public participation ideology in planning legislation.69
Aroney argues that:
‘One of the characteristics of a properly operating system of representative government
is that members have an “obligation” to listen to and ascertain the views of their
constituents during the life of the Parliament.’70

If there is no pressure from the people, the government does not have to listen. A small clique
can govern ‘in the name of the people.’71 As is discussed in chapter 5, the development of the
ratepayer ideology in New South Wales is explained by the absence of local government
structures from the inception of the colony. There was no tradition or experience in municipal
governance. The function of government in NSW was different to that which applied in
England. To disrupt this cosy arrangement requires radical action.

6.2.3

Severing the Gordian Knot

What is necessary to foster participation and promote participation? Put simply, it is
mechanisms that encourage the people to actively take the opportunity to express their voice.72

stage when there is an actual proposal. We may need to do a bit better in this area but it is an
area of ongoing thinking. It is a challenge.’
Who is the one that is not listening?
66
Edwards, above n 40, 140.
67
Hirst, above n 51, 4.
68
Leigh, above n 59, 55-63, argues that Australians are not ‘truly active at the pointy end of politics.’
Australians are not ‘politically active.’
69
Ibid 59-62. Leigh graphs the declining percentage of the Australian population who are members of
recognised political parties. According to Leigh, the membership of the Liberal Party has fallen from its
1967 high of 1.5% of the population base in membership to its current 0.5% or 80,000 Australia wide.
70
Nicholas Aroney, 'Justice McHugh, representative government and the elimination of balancing' (2006)
28(3) Sydney Law Review 505, 510.
71
Cavalier, above n 49, 47, states that in the decade since 1999 there has been a collapse in the
membership of the state Labor party to ‘just 6500 members’ and that ‘[f]ewer than 1000 people play any
sort of active role in the party.’ Yet during that time, the Labor party had absolute control over planning
policy.
72
Uhr, above n 22, 85-6. The democratic revolution in England began with reform of local government.
The aim, suggests Uhr (citing Rossiter 1961), is to ‘cultivate a new “public voice.”’ The theory is:
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If this is to be achieved in NSW, there will need to be a reconfiguration of the ratepayer
ideology in the psyche of the people. Until this occurs, the governing elite will retain control
over the making of laws, including planning laws. Arnstein also drew on history to support her
conclusion that if participation is to occur, power has to be ‘wrested’ from the powerful by the
powerless,73 suggesting that perhaps force is necessary.74 Sharp would disagree, suggesting that
‘political defiance’ is the pathway.75 On either analysis, the status quo must change. In terms of
process, Bora and Hausendorf demonstrate how it is the quality of the participatory mechanisms
that matters. Arnstein wrote in strong terms about participation in the planning process linking
participation directly to power structures. She identified the nexus between participation and
power in the graduations of the ladder of participation.

The question that this poses is will it be necessary for there to be ‘bloody revolution’ of a
political kind before the state elects to share power with the community in relation to planning
policy and decision-making?76 Would the community be prepared to ‘politicize urban space’?77
The people need to do more than merely ‘complain’.78 They must be prepared to participate in

‘Representation is a good thing in itself and not simply an instrument of convenience for an
enlarged political society. The scheme of representation is intended to alter the dynamics of
political life by channelling public opinion through a series of screens or filters, designed “to
refine and enlarge public views” in such a manner that the elected representatives “may best
discern the true interest of their country” with the least distraction from “temporary or partial
considerations.”’
73
Arnstein, above n 21, 222.
74
Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy (4 ed, 2010), 4. As Sharp notes: ‘By placing confidence
in violent means, one has chosen the very type of struggle with which the oppressors nearly always have
superiority.’ (emphasis in original)
75
Ibid 77. As to physical force, Sharp would disagree. Sharp suggests liberation can be achieved through
political defiance, but it requires: ‘Vigilance, hard work, and disciplined struggle, often at great cost.’
76
Rakodi Carole, 'Cities and people: towards a gender-aware urban planning process?' (1991) 11(6)
Public Administration & Development (1986-1998) 541, 546. Rakodi argues that ‘[p]ower is based both
on control of the formal decision-making process and on access to the spoils of political or bureaucratic
office.’ But the concept of ‘taking power’ is different. The economic depression of the 1890s and the
response of the NSW government to the strike led to the formation of the Labor Party in NSW. As Hirst,
above n 49, 151, notes: ‘[t]here was briefly among the working class that galvanising anger that comes
from a sense of betrayal.’ Out of that anger was the formed the Labor Party which quickly changed the
dynamic in the NSW parliament. The people, federally, have recently changed the parliamentary dynamic
at the 2010 election by giving the major political parties a parliamentary minority to govern with. At the
state level, the people of NSW have given the new Liberal National government a thumping majority at
the 2011 election to govern with. Which method of dealing with government will produce real reform is
the unanswered question.
77
Fran Tonkiss, Space, the City and Social Theory (2005), 63. Urban social movements:
‘politicize urban space as an object of contestation between private and public property,
development and environmental quality, the interests of the motorist against those of the rest.
They also politicize spaces in the city through tactics of occupation, protest, sabotage and play
(see Cohen 1993; McKay 1998). Urban space is both the object of political agency and its
medium.’
78
Michael Duffy, 'Democracy that leaves people's views out of the equation', Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney ), 2-3 August 2008, 28. Following the then Minister for Planning Frank Sartor transferring
planning power to a planning panel appointed by himself, the community rallied. A meeting of 200
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the structures of governance, including local governance. Without participatory mechanisms,
the ideology of the public interest will prevail and the government will continue to dictate
planning policy. When an elite has the power to make law, it can, by patronage, grant favours.
The people have not generally been the beneficiaries of this patronage.79

6.3

Should Planning be inclusive?

Planning law remains captured by the bureaucratic theory of governance. In 2009 the Standing
Committee was unable to identify a model which would ensure effective community
engagement at both the strategic and application levels.80 The Director General of Planning, Mr
Haddad, seemed flummoxed as to why the department could not engage the people,81 both at the
strategic level and at the level of local plans.82 The Committee agreed that ‘the right to appeal

‘concerned citizens’ were brought together by a group called ‘newDemocracy’ (founded in 2004 by
Transfield chief Luca Belgiorno-Nettis and whose patron was Fred Chaney and John Button). Duffey
notes that ‘the idea was to use a process known as deliberative democracy to give citizens the chance to
learn more about an issue – in this case the state’s development approval system – and suggest solutions.’
This citizen initiated process has not led to political reform. Indeed, the frustration simply grew,
becoming front page news- see J Huxley, 'Tell 'em they're dreaming - north shore gets bolshie', Sydney
Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 September 2009, 1. ‘From Balmain to Beecroft, Catherine Hill Bay and
Ku-ring-gai, Dungog and Double Bay, from all parts of the state, the people had come to unload on its
unloved government. To put its next government on notice.’ Writing about the same ‘stunt’, John Pitt,
'Democracy has the death rattles in NSW' (30 September 2009) New Matilda <http://newmatilda.com> at
14 December 2009, proclaimed the ‘death of democracy.’ He noted that a collective of ‘about 30
residents’ associations representing some 60,000 people’ held a mock state funeral at parliament house in
Sydney. Pitt suggested the demonstration ‘highlights the desperation felt by many residents’ about the
planning system - neglecting to note that only 300 people actually attended. At the 2011 election the
‘Save Our State’ party could not get a protest vote of a sufficient number to fill a quota for the Legislative
Council.
79
Farrelly, above n 27, 188: ‘Planning is generally seen by politicians as yet another spigot for delivering
windfall favours to political mates, rather than any genuine embodiment of the public interest.’
80
The Standing Committee could have referenced a paper produced by Drs Lyn Carson and Katherine
Gelber presented in 2001 to the then Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources
entitled ‘Ideas for Community Consultation: A discussion paper of principles and procedures for making
consultation work.’ This paper is cited in EDO 2010 Report, above n 3, 39. McAuslan, above n 4, 29-30,
suggests that participation is achieved by giving residents an ‘assurance of a future for their
neighbourhood, so the change around in policies is stated to be based in part at least on resident’s
attitudes and views.’
81
Standing Committee Report, above n 10, 89. The Director General observed that:
‘We find that when we put policies out our plans out we are not getting the level of engagement
sufficiently and then, of course, people engage more at the specific development application
stage when there is an actual proposal. We may need to do a bit better in this area but it is an
area of on-going thinking. It is a challenge.’
82
Ibid 100. The Director General commented that:
‘We need to ensure that their local strategies are properly reflected in the planning instruments.
This is the end outcome. If the standard planning instruments that we now have do not reflect
local strategies – the strategies that have been developed to reflect local requirements – either we
have to find another one or we will have to do something about it.’
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planning decisions is a fundamental and necessary element of the planning framework,’83 but it
did not support a widening of the third party appeal mechanism.

The question is therefore not whether the public ought to have a role in the NSW planning
system.84 The question is what should the role of the public be?85 Whether or not planning
should be inclusive is a question of strategy. It is the government that adopts strategy. The
difficulty is that McAuslan’s ideologies of public interest and public participation are mutually
exclusive. As McAuslan notes, law conforming to the ideology of the public interest:
‘is translated into laws which confer wide powers on administrators to do as they see fit
and which either provide no redress or appeal (for how can there be redress against an
administrator who is advancing the public interest) …’86

It is only if the purpose of the law is to promote the advancement of participation in the
planning processes that consideration needs to be given to the mechanisms by which such
participation is to be facilitated. There is good reason to consider making planning laws which
are socially inclusive. In the urban setting, planning law is fundamentally about local issues.
The intent of planning instruments is to control development. Of necessity, development occurs
on particular parcels land within the neighbourhood. In a functioning democracy, someone must
perform the ‘function of antagonism.’87 In the context of land use planning, who should speak
for the local community?

83

Ibid 155.
Ibid 89. The Committee recognised that there was ‘general agreement’ that the system would benefit
from greater community engagement..
85
Clive Forster, Australian Cities: Community and Change (1995), 126-7. Forster reviews the competing
arguments as being between ‘public participation in decision-making as opposed to the centralist
“government knows best” style of administration.’ Forster also suggests that the ‘danger’ with
participation is the ability of ‘affluent communities to insulate themselves from change,’ whilst at the
same time frustrating the ‘economic master-plans’ of state government. In contrast, the EDO 2010 report,
above n 3, 46, suggests that participation: helps to ensure better decision-making; offers the prospect of
buy-in by the community; and delivers a measure of fairness, justice and accountability. In short, ‘clearly
public involvement is essential to the workings of a democratic system of government.’
86
McAuslan, above n 4, 4.
87
Uhr, above n 22, 73. As Uhr notes:
‘In Mill’s reworking of responsible government, the representative assembly disengages from
the ministry and engages more fully with community opinion. The vital new role of the assembly
in this revised version is to fulfil “the function of Antagonism.”’
In New South Wales, our constitutional arrangements do not allow the representative assembly to so
disengage; parliament is controlled by the executive. In theory, it is the function of the assembly to ‘throw
the light of publicity’ (JS Mill) on the acts of the executive. As the assembly does not perform that
function, who will?
84
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6.3.1

Seizing the Nettle

In theory, land use planning is about a ‘to be constructed’ future. Notionally, this admits of the
possibility of incorporating democratic processes into land use planning processes.88 It is the
people that live in neighbourhoods; they are the umwelt of the community.89 But whilst ever the
minister, and not parliament, makes the planning instrument, the land use process is
fundamentally undemocratic. If planning is to be inclusive, then the local community ought to
be empowered by the planning process. Even the neo-liberal paradigm acknowledges that for a
‘planned order’ to emerge from changes brought about by economic circumstances, the people
need to be able to express their ‘voice.’90
As a polity, we must therefore determine the purpose of our planning laws.91 Some, like
Farrelly, argue that this will encourage another form of ‘mob rule.’92 Others, like Hague,
suggest that governments already recognise that they ‘need to forge relationships with civil
society and the private sector to manage change.’93 An informed choice must be made. The
people have to decide the purpose that our planning laws are to serve. This necessarily implies
that the community should have the choice of whether or not to have planning laws at all.94 If, in
88

Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005), 31. Hague
argues that the neo-liberal argument has ‘been countered by a renewal of calls for more participatory or
collaborative planning.’
89
Ibid 7. Hague and Jenkins suggest that:
‘Places are places (and not just spaces) because they have identity. Place identities are formed
through milieu of feelings, meanings, experiences, memories and actions that, while ultimately
personal, are subsequently filtered through social structures and fostered through socialization.
… [being relational] place identities are encapsulated within power relations and are likely to be
highly contested.’
90
Webster and Lai, above n 3, 20. Webster and Lai suggest that:
‘What can be said about the congestion and evolution of the city as a whole is true of parts of the
city. Neighbourhoods change – rapidly or imperceptibly; by intrinsic or extrinsic influences; by
market activity or government activity. Citizens standing to lose from the emerging order may
react by exit or voice. New spontaneous order emerges in response to exit, and new planned
order emerges in response to voice.’
91
Albert Mabileau et al, Local Politics and Participation in Britain and France (1989), 2. Mabileau
suggests that this may be more myth than reality. However, the ‘presumption of local responsibility’ is
seen as ‘an inducement to local political participation.’ He also suggests that it was this potentiality
‘which inspired the classic participatory theories of John Stuart Mill and Tocqueville.
92
Farrelly, above n 27, 167. As Farrelly tersely suggests:
‘As electors we limit our horizons to the back fence, reliably voting on self-interest alone, and
economic self-interest at that – which is what gives pork-barrelling its power. Thus a terrible
paradox has emerged: democracy as a form of mob rule that seems incapable of acting in the
mob’s best interests.’
93
Hague and Jenkins, above n 88, 29.
94
As Juval Portugali, 'Learning From Paradoxes about Prediction and Planning in Self-Organizing Cities'
(2008) 7(3) Planning Theory 248, 260, notes, as cities are complex self-organising systems:
‘plans [whether of planning authorities or of non-formal agencies such as households or
companies] do not determine or control the development of the system concerned (a city, a
region, etc), but rather become participants in a multi-agents planning game.’
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regards to social policy, it is considered by the polity that planning laws are necessary in the
public interest, then the next choice is whether the bureaucratic or participatory model should be
adopted.

The bureaucratic model is not socially inclusive. Tokenism is not participation. Paying lip
service to the concept of participation by merely referring to it in legislation is a paternalistic
response. It has been the absence of a genuine debate on the purpose of our planning law that
has led to a renewal of interest in neo-liberal principles.95 Gleeson and Low point to the
‘rhetoric and practice’ of planning which has ‘tended to focus on the facilitation of economic
development and the need for administrative efficiency.’ This supports the contention that there
has been a resurgence of a neo-liberal ideology in planning. But the plethora of bureaucratic
measures enacted to centralise power (neatly tabulated by the Standing Committee in its
report),96 also suggests another agenda. It is clear that the intent of successive reforms to the
EP&A Act since its inception have been driven by the public interest ideology. The situation in
Britain is no different.97

Before planning laws, the ideology of private property embedded in the common law gave
control over the development of land to the owner of that land. If the neo-liberal agenda was in
fact a return to the ideology of private property then you would expect to see less (or indeed no)
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This is reflective of the dominance of the neo-liberal agenda which is anti-participation. Suzanne
Lawson and Brendan Gleeson, 'Shifting Urban Governance in Australia' in Paul Smyth, Tim Reddel and
Andrew Jones (eds), Community and Local Governance in Australia (2005) , 76, suggest that there has
been a ‘rescaling of urban governance’ to achieve ‘competitive advantage for urban regions within a
global economy.’ This has led to ‘spatially based interventions by government’ such as urban
consolidation policies to ‘fix’ uneven geographical development. The neo-liberal agenda could be taken
further. In M. Bagaric and J. McConvill, 'Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive
Psychology to the Law' (2005) 10(1) Deakin Law Review 1, 23, Bagaric et al suggest that in terms of
public happiness (the Benthamite purpose to which all law should be directed), planning laws ‘should be
relaxed’ to allow people to do what they like with their property ‘unless there is evidence to suggest that
the proscribed conduct is detrimental to one’s happiness.’ Planning by codes that reduce red tape and
remove merit assessment of applications is a step in this direction.
96
See table 2.1 standing committee report, above n 10, 23.
97
This is best demonstrated in the ‘Barker’ report: Kate Barker, 'Barker Review of Land Use Planning:
Final Report - Recommendations' (2006). The report was commissioned by the Chancellor and the
Deputy Prime minister of the UK to consider ‘how, in the context of globalisation … planning policy and
procedures can better deliver economic growth and prosperity alongside other sustainable development
goals.’ Whilst recognising (at 4) the ‘importance of public participation and democratic accountability,’
the report (at 11) suggested that decision-making should be made at the ‘most appropriate spatial level.’
That means ‘an independent planning commission’ for projects of national significance, and the local
planning authority at the local level. There was no recommendation for a widening of appeal rights to
allow third party appeals. The focus was on streamlining the system. Control over the system was
retained in the Minister and the bureaucracy. The report included a recommendation to incorporate a
presumption in favour of development. The Friends of the Earth, 'A Better Plan: An alternative view of
the Land Use Planning System' (2007) outlined its objections to the report, including the comment that
the Barker report ‘recommends reducing the voice of the local people.’
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regulation.98 Yet, the planning instrument still regulates what development is permissible in a
locality. The minister has centralised the plan making process via the standard template
process.99 The minister still makes the planning instrument. It is suggested by Kelly and Smith
that one effect of this constraint is the ‘[e]rosion] of worthwhile local ingenuity.’100 In short, the
community has lost control over development occurring in the neighbourhood.

The articulated purpose of the most recent reforms of the EP&A Act was to ‘cut red tape.’ The
2008 measures to de-politicise planning by removing decision-making from councils and
transferring the power to decide to panels reinforce the manifest intention to exclude the voice
of the people from the process.101 To facilitate powerful economic interests, power (or control
over development) has been retained in the hands of the government and not private interests (as
would be the case if we were returning exclusively to the ideology of property). Measures have
been introduced by legislation to speed up decisions. This initiative has created an environment
where ‘yes’ is the most likely outcome of an application for development.102 Only the applicant
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Mark Pennington, 'Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative Democracy' (2003)
51(4) Political Studies 722, 732. In contrast to the Habermian deliberative democracy theory (a
commitment to transparent egalitarian structures where equal standing is given to all stakeholders), the
advantage of the market under Hayekian theory, Pennington suggests, is that the market has the advantage
of being polycentric. As such:
‘The institution of private property, … affords multiple minorities the space to try out ideas, the
merits/demerits of which may not be readily discerned by the majority, but from which the latter
may learn.’ (emphasis in original)
Regulation inhibits the creativity of the choices made by individuals under market conditions.
99
In the Standing Committee report, above n 10, 98-100, the committee notes the view of the Department
that:
‘councils will be able to meet their specific local needs through the use of local objectives and
provisions, albeit, “where appropriate” and approved by the department.’
The committee then outlines evidence to support its comment that there was ‘constant criticism’ that the
standard instrument ‘was too city-centric and did not adequately address the needs of rural and regional
councils.’ Evidence given to the committee included evidence from Mr Gordon Clark, Strategic Planning
Manager, Shoalhaven City Council who said his council was required to use a flooding clause that had
‘already been in the system.’ His response to the committee was:
‘We are told to use one of the ones that have already been through the system. We could say yes,
that is fine, but the flooding clause for Liverpool does not assist the Shoalhaven. We have got a
completely different situation. We need a more tailored clause that applies to our situation.’
Mr Haddad, the Director General of the Department of Planning, summarised his concern about specific
local provisions by saying: ‘When we standardise all over the State we must ensure that we do not keep
on adding things as we might end up non-standardising.’
100
Andrew Kelly and Christopher Smith, 'The Capriciousness of Australian Planning Law: Zoning
Objectives in NSW as a Case Study' (2008) 26(1) Urban Policy and Research 83, 96.
101
Farrelly, above n 27, 179. Farrelly suggests that:
‘flexibility [in planning laws] delivers the very opposite of its promise. The talk may be all
transparency, accountability and consultation but the reality is different; a system of government
from closed rooms and whispering corridors, moneyed access and the privileges of power, of
public life being reduced to the rhythmic exchanges of private favours.’
102
McAuslan, above n 4, 44, notes a similar control focus in the intent of the 1968 reforms to the UK
Town and Country Planning Act which curtailed rights of appearance at Public Local Inquiries. As
McAuslan notes, the old forms of participation were:
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(and not the public) has the right to appeal ‘no’. When the answer is generally yes, where does
the opportunity to be heard arise?103 This structural change in the distribution and allocation of
development rights has been secured by the government without any true mandate from the
people to embark on that path.104

6.3.2

Who owns the neighbourhood?

It is arguable, in the context of neighbourhood, that the umwelt is an open access resource. It is
owned by no-one but it is used in common by the community. If it is the case, as suggested by
Webster and Lai, that ‘anarchy results from individuals asserting their economic right to a
resource by might,’105 then tyranny arises when the political elite silences the voice of the
people in decisions about the allocation of shared common resources. Without participation by
the people in the ordering of the neighbourhood, a form of oppression exists.
Market theorists would suggest that markets ‘democratise resource allocation;’106 but they then
argue that democratising planning would lead to collective action inertia in decision-making.
They oppose participation because it is an inefficient allocation of property rights.107 Pennington
argues that the market is a superior mechanism because it ‘enables people to adjust their
behaviour to the changing scarcity of goods without ever having to be consciously aware of why
this is the case’ (emphasis in original).108 The obvious difficulty with the application of the

‘replaced by new forms of participation which, by vesting control of the process in public
authorities throughout and by eliminating any rights in individuals, ensured that the process and
its participants were at all times subordinated to the interest of the public authorities – the
guardians of the public interest.’
103
Linda Pearson and Peter Williams, 'The New South Wales planning reforms : undermining external
merits review of land-use decision-making?' (2009) 26(1) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 19,
25. Pearson and Williams note that according to the department’s figures, of the development approvals
records held by the department for 2006/7, of the 86,287 development applications submitted, only 3%
were refused.
104
Standing Committee Report, above n 10, 35. The committee records the evidence of the Director,
Strategy and Design, City of Sydney who said the council experienced difficulties incorporating policies
for higher density development ‘because without a mandate for a requirement for higher levels of design
quality, it was difficult convincing the community that higher density could be a good outcome.’
105
Webster and Lai, above n 3, 75.
106
Ibid 180. Webster and Lai, citing ‘Greater Soul’ in Korea, also suggest (at 27) that ‘[m]arket-driven
cities constantly innovate, producing new styles of living, new products, new technologies for
overcoming the constraints of distance, congestion and resource management.’
107
Pennington, above n 98, 729, mischievously alludes to Oscar Wilde’s quip on socialism as suggesting
that deliberative democracy procedures would also ‘take up too many evenings.’
108
Ibid 727.
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theory is that in an unequal market, the winners will be the rich and powerful.109 Citizens are
reduced to mere consumers disconnected from the life of the place in which they reside.
The conundrum is that it is only through participation that the voice option emerges.110 What
brought about social change in the nineteenth century was partly social pressure, but it was also
a change in ideation that led to legislative change.111 If there is no voice option, then exit is the
only choice available. It is clear that there is a social disconnect between the government in
New South Wales and the people about decisions on planning.112 The disaffection of the people
with planning outcomes in their localities reflects the corrosive effect of disengagement of the
people from the processes of government.113 Hague suggests that the public ‘lost faith in
planning long before the economic actors and politicians did so.’114 Stokes theorises this
disconnect as the ‘battle for the big back yard,’115 a dispute between private property interests
and the public interest. It is here argued that the dispute is really about whether or not the power
to control the development of land should be exercised according to the participatory theory of
democracy (socially inclusive) or whether that power should be exercised according to the
‘bureaucratic or technical’ theory of democracy (socially exclusive).116 In essence, should there
be open government in the planning process?
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Mannheim, above n 20, 233: ‘as society turns more and more from competition between equals to
competition between unequals, the chances are enhanced that the powerful and wealthy will swallow up
their weaker competitors in the life-and-death struggle of the market place.’
110
Robert Freestone, Urban Nation: Australia's Planning Heritage (2010), 29, argues that: ‘Resident
action and environmental protest have become established features of the urban political process.’
111
WJV Windeyer, Lectures on Legal History (1938), 247. As Windeyer notes, the legislative changes
were the result of ‘pressure by trade unions, partly because of a changed outlook on social questions by
the wealthy and governing classes.’
112
In 2009, Nick Ralston, 'Stars lead planning laws rally in Sydney', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney),
2009, reported that: ‘Actors, comedians and TV and radio personalities have joined MPs and angry
residents in staging a mock funeral in protest at the NSW government’s planning laws.’ However, only
300 people took part. Tanveer Ahmed, 'Bona fide democracy begins on your doorstep', Sydney Morning
Herald (Sydney ), 9 September 2008, 11 extrapolates the disengagement by suggesting:
‘a flourishing democracy depends on people being able to take part in what happens in their backyards. If
they feel they lack control over the street they live on, what chance is there of having a say on climate
change? Or our interactions with foreign powers?’
113
Participants at the EDO forums, EDO 2010 Report, above n 3, 32-3, questioned the use of engaging
the system when discretion ‘seems to be exercised in favour of economic interests over community
interests,’ and when ‘local considerations are constantly overridden.’ It is not without significance that
only 84 people in total attended the workshops, itself suggestive of disengagement with the planning
system.
114
Hague and Jenkins, above n 88, 30.
115
Robert Stokes, The Battle for the Big Back Yard: An Examination of the Conflict Between Suburban
Character and Urban Consolidation and the use of Public Participation in Managing this Conflict (Ph.
D. Thesis, Macquarie University, 2007), 1. Stokes frames the dispute as being ‘between the private
property interest in safeguarding suburban character and the public interest in pursuing a policy of urban
consolidation.’
116
M. Parnell, 'Public Participation in Environmental Decision-Making' (2007) EDOSA Research Paper
<http://www.edo.org.au/edosa/research/aialpaper.htm> at 7 October 2007.
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In a liberal democracy it is incumbent upon the people to empower themselves so that, as Uhr
suggests, ‘they can effectively protect themselves against misguided attempts by government to
determine what is in their best interest.’117 Paradoxically, this admits of the possibility of greater
democracy in land use processes.118 Whether or not this would be a good thing is debatable. On
the one hand, asking the people to be involved in the process is empowering.119 On the other, as
Farrelly observes, beautiful historical towns were built under oppressive conditions:
‘From Myknos to Paris, beautiful, traditional towns – beautiful enough still to draw
tourists centuries later – were produced under conditions that we would consider
intolerably oppressive, with little or no personal choice on the part of the builder,
architect or user as to material, style, colour, or decoration.’120

Do we as a polity aspire to ascetics in built form or to participation? The market cannot
guarantee the former nor can democracy the latter. For planning to be democratic, it will involve
more than being consulted, it must involve the sharing of power.121 As Arnstein suggests, in
power sharing models, ‘citizens hold the significant cards to ensure accountability of the
programme to them.’122 If legislation is the means by which there is to be a sharing of power,
then Bora and Hausendorf’s work suggests a methodology to assess whether the communicative
structures enacted by the government allow for resonance in the decision-maker.

Planning can be inclusive. There is clearly an opportunity for the people, organised in local
communities, to take advantage of the means and the devices of monitory democracy and to
117

Uhr, above n 21, 17. Uhr argues that ‘the strength of the liberal model of representative government is
that it recognises that individuals are best placed to know their own individual interests.’ If this holds true
for representative government then it holds true for local democracy and arguably planning policy.
118
Pope, above n 16, 367. Pope suggests that:
‘Talk of strong democracy and direct popular power sounds romantic in these times of hardnosed economism. Paradoxically, however, direct popular power provides an effective, if partial
and temporary, antidote to three of the most serious evils identified by the economic theory of
collective action.’
The three evils being the problem of ‘free rider’ apathy barrier identified in public choice theory which
prevents participation, the problem of ‘logjam’ ‘created by interest group bargaining,’ and finally, it
dilutes the importance of influences from ‘wealthy interest groups during politics-as-normal.’
119
Keane, above n 33, 853.
120
Farrelly, above n 27, 176. The late Professor Seidler would concur. H Seidler, ‘Aesthetic Jurisdiction
of Local Government Authorities’, (Paper presented at the EPLA Conference, Darling Harbour, Sydney,
October 2000), 1. Professor Seidler suggested that the powers of consent authorities under the EP&A Act
(as at that time) were ‘in direct contradiction to the United Nations International Bill of Human Rights.’
Specifically, ‘covenants on cultural rights …. which states that everyone has the right to the protection …
of the moral interest of any artistic production in the form of art.’ This included an architect's artistic right
to have a building constructed, presumably as the architect saw fit.
121
Even the EDO 2010 report above n 3 is only making recommendations about a better consultation
process; it does not seek empowerment through participation via delegated decision-making.
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take back power to determine what is occurring in their localities.123 As Hall suggests,
democracy occurred when the people had ‘confidence in their own independent judgments and
therefore demanded the right to control their own destinies.’124 Logically, the relevant
‘moments’ in the planning process for this to occur are at the time the local plan is being
formulated and at the time a decision is being made on whether development proposed in a
locality should be approved.

6.3.3

Sharing Plan-Making Powers

If, as the Standing Committee notes, ‘the test of what is the preferred planning system is a
system that meets the social, economic and environmental expectations and needs of the local
community;’125 then it is essential that the local community has power in that system to affect
the strategic decisions that are being made about the neighbourhood of that local community.126

Citizen control arises when the local citizens are ‘in full charge of policy and managerial
aspects,’ with power to negotiate the ‘conditions under which “outsiders” may change them.’127
Logically, local councils could fulfil this role. If the government formally delegated power to
the community through legislation allowing the council, and not the Minister, to make the plan
for the local area, then participation in the planning process may be worthwhile.128 But this is
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Arnstein, above n 21, 222.
Keane, above n 33, 688. Keane describes monitory democracy as:
‘a new historical form of democracy, a variety of “post-parliamentary politics defined by the
rapid growth of many different kinds of extra-parliamentary, power-scrutinising mechanisms.
These monitory bodies take root within the “domestic” fields of government and civil society, as
well as in “cross-border” settings once controlled by empires, states and business organisations.’
Ahmed, ibid, suggests that ‘]m]odern network societies are less tied to geography and
neighbourhood than to communities of interest.’
124
Hall, above n 13, 24.
125
Standing Committee Report, above n 10, 34.
126
EDO 2010 report above n 3, 15. The sentiment is captured in the comment made by a Moruya
participant to the workshop:
‘I don’t understand why governments are so worried about public consultation. Public
consultation is not the problem. It’s avoiding it that’s the problem. The more of it they do the
less problems they’ll have with the public.’
And it is here recognised that the participant was only talking about involvement – at the level of
consultation – not participation at the level of empowerment.
127
Arnstein, above n 21, 223.
128
History may repeat itself. FA Larcombe, The Stabilization of Local Government in New South Wales
1858-1906 (1973), decried the loss of autonomy of local councils and the push for amalgamations in the
early twentieth century. It was this feature, in Larcombe’s view, that caused councils lose their
democratic legitimacy. Restoring local powers may restore this lost legitimacy?
123
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not the case if the bureaucratic model is to be retained.129 In the current confusion of the
planning system, councils lack the necessary power to resolve divisive issues such as the
location of local shopping areas and the character of residential neighbourhoods.130 Why is it
that it should be just the state government which determines the planning policy for local
areas?131 Where is the government’s mandate from the people to ride roughshod over the
community view?132 One potential model would be for the government to confer delegated
power to the council and the ‘community’ of interested persons to jointly have the right to
determine the plan for the local area (or precinct).133 In developing the local planning
instrument, they would have to take into account the requirements of the regional and state
plans which set out the government’s strategic direction for the state, but not be obliged to
accept a predetermined planning outcome.134
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William M Rohe and Lauren B Gates, Planning with Neighbourhoods (1895); William M Rohe and
Lauren B Gates, Planning with Neighbourhoods (1985), 54. As Rohe and Gates note, in the bureaucratic
model participation occurs late in the process:
‘Citizens are often asked to react to a plan in which a considerable investment of staff time and
energy ha been made. Thus, rather than respond to citizen concerns, planners often end up
defending the plan. … Planners often leave with a feeling that citizens have little to offer, and
citizens leave with a feeling that their participation was not genuinely desired.’
130
Paul Bibby, 'Councils battle spread of new supermarkets', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 20
August 2009, 9. Bibby wrote that proposals for supermarkets ‘are fast becoming Sydney’s new urban
development battlefield.’ There is a useful discussion about planning for retail centres and the cases on
retail developments in the papers delivered by Gary Green, 'How not to Plan for Retail' (Paper presented
at the EPLA, Powerhouse Museum, Sydney, October 2009), by Michael Staunton and Chris McEwan,
'Retail - How to assess its real impact (and how to plan for it)' (Paper presented at the EPLA Powerhouse
Museum, Sydney, October 2009), and by Peter Leyshon, 'Planning for Retail in NSW - A Rejoinder'
(Paper presented at the EPLA Powerhouses Museum, Sydney, October 2009) . Green suggests, at 12, that
‘[s]upply of goods and services has become a distant second in terms of its impact in comparison to the
financialisation of capital and its impact on our market which distorts all decision making. Staunton and
McEwan argue, at 20, that the cause of the tension is that land is a scarce resource ‘and there is a
reluctance by councils to rezone land for higher density and business uses often due to objections by
stakeholders or local residents who do not wish to see any development at their expense.’ In fact, Leyshon
is of the view, at 2, that ‘the needs of the population for more/better retail services … do not feature … in
a debate about whether a retail proposal should be approved or not.’
131
McAuslan, above n 4, 269 suggests that proponents of the ideology of public participation:
‘are sceptical, even hostile, to the special claims to pre-eminence in running the system of professionals,
public servants and politicians who do run it and claim legitimacy in so doing by virtue of official
qualifications, official appointments or official elections.’
132
An insight into the mind of the bureaucrat is found in an article written by Sue Holliday, the former
Deputy Director of the Department of Planning and Richard Norton, also of the Department in 1995. Sue
Holliday and Richard Norton, 'Sydney's future: quo vadis' (1995) (17) Urban Futures (Canberra) 13. In
discussing the need to accommodate population growth the comment is made:
‘the public must grapple with new complexities, new ways of thinking about their lifestyle
aspirations, their city and region. The ‘Australian dream’ of a detached family dwelling is
neither appropriate nor achievable in contemporary metropolitan Sydney.’ The thought occurs,
does the public have a say in it?
133
Arnstein, above n 21, 222. As Arnstein notes, such bodies pose ‘an interesting coexistence model for
hostile citizen groups too embittered towards city hall – as a result of past “collaborative efforts” – to
engage in joint planning.’
134
Support for this approach is found in Nicholas Aroney, 'Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best
Constitution: Thomas Acquinas on City, Province and Empire' (2007) 26 law and Philosophy 161, 163.
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6.3.4

Sharing Decision-Making Powers

The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) published a Position Paper in 2007
entitled 'Corruption Risks in NSW development approval processes’ (2007 ICAC Position
Paper). Ironically, it was released some two months before the Government’s 2007 Discussion
paper. In it ICAC suggested that there should be a widening of third-party appeal rights.135 This
recommendation was however not taken up by the NSW Government in its 2008 reforms.

The ICAC recognised that to be effective, the public participation mechanism in the Act must
be such as to allow the public to influence the decision so as to constrain the exercise of
discretion when the administrative decision is being made. 136 This is not the exercise of a right
of veto, it is the giving of an equal right to the public to challenge the decision to approve
development on its merits. Considered in the context of democratic theory, when assessing and
determining an application for development the council is not exercising a representative
parliamentary function in the capacity of lawmaker. Council’s LEPs and planning instruments
are made by the executive arm of the government. In determining applications, the council is
therefore performing a delegated function of the executive government, exercising an
administrative power. Allowing a general right of merit appeal would therefore, arguably, not be
contrary to democratic theory.

Willey suggests that the ‘very arguments that justify appeal rights for permit applicants extend
to legitimate third party rights also.’137 The benefit of widening the process is that it results in
improved decision-making. Even if the decided matters determined in the LEC cases show a
bias in favour of developers,138 which is disputed,139 the fact is that the process adopted in the

Such an approach would be consistent with subsidiary theory which provides ‘that each community
should be allowed to make its own distinctive contribution to the common good without improper
interference from governing institutions of other communities.’
135
ICAC Position Paper, Corruption risks in NSW development approval processes, (2007),
Recommendation 10, 48.
136
Ibid 46:
Merit based reviews can provide a safeguard against corrupt decision-making by consent
authorities as well as enhancing their accountability. Consequently, the extension of third-party
merit-based appeal rights may act as a disincentive for corrupt decision-making by consent
authorities.
137
S. Willey, 'Planning Appeals: Are Third Party Rights Legitimate? The Case Study of Victoria,
Australia' (2006) 24 Urban Policy and Research 369, 370.
138
F. Sartor, 'Sartor seeks curbs on "out of control" Planning Court', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney),
23 August 2000, 6: ‘Approx 60:40 in developers' favour according to the Lord Mayor’.

211

Court enhance the prospects for a better planning outcome. When the rate of approvals is
approaching ninety seven percent of applications,140 and when there is pressure to promote and
encourage development urban consolidation via medium density development, as there has been
since the 1990s,141 it suggests that there is perhaps a need for some oversight.

In the context of the rhetorical appeal in the objects of the EP&A Act to increasing opportunity
and widening the opportunity to access merit appeals, Willey argues that third party appeals
enhance the voice of the citizenry in the process because it acknowledges that ‘parties other than
the appellant and the government have a legitimate interest in planning decisions’.142 A contrary
view was expressed in the minority report of the 2001 Attorney General’s review of the role and
function of the LEC. The then President of the Local Government and Shires Association, Peter
Woods, suggested that democracy demanded that there be no merit appeals at all, for either the
applicant for development or otherwise.143 But this position assumes that the council relevantly
speaks for the community.
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See J. Kelly, 'Court provides an important buffer', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 26 March 2000,
12. As to the bias, in 2000 the NSW Attorney General established a Working Party to examine the
operation of the LEC – see J. Cripps, 'NSW Attorney General's Working Party Report (Majority Report)'
(NSW Government, 2001) . The Majority Report of the Working Party published in September 2001 (at
12) notes that of the 48% of cases actually adjudicated between 1996 and October 2000 56% of appeals
were upheld and 44% were dismissed, hardly a bias in favour of developers. The most recently published
annual 2009 Annual Report (published 24 August 2010) notes (at 28) that matters in classes 1,2 & 3
‘comprised 76% of the Court’s finalised workload.’ No figures are published as to the results in class 1
appeal as to percentage appeals upheld or dismissed.
140
Pearson and Williams, above n 103, 25. According to Pearson and Williams:
‘Class 1 merit appeals are lodged in only a small percentage of the development determinations
made across New South Wales. In 2006/2007, there were 111,194 local development
determinations, which included 86,287 development applications determined by councils, 14,386
modifications of development consents under s96 of the EP&A Act, and 11,241 complying
certificates. Only 3% of development applications were refused.’
141
I H Burnley, 'Immigration and housing in an emerging global city, Sydney, Australia' (2005) 23(3)
Urban Policy and Research 329, 337. Burnley notes in the years following 1980, ‘the State Government
promulgated urban consolidation policies, requiring all 43 municipalities in Sydney to construct a
proportion of redevelopment and new allotments as medium density.’
142
Willey, above n 137, 386. Willey is also of the view that the existence of third party appeals compels
the developer to engage with the community ‘more fully, legitimately and sincerely.’
143
P.Woods, NSW Attorney General’s Working Party Report, 2001 (minority report), 5:
‘Councils, in association with their citizens should be the sole determinates of merit in relation to
development applications, as they are democratically accountable to local communities for the
decisions they make. … I believe that the current system of merit appeals in the Land &
Environment Court is undemocratic. This is not a ‘perception’, rather it is a reality.’
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6.4

Is a Participatory Culture Possible in New South Wales?

Social change is continuing.144 New institutions will need to emerge to accommodate ‘dissent,
or manipulation and frustration.’145At a demographic level, it is forecast that our cities will need
to accommodate millions more people.146 Mackay argues that we presently live in an age of
discontinuity that is making us realise that:
‘[W]e are social creatures who thrive on the sense of belonging to a community, ... no
matter how connected we may feel in other ways, there is a special meaning of
“community” that relies on locality.’147

In this local sphere, as Chen suggests, ‘our life is still governed by domestic political structures
and domestic legal systems.’148 In an era of monitory democracy, will planning policy and the
prospect of a new planning system be the impetus for a new democratic moment?149 A
‘republican moment’, when the legislative imperative shifts from just to paying lip service to the
democratic ideal, to creating a socially inclusive mechanism that confers a right to participate
both at the plan making and at the application decision moment. Whilst such a social change to
create a participatory culture is possible,150 history suggests that it is unlikely to occur.151
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Paul Jenkins, 'Space, Place and Territory: An Analytical Framework' in Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins
(eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005) 19, 24. As Jenkins suggests:
‘Although likely to change in future, the competition and the associated deconstruction and
reconstruction of place identities in the past 50 years have been greatest in urban areas.’
145
Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005), 49. Hague
argues that: ‘Participation can be a new channel for political action, bypassing the clogged traditional
arteries of traditional representative democracy.’
146
From the perspective of demography, Clive Hamilton, 'Population debate misses the facts', Sydney
Morning Herald (Sydney ), 19 April 2010, suggests that the population debate is the ‘grand delusion.’
Hamilton believes that great waves of internal migration caused by climate change will mean ‘many more
people squeezed into an ever-shrinking patchwork of liveable areas.’ Do the people have a say in that?
147
Hugh Mackay, Advance Australia ... where? : how we've changed, why we've changed, and what will
happen next (2007), 10, 286-7. Mackay suggests that ‘there is a strong intuitive sense that we need to feel
part of the local neighbourhood we actually live in.’ This is strongly suggestive of umwelt.
148
J Chen, GV Puig and G Walker, 'The Human Face in Legal Globalisation: Tensions and
Contradictions' (Paper presented at the Conference on Globalisation, Law and Justice, University of
Western Australia, October, 2006), 5.
149
A Bora and H Hausendorf, 'Participatory science governance revisited: normative expectations versus
empirical evidence' (2006) 33(7) Science and Public Policy 478, 481. As Bora and Hausendorf argue,
participatory mechanisms, from a normative perspective, are ‘intended to improve citizenship.’
150
Sharp, above n 74, 21. Sharp observed that there are three important factors: ‘1) the relative desire of
the populace to impose limits on the government’s power; 2) the relative strength of the subject’s
independent organisations and institutions to withdraw collectively from the sources of power; and 3) the
population’s relative ability to whithold their consent and assistance.’ (emphasis in original)
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Moore, above n 52, 398. Moore concludes his book with the observation:
‘Australia’s leaders across the political spectrum have indulged a national talent for bureaucracy
building and managerial surveillance – an illiberal tendency in our public life that is perhaps a
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6.4.1

Bureaucracy or Participation?

To affect the current play of power in land use planning, there will need to be a struggle. As
McAuslan identifies, legislation is necessary to formalise ‘separate and independent’
mechanisms which facilitate genuine public participation in land use planning processes.152 As
Keane has demonstrated, representative democracy emerged from the struggles of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century despite the best efforts of the ruling elite who ‘fought tooth
and claw’ to prevent it from occurring.153 It is here posited that the same will be true of attempts
by the people to wrest control over planning decisions to empower local communities to
determine the nature of development in the neighbourhood.154

As can be seen from the discussion in chapter 5, political and economic processes have
conspired to ensure that the bureaucratic and not participatory model prevails. Brown and
Sherrard recognised in the 1960s that it is the ‘powerful social and economic forces’ at work in
society that shape the physical urban form.155 Nothing much has changed since. Gleeson and
Low suggest that the government has continued to listen ‘to a narrow range of constantly
mobilised economic powers.’156 It has excluded the voice of the people.157 Even though it
appears clear that the present planning system, based as it is on the ideology of the public

colonial hangover from the vast convict apparatus erected on our shores to catalogue, control and
coerce human beings.’
152
McAuslan, above n 4, 20:
‘A statute whose ideology on this matter was that of participation would provide for the
participation in such a way that the right of the public to participate was separate and
independent from the bodies whose proposals and plans were to be the subject of participation.’
153

Keane, above n 33, 169. The cause of the people was invoked by both sides in the
struggle but only in terms of who was best placed to rule over the people.
154

As Peter Williams, 'Government, People and Politics' in Susan Thompson (ed), Planning Australia
(2007) , 46, notes:
‘Achieving a balance between crucial public policy outcomes and the public consultation and
participation processes that ideally should accompany them is therefore likely to be an ongoing
challenge for both governance and planning in Australia.’
155
AJ Brown and HM Sherrard, Town and Country Planning (1959), 9:
‘Powerful social and economic forces constantly at work in a changing world shape the physical town
into a certain mould directly reflecting those changes.’
156
Gleeson and Low, above n 3, 153.
157
D. Maher, 'Friendless and Furious: Ku-ring-gai fights for life', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 1920 September 2009, 10. Maher, commenting on the resentment caused by the infliction of state urban
consolidation policy on the affluent north shore suburbs over community objection, noted that:
‘So much antagonism built up across Sydney that Nick Greiner in 1988 and Bob Carr in 1995
both came to power with the mantra that planning was to be handed back to the people.’ But he
then suggests that ‘such promises are rarely kept in Sydney.’
The specific policies as to how planning was to be handed back were never articulated. Nor was either
government’s intention to increase urban density. Maher notes that upon being elected in 1995, Carr
subsequently ‘decreed that half a million new “dwellings” were to be inserted into the city’s suburbs.’
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interest, has failed of its purposes,158 this does not mean that the state will cede the power of
control over the planning system to either private interests or the people. At the level of the
neighbourhood, the state does not believe that the collective wish of the individuals in the
locality could inform planning policy and decision-making in relation to the development of the
umwelt of the neighbourhood. The state remains firmly of the view that it, and not the people, is
best placed to determine what development is in the public interest.159 When it comes to
planning for the neighbourhood, like the citizens of Rome described in chapter three, the
citizens of New South Wales live in a civic culture where they are citizens in name but without
power. Neither major political party in New South Wales has articulated a willingness to depart
from the ‘status quo’ being the ideology of the public interest.160 It is again apparent, as it was in
1974, that there is bi-partisan agreement about the need to reform the planning system. But to
create legislation based on the ideology of public participation would require a paradigm shift in
strategy towards open government in circumstances where there is insufficient pressure from the
people for this to occur. Accordingly, any reform of the planning system is unlikely to accord
anything more than lip service to genuine participatory models.

6.4.2

Displacing the Ratepayer Ideology

The absence of a civic culture in New South Wales is the complicating factor which feeds into
the planning system. It has created a situation where the citizens of the locality in which
development is to occur lack the power to influence the decision-maker both at the plan making
and development assessment levels.161 In 2008 the government was confident enough in its
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As the Standing Committee Report , above n 10, 27, concluded, ‘there was consistent support for a
complete review and overhaul of the current legislation.’
159
Josephine Tovey, 'Mayors boo Premier over takeover of planning laws', Sydney Morning Herald
(Sydney), 26 October 2010, 2. During an address to the Local Government and Shires Association
Conference at Albury the Premier Kristina Keneally, to boos from the assemblage said:
‘The promise of handing planning powers back to local community may sound desirable, but
under the surface what does it mean? It means a great deal more work for local government. I
hear nothing about more funding or more resources to support that workload.’
It is a remarkable insight into the mind of the government. It signifies a steadfast refusal to contemplate
resourcing the community to participate in the planning process.
160
McAuslan, above n 4, 268-9. The status quo being ‘the existing state of property relations in society,
the existing capitalist system with its emphasis on private property and a functioning market for that
property.’ McAuslan suggests that ‘the ideologies of public interest and private property are the
ideologies of the status quo.’ The ideology of public participation is ‘the ideology of opposition to the
status quo.’
161
William M Rohe and Lauren B Gates, Planning with Neighbourhoods (1985), 56-57 argue that
allowing participation enables citizens to control the agenda. They note that:
‘Controlling the agenda is an important source of power that has traditionally been denied
neighbourhood groups in the dealings with public officials on planning issues. Within the
context of neighbourhood planning, [neighbourhood planning programmes allow] citizens …
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power to fashion the planning system to its design. It removed the role of local government in
determining applications for development thereby removing the last vestige of influence. It is
arguable, following the 2008 reforms, that New South Wales is now descending the Arnstein
ladder of participation towards the zone of manipulation, a socially destructive zone.162
Governments do not share power unless pressure is applied by the people.163 There is a
difference between the changing of governments with similar ideologies at an election and
change which results in a different style of governance. This suggests that in the context of land
use planning, the real difficulty confronting the people of New South Wales is whether or not,
collectively, the ratepayer ideology can be displaced. That will require a real shift in the
gemeinschaft of the people.164

To date, there is no evidence to suggest that the people will mobilise sufficiently to allow
genuine protest to foment into political pressure for legislative change.165 Both Andrews166 and
Edwards167 reference Putnam’s 1993 work, Making Democracy Work, as indicating that before
a civic culture can exist in a society, there needs to be a culture of political participation, an
associational life among citizens and interpersonal trust between citizens. It was Tocqueville
that observed in the nineteenth century that it is through civil associations that people come to
feel that they are citizens.168 In Mannheim’s view, it is necessary for the citizenry to be

opportunities to develop and recommend their own projects and raise their own concerns rather
than simply respond to those identified by planners.’
162
Socially exclusive dynamics are destructive of social happiness. M. Bagaric and J. McConvill,
'Goodbye Justice, Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive Psychology to the Law' (2005) 10(1) Deakin
Law Review 1, 10. Bagaric et al suggest that:
‘Involvement and a sense of contribution and control over the activities that impact on one’s life
are key ingredients to a sense of well-being. The connection between participation, control and
happiness manifests in many sorts of domains.’
163
As AJ Brown, 'Regional Governance and Regionalism in Australia' in Robyn Eversole and John
Martin (eds), Participation and Governance in Regional Development (2005) , 17, notes:
‘Yet at the levels of state and federal governments, where the bulk of political power and public
financial resources are held, the in-principle commitment [to participation] translates into a very
different reality.’
164
McAuslan, above n 4, 273, citing Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, OPUS 83,
OUP (1977), suggests that to move to what Macpherson terms as ‘participatory democracy,’ it is
necessary for there to be:
‘a change in people’s consciousness (or unconsciousness) from seeing themselves and acting as
essentially consumers to seeing themselves and acting as exerters and enjoyers of the exertion
and development of their own capacities.’
165
David Humphries, 'Winning over a tough crowd ', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney ), 29 August 2010,
1. Humphries argues that:
‘Without vigorously judging national need and scrutinizing parliamentary and executive
outcomes, voters get governments they deserve. Equally, without facilitating scrutiny and by
keeping voters in the mushroom club, governments get the people they deserve.’
166
R. Andrews, 'Civic culture and public service failure: An empirical exploration' (2007) 44 Urban
Studies 845.
167
Edwards, above n 40.
168
Keane, above n 33, 308.
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motivated by this ‘democratic personality.’169 As Sharp observes, ‘these centres of power
provide the institutional bases from which the population can exert pressure or can resist
dictatorial controls.’170
In New South Wales, political participation is low.171 The people of New South Wales may have
a well developed associational life, but that associational life is not directed, in the main, to the
business of politics.172 Whilst a generalisation, it can also be argued that there is amongst the
people interpersonal trust by reason of the nature of the polity in New South Wales. However,
this generalisation does mean that there is interpersonal trust between the people and their
politicians.173 To the contrary, there appears to be a significant disconnect between these
spheres.174 Structurally, at the surface level of discourse between the government and the
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Mannheim, above n 19, 231:
‘[W]e may say that a society is democratic only so long as its members, consciously or
unconsciously, are motivated by the ideal of democratic personality and try to abide by this
ideal.’
170
Sharp, above n 74, 22.
171
As Cavalier, above n 49, 47, notes: ‘over the past decade, over 100 ALP branches have folded in New
South Wales. … Many branches are phantoms or paper frauds.’ This supports Leigh’s observation, above
n 57, 54-5 that:
‘politics is something other people do. According to the Australian Electoral Study, 24 per cent
[of people] contacted a politician in the past five years, 13 per cent had attended a demonstration
or protest march, and 24 per cent had worked together with people who shared their concern.’
172
Leigh, ibid 59. Leigh suggests that the ‘wave of civic creativity’ post World War II has ebbed. He
notes that in the 1960s, 33 per cent of Australians were members of a community association, but this
participation rate has fallen to 18 per cent by the mid 2000s. Similarly, the share of the population
involved in politics has declined, but from a much smaller base. Once again the high point was in the post
war period when the major parties approached a membership above one percent of the total population in
the 1960s, declining to less than half of one percent now. Cavalier, above n 49, 48, suggests that a reason
for the disconnect, in relation to the Labor party, is because:
‘Ordinary Australians wanting to be politically active – and not seeking a material reward –
cannot be bothered with an organisation [Labor] which they have no prospect of influencing in
any worthwhile way.’
Salt attributes the disconnect to the rise of a new ‘individualism.’ Bernard Salt, 'It's all about me: the rise
and rise of individualism', The Australian (Sydney), 2011, 33. That is:
‘What I am referring to is the rise of what might be termed individualism over collectivism. This
is the idea that our world view has shifted from the need to play a minor part in a bigger society
to the view society, and pretty much everything else, should revolve around us.’
173
This is the conclusion of the EDO 2010 Report, above n 3, 3; See also Wiseman, above n 3, 59.
Wiseman suggests that there is now a widely documented fall in the levels of trust; Lawson and Gleeson’s
comment, above n 95, 83, that ‘citizens have become increasingly active and highly mistrustful of
government’; Mark Findlay, 'ICAC now little more than a last resort', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney),
10 September 2009, 11 : ‘Neither has [ICAC] succeeded in overcoming public suspicion that it is
business as usual in Macquarie Street’; and Leigh, above n 57, 52: ‘Across 16 other developed countries,
an average of 43 per cent of respondents expressed confidence in their national parliament. In Australia,
only 31 per cent did so. … as the trust data demonstrate, Australian’s commitment to democratic politics
is lukewarm’; all these observations support this conclusion.
174
Mackay, above n 147, 312, ‘esteem for politics and politicians is so low – partly reflected in declining
membership of political parties, and partly in scathing attitudes towards politics in the wider community –
that something has to change.’ See also Harry Smith, 'Place Identity and Participation' in Cliff Hague and
Paul Jenkins (eds), Place Identity, Participation and Planning (2005) 39, 51. Smith cites international
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people, a communicative deficit has emerged.175 Lacking the necessary participatory
mechanisms, the government is unable to engage the people.176 Arguably, land use policy
presently occurs by the decree of the executive.177

6.4.3

A Revolution in Local Government?

The logical mechanism to create a participatory culture in the making of planning policy and in
development decision-making would be the existing local government structures. This has been
recognised since Tocqueville first considered how to find the way to protect liberty when the
mob demonstrated ‘a willingness to place themselves under the tyranny of the majority.’178 In
local government is found the representative democratic bodies that can facilitate participation.
This approach is supported by social commentators.179 It is consistent with the identified shift of
local government away from strictly infrastructure needs to the provision of ‘human services’.180
That shift began when councils were given the central role in land use planning under Part XIIA
of the Local Government Act, 1919 in the 1960s.

research, (Jenkins, Kirk and Smith, 2002), which ‘revealed the widespread the widespread alienation of
the public in relation to government, which affects planning as it is de facto perceived as a government
activity.’
175
Bora and Hausendorf, above n 149, 482.
176
As the Director General of Planning, Mr Haddad acknowledged to the Standing Committee, above n
10, 89, whilst the community was active to engage the processes at the development application stage,
‘we are not getting the level of engagement’ at the strategic planning stage. As to why, the best he could
advance was that ‘it is an area of ongoing thinking. It is a challenge.’
177
Evidenced by the strident opposition to the Part 3A processes in the EP&A Act (now repealed).
178
Manning Clark, above n 54, 213. As Manning Clarke notes:
‘The remedies Tocqueville prescribed were: indirect election to increase the number of
conservatives in the central house of assembly; local government to give men practice in and
induce a taste for participation in public life; a federal constitution, because it combined the
advantages of a powerful central government with protection of liberty by the division of
legislative and executive powers, and the rights of property by built-in constitutional checks on
radicalism; religious education so that citizens might know what was “good and just”.’
179
Ahmed, above n 112, 11 suggests that:
‘Local government’s great strength lies in its proximity to the people. It is the most transparent,
responsive and accountable form of democracy we have.’ … ‘It is the most accessible form of
democracy, for candidates and for citizens.’
See also Mike Geddes, 'International Perspectives and Policy Issues' in Paul Smyth, T Reddel and
Andrew Jones (eds), Community and Local Governance in Australia (2005) 26-7. Geddes recognises that
‘excessive centralisation saps morale at a local level.’ He suggests other models which include an
Arnstein ‘partnership’ model to mobilise local capacities. But he doubts the prospects for success to have
them implemented as ‘there seems to be few signs that this more optimistic agenda, attractive as it may be
locally, is having much purchase centrally.’
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Andrew H. Kelly and Natalie P. Stoianoff, 'Biodiversity conservation, local government finance and
differential rates : the good, the bad and the potentially attractive' (2009) 26(1) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 5, 7.
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It is a view supported by academics advancing the third way. As Smith observes, ‘the end of
class politics does not mean that the market alone shapes place identities and territory.’181 The
difficulty is that local government lacks the support of the people.182 It also lacks a funding base
to enable it to adequately perform the task.183 Cherry provides an illuminating insight into the
different cultures that existed in England as compared to Australia. In England the people had
been ‘conditioned’ to local government.184 In contrast, no such conditioning occurred in
Australia because the colonial elites feared losing power.185 But the people have themselves to
blame. As Hirst notes, ‘Australia is very democratic, but Australians have little regard for their
democratic government.’186 Larcombe, Halligan and Paris, Kelly and others have demonstrated
that in Australia, there was strong opposition to municipalisation and to any form of land
taxation. Larcombe cites public apathy towards local government as the reason why the state
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Smith, above n 173, 47.
Larcombe, above n 128, 1. Larcombe also condemns the successive failures of colonial and state
governments to provide constructive leadership. In Larcombe’s view, the leadership of government has
been poor. He believes that ‘apathy has reduced vitally both popular interest and participation in
government. The state, meanwhile, has become adept at taking advantage of this circular problem to
tamper with local government politically and to damage its prestige.’ Ahmed, above n 108, captures the
reality confronting the implementation of reform: ‘Unlike our Anglo-American cousins, local government
in Australia has no firm roots. It rose haphazardly, lacks real authority and regularly endures corruption
scandals.
183
Kelly and Stoianoff, above n 180, 8. As Kelly and Stoianoff note:
‘In view of the increasing functional burden, local government is becoming a legless horse, or at
least a horse doing its best to remain standing.’
History continues to repeat itself. AJC Mayne, Fever, Squalor and Vice: Sanitation and Social Policy in
Victorian Sydney (1982), 47 cites the comment of the City Solicitor, Richard Driver, to the NSW
parliament in 1879 who was frustrated at the inability of the city council to address public health issues.
Iin his view, the council was ‘crippled for want of power and money.’ Mayne attributes these frustrations
to ‘basis inadequacies in the framework of municipal administration set down by parliament.’
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G Cherry, The Politics of Town Planning (1982), 62-3. Commenting on the reforms enacted by the
Housing and Town Planning Act, 1909 (UK), Cherry notes:
‘Had local government been weaker, and had not the spirit of local democracy been built into
effective machineries of government at this level, British town planning would have followed a
different course. The benevolent guiding hand of a local Council was a sure rock on which town
planning could rest.’
McAuslan, above n 4, 238-245, suggests that following the reorganisation of Local Government in 1972,
local government in Britain changed. He suggests that the impact of the reform process tended:
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Brown, above n 163, 23. As Brown notes, the development of local government was retarded ‘by
resistance from colonial elites who saw local government as a threat to their own influence.’
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Hirst, above n 51, 19. However, there may be evidence that Keane’s monitory democracy is impacting
the polity. Paul Bibby, 'People Power Teams', Sun Herald (Sydney), 13 December 2009, 26, cites James
Goodwin from the Department of Social and Political Change at the University of Technology, Sydney as
observing that the modern approach of resident groups opposed to development ‘utilising social
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter to raise awareness and keep the community engaged’ as
operating at a new level of sophistication which is ‘natural and normal for people now, which it wasn’t
five to 10 years ago.’
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government became ‘adept at taking advantage’ of the political discourse to diminish the role
and function of local government.187

It was opposition to participation that defeated successive legislative initiatives to introduce
local government structures.188 As a consequence local government in Australia represents,
according to Kelly and Stoianoff, one of the weakest municipal systems throughout the
developed world.’189 Because of apathy, the private property ideology is resurgent. Apathy is
the antithesis of revolution.190 Left to the ravages of the market, the people may find themselves
once again living in slums like their counterparts of Roman civilization and England discussed
in chapters 3 and 4.191 It took only a hundred years of development for Sydney to create its own
version.192
Planning laws have no inherent social or moral content (although the contrary is arguable).193
Planning laws are simply a function of political power. Government assumes that it, and not the
market or the people, is best placed to make the necessary strategic decisions.194 If there is to be
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and environmental, and shared similar responses to those problems. … the last decades of the
nineteenth century were a period absorbed by the dilemma of how best to overcome the
combined health and social problems associated with mass urban living.’
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Sheehan and Garrick, above n 32, 6. Sheehan, citing Lord Devlin (1977), argues that:
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see Mark Pennington, 'Citizen Participation, the 'Knowledge Problem' and Urban Land Use Planning'
(2004) 17(2-3) Review of Austrian Economics , 219. Pennington argues that the better way of dealing
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a participatory culture in New South Wales it is clear that it will take leadership from political
parties to both create and foster it.195 It is true, as Hirst suggests, that in theory governments ‘can
do anything.’196 But expecting government to share power with the people is perhaps asking too
much.

The ideation that the people of New South Wales are the government is a radical ideology. The
1970s was the last time when the state would explore the possibilities for participatory
structures in planning law. This quasi-revolutionary moment occurred because of pressure from
the people.197 Under political threat, the Liberal Askin government would institute a broad
ranging enquiry into the planning system which would result in the ‘green book’ which
advocated ‘public decision-making’ be incorporated into land use planning.198 The power
sharing proposals advocated did not garner enough support to become law. The revolutionary
moment for local government to lead the way passed. Following the 2011 state election the
planning system is poised at the cross-roads again.
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Alessandro Colombo, 'The 'Lombardy Model': Subsidiarity-informed Regional Governance' (2008)
42(2) Social Policy & Administration 177, 183-4. Colombo argues:
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course, it has the responsibility to guarantee equal opportunities, and respect for the rules.’
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Standing Committee Report, above n 10, 21. As the report notes:
‘Prior to the commencement of the EP&A Act, land use planning was dominated by central
government and assisted by technical experts, with limited opportunity for public involvement in
planning. The 1970s saw the outcomes of post war planning being questioned – both the high
rise housing and inner city freeways and the low density suburbanisation, in Australia and
worldwide. At the same time, the rise of resident action groups, movements for social justice and
participation in government, environment and heritage protection and green ban movements in
Sydney and Melbourne, all shaped a new climate for planning.’
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Minister for Planning and Environment, 'Towards A New Planning System for New South Wales'
(NSW Government, 1974) (The Green Book). Discussed above see section 5.5.
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6.5

Conclusion: Should s5(c) be repealed?

Axiomatically, when implementing social policy the government must have a legitimate reason
to interfere with the property rights of the people. Normally that legitimacy would come from
having a mandate to implement a social policy put before the people at the time of an election.
A slogan is not a policy. Empowering local communities means nothing without legislative
force. McAuslan identified three ideologies of planning but not the sequential nature of their
development. The age of the ideology of private property has passed. Whilst neo-liberalism is
making in-roads to public policy decision-making, land use planning remains firmly in the age
of the ideology of public interest. For neo-liberalism to succeed, the government would have to
decide to leave the field of play. It shows no propensity to do so. As for the public, apathy
prevails. In that environment, how likely is it that planning issues will win votes?199 As was
indicated in the introduction, the framing of the thesis of this research as a call to consider the
repeal of section 5(c) of the EP&A Act was deliberate. It brings into relief the issue of whether
or not planning laws should be made to advance the public interest (as interpreted by the
government of the day) or to advance the cause of public participation.

In 1980, McAuslan saw the attempt to conflate in legislation these two mutually exclusive
ideologies as the reason for the ‘confusion and disarray’ in the administration of planning.200
Historical analysis suggests that nothing has changed to alter that view. Until the government is
clear as to its strategy for planning law, the confusion will continue. The examination of the use
of parliamentary power in land use decision-making supports the thesis posed by Arnstein.
Participation is all about ‘citizen power’.201 McAuslan’s formulations of the ideologies of
planning remain valid, though they are best understood as perhaps reflecting a sequential
development of the ideation of governance. McAuslan’s public participation ideology is open to
the observation that it requires for its attainment a parliament that would legislate to create the
mechanism that permits the voice of the people to resonate in the deliberations of the decision-
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The Save Our Suburbs organisation is now the ‘Save Our State’ party at the 2011 State election. It
fielded only two lower house candidates but boasted a team of seventeen in the Legislative Council. As
its website www.saveourstate.org.au at April 2011, explains:
‘The party decided it could no longer ignore the shocking incompetence, sleaze and corruption
shown by the New South Wales Government. Its expanded aspiration became cleaning up
politics in New South Wales.’
It was unsuccessful in its attempt. It did not get sufficient electoral support to gain a seat in the
Legislative Council. Indeed, the ‘No Parking Meters Party’ received almost four times the number of
votes as the Save Our State Party.
200
McAuslan, above n 4, 269.
201
Arnstein above n 21, 216.
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maker. Such a participatory model is yet to see its fulfilment in legislation. All that remains of
the optimistic exhortation of 1945 to ‘make planning democratic,’ is the reference to
participation in the objectives of the EP&A Act. If the purpose of planning law is to promote the
‘efficient’ administration of planning policy, then the legislative scheme should not promote
participation (which is seen to be the anathema to efficiency). Nor should the legislation merely
pay lip service to the concept of participation because that is the cause of confusion. An
invitation to participate is emblematic of democratic processes. The empty rhetoric in section
5(c) of the EP&A Act is meaningless when the legislation is silent as to how participation will
be achieved as a matter of practical and legal reality.202 Under the EP&A Act, the functional
role of the public is only to be consulted; and even then, only when invited.203 This is a role
firmly situated in Arnstein’s realm of tokenism.

If that is the strategy to be adopted by government, then in any reform of the EP&A Act,
Section 5(c) and any reference to participation in the new legislation should be removed.
Omitting such provisions would not deny the people rights that they currently enjoy (because
they do not exist). It would make the EP&A Act more honest in its intent. As Aaron Gadiel of
the Urban Taskforce said in evidence to the Standing Committee in 2009:
‘I think there is a tendency, in dealing with the law legislation, to sort of gloss over the
objects of the Act, saying, “Don’t worry about the statement of principles. Lets us
worry about the substantive provisions.” In some legislation that is okay because the
objects of the Act are not harmful. In the Environment Planning and Assessment Act
they are seriously harmful. They are used as the touchstone every day in the planning
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McAuslan’s sentiment on the meaninglessness of public participation is echoed in the EDO 2010
Report, above n 3, 45, where it is stated:
‘The community must therefore be able to participate in a genuine and meaningful manner in
relation to all aspects of the planning system, ranging from plan-making to development
assessment and post-approval monitoring.’
Uhr, above n 22, 11, references Fiskin’s experiments of 1991 and 1995 described as ‘deliberative
democratic polling.’ He suggests this as a possible device to open the policy process to force ‘elected
policy-makers to account publicly for their decisions to accept or reject various community proposals’ as
a means of creating greater accountability via participatory mechanisms. These mechanisms echo those
outlined in the Green book published by the NSW government in 1974. Until such participatory
mechanisms are legislated, lip service is all that is achieved by the legislative mechanism.
203
This is highlighted by the recent decision of Justice Craig to overturn the Ku-Ring-Gai Town Centres
plan –see Friends of Turramurra Inc v Minister for Planning [2011] NSWLEC 128. The court noted that
there were more than 1800 submissions received in relation to the draft plan. Despite these submissions,
what invalidated the plan was the making of amendments to the draft plan after exhibition by the panel
and the Minister, without referring the amended plan back for exhibition. In the view of the court, the
changes had the effect of making the plan, as made, different in ‘important respects’ thereby vitiating the
plan as a matter of administrative law. Re-exhibition of the plan with those changes would have led to a
validly made plan notwithstanding the submissions. The legal foundation for the challenge would have
been taken away.
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system for public servants, the Land and Environment Court, panels. They are
constantly referred to and cited.’204

It would be lamentable if that is the outcome of any reform. Planning ought not to be the
preserve of central administration. The functional operation of planning laws requires that the
mechanisms for determining planning policy and decision-making reflect ‘the public interest’
and not self-interest of the political elite. Public participation in planning is not antipathetic to
the concept of good planning. However, participation is radical in its ideology. Participatory
mechanisms challenge the status quo. It is more than exercising a ‘veto’ over development that
is to occur in the neighbourhood.205 Participation envisages open, accountable government. It
involves the deliberate selection of the strategy of conscious choice over the abrogation of
decision-making to the unconscious mechanism of the market. To implement participatory
legislation, the government must alter its current strategy and determine that the present
paternalistic approach to the exercise of planning powers should be changed to a model that
favours citizen participation. The government must be prepared to trust the people and not just a
committee of hand picked experts.206 It is recognised that such an approach is inconsistent with
the government’s manifest intention to retain the power over planning within the discretion of
the executive branch of government.207 Without political force (or courage), the current state of
affairs will not be altered.208

Where there is a concentration of power, it can be used ‘despotically’ in the sense that where it
is the state which defines the public interest, those subject to the law may have no recourse to
justice.209 Even where there is a sophisticated legal system, courts cannot make up for an
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Standing Committee Report, above n 10, 35.
2007 Discussion Paper, above n 12, 19:
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Whilst this is the recommendation of the standing committee, there are alternatives. For example,
Wiseman, above n 3, 59-60 suggests that: ‘A world of complex relationships requires learning a great
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businesses – and government – in making and implementing policy.’
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Cavalier, above n 49, 56. Cavalier argues that in New South Wales, the Labor Party has:
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Aroney, above n 134, 219. Aroney cites Lord Acton’s aphorism in support of the argument that when
power is consolidated into the hands of the few, ‘it tends to corrupt.’ Farrelly suggests that the system
created by the former minister Sartor was ‘classic narcissism’ - see Elizabeth Farrelly, 'A plan for more
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absence of laws made to advance the public interest. The role of the court is to uphold the laws
made by the state. This creates a dilemma for the courts.210 Courts are subject to the rule of the
state.211 As Gleeson and Low suggest, in those circumstances, resort to the court places the court
in a position where it must support parliament to ‘control the threat of democracy,’212

St Augustine is attributed with the pithy saying ‘and if justice is left out, what are Kingdoms
except robber barons?’213 Unless the law, at a procedural level, provides a mechanism which
enables those affected by the law to effectively engage the state and thereby to alter the outcome
of a matter under consideration, then the state has taken rights both without consent and without
compensation. Webster and Lai view this type of state action as a violence by the state against
the individual citizen.214 McAuslan argued that a right to participate is meaningless if ‘the
planning authorities [are] able to determine the extent and mode of participation.’215 If that is
correct then the state, by stifling participation, takes from the people a most valuable right, the

‘Construct a system to which you are personally central. Practise the rhythmic giving and
withholding of your beneficence within that system and watch the ripples flow. Ensure that
everybody else in the system has responsibility without power. Then when there are complaints,
blame failures and delays on the total incompetence by which you are surrounded.’
The extent of this power is highlighted in Jano Gibson, Andrew Clennell and Alexandra Smith, 'How
donor's project got Sartor's ear', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 28 February 2008, 1. It was reported
that: ‘The Planning Minister, Frank Sartor, took control of a major Labor Party donor’s $51.7 million
residential development in Burwood shortly before he appointed an independent planning panel to assess
all other similar development in the suburb.’ Subsequently, six ‘major developments personally approved
by former planning minister Frank Sartor’ were referred to ICAC - see Matthew Bens, 'Greens push for
ICAC to review Sartor deals', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 14 September 2008, 1. Ms Hale of the
Greens was quoted as saying: ‘Nearly $900,000 has changed hands between these developers and the
NSW ALP. All of them have received favourable decisions from Mr Sartor or his department, in at least
three cases against independent advice.”’
210
Uhr, above n 22, 75-6. As Uhr says, ‘courts are only permitted to recognise rights which parliament
itself has declared.’
211
As Wiseman, above n 3, 59, suggests:
‘the complex challenges of combining democratic legitimacy, social inclusion, environmental
sustainability and economic prosperity will not be solved by a simplistic faith in competitiveness
– any more than by a simplistic faith in central planning or local self-help.’
212
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213
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have integrity and accountability. As Farrelly argues, see Elizabeth Farrelly, 'Clean up this mess: put
planning on a pedestal ', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 10 September 2009, 11: ‘The answer is not a
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planning outcomes? Bagaric et al, above n 162, 4, have an alternate perspective on justice. They suggest:
‘Happiness is a more relevant and important benchmark than justice because, despite the
thousands of years that have been spent examining the notion of justice, its meaning remains
vague and indeterminate and hence provides little guidance on important issues. Moreover,
justice is less important than happiness. Who needs justice if we are all happy?’
214
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215
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right to determine the nature and extent of development that is to occur in their
neighbourhood.216

Roman civilization is historically acclaimed as a civil society. It operated under market
conditions. But it was an unequal and tyrannical society. It denied the people a voice in its civic
affairs. Nineteenth century England saw a flowering of libertine principles, but it could not be
said to be a democratic society. Patronage and self-interest still ruled in the corridors of power.
There is a difference between governance and participation.217 The successive reforms to the
EP&A Act have entrenched an exclusionary dynamic in the land use planning system of New
South Wales. Until this state of affairs is redressed by law, a tyranny of sorts prevails, at least
that is what media commentators suggest.218
The new government has announced an overhaul of the planning system.219 But to sever the
Gordian knot to create a participatory process the people will need a champion in parliament.220
Like Wilberforce did with slavery, the people need a politician to challenge parliament to
embark on a process of engagement that creates a participatory culture.221 As Kenneth Clark
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It is axiomatic that planning laws override property rights and, in a de facto sense, suggest a taking of
rights. When it comes to assessing the value of the right surrendered, the ‘compensation’ for the taking
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there has been a taking without consent.
217
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Elizabeth Farrelly, 'It's D-day for democracy, developers and design', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney ),
11 June 2008, 11:
‘The removal of legal recourse is packaged as providing cheaper dispute resolution for “mum
and dad developers”. But Sartor has been at war with councils and the Land and Environment
Court since his lord mayoral days. He’s really replacing a system of arbitrators he cannot control
– councillors and judges – with a system of hired consultants, summarily sackable by him, no
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The Hon Brad Hazzard MP, Minister for Planning & Infrastructure, 'Overhaul of the Planning System
Heralds a new era in NSW' (Media Release, 12 July 2011):
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suggests, civil society requires the confidence of the people in the state.222 If the state wants to
give the people confidence that they can participate, then the legislative scheme needs to reflect
that deliberate strategy of government. The task is formidable.223 In order for the powerless to
succeed in this struggle, the mechanisms created by planning laws will need to ensure, as
Gleeson and Low suggest, that the ‘voices which are normally silent are heard.’224

But the corollary to this proposition is that in order for the people to ‘rise up’ they must decide
to actively participate in the affairs of governance. Yes, that may seem like the mob will rule;
but isn’t that the ‘beauty’ of democracy?225 Arnstein argued that power is not given by city hall.
Sharpe posits that the people will have to ‘learn how to take that freedom.’226 The people of
New South Wales await their own republican moment – ‘an extraordinary moment when broad
segments of the public are intensely involved with an issue.’227 If the people of New South
Wales truly want increased opportunities for public involvement and participation in planning,
then they will need to stop blaming politicians.228 The people need to decide to abandon the
rate-payer ideology. They need to become ‘self-conscious citizens.’229
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time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule,
and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control
the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.’
226
Sharp, above n 74, 78:
‘The oft quoted phrase “Freedom is not free” is true. No outside force is coming to give
oppressed people the freedom they so much want. People will have to learn how to take that
freedom themselves. Easy it cannot be.’
227
Faber, above n 221, 66. See also Pope, above n 16, 293:
‘Not only do republican moments upset systems-thinking, they also violate the axiom that ours is
a system of representative government in which, according to Publius and others, the people
have no direct role. During republican moments, social movements exert direct popular power
on governmental and private institutions.’
228
Bentley, above n 190, 17. As Bentley suggests. ‘we need to pay attention to the ways in which the
everyday acts of citizenship contribute to the cumulative possibilities of politics, and to the quality and
transparency of the public domain.’

227

Demanding the repeal of section 5(c) may not be the clarion call, but its repeal will signal that
unless voices are raised, the government will own the neighbourhood and define its umwelt.

229

Hirst, above n 51, 27: ‘Australia still awaits the moment when its natural democrats will become selfconscious citizens.’
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